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Report to the Ranking Democratic Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 
Representatives: 

July 2004: 

AVIATION SAFETY: 

Better Management Controls are Needed to Improve FAA's Safety 
Enforcement and Compliance Efforts: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-646]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-04-646, a report to the Ranking Democratic Member, 
Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:  

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The safety of the nation’s flying public depends, in large part, on 
the aviation industry’s compliance with safety regulations and the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) enforcement of those 
regulations when violations occur. FAA attempts to gain the industry’s 
compliance through enforcement tools, including levying fines and 
suspending or revoking operating certificates, and partnership programs 
that allow participating companies or individuals to self-report 
violations of safety regulations and mitigate or avoid fines or other 
legal actions. 

GAO was asked to assess how FAA uses its enforcement options to 
address noncompliance and what management controls are in place to 
ensure that enforcement efforts and partnership programs result in 
compliance with aviation safety regulations.


What GAO Found: 

FAA relied on administrative actions such as warning notices to close 
most of its enforcement cases—53 percent of the nearly 200,000 
enforcement actions taken during fiscal years 1993 through 2003—and 
closed about 28 percent with legal sanctions, such as fines. The 
administrative actions include those taken in response to violations 
that were self-reported under FAA’s industry partnership programs, 
some of which allow airlines and pilots to self-report violations 
that, in many cases, FAA then closes administratively. In addition, 
when FAA managers recommend legal sanctions, they are often reduced by 
FAA legal counsel staff. For example, FAA managers recommended fines 
totaling about $334 million for fiscal years 1993-2003; that amount was 
subsequently reduced to about $162 million. According to FAA, it 
reduces or eliminates the sanctions when it has proof that the violator 
is attempting to correct the violation or new evidence arises that may 
exonerate the alleged violator. Annually, FAA closed about 3,200 cases 
(about 18 percent of the total cases) without taking action. Cases 
were often closed in this manner because the investigative reports 
prepared by inspectors who initially identified the possible 
violations lacked sufficient evidence, according to FAA.

FAA has established some management controls over its enforcement 
efforts and partnership programs, such as guidance on detecting 
violations, but lacks management controls in other areas. Specifically, 
FAA lacks explicit, measurable performance goals for its enforcement 
actions and partnership programs. In addition, FAA does not evaluate 
its enforcement efforts and partnership programs. Because FAA has not 
evaluated the effect of its enforcement actions, it is not possible to 
tell whether those actions have had a deterrent effect on future 
violations. FAA is limited in its ability to evaluate enforcement 
efforts because the agency lacks comprehensive nationwide data. For 
example, FAA field offices maintain independent, site-specific 
databases on enforcement cases because of missing or incomplete 
information in the nationwide Enforcement Information System database, 
but these databases are not linked. Thus, data maintained in one 
office are not readily available to other offices.

Number of Closed Enforcement Cases: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that FAA develop evaluative processes for its 
enforcement efforts and partnership programs and use them to create 
performance goals, track performance towards those goals, and determine 
appropriate program changes. GAO also recommends that FAA improve the 
completeness of information in the nationwide enforcement database. 
FAA agreed with these recommendations and provided comments on general 
areas covered in the report. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-646.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud at 
(202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

FAA Resolved Most Enforcement Cases Administratively and Often Reduced 
Penalties: 

FAA Has Established Some Management Controls Over Its Enforcement and 
Partnership Efforts but Lacks Processes to Measure Their Impact: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Data Analyses: 

Management Controls: 

Appendix II: Description of FAA's Partnership Programs: 

Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP): 

Aviation Safety Reporting Program (ASRP): 

Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA): 

Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP): 

Appendix III: Additional Data Analyses: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: FAA Program Offices and Inspection Responsibilities and 
Resources: 

Table 2: Maximum Fines for Violations, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Table 3: Total Amounts of Recommended Fines and Final Fines and Final 
Fine as a Percentage of Recommended Fine, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Table 4: Regions' Recommended Fines and Final Fines for Selected 
Entities, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Table 5: Regions' Recommended Certificate Suspension and Final 
Certificate Suspension for Selected Types of Violators, Fiscal Years 
1993-2003: 

Table 6: Examples of Fine Reductions that Lack Explanations in EIS: 

Table 7: FAA Offices Where We Conducted Interviews: 

Table 8: Selected Internal Control Standards Used to Assess Enforcement 
Activities: 

Table 9: Selected Internal Control Standards Used to Assess Partnership 
Programs: 

Table 10: Number and Percentage of Enforcement Sanctions Resolved with 
Administrative Actions, Legal Sanctions, and No Action, for Cases 
Closed during Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Table 11: Types of Enforcement Cases against Violators, Fiscal Years 
1993-2003: 

Table 12: Number and Percentage of Enforcement Actions Resolved with 
Administrative Actions, Legal Sanctions, and No Actions by Region, for 
Cases Closed during Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Table 13: Total Number and Percentage of Closed Enforcement Cases for 
Which Regions Recommended Legal Sanctions, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: FAA's Enforcement Process: 

Figure 2: Number of Closed Administrative Actions, Legal Actions, and 
No Actions, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Figure 3: Number of Administrative Actions Recorded in EIS as Self-
reported Cases, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Figure 4: Average Number of Days to Process Enforcement Cases and Number 
of Attorneys, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Abbreviations: 

ASAP: Aviation Safety Action Program: 

ASRP: Aviation Safety Reporting Program: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

EIS: Enforcement Information System: 

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FOQA: Flight Operational Quality Assurance: 

GAO: General Accounting Office: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

VDRP: Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program: 

Letter July 6, 2004: 

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio: 
Ranking Democratic Member: 
Subcommittee on Aviation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. DeFazio: 

The safety of the nation's flying public depends, in large part, on the 
aviation industry's compliance with safety regulations and the Federal 
Aviation Administration's (FAA) enforcement of those regulations when 
violations occur. FAA has a variety of enforcement tools that it may 
use to respond to violations including administrative actions (such as 
issuing a warning notice or a letter of correction that includes the 
corrective actions the violator will take) and legal sanctions (such as 
levying a fine or suspending or revoking a pilot or other FAA-issued 
certificate). FAA plans to revise how it uses these enforcement tools 
over the next several years to target the type of enforcement actions 
so that they will be based on an assessment of the intent of the 
violator and the risks to safety.

Since 1990, FAA has emphasized gaining compliance from the aviation 
industry through cooperative means. One way that FAA focuses on 
industry cooperation is through partnership programs with the aviation 
community that allow participants, such as airlines and pilots, to 
self-report violations of safety regulations and help identify safety 
deficiencies, and potentially mitigate or avoid fines or other legal 
action.

This report responds to your request for information on FAA's 
enforcement actions and partnership programs. Specifically, we are 
reporting on: (1) How has FAA used its various enforcement options over 
the last decade to address noncompliance? and (2) To what extent has 
FAA established management controls, including measuring and monitoring 
performance, for its enforcement activities and partnership programs?

To address these questions, we obtained and analyzed data from FAA's 
computerized enforcement database--the Enforcement Information System 
(EIS)--for enforcement cases closed during fiscal years 1993 through 
2003. We conducted a reliability assessment of the EIS data and 
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the types of 
analyses that we performed for this report--analyses of nationwide 
trends on the amounts and types of recommended actions and final 
sanctions, the types of violations, and the time required for 
resolution. Using the federal government's guides for management 
controls at federal agencies[Footnote 1] and guidance from specialists 
in GAO who assess those controls, we selected control standards that 
are relevant to the types of enforcement activities and partnership 
programs that FAA administers and assessed whether FAA had these 
controls in place. These controls include standards such as having 
measurable performance goals and indicators for programs, monitoring 
programs, and having adequate controls over information processing and 
systems. We obtained information on FAA's enforcement process, 
partnership programs, and management controls through interviews with 
program offices that conduct enforcement and compliance activities, 
FAA's Office of Chief Counsel, aviation industry organizations, and 
union officials who represent FAA inspectors and by reviewing agency 
guidance and orders on enforcement efforts and partnership programs. 
(See app. I for additional information on our methodology.) We 
conducted our review from April 2003 through July 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief: 

FAA's enforcement efforts and partnership programs are designed to 
promote compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements for 
aviation safety. During fiscal years 1993 through 2003, FAA closed 
nearly 200,000 enforcement cases--using administrative actions (such as 
warning notices) about 53 percent of the time, assessing legal 
sanctions (such as fines) about 28 percent of the time, and closing 18 
percent with no enforcement action. The initial decisions to use either 
administrative actions or legal sanctions are based, in large part, on 
the judgment of FAA inspectors. Inspector recommendations for 
enforcement actions are reviewed by management in the appropriate 
regional or program office; administrative actions receive no further 
review, but recommendations for legal sanctions are also reviewed by 
FAA's legal counsel. The type and amount of sanction or administrative 
action can be changed anywhere within the review process. FAA's use of 
administrative actions reflects, in part, the agency's emphasis on 
using alternatives to legal enforcement in certain circumstances. The 
administrative actions include those taken in response to violations 
that were self-reported under two of FAA's industry partnership 
programs--the Voluntary Disclosure Program and the Aviation Safety 
Action Program. To encourage the aviation community's participation in 
these two programs, FAA allows participants to self-report violations, 
which, in certain cases, FAA then closes with administrative actions. 
In addition, when FAA resolved cases with legal sanctions, FAA's legal 
staff generally reduced the penalties--fines or duration of operating 
certificate suspension--recommended by program management. For 
example, during fiscal years 1993 through 2003, program management 
recommended fining entities and individuals a total of about $334 
million, but legal counsel staff subsequently reduced that amount to a 
total of about $162 million. FAA cited several reasons for reducing or 
eliminating sanctions, including proof that the violator was making a 
good faith attempt to correct the violation or indicate mitigating 
circumstances, new evidence that might exonerate the alleged violator, 
and to resolve cases without litigation. Finally, from fiscal years 
1993 through 2003, FAA closed about 3,200 cases annually (about 18 
percent of all cases) without taking action. In about two-thirds of 
those cases management recommended no action after reviewing the 
inspector's initial report. The reasons most often cited by FAA for 
closing the cases in such a manner was that investigative reports 
submitted by inspectors did not contain sufficient evidence to support 
the allegation of noncompliance of safety regulations or that no 
violation occurred.

FAA has established some management controls over its enforcement 
efforts and partnership programs, but it lacks controls to measure and 
evaluate performance. For instance, FAA has controls in the form of 
guidance for inspectors and managers on detecting violations of safety 
regulations and procedures to track actions to correct violations and 
to track actions taken to correct safety incidents reported under the 
partnership programs. However, FAA lacks performance goals and measures 
for its enforcement efforts and partnership programs. In addition, FAA 
does not evaluate its enforcement activities and partnership programs 
to determine if stated program goals, such as deterrence of future 
violations, are being achieved. For example, little is known about 
nationwide trends in the types of violations reported under the 
partnership programs or whether systemic, nationwide causes of those 
violations are identified and addressed. Furthermore, FAA's enforcement 
policy calls for inspectors and regional counsels to recommend or 
assess enforcement sanctions that would potentially deter future 
violations. However, the agency's practice of generally closing cases 
with administrative actions rather than legal sanctions and often 
reducing the amount of the fines is at odds with that policy and may 
reduce any deterrent effect that would be expected from sanctions. 
Moreover, FAA enforcement guidance indicates that increases in 
noncompliance with particular regulations may require an evaluation of 
the sufficiency of sanctions in order to determine if FAA's sanction 
policy is providing an effective deterrent and if changes to that 
policy are warranted. Because FAA has not evaluated the impact of its 
enforcement efforts, it is not possible to tell whether past 
enforcement sanctions have had a deterrent effect. In addition, FAA 
lacks a useful nationwide database to measure and evaluate enforcement 
activities. FAA inspection offices maintain independent, site-specific 
databases because they do not find the nationwide enforcement database-
-the EIS--user friendly or useful because of missing or incomplete 
historical information about enforcement cases. As a result of 
incomplete data on individual cases, FAA inspectors lack the complete 
compliance history of violators when assessing sanctions. For example, 
FAA regularly expunges the identity of individuals who committed 
violations from the national database. Later in fiscal year 2004, FAA 
plans to examine problems with the database and identify possible 
solutions.

