MISSILES WERE LOADED WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS BUT THEY WERE NOT
           USED. WE DIDN'T USE THEM BECAUSE THE OTHER SIDE HAD A DETERRENT
           FORCE. I DO NOT THINK SADDAM WAS CAPABLE OF TAKING A DECISION
           TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER
           TYPES OF WEAPONS AGAINST THE ALLIED TROOPS BECAUSE THE WARNING
           WAS SEVERE AND QUITE EFFECTIVE. THE ALLIED TROOPS WERE CERTAIN
           TO USE NUCLEAR ARMS AND THE PRICE WILL BE TOO DEAR AND TOO
           HIGH. MR. PRESIDENT, AS THESE STATEMENTS SHOW, A CREDIBLE
           NUCLEAR DETERRENT REMAINS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO OUR NATION. I

           WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD BEGIN THIS DEBATE ON THE CTBT BY
           AGREEING THAT A STRONG U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT REMAINS ESSENTIAL
           AND THAT THE SENATE SHOULD REJECT ANY ACTIONS THAT WOULD
           UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS DETERRENT. NOW TO THE SECOND
           PRELIMINARY POINT, THE FALLACY OF ARMS CONTROL. UNFORTUNATELY,
           THE CTBT NEGOTIATED BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION WOULD
           UNDERMIN THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENT. THIS IS NOT

           SURPRISING SINCE THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS SOUGHT TO
           PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY WITH A FIXATION ON ARMS CONTROL
           THAT COLUMNIST CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER APTLY CALLS PEACE THROUGH
           PAPER. OF COURSE ARMS CONTROL IS NOT A NEW IDEA. AFTER ALL, IN
           THE YEAR 1139 ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH TRIED TO BAN THE CROSSBOW.
           LIKE SO MANY OTHER WELL-INTENTIONED ARMS CONTROL MEASURES THIS
           WAS DOOMED TO FAILURE FROM THE START. WHO CAN FORGET THE TREATY
           RATIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES IN 1929 THAT OUTLAWED WAR AS AN

           INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY. THIS AGREEMENT AND OTHERS
           SPAWNED IN ITS WAKE LEFT THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN
           UNPREPARED TO FIGHT AND UNABLE TO DETER WORLD WAR II. YET,
           DESPITE THESE AND MANY OTHER NOTABLE FAILURES, THE CLINTON
           ADMINISTRATION STILL LOOKS TO ARMS CONTROL AS THE BEST WAY TO
           SAFEGUARD OUR SECURITY. UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE JOHN HOLLOM
           EXPLAINED THIS PHILOSOPHY IN 1994 STATING THE CLINTON
           ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY AIMS TO PROTECT US FIRST AND FOREMOST

           THROUGH ARMS CONTROL BY WORKING HARD TO PREVENT NEW THREATS
           AND, SECOND, BY LEGALLY PURSUING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEATRE
           DEFENSES FOR THOSE CASES WHERE ARMS CONTROL IS NOT YET
           SUCCESSFUL. THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO CLING TENACIOUSLY
           TO THE A.B.M. TREATY WHICH PREVENTS US FROM DEFENDING OURSELVES
           AGAINST MISSILE ATTACK AND NUMEROUS OTHER ARMS CONTROL MEASURES
           HAVE BEEN PROPOSED BY SCENE YORE OFFICIALS, SUCH AS BANS OF
           SHOULDER FIRED S.A.M. MISSILES AND EVEN A PROPOSAL TO ELIMIT

           THE AVAILABILITY OF ASSAULT RIFLES. IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT THE
           DESIGNATION SUPERFICIAL FITS BECAUSE THE FAITH OF BELIEVERS IN
           ARMS CONTROL IS MORE THAN IMPERVIOUS TO EVIDENCE. THEIR FAITH
           IS STRENGTHENED EVEN BY EVIDENCE THAT ACTUALLY REFUTES IT.
           THERE IS ENDURING WISDOM IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT OF
           PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH. BACK IN 1780 OUR NATION'S FIRST
           PRESIDENT, GEORGE WASHINGTON, SAID THERE IS NOTHING SO LIKELY