Because FAA is responsible for ensuring that management controls are an 
integral part of its operations and that risks to aviation safety are 
identified and dealt with, we recommend that the agency develop 
evaluative processes for its enforcement activities and partnership 
programs and use them to create performance goals, track performance 
towards those goals, and determine appropriate program changes. We also 
recommend that FAA take steps to improve the usefulness of the EIS 
database by enhancing the completeness of enforcement information, such 
as including information on why sanctions are reduced, as part of the 
agency's planned efforts to enhance the database. FAA agreed with these 
recommendations and provided some additional comments on general areas 
covered in this report.

Background: 

FAA's enforcement efforts are designed to promote compliance with 
statutory and regulatory requirements for aviation safety. The agency's 
partnership programs are designed to promote increased safety by 
providing a means for the identification and correction of safety-
related issues, including, but not limited to, possible violations of 
federal regulations. FAA Order 2150.3A, the agencywide compliance and 
enforcement program handbook, sets forth the responsibilities of FAA 
personnel and provides them with guidance on carrying out enforcement 
activities. When violations are identified, the order calls for 
inspectors[Footnote 2] to take the action most appropriate to achieve 
future compliance. The order identifies common violations, assigns 
responsibility to the inspection staff for initially recommending 
appropriate corrective actions, and contains recommended sanctions to 
promote national consistency. These actions range from education and 
remedial efforts, to administrative actions (such as warning notices), 
to punitive legal enforcement.

The enforcement process begins when an FAA inspector has evidence that 
a violation has occurred. An inspector can learn about possible 
violations from a variety of sources, including (1) inspection of 
certificate holders, such as airports, air carriers, aviation 
mechanics, and manufacturers of aircraft and their parts; (2) air 
traffic controllers; and (3) others, such as state and local government 
officials. Nearly 4,200 inspectors in six program offices inspect 
thousands of FAA certificate holders, such as airlines and aircraft 
repair stations and others, such as shippers of hazardous materials. 
Table 1 describes these program offices and the inspectors' 
responsibilities. The purpose of the inspections is to ensure that 
these entities and individuals adhere to FAA safety regulations, to 
detect violations of those regulations so that threats to aviation 
safety can be corrected, and to deter violations by making the entities 
and individuals aware of the possibility that they will be discovered 
and prosecuted.

Table 1: FAA Program Offices and Inspection Responsibilities and 
Resources: 

Program office: Aircraft Certification Service; 
Responsibilities of inspection staff: Inspect all manufacturers 
(aircraft, engines, propellers, parts) and monitor the activities of 
designees who act on FAA's behalf.[A]; 
Number of inspection staff: 666; 
Number of entities inspected: 7,388 (includes 5,615 designees[A] ).

Program office: Flight Standards Service; 
Responsibilities of inspection staff: Monitor the compliance of air 
carriers, repair stations, aircrews, mechanics, and the activities of 
designees who act on FAA's behalf.[A]; 
Number of inspection staff: 3,236; 
Number of entities inspected: 14,210 (includes 1,632 designees).

Program office: Commercial Space Transportation Division; 
Responsibilities of inspection staff: Monitor compliance with licenses 
issued to launch satellites; 
Number of inspection staff: 30; 
Number of entities inspected: 14 launch licensees and 4 launch site 
operators.

Program office: Aerospace Medicine; 
Responsibilities of inspection staff: Oversee the development and 
implementation of employee drug and alcohol testing programs for 
aviation industry employers and monitor the activities of designees 
who act on FAA's behalf.[ A]; 
Number of inspection staff: 40; 
Number of entities inspected: 7,200.

Program office: Airport Safety and Standards; 
Responsibilities of inspection staff: Ensure that airports 
certificated under 14 CFR part 139 comply with the requirements of 
this regulation; 
Number of inspection staff: 35; 
Number of entities inspected: Approximately 575 airports.

Program office: Security and Hazardous Materials; 
Responsibilities of inspection staff: Monitor the transportation of 
hazardous materials. Prior to 2003, when this function was transferred 
to the Department of Homeland Security, inspectors also oversaw the 
security at airports and by U.S. and foreign air carriers; 
Number of inspection staff: 156; 
Number of entities inspected: 1,235.

Total; 
Number of inspection staff: 4,163; 
Number of entities inspected: 30,626 (includes 7,247 designees). 

Source: FAA.

[A] Designees are authorized by FAA to act as its representatives in 
examining, inspecting, and testing persons and aircraft for the purpose 
of issuing airman and aircraft certificates. Designated pilot 
examiners, for example, can accept applications for flight tests, 
conduct those tests, and issue temporary operating certificates to 
pilots. FAA inspectors are required to review and/or inspect the work 
of designees.

[End of table]

When an inspector learns about a possible violation, he or she creates 
a report that describes the violation and recommends an enforcement 
action. Information that identifies the potential violator, the nature 
of the violation, and the recommended enforcement action is entered in 
the EIS database. The initial recommendation to use administrative 
actions (such as warning notices and letters of correction) or legal 
sanctions (such as fines, suspension of operating certificates, and 
revocation of operating certificates) is based on the judgment of the 
inspectors. Administrative actions can be used for any violation if 
several criteria are met--examples of activities that would not qualify 
for administrative actions include flying while intoxicated, 
intentional falsification of information, and reckless or grossly 
careless operation of an aircraft. If the inspector recommends a legal 
sanction, he or she must consult FAA's sanction guidance policy in 
determining the amount of the proposed penalty. The guidance provides 
ranges of civil penalties for a single violation, which vary by entity. 
For example, the civil penalty against an air carrier can range from 
$1,100 to $11,000 for a single violation. The guidance also lists 
violations with a corresponding range of civil penalties for each 
violation. For example, for failure to comply with inspection and 
maintenance overhaul time limitations, FAA guidance calls for a maximum 
penalty of a 7 day suspension of the entity's operating certificate. In 
addition, the guidance lists factors that should be taken into 
consideration in setting sanctions, including the risk to safety, the 
past violation history, the attitude of the alleged violator, and the 
ability of the alleged violator to absorb the sanction.

The inspector's report and proposed enforcement action are reviewed by 
management in the appropriate program office, which may issue an 
administrative action; recommend a legal sanction, which is then 
referred to FAA's legal counsel; or determine that no violation took 
place and close the case with no action.[Footnote 3] In situations 
where proposed penalties are $100,000 or more or involve suspending or 
revoking an entity's certificate, legal counsel in FAA headquarters 
review the penalty. Legal counsel staff are responsible for the 
agency's assessment of any legal sanction. During the period of our 
review--fiscal years 1993 through 2003--cases with fines of $50,000 or 
more were generally referred to the Department of Justice for 
resolution if they could not be settled.[Footnote 4] At any point 
during the review by management and/or legal counsel, the amount and/or 
type of sanction may change or a decision can be made that no action is 
warranted. Once a penalty has been proposed, the entity or individual 
may comply with the penalty (by paying the fine or surrendering its 
certificate) or engage in informal procedures (such as conferences) 
with FAA officials to discuss the case. As a result of information 
obtained during these informal procedures, FAA may decide to change the 
penalty. After these procedures, an entity or individual may comply 
with the penalty or appeal the penalty to an administrative law judge. 
Figure 1 depicts the enforcement process.

Figure 1: FAA's Enforcement Process: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] In December 2003, Congress increased the threshold from $50,000 to 
$400,000. The threshold remained at $50,000 for individuals and small 
businesses.

[End of figure] 

For fiscal years 1993 through 1996, the maximum fine per violation that 
FAA could impose ranged from $1,000 to $25,000 (see table 2). During 
fiscal year 1997, all fines were increased 10 percent to account for 
inflation. In addition, during fiscal year 2002, the maximum fine for 
transporting hazardous materials was increased to $30,000. In December 
2003, Congress increased the maximum fine for other violations to 
$25,000 for certain entities. Because individual enforcement cases may 
include multiple violations, it is possible for violators to be 
assessed fines greater than these maximums.

Table 2: Maximum Fines for Violations, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Violation: General safety violations by companies operating aircraft 
for compensation: 
Maximum penalty: $10,000; 
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1993-1996[A]; 
Maximum penalty: $11,000; 
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1996-2003.

Violation: General safety violations by individuals and small 
businesses: 
Maximum penalty: $1,000; 
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1993-1996[A]; 
Maximum penalty: $1,100;
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1996-2003.

Violation: Transportation of hazardous materials: 
Maximum penalty: $25,000; 
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1993-1996[A]; 
Maximum penalty: $27,500; 
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1996-2002[B]; 
Maximum penalty: $30,000;
Time frame (in fiscal years): 2002-2003.

Violation: Interfering with cabin or flight crew: 
Maximum penalty: $25,000; 
Time frame (in fiscal years): 2000-2003[C].

Violation: Carrying a concealed dangerous weapon: 
Maximum penalty: $10,000; 
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1993-1996[A]; 
Maximum penalty: $11,000;
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1996- 2003.

Violation: Providing false information to an investigation of aircraft 
piracy: 
Maximum penalty: $10,000; 
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1993-1996[A]; 
Maximum penalty: $11,000;
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1996-2003.

Violation: Tampering with a smoke alarm: Maximum penalty: $2,000; 
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1993-1996[A]; 
Maximum penalty: $2,200;
Time frame (in fiscal years): 1996-2003. 

Source: GAO analysis of FAA information.

[A] Fine increased December 20,1996.

[B] Fine increased February 11, 2002.

[C] Fine created in 2000.

[End of table]

FAA's Industry Partnership Programs: 

FAA's "partnership" programs with industry are designed to assist the 
agency in receiving safety information, which includes reports of 
safety violations. According to FAA officials, the Aviation Safety 
Action Program, Aviation Safety Reporting Program, and Voluntary 
Disclosure Program augment FAA's enforcement activities and allow FAA 
to be aware of many more safety incidents than are discovered during 
inspections and surveillance. All violations that FAA learns about 
through the Voluntary Disclosure Program are intended to be processed 
as administrative actions. Violations that are self-reported by 
participants in the Aviation Safety Action Program and FAA was aware of 
through its normal inspection operations are processed as 
administrative actions. When safety violations that have been 
previously reported under the Aviation Safety Reporting Program come to 
the attention of FAA, the agency issues legal sanctions, which are then 
waived. To qualify for any of these three programs, a safety incident 
must not involve such actions as criminal activity, drugs, alcohol, or 
intentional falsification. In addition, the Flight Operational Quality 
Assurance Program, a fourth partnership program, is designed to enhance 
aviation safety through the analysis of digital flight data generated 
during routine flights. Information that FAA learns about through this 
program is generally not used for enforcement. Appendix II describes 
each partnership program.

Management Controls: 

Management controls are the continuous processes and sanctions that 
federal agencies are required by law to use to provide reasonable 
assurance that their goals, objectives, and missions are being met. 
Controls allow organizations to clarify their missions, set strategic 
and annual performance goals, and measure and report on progress toward 
those goals. Several federal laws address the need for agencies and 
programs to have management controls that are appropriate for their 
areas of responsibility.[Footnote 5] The Federal Managers' Financial 
Integrity Act of 1982 further required us to issue standards for 
management controls in government.[Footnote 6] In addition, the Office 
of Management and Budget[Footnote 7] requires federal agencies to 
establish controls for their programs and operations. The standards 
indicate that controls should be an integral part of an agency's 
operations and include a continuous commitment to identifying and 
analyzing relevant risks associated with achieving the agency's 
objectives, establishing a process for verifying and reconciling 
program sanctions, establishing program goals and evaluating outcomes, 
and creating and maintaining related records that provide evidence of 
the execution of these sanctions as well as appropriate documentation.