           TO PRODUCE PEACE AS TO BE WELL PREPARED TO MEET AN ENEMY. AND
           200 YEARS LATER PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN WOULD CALL THIS
           DOCTRINE PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH. I URGE SENATORS TO TO THINK
           ABOUT THE ENDURING WISDOM OF THESE STATEMENTS IN THE COMING
           DAYS AS WE DEBATE THE CTBT AND THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS ITS
           RATIFICATION WOULD HAVE ON OUR NATION'S SECURITY. NOW LET ME
           TURN TO A DISCUSSION OF THE CTBT'S MANY FLAWS. AMERICA'S
           NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE THE MOST SOPHISTICATED IN THE WORLD. THIS
           WAS THE POINT OF THE LETTER OF THE FORMER SECRETARIES OF

           DEFENSE. THEY POINTED OUT THAT EACH ONE TYPICALLY HAS THOUSANDS
           OF PARTS AND OVER TIME THE NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND HIGH SPLO
           SEIVE TRIGGERS IN OUR WEAPONS DETERIORATE AND WE LACK
           EXPERIENCE PREDICTING THE EFFECTS OF THESE CHANGES. SOME OF THE
           MATERIALS USED IN OUR WEAPONS, LIKE PLUTONIUM, ENRICHED URANIUM
           AND TRITIUM ARE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS THAT DECAY. AS THEY DECAY
           THEY ALSO CHANGE THE PROPERTIES OF OTHER MATERIALS WITHIN THE
           WEAPON. WE LACK EXPERIENCE TO PREDICTING THE EFFECTS OF SUCH

           AGING ON THE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF OUR WEAPONS. WE DID NOT
           DESIGN OUR WEAPONS TO LAST FOREVER. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE
           SHELF LIFE ON OUR WEAPONS WAS EXPECTED TO BE ABOUT 20 YEARS. IN
           THE PAST WE DID NOT ENCOUNTER PROBLEMS WITH AGING WEAPONS
           BECAUSE WE WERE FIELDING NEW DESIGNS AND OLDER WEAPONS DESIGNS
           WERE BEING RETIRED. BUT UNDER THE CTBT, WE COULD NOT FIELD NEW
           DESIGNS TO REPLACE OLDER WEAPONS BECAUSE TESTING WOULD BE
           REQUIRED TO DEVELOP NEW DESIGNS. REMANUFACTURING COMPONE NEBITS

           OF EXISTING WEAPONS THAT HAVE DETERIORATED ALSO POSES
           SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS. OVER TIME MANUFACTURING PROCESSES WILL
           CHANGE. SOME CHEMICALS PREVIOUSLY USED IN THE PRODUCTION OF OUR
           WEAPONS HAVE BEEN BANNED BY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS. AND OUR
           DOCUMENTATION OF THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OLDER WEAPONS
           IN SOME CASES IS INCOMPLETE. FURTHERMORE, AS JAMES SCHLESINGER,
           WHO FORMERLY SERVED AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND SECRETARY OF
           ENERGY, HAS TESTIFIED TO THE SENATE THE PLUTONIUM PITS IN SOME
           OF OUR WEAPONS ARE APPROACHING THE END OF THEIR LIFE SPAN.

           ACCORDING TO DR. SCHLESINGER, ONE OF OUR NATIONAL LABORATORIES
           ESTIMATES THAT PITS USED IN SOME OF OUR WEAPONS WILL LAST 35
           YEARS. SINCE MANY OF THE PITS USED IN THE CURRENT ARSENAL ARE
           ABOUT 30 YEARS OLD, THIS MEANS WE WILL SOON HAVE TO REPLACE
           THESE PITS BUT WITHOUT TESTING, WE WILL NEVER KNOW IF THESE
           REPLACEMENT PARTS WILL WORK AS THEIR PREDECESSORS DID. AS THE
           FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY,
           DR. JOHN KNUCKLE, SAID LAST MONTH IN A LETTER TO ME, COMPEE