In 1998, we reported on FAA's inspection and enforcement activities and 
deficiencies that we found in the agency's management controls in such 
areas as detecting and reporting violations and in the usefulness of 
FAA's databases for identifying and targeting enforcement 
resources.[Footnote 8] We made recommendations on how the deficiencies 
could be improved, including improving the databases to identify major 
violations and cases. In response to our recommendations, FAA revised 
its enforcement policy guidance to prioritize enforcement cases, but 
did not further revise the guidance to address how inspectors should 
document all violations. FAA made no revisions to the EIS database in 
response to our recommendations.

FAA Resolved Most Enforcement Cases Administratively and Often Reduced 
Penalties: 

During fiscal years 1993 through 2003, FAA closed about 196,000 
enforcement cases that involved nearly 200,000 enforcement actions 
against entities and individuals.[Footnote 9] Overall, about 53 percent 
of the actions were administrative, such as a warning notice, and 28 
percent were legal sanctions, such as fines or suspension or revocation 
of a certificate. The remaining 18 percent of cases were closed with no 
action being taken by the agency. Most of the violations were security-
related (29 percent), followed by flight operations (21 percent) and 
maintenance (15 percent); the remainder (35 percent) consisted of other 
categories, such as hazardous materials violations; training 
violations, which can involve violations of safety-related instructions 
for pilots, flights attendants, mechanics, and others; and violations 
of airport safety standards. (See app. III for additional information 
on closed enforcement cases.)

The number of closed enforcement actions reached a peak of about 20,500 
actions in fiscal years 2000 and 2001 and has since declined. (See fig. 
2.) In fiscal year 2003, FAA closed about 15,000 enforcement actions, a 
27 percent decline from fiscal year 2000. The drop in actions is due, 
in large part, to the transfer of aviation security cases from FAA to 
the Department of Homeland Security during fiscal year 2002, when 
Homeland Security assumed responsibility for security inspections and 
enforcement. For example, in fiscal year 2001, 28 percent of the 
approximately 20,000 cases involved security violations, and in fiscal 
year 2002, about 23 percent of the enforcement cases involved security. 
By fiscal year 2003, the percentage of security cases had dropped to 
about 2 percent of the closed cases, reflecting the cases that had been 
on-going prior to the transfer of authority to Homeland Security.

Figure 2: Number of Closed Administrative Actions, Legal Actions, and 
No Actions, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

FAA Used Administrative Actions to Close More than Half of the 
Enforcement Cases: 

During fiscal years 1993 through 2003, FAA used administrative actions 
as its primary enforcement tool and provided inspection staff and 
agency reviewers with considerable flexibility as to whether cases are 
processed with administrative or legal actions. Such administrative 
actions can include warning notices to violators or letters of 
correction in which the agency and the violator agree to resolve a 
problem in a specific way. For example, in August 2002, a major airline 
reported that a flight attendant had been suspended by the airline for 
14 days and was to be retrained for allowing a flight to depart with an 
extra passenger in the cabin. According to FAA information, the airline 
"has initiated a separate action to determine how and why 51 passengers 
were boarded on a 50-passenger plane." The issue was resolved a month 
later with a letter of correction from FAA, according to information 
recorded in EIS.

The administrative actions include those taken in response to 
violations that were self-reported under FAA's Voluntary Disclosure 
Program and a small number of violations reported under the Aviation 
Safety Action Program.[Footnote 10] The self-reports include such 
information as a description of the violation, how long it lasted, and 
when it was discovered. To encourage participation in these programs, 
FAA allows some self-reported violations to be closed with 
administrative actions.[Footnote 11] Our analysis of FAA's EIS database 
indicated that individuals and companies in these two partnership 
programs filed 13,603 self-reports, which were processed with 
administrative actions, during fiscal years 1993 through 2003. (See 
fig. 3.) Increases in the number of self-reports after fiscal years 
1994 and 2000 likely reflect the beginning of the Aviation Safety 
Action Program as a prototype program in 1994 with one major airline 
and the expansion of that program to the entire airline industry in 
2000. According to an FAA official, not all self-reported cases that 
are filed with the agency are entered in the EIS database. For example, 
according to a 2003 internal agency report, only about 2 percent of the 
self-reported cases filed under the Aviation Safety: 

Action Program are entered into EIS.[Footnote 12] An FAA official 
indicated that, overall, more than 500,000 reports have been made to 
FAA under the partnership programs since their inception.[Footnote 13] 
We could not confirm that number because FAA does not maintain 
comprehensive reports or data from them. According to FAA, that 
information is located with the program participants.

Figure 3: Number of Administrative Actions Recorded in EIS as Self-
reported Cases, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

FAA's use of administrative actions also reflects the agency's emphasis 
on using alternatives to legal enforcement in certain circumstances. 
According to FAA officials, administrative actions are often used the 
first time an individual or entity commits a violation and the 
violation does not reflect a continuing safety issue. FAA's Chief 
Counsel expects the agency to revise its use of administrative actions 
and legal sanctions over the next several years as the office begins 
implementing a new targeted enforcement approach.

FAA Often Reduced Penalties for Assessed Fines: 

Overall, during the period that we reviewed, FAA's regional program 
management recommended fines totaling about $334 million for a total of 
approximately 25,900 cases that had both a regionally recommended fine 
and final fine. In many cases, the recommended fines were subsequently 
reduced by legal counsel. For cases closed during fiscal years 1993 
through 2003, FAA collected about 48 percent of the initially 
recommended fines (about $162 million). (See table 3.)

Table 3: Total Amounts of Recommended Fines and Final Fines and Final 
Fine as a Percentage of Recommended Fine, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Dollars in millions.

Fiscal year[A]: 1993; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $9.1; 
Total amount of final fines: $5.6; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 62%.

Fiscal year[A]: 1994; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $14.7; 
Total amount of final fines: $6.4; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 44%. 

Fiscal year[A]: 1995; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $14.0; 
Total amount of final fines: $17.5; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 125%. 

Fiscal year[A]: 1996; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $13.0; 
Total amount of final fines: $10.5; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 81%. 

Fiscal year[A]: 1997; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $16.4; 
Total amount of final fines: $9.4; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 57%. 

Fiscal year[A]: 1998; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $45.0; 
Total amount of final fines: $14.7; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 33%. 

Fiscal year[A]: 1999; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $56.7; 
Total amount of final fines: $18.1; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 32%. 

Fiscal year[A]: 2000; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $55.1; 
Total amount of final fines: $19.1; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 35%. 

Fiscal year[A]: 2001; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $41.8; 
Total amount of final fines: $33.7; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 81%. 

Fiscal year[A]: 2002; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $42.2; 
Total amount of final fines: $17.0; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 40%. 

Fiscal year[A]: 2003; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $25.9; 
Total amount of final fines: $9.8; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 38%. 

Total; 
Total amount of fines recommended by 
regional program management: $333.9; 
Total amount of final fines: $161.8; 
Final fine as a percentage of recommended fine: 48%. 

Source: GAO analysis of FAA's EIS data.

Note: This table includes only those cases that had both a recommended 
fine by the region and a final assessed fine.

[A] Fiscal year in which case closed.

[End of table]

During the period that we reviewed, for the approximately 25,900 cases 
that had both a regionally recommended fine and final fine assessed by 
legal counsel, 79 percent had a final fine that was less than the 
initial penalty. In about 5 percent of the cases, legal counsel 
increased the final fine from the region's recommendation; and in about 
16 percent of the cases, legal counsel did not change the fine.

Our analysis showed that FAA was more likely to assess fines against 
commercial entities, such as air carriers and repair stations, and to 
take certificate sanctions against individuals, such as pilots and 
mechanics. For both types of legal sanctions, legal counsel often 
reduced the penalties from the regional program management's 
recommendation. (See tables 4 and 5.) For example, fines against 
scheduled air carriers were reduced about 59 percent from an average 
recommended fine of about $41,800 to an average final fine of about 
$17,200. As another example, sanctions against mechanics were reduced 
from an average 87-day suspension of their mechanic's certificate to an 
average final suspension of 63 days (a 28 percent reduction). While 
their certificates are suspended, mechanics are allowed to repair 
aircraft under the supervision of another certified mechanic, but they 
are not allowed to certify that the repaired aircraft are airworthy; 
such certification is required for aircraft to be returned to service. 
Other types of legal sanctions were also changed between the regional 
or program management's recommendation and the final assessment. For 
example, of the approximately 8,800 cases that started out with a 
recommended certificate revocation, which would put an entity out of 
business or an airman out of work, about 1,308 (about 14 percent) of 
the cases were changed to a suspended certificate. Another 25 cases 
were changed to fines.

Table 4: Regions' Recommended Fines and Final Fines for Selected 
Entities, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Type of entity: Scheduled air carrier; 
Number of entities: 1,767; 
Recommended fine: Amount of total fine: $73,772,685; 
Recommended fine: Average fine per entity: $41,750; 
Recommended fine: Median fine per entity: $11,000; 
Final fine: Amount of total fine: $30,463,300; 
Final fine: Average fine per entity: $17,240; 
Final fine: Median fine per entity: $7,000.

Type of entity: Charter operator; 
Number of entities: 789; 
Recommended fine: Amount of total fine: $12,088,068; 
Recommended fine: Average fine per entity: $15,321; 
Recommended fine: Median fine per entity: $8,000; 
Final fine: Amount of total fine: $3,612,047; 
Final fine: Average fine per entity: $4,578; 
Final fine: Median fine per entity: $2,000.

Type of entity: Repair station[A]; 
Number of entities: 742; 
Recommended fine: Amount of total fine: $5,606,049; 
Recommended fine: Average fine per entity: $7,555; 
Recommended fine: Median fine per entity: $2,000; 
Final fine: Amount of total fine: $2,508,250; 
Final fine: Average fine per entity: $3,380; 
Final fine: Median fine per entity: $1,225.

Type of entity: Cargo air carrier; 
Number of entities: 186; 
Recommended fine: Amount of total fine: $6,438,072; 
Recommended fine: Average fine per entity: $34,613; 
Recommended fine: Median fine per entity: $15,000; 
Final fine: Amount of total fine: $2,358,675; 
Final fine: Average fine per entity: $12,681; 
Final fine: Median fine per entity: $7,500.

Type of entity: Foreign air carrier; 
Number of entities: 128; 
Recommended fine: Amount of total fine: $9,489,649; 
Recommended fine: Average fine per entity: $74,138; 
Recommended fine: Median fine per entity: $20,000; 
Final fine: Amount of total fine: $2,207,975; 
Final fine: Average fine per entity: $17,250; 
Final fine: Median fine per entity: $7,750.

Source: GAO analysis of FAA's EIS data.

[A] This analysis excludes a case against one repair station in which 
FAA assessed a final fine of $5 million in 1998.

Note: This table includes a total of about 3,600 cases out of the 
total 25,900 cases that had both an initially recommended and final 
fine. This table excludes over 21,000 cases for which information on 
the type of violator was missing or listed in EIS as "none."

[End of table]
 
Table 5: Regions' Recommended Certificate Suspension and Final 
Certificate Suspension for Selected Types of Violators, Fiscal Years 
1993-2003: 

Type of violator: Private pilots; 
Number of violators: 4,544; 
Recommended assessment: Average days: 81; 
Recommended assessment: Median days: 60; 
Final assessment: Average days: 68; 
Final assessment: Median days: 60.

Type of violator: Commercial pilots; 
Number of violators: 1,262; 
Recommended assessment: Average days: 75; 
Recommended assessment: Median days: 60; 
Final assessment: Average days: 48; 
Final assessment: Median days: 30.

Type of violator: Mechanics; 
Number of violators: 989; 
Recommended assessment: Average days: 87; 
Recommended assessment: Median days: 60; 
Final assessment: Average days: 63; 
Final assessment: Median days: 45.

Source: GAO analysis of FAA's EIS data.

[End of table]
 
According to an official in FAA's Office of Chief Counsel, legal 
sanctions are reduced for several reasons including proof that the 
violator is taking corrective action to prevent the recurrence of the 
violation (e.g., requiring training for staff in the affected area); 
the economic hardship that might accrue to the entity that caused the 
violation; and to speed up the processing of the case and resolve cases 
without litigation. In addition, according to officials in FAA's 
Office of Chief Counsel, the agency reduces or eliminates sanctions if 
it obtains new evidence to support a reduction. For example, an FAA 
official from the Chief Counsel's office said the agency will drop a 
case against a pilot and close it with no action if evidence shows a 
mechanical malfunction was the cause of the reported problem, not 
pilot error.

We could not verify the reasons for the reductions in sanctions because 
FAA's EIS database does not consistently provide that information. The 
database contains a series of comment fields, in which FAA legal 
counsel staff are encouraged to provide narrative to explain 
significant sanction changes, according to an official in the Office of 
Chief Counsel. However, officials in the Chief Counsel's office further 
explained that the comments field in EIS provided too little space to 
enter useful information on the reasons for reductions. In addition, 
the reasons for the reductions are expected to be documented in the 
paper file for the cases. Our review of a few case files found that 
such information was included in the paper file. Information on the 
reasons for reductions can be useful in subsequent enforcement cases, 
especially if the FAA attorney involved in the case is not available. 
(See table 6 for examples.)

Table 6: Examples of Fine Reductions that Lack Explanations in EIS: 

Entity: Private pilot; 
Amount of recommended fine: $19,239; 
Amount of final fine: $3,000; 
Comments in EIS: Electronic information says the fine was paid in 12 
installments with 5 percent interest. There was no explanation of why 
the fine was reduced.

Entity: Mechanic; 
Amount of recommended fine: $50,000; 
Amount of final fine: $5,000; 
Comments in EIS: Electronic information says FAA terminated collection 
of the fine in January 1999 when a U.S. Attorney's Office took over 
collecting the penalty "due to criminal indictment." There was no 
explanation of why the fine was reduced.

Entity: Commercial pilot; 
Amount of recommended fine: $2,996; 
Amount of final fine: $500; 
Comments in EIS: There was no explanation of why the fine was reduced.

Entity: Repair station; 
Amount of recommended fine: $420,000; 
Amount of final fine: $18,000; 
Comments in EIS: There was no explanation of why the fine was reduced.

Entity: Foreign air carrier; 
Amount of recommended fine: $46,000; 
Amount of final fine: $25,000; 
Comments in EIS: There was no explanation of why the fine was reduced.

Entity: Cargo air carrier; 
Amount of recommended fine: $125,000; 
Amount of final fine: $32,500; 
Comments in EIS: There was no explanation of why the fine was reduced.

Source: GAO analysis of FAA's EIS database. 

[End of table]

FAA Closed Nearly One-fifth of Its Cases with "No Action": 

During fiscal years 1993 through 2003, FAA closed with no action (or 
dismissal) about 18 percent of its cases (more than 35,000 cases 
total), an average of about 3,200 cases each year. During that period, 
regional or program management recommended closing 24,599 of those 
cases with no action. The reasons cited for closing the cases in such a 
manner were that investigative reports submitted by inspectors did not 
contain sufficient evidence to support the allegation of noncompliance 
with safety regulations, or that no violation occurred. Some cases were 
closed with no action if the case was not acted on expeditiously and, 
according to FAA guidelines, became "stale."[Footnote 14] As a result 
of closing the stale cases with no action, enforcement decisions are 
not based on the merits of the cases and any potential deterrent effect 
on future violations is weakened.

Length of Time to Close Cases Has Varied Widely in Recent Years: 

In recent years, the length of time FAA has taken to process 
enforcement cases between when they were first known to FAA to eventual 
closure has varied widely from year to year. In fiscal year 1998, for 
example, FAA took an average of 316 days to process all types of cases, 
including administrative, legal, and those that were closed with no 
action. That average declined to 251 days in fiscal year 2003. 
Meanwhile, the average time to process legal enforcement sanctions 
increased from 438 days in fiscal year 1998 to 518 days in fiscal year 
2003 (an 18 percent increase). During that same period, the time taken 
to process cases that resulted in no action declined from 625 days to 
377 days (a 40 percent decline). According to FAA, the increase in time 
taken to close legal enforcement cases is due, in part, to a reduction 
in the number of attorneys and an increase in complexity of the cases 
they are processing. In fiscal year 2001, FAA's Office of the Chief 
Counsel had 205 attorneys in headquarters and regional offices; in 
fiscal year 2003, the number of attorneys declined to 175 due to 
attrition and transfers to the Transportation Security Administration. 
(See fig. 4.)

Figure 4: Average Number of Days to Process Enforcement Cases and 
Number of Attorneys, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

According to FAA, delays in investigating or processing enforcement 
cases can affect the effectiveness of the agency's enforcement 
activities in several ways. Delays deemphasize the seriousness of a 
given violation and diminish the deterrent value of any enforcement 
action taken. By the same token, if the allegations of violation are 
not sustained, any unwarranted delay in processing a case may impose an 
unjustified hardship on the alleged violator if, for example, the 
alleged violator's certificate is suspended.

FAA Has Established Some Management Controls Over Its Enforcement and 
Partnership Efforts but Lacks Processes to Measure Their Impact: 

Federal agencies are required to implement ongoing processes and 
actions, called management controls, that allow them to set performance 
goals and measure and report on progress towards those goals, among 
other things. FAA has established some management controls, such as 
guidance on detecting violations of safety regulations and procedures 
for tracking sanctions to correct the violations. However, FAA lacks 
(1) results-oriented goals and measures for enforcement efforts and its 
partnership programs and (2) useable data to measure and evaluate these 
efforts and programs. As a result, FAA does not know if its enforcement 
sanctions and partnership programs are deterring future violations.

FAA Has Established Procedures to Guide Enforcement Activities and to 
Enhance Participation in Partnership Programs: 

FAA has established management controls over its enforcement efforts 
with procedures that provide guidance on identifying regulated entities 
and individuals that are subject to inspections or surveillance 
actions, determining workload priorities on the basis of the timing and 
type of inspection to be performed, detecting violations of safety 
regulations, tracking the actions that are taken by the entities/
individuals to correct the violations and achieve compliance with 
regulations, and imposing punitive sanctions or remedial conditions on 
the violators. These procedures provide FAA inspectors, managers, and 
attorneys with a process to handle violations of safety regulations 
that are found during routine inspections of those areas for which the 
agency is responsible.

The management controls that FAA uses for its industry-agency 
partnership programs are similar to the controls the agency uses for 
enforcement efforts. The controls over the partnership programs exist 
principally to increase the likelihood that the safety incidents 
identified through the program are, in fact, corrected. When FAA is 
made aware of a safety incident through reports by participants in the 
Voluntary Disclosure Program and Aviation Safety Action Program, the 
agency has procedures to track incidents and actions taken to correct 
the incidents. FAA has procedures to handle some reported incidents 
with administrative actions. In addition, FAA has procedures to handle 
violations reported under the Aviation Safety Reporting Program with 
legal sanctions, which may then be waived.

FAA Does Not Have Results-Oriented Goals and Measures for Enforcement 
Efforts and Partnership Programs: 

According to the government's management control standards and prior 
GAO reports on results-oriented management,[Footnote 15] federal 
agencies should establish measurable performance goals for their 
programs and operations. Moreover, those goals and measures should 
contribute to the agency's mission and strategic goals. FAA's strategic 
plan supports the Department of Transportation's goal to improve 
aviation safety. In addition, FAA guidance, in Order 2150.3A, provides 
a well-articulated enforcement strategy. However, the strategic plan 
and the enforcement strategy are not linked by measurable, results-
oriented goals. For example, FAA's strategic plan has a goal to reduce 
fatal aviation accident rates and strategies for achieving that goal 
that mention the agency's enforcement activities and the safety 
information obtained from partnership programs. However, FAA does not 
have explicit, measurable performance goals that are related to the 
outcomes that its enforcement programs are expected to achieve, such as 
increased compliance or deterrence of future violations. Instead, FAA 
determines which companies should be inspected, when the inspection 
should occur, and the number of inspections that should be conducted in 
a fiscal year based on the inspection offices' assessment of risks. In 
1998, we also reported that FAA lacked direct measures of the aviation 
industry's compliance with aviation safety regulations. Rather, the 
agency relied on the results of inspections as an indirect measure of 
the industry's compliance.[Footnote 16] In that report, we questioned 
whether this was a meaningful measure because inspectors did not report 
all violations, and we recommended that FAA's tracking systems be 
revised to distinguish major from minor violations. FAA declined to 
implement this recommendation. With regard to partnership programs, FAA 
has the explicit expectation that demonstrable safety enhancements will 
be achieved and tracked at the local level for each program, according 
to agency officials. These have included modifications to company 
operating procedures for take-off, approach and landing, coordination 
of changes to air traffic procedures at problem airports, improvements 
to company manuals and checklists, revised training curricula, and 
coordination of possible airworthiness issues with airframe 
manufacturers. The agency, however, does not have measurable 
performance goals that are related to the outcomes of the partnership 
programs. In contrast, other federal agencies, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), have measurable performance 
goals for their compliance and enforcement activities. For example, 
EPA's fiscal year 2003 performance plan includes goals to "increase 
opportunities through new targeted sector initiatives for industries to 
voluntarily self-disclose and correct violations on a corporate-wide 
basis" and "direct enforcement actions to maximize compliance and 
address environmental and human health problems."

EIS could provide the agency with baseline data for performance 
measures for the enforcement efforts; however, problems with incomplete 
data, which we discuss later in this report, would have to be 
addressed. FAA lacks such data for its partnership programs. For 
example, although FAA believes that the number of self-reported 
violations in the partnership programs has increased, the agency lacks 
comprehensive, programwide information to show the types of problems 
being reported or agency responses to the self-reported violations. 
However, under the Aviation Safety Action Program, FAA has access to 
databases maintained by individual participating entities, which allows 
it to track corrective actions by individual participants. In addition, 
FAA maintains a database of quarterly reports that field offices submit 
on safety enhancements achieved through this program.[Footnote 17] 
Under the Aviation Safety Reporting System, FAA has access to incident 
reports, which are screened for urgent safety issues that are 
distributed to the aviation community. In addition, FAA has identified 
examples of safety enhancements that have been made as a result of some 
programs, as mentioned above in this report. However, FAA does not use 
this information to track nationwide performance in relation to 
specific program goals.

FAA Has Not Evaluated the Results of Enforcement Actions and 
Partnership Programs: 

One management control standard requires agencies to have an evaluation 
process so that agency officials, Members of Congress, and others will 
be able to determine if program goals are being achieved. Moreover, FAA 
enforcement guidance indicates that increases in noncompliance with 
particular regulations may require an evaluation of the sufficiency of 
sanctions in order to determine if FAA's sanction policy is providing 
an effective deterrent and if changes to that policy are warranted. 
However, FAA does not have an evaluative process for its enforcement 
activities that would provide the information needed to determine 
whether these activities are having an impact on ensuring industry 
compliance with aviation safety regulations.