           COMPONENTS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS ARE AGING BY RADIOACTIVE DECAY
           AND CORROSION. PERIODIC REMANUFACTURE IS NECESSARY BUT MAY COPY
           EXISTING DEFECTS AND INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL DEFECTS. SOME OF THE
           REMANUFACTURED PARTS MAY DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE ORIGINAL
           PARTS DUE TO LOSS OF NUCLEAR TEST VALIDATED PERSONNEL WHO
           MANUFACTURED THE ORIGINAL PARTS, THE USE OF NEW MATERIAL AND
           FABRICATION PROCESSES AND INADEQUATE SPECIFICATION OF ORIGINAL
           PARTS. THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT RISKS OF REDUCING STOCKPILE
           RELIABILITY WHEN REMANUFACTURED PARTS ARE INVOLVED IN WARHEAD

           PROCESSES WHERE THERE ARE MAJOR GAPS IN OUR SCIENTIFIC
           UNDERSTANDING. THE FACT IS, MR. PRESIDENT, DESPITE OUR
           TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, THERE IS MUCH WE STILL DO NOT
           UNDERSTANDABOUT OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS C. PAUL ROBINSON,
           DIRECTOR OF THE SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORY, HAS SAITED, SOME
           ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DESIGN ARE STILL NOT UNDERSTOOD AT
           THE LEVEL OF PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES. THESE GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE
           DO NOT MERELY PRESENT A THEORETICAL PROBLEM, AS PRESIDENT BUSH
           NOTED IN A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN JANUARY OF 1993, OF ALL U.S.

           NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGNS FIELDED SINCE 1958, APPROXIMATELY
           ONE-THIRD HAVE REQUIRED NUCLEAR TESTING TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS
           ARISING AFTER DEPLOYMENT. FURTHERMORE, IN 1987 LAWRENCE
           LIVERMORE LAB PRODUCED A REPORT TITLED "REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
           STOCKPILE
           
           RELIABILITY: WEAPON REMANUFACTURE AND THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR
           TESTING." IN WHICH IT EBGS# TOLD THE IMPORTANCE OF TESTING --
           AND I QUOTE -- "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A TOW ROLE TESTED
           NUCLEAR TESTING. THE REPORT ALSO GOES ON TO STATE THAT OF THE
           ONE-THIRD OF WEAPONS DESIGNED INTRODUCED INTO THE STOCKPILE

           SINCE 1958 THAT HAVE REQUIRED TESTING TO FIX, IN THREE-FOURTHS
           OF THESE CASES THE PROBLEMS WERE DISCOVERED ONLY BECAUSE OF THE
           ONGOING NUCLEAR TESTING. THIS REPORT WENT ON TO SAY, AGAIN
           QUOTING, BECAUSE WE FREQUENTLY HAVE DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING
           FULLY THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES, PARTICULARLY SEEMINGLY SMALL
           CHANGES ON THE NUCLEAR PERFORMANCE, NUCLEAR TESTING HAS BEEN
           REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF OUR NATION'S
           DETERRENT. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER SUMMED YOU

           HAVE THIS -- UP THIS POINT NICELY IN 1986 WHEN HE SAID THE
           IRREDUCIBLE FACT IS THAT NUCLEAR TESTING IS ESSENTIAL TO
           PROVIDING FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF OUR WARHEADS AND
           WEAPONS SYSTEMS. IT ALSO IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN
           THEIR RELIABILITY. THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF CONJECTURE, BUT A
           LESSON LEARNED THROUGH HARD EXPERIENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, HE WENT ON
           TO SAY, IN THE CASE OF ONE NUCLEAR SYSTEM, THE WARHEAD FOR THE
           POLARISSLBM, TESTING ALLOWED US TO FIX DEFECTS, UNTIL

           DISCOVERED THESE DEFECTS COULD HAVE RENDERED THE VAST MAJORITY
           OF THESE WEAPONS COMPLETELY INOPERABLE. THE IMPORTANCE OF
           TESTING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF ANY COMPLEX WEAPON 0 OR MACHINE
           CANNOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. AS THE SIX FORMER SECRETARIES OF
           DEFENSE NOTED IN THEIR LETTER OPPOSING THE CTBT, THE HISTORY OF
           MAINTAINING COMPLEX MILITARY HARDWARE WITHOUT TESTING
           DEMONSTRATES THE PITFALLS OF SUCH AN APPROACH. PRIOR TO WORLD
           WAR II THE NAVY'S TORPEDOES HAD NOT ADEQUATELY BEEN TESTED
           BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT FUNDS. IT TOOK NEARLY TWO YEARS OF WAR