In internal reviews of its enforcement activities issued in 2001 and 
2003,[Footnote 18] FAA reported descriptive, process-oriented 
information, such as the number of enforcement actions and length of 
time taken to process enforcement cases. These reviews did not evaluate 
the results or impact of these activities, although the 2003 review 
made a number of recommendations to improve the enforcement and 
partnership programs, including recommendations to evaluate the use and 
effectiveness of all types of administrative action for the partnership 
programs and modernize or replace the EIS database.

For its partnership programs, FAA relies on examples from individual 
programs to document results. For instance, the manager of FAA's 
Voluntary Safety Programs Branch told us that data collected under the 
Aviation Safety Reporting Program helped to identify operational safety 
issues, such as general aviation incidents, pilot and controller 
communications, and runway incursions. In addition, the agency has an 
ongoing periodic review process for the Aviation Safety Action Program 
that incorporates a detailed questionnaire on program results to date. 
According to FAA officials, agency inspectors are also required to 
review Aviation Safety Action Program annually. FAA also holds periodic 
meetings at the national level with operators participating in the 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program to discuss safety 
issues identified through that program, and to formulate joint working 
groups to develop possible solutions. In addition, FAA requires 
operators with approved FOQA programs to brief their local FAA offices 
on adverse safety trends observed through their programs and on any 
corrective actions undertaken. Local FAA offices are responsible for 
tracking the effectiveness of such corrective actions. However, such 
examples do not provide an evaluation of the nationwide effectiveness 
of the programs or identify ways to enhance the programs' overall 
effectiveness.

FAA has increased its use of and promotion of partnership programs even 
in the absence of evaluative information on the effectiveness of these 
programs. The number of participants in partnership programs has 
increased in the last few years, and participation is expected to 
increase in the future. For example, as of June 2004, FAA had 
established 54 memoranda of understanding with airlines and repair 
stations to participate in the Aviation Safety Action Program, an 
increase from 51 participants in April 2004 and it had received over 
80,000 self-reports. Because the agency is prohibited[Footnote 19] from 
disclosing information on those self-reports, little is known outside 
of FAA about the extent of the problems reported or whether the actions 
taken in response to them will correct problems across the industry. 
FAA officials indicated that they have not analyzed violation data from 
the partnership programs for nationwide trends, such as the frequency 
of the types of violations and, in some cases, the agency lacks data to 
conduct those types of studies. However, at the program participant 
level--such as an air carrier participating under the Aviation Safety 
Action Program--FAA does receive information about the types of 
violations and remedial actions, and FAA staff are expected to conduct 
periodic analyses of that information. Such information is not compiled 
by FAA for industry wide analyses, according to agency officials. FAA 
officials further noted that the agency does not analyze safety 
information obtained from the partnership programs for nationwide 
trends.

In 2003, an internal FAA report[Footnote 20] acknowledged the need for 
evaluations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the agency's 
enforcement efforts and partnership programs. The report recommended 
that FAA evaluate the use and effectiveness of all types of 
administrative actions, including their use in the Voluntary Disclosure 
and Aviation Safety Action programs, conduct a review to determine the 
level of compliance with FAA enforcement policy and procedures by 
program offices within FAA, and evaluate the timeliness of processing 
legal enforcement actions in each program office. As of June 2004, the 
agency had not taken actions to implement those recommendations.

The Effect of FAA's Application of Enforcement Sanctions on Deterrence 
Is Unclear: 

FAA's policy for assessing enforcement sanctions against entities and/
or individuals that do not comply with aviation safety regulations is 
intended to deter future violations. However, the agency's practice of 
reducing those sanctions and assessing more violations with 
administrative actions rather than legal sanctions could at times be at 
odds with the information on deterrence that is found in economic 
literature on that subject.[Footnote 21] Moreover, because FAA has not 
evaluated the impact of its enforcement efforts, it is impossible to 
tell whether past enforcement sanctions have had a deterrent effect.

As discussed previously in this report, from fiscal years 1993 through 
2003, attorneys in FAA's Office of the Chief Counsel authorized a 52 
percent reduction in the civil monetary penalties assessed from a total 
of $334 million to $162 million. Recommendations for sanctions are 
sometimes changed on the basis of factors that are not associated with 
the merits of the case. For example, FAA officials told us that the 
agency sometimes reduces sanctions in order to prioritize attorneys' 
caseloads by closing the cases more quickly through negotiating a lower 
fine. Economic literature on deterrence[Footnote 22] suggests that 
although negative sanctions (such as fines and certificate suspensions) 
can deter violations, if the violator expects sanctions to be reduced, 
he or she may have less incentive to comply with regulations. In 
effect, the goal of preventing future violations is weakened when the 
penalties for present violations are lowered for reasons not related to 
the merits of the case, or cases are closed with no action because they 
are "stale." In December 2003, Congress increased the maximum fines 
that FAA may impose. It is unknown what effect this increase will have 
on deterrence, because FAA frequently reduced fines in the past and 
thus did not always use the maximum available fine. We also found that 
FAA had closed the majority (about 53 percent) of enforcement cases 
with administrative rather than legal sanctions. It is unknown what 
impact FAA's frequent use of administrative actions has on the 
deterrent effect of the enforcement system.

Incomplete Nationwide Data Hinder FAA's Ability to Analyze and Evaluate 
the Impact of Enforcement Efforts: 

Another management control for federal managers is to develop, manage, 
and revise information systems to improve the usefulness and 
reliability of data. In our 1998 report, we pointed out deficiencies in 
the EIS database. In our current review, we found that the usefulness 
of the EIS database to inspectors and program offices remains a 
problem. For instance, staff in several inspection offices that we 
contacted indicated that they found EIS difficult to use because of 
missing or incomplete historical information about enforcement cases. 
As a result of incomplete information, when assessing sanctions, FAA 
inspectors are not able to consider the entities' or individuals' full 
compliance history, as required by FAA's compliance and enforcement 
order. One reason for the lack of information about prior safety 
violations is FAA's policy to expunge data about the identities of 
individual violators. Prior to 1991, FAA indefinitely retained in its 
enforcement records the identity of individuals (such as pilots and 
mechanics) who committed violations. In 1991, FAA changed this policy 
after representatives of the general aviation community expressed 
concern about employment opportunities and insurance costs for 
certificate holders if their violation histories were made available. 
Consequently, FAA decided to routinely expunge the identity of 
individuals from the EIS database and case files using set 
criteria.[Footnote 23] From fiscal years 1993 through 2003, FAA 
expunged the identities of individuals in about 54,000 cases--about 27 
percent of the total number of closed cases. Most of the cases involved 
commercial pilots, private pilots, and mechanics. Others who also had 
their identities expunged included air traffic controllers, flight 
instructors, and student pilots. These cases involved administrative 
actions, fines, or suspensions.

In addition, FAA staff told us that about 55,000 closed security-
related cases were purged from EIS in 2003 and transferred to the 
Transportation Security Administration, which has assumed 
responsibility for enforcing security regulations. By not maintaining a 
copy of the cases, FAA does not have complete data on the enforcement 
history of violators who have both security and safety violations to 
use in determining future sanctions. In addition, FAA lacks complete 
data on which to develop trend analyses and other historical 
information, such as analyses of attorney workload. According to FAA 
officials, safety inspectors never look at security violations in 
determining sanctions, so FAA does not need the security information.

Officials from FAA offices that conduct inspections told us that they 
created additional databases in individual field offices to obtain 
historical information about the entities that they inspected because 
EIS was not user-friendly and case information was incomplete. However, 
the site-specific databases are not linked; therefore, enforcement and 
compliance information maintained in one inspection office is not 
readily available to other inspection offices. As a result, inspectors 
lack complete compliance history for certain regulated entities, which 
they are supposed to consider when assessing sanctions. FAA's 
enforcement policy calls for inspectors to consider, among other 
things, the past violation history of entities in determining whether 
to assess sanctions above the amount recommended in FAA penalty tables.

FAA has also reported on problems with the EIS database. For instance, 
the agency's July 2003 review of compliance and enforcement activities 
recommended that the agency "modernize or replace the system to provide 
the ability to enter and track data in a user-friendly manner and to 
capture sufficient data to enable the ongoing evaluation of the 
accuracy, consistency, timeliness, and effectiveness of the compliance 
and enforcement program." FAA indicated that an agency team met in May 
2004 to examine problems with and possible solutions to the usability 
of EIS data. The team is expected to report to FAA's Deputy 
Administrator by the end of fiscal year 2004 with detailed solutions.

Conclusions: 

FAA has undertaken tens of thousands of enforcement actions intended to 
gain industry compliance with safety regulations. However, it has not 
developed the management controls, required of all federal agencies, 
that would allow Congress, agency officials, and others to evaluate 
program data to determine if program goals are being achieved and 
safety risks, such as repeat violations and offenders, are being 
addressed or whether the enforcement program should be changed as a 
result of changes in industry compliance. For example, FAA does not 
have explicit, measurable performance goals that are related to the 
outcomes that its enforcement and partnership programs are expected to 
achieve. Other agencies, such as EPA, have developed measurable 
performance goals for their enforcement programs, which might serve as 
a model for FAA. In addition, while FAA receives and tracks information 
on individual safety violations and from individual participants in its 
partnership programs, the agency does not evaluate such information in 
the aggregate to identify trends in violations and their potential 
causes in order to reduce future violations. Furthermore, FAA has not 
evaluated the effectiveness of the use of administrative actions in 
achieving program goals or the consistency of the use of administrative 
actions and legal sanctions in the absence of specific criteria. 
Integral to the analyses and evaluation processes is the information 
system used to collect relevant program data. However, the EIS database 
fails to provide inspectors with useful, complete data. For example, in 
many cases, the EIS database lacks information on why sanctions were 
reduced. Because of the difficulty that FAA inspecting offices have in 
using the EIS database, they have developed localized databases that 
are not linked with other offices. Thus, enforcement and compliance 
information maintained in one inspection office about the violation 
history of a FAA certificate holder may not be available to other 
inspection offices. As a result, FAA inspectors lack complete 
compliance history when assessing sanctions. The lack of complete 
information on FAA's enforcement activities and partnership programs 
hinders FAA's ability to evaluate their impact or to know if future 
changes to these efforts are appropriate.

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To determine the effectiveness of the agency's enforcement actions and 
partnership programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation 
direct the FAA Administrator to implement the following three 
recommendations: 

1.Develop a continuous evaluative process and use it to create 
measurable performance goals for enforcement actions, track performance 
towards those goals, and determine appropriate program changes. The 
evaluation should consider the agency's use of administrative actions 
and closure of cases with no action, and to identify repeat violators 
and repeat types of violations.

2.Work with industry partners to develop a continuous evaluative 
process and use it to create measurable performance goals for the 
partnership programs, track performance towards those goals, and 
determine appropriate program changes. The evaluation should consider 
the use and effectiveness of administrative actions in certain 
partnership programs.

3.Finally, to improve the usefulness of the EIS database to inspection 
offices and the Office of Chief Counsel, including providing them with 
historical data on which to base their sanctions, we recommend that the 
Secretary direct the Administrator to make efforts to improve the 
completeness of enforcement information, such as consistently including 
information on why the sanctions are reduced, as part of the agency's 
planned efforts to enhance EIS.

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation 
for review and comment. FAA's Deputy Associate Administrator for 
Regulation and Certification and FAA's Assistant Chief Counsel for 
Enforcement provided comments. FAA agreed with our recommendations and 
provided technical corrections, which we incorporated as appropriate. 
In addition, FAA provided comments on two general areas covered in the 
report. First, FAA noted that the differences between the enforcement 
program and the partnership programs need to be clearly understood. FAA 
stated that the agency's enforcement program is intended to exact 
penalties for regulatory failures discovered through agency actions and 
that industry partnership programs are intended to promote the 
identification of potential safety lapses that can be fixed before 
safety is compromised. FAA stated that both efforts contribute to the 
agency's goal of reducing the rate of fatal accidents in commercial 
aviation and understanding the fundamental difference between the 
programs is important. Second, regarding our finding that FAA lacks a 
process to evaluate the nationwide effectiveness of actions implemented 
through the partnership programs, FAA noted that before measures can be 
established for such evaluations, it needs a process for collecting and 
evaluating nationwide data. The agency noted that this situation has 
posed both technical problems concerning the collection and analysis of 
data from various operators as well as valid concerns expressed by 
industry participants about how to protect data that are shared among 
operators. The agency indicated that, although it is not noted in our 
report, it is making progress in this area. According to FAA, it has 
established two aviation rulemaking committees that are developing a 
process to share data among all participants in the Aviation Safety 
Action Program and Flight Operational Quality Assurance program without 
revealing their identities.