           BEFORE WE FULLY SOLVED THE PROBLEMS THAT CAUSED OUR TORPEDOES
           TO ROUTINELY PASS HARMLESSLY UNDER THE TARGET OR FAIL TO
           EXPLODE ON CONTACTS. FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY, THE
           U.S. LAUNCHED47 TORPEDO AIRCRAFT WITHOUT DAMAGING A SINGLE
           JAPANESE SHIP. IF NOT FOR OUR DIVE BOMBERS, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE
           LOST A CRUCIAL NAVAL BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC WAR. MR. PRESIDENT,
           THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS PROPOSED A PROGRAM THAT IT HOPES
           SOMEDAY WILL REPLACE ACTUAL NUCLEAR TESTS WITH COMPUTER

           SIMULATIONS AND A MUCH GREATER EMPHASIS ON SCIENCE-BASED
           EXPERIMENTS. IT'S CALLED A STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM.
           ACCORDING TO THE FISCAL YEAR 2000 STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PLAN
           EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IN
           MARCH OF THIS YEAR, THE OVERALL GOAL OF THE STOCKPILED
           STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM IS TO HAVE IN PLACE BY 2010 THE
           CAPABILITIES THAT ARE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE CONTINUING
           CONFIDENCE IN THE ANNUAL CERTIFICATION OF THE STOCKPILE WITHOUT
           THE NECESSITY FOR NUCLEAR TESTING. I SUPPORT THE STOCKPILE
           STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT WILL IMPROVE OUR

           KNOWLEDGE ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT AS FORMER SECRETARIES OF
           STATE HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BRENT
           SCOWCROFT AND JOHN DEUTCH SAID IN A LETTER THIS WEEK, THE FACT
           IS THAT THE SCIENTIFIC CASE SIMPLY HAS NOT BEEN MADE THAT OVER
           THE LONG TERM THE UNITED STATES CAN ENSURE THE STPHUKE LETTER
           STOCKPILE WITHOUT NUCLEAR TEST -- NUCLEAR STOCKPILE WITHOUT
           NUCLEAR TESTING. THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM FACES
           TREMENDOUS CHANGES. AS DR. ROBINSON HAS SAID THE COMMERCIALLY
           AVAILABLE AND LABORATORY TECHNOLOGIES OF TODAY ARE INADEQUATE

           FOR THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP TESTS WE WILL FACE IN THE FUTURE.
           ANOTHER 100 TO 1,000-FOLD INCREASE IN CAPABILITY FROM HARDWARE
           AND SOFTWARE COMBINED WILL BE REQUIRED. DR. VICTOR REECE, THE
           ARCHITECT OF THE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM, SAID THIS ABOUT IT DURING
           A SPEECH IN ALBUQUERQUE. THINK ABOUT IT. WE ARE ASKED TO
           MAINTAIN FOREVER AN INCREDIBLY COMPLEX DEVICE NO LARGER THAN
           THIS PODIUM, FILLED WITH EXOTIC RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
           TEMPERATURES AND PRESSURES ONLY SEEN IN THE NATURE AT THE

           CENTER OF STARS. DO IT WITHOUT AN INTEGRATING NUCLEAR TEST AND
           WITHOUT ANY REDUCTION IN THE EXTRAORDINARILY HIGH STANDARDS OF
           SAFETY AND RELIABILITY. AND WHILE YOU'RE AT IT, DOWNSIZE IT,
           THE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX THAT SUPPORTS THIS INTERPRICE BY A
           FACTOR OF TWO AND STAND UP CRITICAL NEW MANUFACTURING
           PROCESSES. THIS WITHIN AN INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM THAT WAS STRUCTURED
           TO TURN OVER NEW DESIGNS EVERY 15 YEARS AND FOR WHICH NUCLEAR
           EXPLOSIVE TESTING WAS THE MAJOR TOOL FOR DEMONSTRATING SUCCESS.
           SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND OUR NUCLEAR