As agreed with your office, unless you announce the contents of this 
report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 13 days from the 
report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other 
congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and the 
Administrator of FAA. Copies will also be available to others upon 
request and at no cost on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink, http://
www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any questions about this 
report, please call me at (202) 512-2834. Major contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Katherine Siggerud: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report focuses on the enforcement options and management controls 
used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to address 
noncompliance with aviation safety regulations. We answered the 
following questions: (1) How has FAA used its various enforcement 
options over the last decade to address noncompliance? and (2) To what 
extent has FAA established management controls, including measuring and 
monitoring performance, for its enforcement activities and partnership 
programs?

To better understand FAA's enforcement and compliance processes, we 
reviewed federal laws that authorize the agency to take enforcement 
actions against entities and individuals that do not comply with 
federal aviation regulations. We also examined the FAA orders used by 
aviation safety inspectors[Footnote 24] to determine the steps they are 
required to take when a potential violation has been identified and the 
criteria they are expected to use to categorize violations and 
recommend sanctions.[Footnote 25] In addition, to understand how each 
office implements the enforcement orders, we interviewed FAA officials 
in 11 offices (shown in table 7) that either conduct inspections and/or 
surveillances or, in the case of the Office of the Chief Counsel, are 
responsible for implementing legal action for violations of safety 
regulations.

Table 7: FAA Offices Where We Conducted Interviews: 

FAA office: Office of the Chief Counsel; Enforcement Division; 
Location: Washington, D.C.

FAA office: Office of Aerospace Medicine; 
* Drug Abatement Division; 
Location: Washington, D.C.

FAA office: Office of Aerospace Medicine; 
* Aerospace Medical Certification Division; 
Location: Oklahoma City, OK.

FAA office: Flight Standards Service; 
Location: Dulles, VA; Fort Worth, TX.

FAA office: Office of Airport Safety and Standards; 
Location: Washington, D.C.

FAA office: Commercial Space Transportation Division; 
Location: Washington, D.C.

FAA office: Office of Security and Hazardous Materials; 
Location: Washington, D.C.

FAA office: Aircraft Certification Service, Manufacturing Inspection 
Office; 
* Small Airplane Directorate; 
Location: Kansas City, MO.

FAA office: Aircraft Certification Service, Manufacturing Inspection 
Office; 
* Transport Airplane Directorate; 
Location: Renton, WA.

FAA office: Aircraft Certification Service, Manufacturing Inspection 
Office; 
* Engine and Propeller Directorate; 
Location: Burlington, MA.

FAA office: Aircraft Certification Service, Manufacturing Inspection 
Office; 
* Rotorcraft Directorate; 
Location: Fort Worth, TX. 

Source: GAO.

[End of table]

Data Analyses: 

To obtain information on how FAA used its enforcement options to 
address noncompliance with aviation safety regulations in the past, we 
obtained and analyzed selected enforcement data for cases closed from 
fiscal years 1993 through 2003 from FAA's Enforcement Information 
System (EIS) database, which is maintained by the Aviation Data Systems 
Branch in Oklahoma City. To assess the reliability of the EIS data, we 
(1) performed electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and 
completeness as well as inconsistencies; (2) reviewed existing 
information from internal FAA studies on EIS, as well as prior reports 
by us, about EIS and the data; and (3) interviewed officials in FAA's 
Aviation Data Systems Branch and Office of the Chief Counsel 
(Enforcement Division), Washington, D.C., who are knowledgeable about 
the content of the data and how they were entered. We consulted 
regularly with these officials to resolve the handling of problematic 
data entries. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable 
for the nationwide trend analyses that we used for this report.

Our analyses of the EIS data for fiscal years 1993 through 2003 formed 
the basis of the numerical information shown throughout this report on 
how FAA responded to prior enforcement and self-reported cases. Our 
analyses included only closed cases, which we reported by the year 
closed. The information we developed from the data includes types of 
violators and enforcement actions associated with the cases closed; 
trends in the numbers of cases closed; and trends in the enforcement 
sanctions used to close them (administrative actions, no action, and 
various types of legal sanctions). We also conducted analyses to 
determine the extent to which FAA modified penalties and determined the 
average, median, range, and total monetary and nonmonetary penalties 
associated with various types of sanctions and violators.

We documented the procedures that we used to derive the EIS-based 
numerical information in our report and submitted them to officials in 
the Aviation Data Systems Branch and Office of the Chief Counsel 
(Enforcement Division), Washington, D.C., for their review. We 
consulted FAA officials and knowledgeable program staff regarding our 
approach and our analysis of the data.

Management Controls: 

We interviewed FAA managers in the Flight Standards Service, Aircraft 
Certification Service, Office of Aerospace Medicine, Office of Airport 
Safety and Standards, Commercial Space Transportation Division, and 
Office of Security and Hazardous Materials to determine what, if any, 
performance measures and goals have been established for their 
enforcement activities and partnership programs and the types of 
management controls they have incorporated in their areas. In addition, 
we reviewed the agency's internal management reports, including 
compliance and enforcement reviews for 1995 and 2003; the Quarterly 
Management Report for the Flight Standards Division's Southwest Region 
for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2003; the Department of 
Transportation's Performance and Accountability report for fiscal year 
2002; and FAA Order 2150.3A, Compliance and Enforcement Program (issued 
December 14, 1988, and changes incorporated and reprinted July 1999).

Using the federal government's guides for management controls at 
federal agencies,[Footnote 26] we selected control standards that are 
relevant to the types of enforcement activities and partnership 
programs that FAA administers. (See tables 8 and 9.) We obtained 
information on FAA's risk assessment and program evaluation policies 
and administration of penalties and sanctions for violations. We 
analyzed the information provided by the managers on the agency's 
procedures and policies, and we compared it with control standards 
required of federal agencies in order to determine the presence and 
adequacy of management controls for FAA's enforcement activities and 
partnership programs.

Table 8: Selected Internal Control Standards Used to Assess Enforcement 
Activities: 

Performance measures; 

1. Have performance measures and indicators been established for the 
program? 
2. Are the strategic goals communicated to staff? 
3. Does management track program/unit's achievements and compare them 
to the plans, goals, and objectives established by the performance 
measures? 

Risk assessment; 

4. Are enforcement violations analyzed and ranked by: 
* severity of infraction? 
* frequency of occurrence? 
* likelihood of recurrence? 
5. Are the inspected entities ranked in any way? 
6. Are analyses performed on inspection findings or other data? 
7. Are the results of the analyses used to prepare a risk analyses 
plan? 
8. Are findings from other audits and inspections considered before an 
inspection is conducted? 
9. Are procedures or systems in place to deal with unexpected problems 
found during inspections? 

Control activities; 

10. Have policies, procedures, techniques, or mechanisms for 
conducting an inspection and reporting findings been established? 
11. Have policies, procedures, techniques, or mechanisms for 
recommending types of actions to correct violations been established? 
12. Have policies, procedures, techniques, or mechanisms for verifying 
that action taken to correction violations been established? 
13. Are records and appropriate documents that provide evidence of the 
findings and corrective actions created and maintained? 
14. Does program management ensure that records and appropriate 
documents concerning enforcement activities are properly managed (i.e., 
information is timely recorded, complete, accurate, and readily 
available for examination by authorized persons)? 
15. Are inspectors provided timely training aimed at developing and 
retaining skill levels regarding enforcement activities? 

Controls over information processing and systems; 

16. Are databases other than the Enforcement Inspection System (EIS) 
used to record information about inspections? 
17. Are databases used in addition to EIS? 
18. Is the non-EIS database used throughout the field and program 
offices? 
19. Is either of these two databases the principal vehicle used to 
record information about inspections? 
20. Are data from EIS and/or the regional database used to obtain 
information before an inspection proceeds?
21. Have inspectors been trained to use EIS and/or the regional 
database? 
22. Do inspectors find using EIS and/or the regional database an 
easily attainable source of information on prior inspections? 
23. Is information from EIS and/or the regional database used for 
reports to agency officials? 
24. Is access to EIS and/ or the regional database limited to 
inspectors? 
25. Is access to the databases limited to specific staff? 
26. Does the information from regional database differ from the 
information inputted into EIS database? If yes, how is the information 
in the two databases reconciled? 

Monitoring; 

27. Have audits or reviews been performed on operations? 
28. Have the results of those audits/reviews been evaluated by 
management? 
29. Were actions taken to correct or resolve, within an established 
timeframe, matters brought to management's attention?

Source: GAO.

[End of table]

Table 9: Selected Internal Control Standards Used to Assess 
Partnership Programs: 

Risk assessment; 

1. Are incidents analyzed and ranked by severity of infraction, 
frequency of occurrence, and likelihood of recurrence? 
2. Are the participating entities ranked in any way? 
3. Are analyses performed on disclosed incidents or other data? 
4. Are the results of the analyses used to prepare a risk analyses 
plan? 
5. Are findings from other audits and assessments considered when an 
incident is disclosed? 
6. Is there a procedure or system in place to deal with unexpected 
problems found as a result of a disclosure? 

Control activities; 

7. Does the program have a policy, procedure, technique, or mechanism 
for receiving voluntarily disclosed information and reporting 
findings? 
8. Does the program have a policy, procedure, technique, or mechanism 
for recommending types of actions to correct incidents? 
9. Does the program have a policy, procedure, technique, or mechanism 
for verifying that action taken to correct incidents has occurred? 
10. Does the agency staff create and maintain records and appropriate 
documents that provide evidence of the disclosed incidents and 
corrective actions? 
11. Does the agency ensure that records and appropriate documents are 
recorded in a timely manner, complete, and accurate? 
12. Are incident reviewers within the agency provided timely training 
aimed at developing and retaining skill levels? 

Performance measures; 

13. Are there established performance measures and indicators for the 
program office? If so, how frequently are they reviewed and by whom? 
14. Are the strategic goals communicated to staff? 
15. Does management track unit's achievements and compare them to the 
plans, goals, and objectives established by the performance measures? 

Controls over information processing and systems; 

16. Does the agency use a database to record information about 
disclosed incidents? 
17. Is the database used throughout the field offices? 
18. Is this database the principal vehicle used to record information 
about incidents? 
19. Have staff been trained to use the database? 
20. Do staff find using the database an easily attainable source of 
information on prior incidents? 
21. Is information from the database used for reports to agency 
officials? 
22. Is access to the database limited to specific staff? 

Monitoring; 

23. Have audits or reviews been performed on the program's operation? 
24. Have the results of those audits/reviews been evaluated by 
management? 
25. Were actions taken to correct or resolve, within an established 
timeframe, matters brought to management's attention? 

Source: GAO.

[End of table]

In order to understand the impact that FAA's enforcement activities and 
partnership programs have on enhancing compliance with safety 
regulations, we reviewed orders related to the partnership programs, 
interviewed the manager of the FAA's Voluntary Safety Programs Branch, 
and interviewed officials from the Airline Pilots Association, Air 
Transport Association, and Regional Airline Association because their 
members are subject to FAA enforcement and compliance efforts. We also 
interviewed representatives of FAA's largest inspector unions--the 
National Air Traffic Controllers Association and Professional Airways 
Systems Specialists--to obtain their views on FAA enforcement and 
compliance activities including the use of penalties and sanctions as a 
deterrence for future violations, inspector training, and the 
inspectors' role in FAA's enforcement process and partnership programs.