           LABS ARE GENERALLY CAREFUL IN HOW THEY COUCH THEIR REMARKS
           ABOUT THIS STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM. THEY TYPICALLY STATE
           THAT THE PROGRAM IS THE BEST APPROACH TO MAINTAINING OUR
           WEAPONS IN THE ABSENCE OF TESTING, BUT THEY ARE ALSO CAREFUL
           NOT TO GUARANTEE THAT DESPITE THE UNQUESTIONED BRILLIANCE OF
           THE SCIENTISTS THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM WILL SUCCEED
           IN REPLACING TESTING. IN FACT, THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP
           PROGRAM HAS ALREADY EXPERIENCED SETBACKS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE
           NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY, WHICH IS THE LINCHPIN OF THE
           PROGRAM, HAS RECENTLY FALLEN BEHIND SCHEDULE AND IS OVER

           BUDGET. IT FACES CRITICAL TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTY ABOUT A MAJOR
           GOAL OF ITS DESIGN. WILL IT BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THERMONUCLEAR
           IGNITION?
           ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH RELYING ON COMPUTER SIMULATION TO REPLACE
           TESTING IS THE INCREASED RISK OF ESPIONAGE. FORMER LAWRENCE
           LIVERMORE NATIONAL LAB DIRECTOR JOHN KNUCKLE MADE THIS POINT IN
           A LETTER TO ME. HE SAID ESPIONAGE, IF FACILITATED WHEN U.S.
           PROGRESS IS FROZEN AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS BEING
           CONCENTRATED -- EXCUSE ME. LET ME RESTATE THIS, MR. PRESIDENT.

           HE SAID ESPIONAGE IS FACILITATED WHEN U.S. PROGRESS IS FROZEN
           AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS BEING CONCENTRATED AND ORGANIZED
           IN ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS. IN SHORT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE VAST
           INCREASES IN COMPUTING POWER REQUIRED FOR THE STEWARDSHIP
           PROGRAM, MUCH OF THE COMPUTER CODE REQUIRED FOR THE PROGRAM
           WILL BE WRITTEN BY HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE AT PARTICIPATING
           UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES. IN MANY CASES PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT
           EVEN AMERICAN CITIZENS. MR. PRESIDENT, THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT
           A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT IS JUST TOO IMPORTANT TO PUT ALL

           OUR EGGS IN THE STEWARDSHIP BASKET. IN ADDITION TO IMPAIRING
           THE RELIABILITY OF OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL, THE CTBT WILL PREVENT
           US FROM MAKING OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS SAFE AS THEY CAN BE AND
           THIS IS EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT. NUCLEAR WEAPON SAFETY HAS
           ALWAYS BEEN A PARAMOUNT CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES.
           THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, WE'VE
           MADE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT EVEN IN THE MOST VIOLENT OF
           ACCIDENTS THERE WOULD BE A MINIMUM CHANCE OF A NUCLEAR
           EXPLOSION OR RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION. THE RESULTS OF SUCH AN
           ACCIDENT WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC. THAT'S WHY PRESIDENT CLINTON'S
           SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BILL COHEN OPPOSED A TEST MORATORIUM WHEN

           HE WAS A SENATOR. DURING DEBATE ON AN AMENDMENT IMPOSING A
           MORATORIUM ON TESTING ON AUGUST 3, 1993, THEN-SENATOR COHEN
           SAID A VOTE TO HALT NUCLEAR TESTING TODAY IS A VOTE TO CONDEMN
           THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO LIVE WITH UNSAFE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
           THEIR MIDST FOR YEARS AND YEARS. INDEED, UNTIL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
           ARE ELIMINATED. NOT JUST A FEW UNSAFE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT A
           NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN WHICH MOST OF THE WEAPONS DO NOT HAVE
           CRITICAL SAFETY FEATURES.
{END: 1999/10/08 TIME: 10-00 , Fri.  106TH SENATE, FIRST SESSION}