To obtain information about the significance of penalties and sanctions 
in deterring future violations in general, we reviewed literature and 
studies on the overall effect that those items have on ensuring 
compliance with rules and regulations. We assessed the relevancy of 
that information to the issues identified in this review. The 
literature on deterrence that we reviewed included: 

* A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, "The Economic Theory of 
Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
XXXVIII (March 2000);

* Oren Bar-Gill & Alon Harel, "Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The 
Economics of Deterrence Revisited," Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. XXX 
(June 2001), pp. 485-501;

* Isaac Ehrlich, "Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses," 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10 (Winter 1996), pp. 43-67;

* Richard Posner, "Economic Analysis of Law," 3RD edition (1986); and: 

* Steven Levitt, "Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: 
Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?" working paper #5268, 
National Bureau of Economic Research (September 1995).

We conducted our review from April 2003 through July 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Description of FAA's Partnership Programs: 

Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP): 

Year Established: 1997: 

Participation: Participants include employees of air carriers and 
repair stations that have entered into a memorandum of understanding 
with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The memoranda can cover 
employee groups, such as pilots, maintenance employees, dispatchers, or 
flight attendants. Each employee group is covered by a separate 
memorandum of understanding. As of June 2004, FAA had accepted 54 
memoranda of understanding and received over 80,000 ASAP reports, which 
may or may not include safety violations, according to FAA officials.

Purpose: ASAP seeks to improve aviation safety through the voluntary 
self-reporting of safety incidents under the procedures set forth in 
the memorandum of understanding. Under the program, FAA does not take 
enforcement action against employees who voluntarily reported safety 
violations for reports that are sole-source (the report is the only way 
FAA would have learned about the incident) and will pursue 
administrative action only for reports that are not sole-source. 
Incidents that involve alcohol, drugs, criminal activity, or an 
intentional disregard for safety are not eligible for self-reporting 
under ASAP.

Process: Each memorandum of understanding is a voluntary partnership 
between FAA, the airline, and an employee group. Although employee 
groups are not always included, FAA encourages their participation. The 
memorandum of understanding ensures that employees who voluntarily 
disclose FAA safety violations in accordance with the procedures and 
guidelines of ASAP will receive administrative action or no action in 
lieu of legal enforcement action.

Once a memorandum of understanding is approved, employees can begin 
reporting violations that fall under the agreement. When a violation 
occurs, an employee notifies the Event Review Committee, which includes 
representatives from FAA and the airline or the repair station and 
generally includes the appropriate employee association. The committee 
must be notified in writing within the time limit specified in the 
memorandum of understanding. The committee then determines whether to 
accept the report under the ASAP program. If the report is accepted (it 
meets the acceptance criteria in the memorandum and does not involve 
criminal activity, substance abuse, controlled substances, or alcohol), 
then the committee determines the action to take. That action may 
include remedial training or administrative action, but it will not 
include a legal sanction.

Results: FAA does not have a national, systematic process in place to 
evaluate the overall success of ASAP. However, FAA cites examples that 
describes ASAP's contribution to enhanced aviation safety. These 
examples include identifying deficiencies in aircraft operations 
manuals, airport equipment, and runways. In July 2003, FAA's Compliance 
and Enforcement Review recommended that FAA evaluate the use and 
effectiveness of this program.

Aviation Safety Reporting Program (ASRP): 

Year Established: 1975: 

Participation: Participants are all users of the national airspace 
system, including air traffic controllers and employees of air carriers 
and repair stations.

Purpose: The program is designed to improve aviation safety by offering 
limited immunity for individuals who voluntarily report safety 
incidents. ASRP was founded after TWA Flight 514 crashed on approach to 
landing in December 1974 after the crew misinterpreted information on 
the approach chart. This accident occurred only 6 weeks after another 
plane experienced the same error.

Process: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
administers this program. When a safety incident occurs, a person may 
submit a form and incident report to NASA. There are four types of 
forms that can be submitted to NASA: (1) Air Traffic Control, (2) 
General Reports (includes Pilots), (3) Flight Attendants, and (4) 
Maintenance Personnel.

At least two aviation safety analysts read these forms and the incident 
reports that accompany them. The analysts at NASA screen the incident 
reports for urgent safety issues, which will be marked for immediate 
action to the appropriate FAA office or aviation authority. NASA 
analysts also edit the report's narrative to eliminate any identifying 
information. In addition, each report has a tear-off portion, which is 
separated and returned to the individual who reported the incident as a 
receipt of the incident report's acceptance into the ASRP. When a 
safety violation that has been previously reported under ASRP comes to 
the attention of FAA, the agency issues a legal sanction, which is then 
waived. Reports that would not be eligible to have a legal sanction 
waived include deliberate violations, violations involving a criminal 
offense, or accident; reports filed by participants who have committed 
a violation of federal aviation regulations or law within the last 5 
years and reports filed later than 10 days following an incident.

Results: FAA and NASA have no formal national evaluation program to 
measure the overall effectiveness of the program. ASRP reports are 
compiled into a database known as the Aviation Safety Reporting System. 
When a potentially hazardous condition is reported, such as a defect in 
a navigational aid or a confusing procedure, NASA will send a safety 
alert to aircraft manufacturers, the FAA, airport representatives, and 
other aviation groups. Individuals and organizations can request a 
search of the database for information on particular aircraft aviation 
safety subjects, including human performance errors and safety 
deficiencies. In addition, the database is used for a monthly safety 
bulletin that includes excerpts from incident reports with supporting 
commentary by FAA safety experts. NASA officials estimate that the 
bulletin is read by over 150,000 people.

NASA has been able to use the data collected in the database to analyze 
operational safety issues, such as general aviation incidents, pilot 
and controller communications, and runway incursions.

Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA): 

Year Established: 1995: 

Participation: Participants include air carriers that equip their 
airplanes to record flight data. As of March 2004, 13 airlines had FAA-
approved FOQA programs, and approximately 1,400 airplanes were equipped 
for the program.

Purpose: FOQA is designed to enhance aviation safety through the 
analysis of digital flight data generated during routine flights.

Process: Air carriers that participate in the program equip their 
aircraft with special acquisition devices or use the airplanes' flight 
data recorders to collect data and determine if the aircraft are 
deviating from standard procedures. These data include engine 
temperatures, descent rate, and deviations from the flight path. When 
the aircraft lands, data are transmitted from the aircraft to the 
airline's FOQA station, where they are analyzed for flight trends and 
possible safety problems.

Once the data are transmitted to the FOQA ground station, the data are 
extracted and analyzed by software programs. The FOQA data are combined 
with data from maintenance databases, weather conditions, and other 
safety reporting systems, such as ASAP, in order to identify trends in 
flight operations. The analysis typically focuses on events that fall 
outside normal boundaries specified by the manufacturer's operational 
limitations and the air carrier's operational standards.

FAA does not receive FOQA data. Instead, the data are maintained by air 
carriers, who are responsible for the analysis of FOQA data and 
reporting to FAA information on safety trends. According to FAA 
officials, air carriers do not want to release these data to any 
outside party (including FAA) because of concerns that the data could 
then be publicly released. Air carriers pay for the special flight data 
recorders that can record FOQA data, which cost approximately $20,000 
each. Although this can be an expensive investment for some air 
carriers, most newer aircraft models come with the data recorder built 
into the airplane. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
has recommended that airlines from member countries implement a FOQA 
program. FAA has notified ICAO that the program will remain voluntary 
in the United States.

Results: FAA has no formal national evaluation program to measure the 
overall effectiveness of FOQA program. However, FAA cites examples that 
describes FOQA's contribution to enhanced aviation safety. For example, 
one FOQA program highlighted a high rate of descent when airplanes land 
at a particular airport. On the basis of the information provided from 
FOQA, air traffic controllers at the airport were able to develop 
alternative approach procedures to decrease the rate of descent.

Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP): 

Year Established: 1990: 

Participation: Participants include air carriers, repair stations, and 
production approval holders.[Footnote 27]

Purpose: FAA initiated the program to promote aviation safety by 
encouraging the voluntary self-reporting of manufacturing, and quality 
control problems and safety incidents involving FAA requirements for 
maintenance, flight operations, drug and alcohol prevention programs, 
and security functions.

Process: Upon discovering a safety violation, participants can 
voluntarily disclose the violation to FAA within 24 hours. The initial 
notification should include a description of the violation, how and 
when the violation was discovered, and the corrective steps necessary 
to prevent repeat violations. Within 10 days of filing the initial 
notification to FAA, the entity is required to provide a written report 
that cites the regulations violated, describes how the violation was 
detected, provides an explanation of how the violation was inadvertent, 
and provides a description of the proposed comprehensive fix. The FAA 
may pursue legal action if the participant discloses violations during, 
or in anticipation of, a FAA inspection.

The violation must be reported immediately after being detected, must 
be inadvertent, must not indicate that a certificate holder is 
unqualified, and must include the immediate steps that were taken to 
terminate the apparent violation. If these conditions are met, and the 
FAA inspector has approved the comprehensive fix, then the FAA 
inspector will prepare a letter of correction and the case is 
considered closed with the possibility of being reopened if the 
comprehensive fix is not completed.

Results: FAA has no formal national evaluation program to measure the 
overall effectiveness of the program. A 2003 internal FAA report 
recommended that the agency evaluate the use and effectiveness of this 
program.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Additional Data Analyses: 

Table 10: Number and Percentage of Enforcement Sanctions Resolved with 
Administrative Actions, Legal Sanctions, and No Action, for Cases 
Closed during Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Type of action: Administrative; 
Fiscal year: 1993: 8,952; (52%); 
Fiscal year: 1994: 10,516; (57%); 
Fiscal year: 1995: 9,218; (53%); 
Fiscal year: 1996: 8,934; (56%); 
Fiscal year: 1997: 8,168; (50%); 
Fiscal year: 1998: 10,141; (51%); 
Fiscal year: 1999: 10,465; (53%); 
Fiscal year: 2000: 11,046; (54%); 
Fiscal year: 2001: 10,670; (52%); 
Fiscal year: 2002: 9,128; (52%); 
Fiscal year: 2003: 8,921; (59%); 
Total: 106,159; (53%).

Type of action: Legal; 
Fiscal year: 1993: 4,815; (28%); 
Fiscal year: 1994: 4,668; (25%); 
Fiscal year: 1995: 4,621; (27%); 
Fiscal year: 1996: 4,315; (27%); 
Fiscal year: 1997: 5,271; (32%); 
Fiscal year: 1998: 5,731; (29%); 
Fiscal year: 1999: 5,700; (29%); 
Fiscal year: 2000: 5,784; (28%); 
Fiscal year: 2001: 5,804; (28%); 
Fiscal year: 2002: 4,830; (28%); 
Fiscal year: 2003: 3,568; (24%); 
Total: 55,107; (28%).

Type of action: No action; 
Fiscal year: 1993: 3,109; (18%); 
Fiscal year: 1994: 3,070; (17%); 
Fiscal year: 1995: 3,198; (19%); 
Fiscal year: 1996: 2,549; (16%); 
Fiscal year: 1997: 2,725; (17%); 
Fiscal year: 1998: 3,963; (20%); 
Fiscal year: 1999: 3,411; (17%); 
Fiscal year: 2000: 3,487; (17%); 
Fiscal year: 2001: 3,800; (19%); 
Fiscal year: 2002: 3,363; (19%); 
Fiscal year: 2003: 2,390; (16%); 
Total: 35,065; (18%).

Type of action: Other[A]; 
Fiscal year: 1993: 405; (2%); 
Fiscal year: 1994: 382; (2%); 
Fiscal year: 1995: 262; (2%); 
Fiscal year: 1996: 256; (2%); 
Fiscal year: 1997: 224; (1%); 
Fiscal year: 1998: 233; (1%); 
Fiscal year: 1999: 201; (1%); 
Fiscal year: 2000: 183; (1%); 
Fiscal year: 2001: 179; (1%); 
Fiscal year: 2002: 195; (1%); 
Fiscal year: 2003: 188; (1%); 
Total: 2,708 (1%).

Type of action: Total; 
Fiscal year: 1993: 17,281; (100%); 
Fiscal year: 1994: 18,636; (100%); 
Fiscal year: 1995: 17,299; (100%); 
Fiscal year: 1996: 16,054; (100%); 
Fiscal year: 1997: 16,388; (100%); 
Fiscal year: 1998: 20,068; (100%); 
Fiscal year: 1999: 19,777; (100%); 
Fiscal year: 2000: 20,500; (100%); 
Fiscal year: 2001: 20,453; (100%); 
Fiscal year: 2002: 17,516; (100%); 
Fiscal year: 2003: 15,067 (100%); 
Total: 199,039; (100%).

Source: GAO analysis of FAA's EIS data.

[A] Other includes cases that the U.S. attorney declined to process, 
cases in which the certificates expired, and cases in which FAA was 
unable to locate the violators: 

[End of table]
 

Table 11: Types of Enforcement Cases against Violators, Fiscal Years 
1993-2003: 

Type of case: Security; 
Number of cases: 55,877; 
Percentage of cases: 29%.

Type of case: Flight operations; 
Number of cases: 41,530; 
Percentage of cases: 21%. 

Type of case: Maintenance; 
Number of cases: 28,679; 
Percentage of cases: 15%. 

Type of case: Records and reports; 
Number of cases: 18,222; 
Percentage of cases: 9%. 

Type of case: Hazardous materials; 
Number of cases: 17,808; 
Percentage of cases: 9%. 

Type of case: Medical; 
Number of cases: 15,539; 
Percentage of cases: 8%. 

Type of case: Quality controls; 
Number of cases: 4,768; 
Percentage of cases: 2%. 

Type of case: Training; 
Number of cases: 2,781; 
Percentage of cases: 1%. 

Type of case: Interference with crew member; 
Number of cases: 1,606; 
Percentage of cases: 1%. 

Type of case: Airport; 
Number of cases: 1,126; 
Percentage of cases: 1%. 

Type of case: Hazards to persons/property on surface; 
Number of cases: 1,029; 
Percentage of cases: 1%. 

Type of case: Hazards to air navigation; 
Number of cases: 230; 
Percentage of cases: 0%. 

Type of case: Aircraft certification; 
Number of cases: 180; 
Percentage of cases: 0%. 

Type of case: Other[A]; 
Number of cases: 6,247; 
Percentage of cases: 3%. 

Type of case: Total; 
Number of cases: 195,622; 
Percentage of cases: 100%.

Source: GAO analysis of FAA's EIS data.

[A] Other includes noise violations, missing data, and violations that 
FAA categorized as "other."

[End of table]

Table 12: Number and Percentage of Enforcement Actions Resolved with 
Administrative Actions, Legal Sanctions, and No Actions by Region, for 
Cases Closed during Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Region: Aero Center[A]; 
Type of action: Administrative: 2,252; (18%); 
Type of action: Legal: 8,592; (70%); 
Type of action: No action: 1,227; (10%); 
Type of action: Other: 133; (1%); 
Total: 12,204; (100%).

Region: Headquarters; 
Type of action: Administrative: 1,724; (29%); 
Type of action: Legal: 1,620; (27%); 
Type of action: No action: 2,603; (43%); 
Type of action: Other: 92; (2%); 
Total: 6,039; (100%).

Region: Alaska; 
Type of action: Administrative: 3,937; (60%); 
Type of action: Legal: 1,571; (24%); 
Type of action: No action: 943; (14%); 
Type of action: Other: 67; (1%); 
Total: 6,518; (100%).

Region: Central; 
Type of action: Administrative: 4,781; (52%); 
Type of action: Legal: 2,906; (32%); 
Type of action: No action: 1,358; (15%); 
Type of action: Other: 65; (1%); 
Total: 9,110; (100%).

Region: Eastern; 
Type of action: Administrative: 12,487; (59%); 
Type of action: Legal: 4,967; (23%); 
Type of action: No action: 3,631; (17%); 
Type of action: Other: 185; (1%); 
Total: 21,270; (100%).

Region: Europe; 
Type of action: Administrative: 388; (73%); 
Type of action: Legal: 78; (15%); 
Type of action: No action: 64; (12%); 
Type of action: Other: 0; (0%); 
Total: 530; (100%).

Region: Great Lakes; 
Type of action: Administrative: 11,680; (54%); 
Type of action: Legal: 5,457; (25%); 
Type of action: No action: 4,417; (20%); 
Type of action: Other: 260; (1%); 
Total: 21,814; (100%).

Region: New England; 
Type of action: Administrative: 2,567; (53%); 
Type of action: Legal: 1,325; (28%); 
Type of action: No action: 841; (17%); 
Type of action: Other: 80; (2%); 
Total: 4,813; (100%).

Region: Northwest Mountains; 
Type of action: Administrative: 10,995; (58%); 
Type of action: Legal: 5,427; (28%); 
Type of action: No action: 2,512; (13%); 
Type of action: Other: 186; (1%); 
Total: 19,120; (100%).

Region: Southern; 
Type of action: Administrative: 16,674; (52%); 
Type of action: Legal: 8,936; (28%); 
Type of action: No action: 6,187; (19%); 
Type of action: Other: 421; (1%); 
Total: 32,218; (100%).

Region: Southwest; 
Type of action: Administrative: 17,170; (55%); 
Type of action: Legal: 7,144; (23%); 
Type of action: No action: 6,026; (19%); 
Type of action: Other: 667; (2%); 
Total: 31,007; (100%).

Region: Western Pacific; 
Type of action: Administrative: 17,905; (58%); 
Type of action: Legal: 7,083; (23%); 
Type of action: No action: 5,256; (17%); 
Type of action: Other: 552; (2%); 
Total: 30,796; (100%).

Region: Total; 
Type of action: Administrative: 106,159[B]; (53%); 
Type of action: Legal: 55,107[C]; (28%); 
Type of action: No action: 35,065; (18%); 
Type of action: Other: 2,708; (1%); 
Total: 199,039; (100%).

Source: GAO analysis of FAA's EIS data.

[A] Aero Center is the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma 
City.

[B] Total number of administrative actions includes 3,599 self-
reported cases that FAA did not assign to any region.

[C] Total number of legal actions includes 1 self-reported case that 
FAA did not assign to any region.

[End of table]
 

Table 13: Total Number and Percentage of Closed Enforcement Cases for 
Which Regions Recommended Legal Sanctions, Fiscal Years 1993-2003: 

Type of legal sanctions: Certificate suspension; 
Number of cases: 17,439; 
Percentage of cases: 28%.

Type of legal sanctions: Fine; 
Number of cases: 36,320; 
Percentage of cases: 58%. 

Type of legal sanctions: Certificate revocation; 
Number of cases: 8,844; 
Percentage of cases: 14%. 

Type of legal sanctions: Other legal sanction[A]; 
Number of cases: 21; 
Percentage of cases: 0%. 

Type of legal sanctions: Total; 
Number of cases: 62,624; 
Percentage of cases: 100%. 

Source: GAO analysis of FAA's EIS data.

[A] Other includes cases in which the sanction was deferred or waived.

[End of table]

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Katherine Siggerud (202) 512-2834 Gerald L. Dillingham (202) 512-2834 
Teresa Spisak (202) 512-3952: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the above, Charles Bausell, Curtis Groves, David Hooper, 
Daniel Kaneshiro, Mitchell Karpman, Stan Kostyla, Heather Krause, Donna 
Leiss, Elizabeth A. Marchak, Phillis Riley, Richard Scott, and John W. 
Shumann made key contributions to this report.

(540050): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in 
the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
1999) and U.S. General Accounting Office, Internal Control Management 
and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2001).

[2] Some FAA offices use inspectors to identify and investigate 
violations. Other offices use personnel such as engineers and flight 
test pilots. For purposes of this report, we refer to all FAA staff who 
identify and investigate violations as inspectors.

[3] Legal counsel are located in FAA regional offices as well as 
headquarters.

[4] The threshold penalty amount that triggers referral to the 
Department of Justice was generally increased to $400,000 in December 
2003 under Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, P.L. 
108-176, Sec. 503. The threshold for individuals and small business 
remained at $50,000.

[5] The laws are the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982, 
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the Chief Financial 
Officers Act of 1990, and the Federal Financial Management Improvement 
Act of 1996.

[6] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

[7] Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123, revised June 21, 
1995.

[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in 
Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in Identifying and Responding to 
Risks, GAO/RCED-98-6 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 1998).

[9] Some cases were closed with more than one enforcement action. For 
example, a case may be closed with a fine and a certificate suspension.

[10] FAA classifies self-reports received under the Aviation Safety 
Action Program as either "sole-source" or "not sole-source." FAA 
considers a report sole-source if the self-report is the only way the 
agency would have learned about the incident. FAA considers a report 
not sole-source if the agency also receives information about the 
incident through other means, such as inspections. FAA takes no 
enforcement action for sole-source reports, and pursues administrative 
actions for self-reports that are not sole-source. 

[11] To qualify for any of these programs, the self-reports must not 
involve criminal activity, drugs, alcohol, or intentional 
falsification. 

[12] Federal Aviation Administration, Compliance and Enforcement Review 
(July 2003). Only the self-reports that are not sole-source are 
included in EIS.

[13] The Aviation Safety Reporting Program was established in 1975, the 
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program in 1990, the Flight Operational 
Quality Assurance Program in 1995, and the Aviation Safety Action 
Program in 2000.

[14] A case is said to be stale if the alleged violator is not notified 
of the violation within the prescribed time, which is calculated from 
the date of the violation to the date that FAA sends the violator a 
notice of proposed action. The time depends on the type of violation, 
the identity of the violator, and the type and/or amount of proposed 
penalty. We were not able to determine how many cases were stale 
because such information is not consistently maintained in the EIS 
database.

[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: 
Strengthening Regulatory Agencies' Performance Management Practices, 
GAO/GGD-00-10 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 1999) and U.S. General 
Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 
Government Performance Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: 
June 1996).

[16] GAO/RCED-98-6.

[17] Similar information will be required for the Flight Operational 
Quality Assurance program after program guidance is revised later in 
2004, according to the manager of FAA's Voluntary Safety Programs 
Branch.

[18] Federal Aviation Administration, Compliance and Enforcement Review 
(July 2003).

[19] Under 14 CFR 193 and FAA Order 800.82, the agency does not 
disclose information on those self-reports.

[20] Federal Aviation Administration, Compliance and Enforcement Review 
(July 2003).

[21] See app. I for a list of selected studies that we reviewed.

[22] See, for example, A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, "The 
Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. XXXVIII (March 2000). 

[23] For example, for a closed case involving a civil penalty against 
an individual, the identity of the individual is to be destroyed 5 
years after the date the civil penalty was paid, unless subsequent 
enforcement actions are open against the individual.

[24] In this report, we refer to FAA staff who perform safety audits, 
inspections, and surveillance as inspectors.

[25] FAA Order 2150.3A, Compliance and Enforcement Program, December 
14, 1988, and changes incorporated and reprinted July 1999. 

[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in 
the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
1999) and U.S. General Accounting Office, Internal Control Management 
and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2001).

[27] A production approval holder is an entity that holds a 
certificate, approval, or authorization from FAA to manufacture 
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and related parts and articles.

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