Before the House Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on Foreign Affairs

April 3, 2003

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I welcome this opportunity to testify on the crisis in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. This hearing is particularly timely, given very significant recent developments in the evolution of both the Congolese and Burundi peace processes. By way of background, I should indicate that I have been deeply engaged in the Great Lakes Region since 1995, either as a consultant to the National Democratic Institute or to the World Bank, or as Presidential Special Envoy to the Burundi peace process and the Great Lakes region. Currently, I am leading a Burundi leadership training project that is being run out of the Woodrow Wilson International Center, with funding by the World Bank. Since last October, I have traveled to Central and Southern Africa on four occasions, meeting with key Burundian leaders; with persons in South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda that have been actively involved in the facilitation of the Burundi and Congolese peace processes; and with a number of analysts and diplomats who have been closely tracking Great Lakes developments.

My remarks this afternoon will focus on Burundi – because, in my view, the impact of the Burundian conflict on the Great Lakes crisis is often overlooked. Moreover, the Burundi peace process is at a decisive turning point, a historical moment characterized both by peril and by significant opportunity. In my view, actions of the region and the international community in the weeks and months ahead will have a major bearing on whether the progress that has been achieved to this point will be sustained, or whether there will be a serious retrogression into intensified political conflict, more violence and greater regional instability. I believe that the United States, together with others in the international community, can – by judicious interventions – play a decisive role in assisting Burundi in consolidating its fragile peace process.

Burundi is a small country. No larger than the state of Maryland. A population numbering just over 6 million.

But the dimensions of the human tragedy that has played itself out in Burundi since the country’s independence in 1960, are anything but diminutive: an estimated 400,000 killed; some 800,000 forced to flee the country, many tens of thousands internally displaced. Indeed, the human catastrophe that is Burundi is dwarfed in Africa only by its equally diminutive neighbor, Rwanda, which in 1994 saw up to one million of its population fall victim to genocide.

Moreover, the ramifications of the Burundi conflict have extended far beyond Burundi itself. Indeed, the conflict between Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi, as in Rwanda, is at the heart of the Great Lakes crisis, producing massive refugee flows, insurgencies and cross-border violence.

Nor can the Burundi conflict be fully understood, or resolved, without reference to the wider region. For the Tutsi/Hutu schism within Burundi and the war within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been inter-linked. Not only have armed groups operated across national borders, but a number of regional states have been interested parties in both conflicts. Moreover, Burundian political dynamics have been directly impacted by events in Rwanda and the DRC, just as Burundian developments have affected the perspectives and actions of both Rwandans and the Congolese.

Let there be no mistake: the failure of the Burundi peace process will mean not only increased suffering for the Burundian population, but will jeopardize all of the ongoing efforts to disarm and demobilize armed groups operating within the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and will have significant negative consequences for all of central and southern Africa.

The conflict between Tutsi and Hutu, both in Rwanda and Burundi, is unique to the African continent in that it is the only instance in which inter-communal violence has produced genocide. Most Americans are cognizant of the horrific 1994 Rwandan genocide, which claimed the lives of up to one million persons, predominantly of Tutsi ethnicity but including as well many moderate Hutus. What is less well known is that the first regional genocide took place in Burundi, in 1972, in which approximately 150,000 educated Hutus were systematically massacred. And, beyond these two tragic moments of mass death there have been many other episodes, both in Rwanda and in Burundi, in which thousands of people – both Tutsi and Hutu -- have been killed either in inter-communal violence, or as the result of indiscriminant killing of civilians either by rebel forces or by national armies.

But, in addition to the endemic violence, there is a second recurrent theme in contemporary Burundian political life: the economic and political dominance of the minority Tutsi (comprising an estimated 14% of the population), in combination with the systematic exclusion of the Hutu majority (approximately 84% of the population) from key social, economic and political institutions.

It is this combination of extreme political and economic inequality, on the one hand, and recurrent inter-communal mass violence, on the other, that has made the conflict between Tutsi and Hutu perhaps the most intractable conflict in Africa. There is virtually no Burundian commune or family that has not been affected in some way by this history. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that fear and insecurity, and a reciprocal demonization of the two groups, have given rise to exceedingly low levels of inter-communal trust and confidence – and to a pattern of pre-emptive violence, each side fearing that restraint invites vulnerability.

On August 28, 2000, enormous pressure from Burundi peace process Facilitator Nelson Mandela and regional leaders resulted in the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord by all but a few of the nineteen delegations who had participated in its negotiation. But this political agreement notwithstanding, at the time of the August signing the Burundi peace process was still very much a work in progress, having left unresolved three of the most contentious and fundamental issues: Who would lead the 36-month transition? How would the critical issues of Army reform and the integration of armed forces be handled? And what would it take to get the two principal armed groups who were absent from the Arusha negotiations to lay down their arms and participate in the newly established Transitional institutions?

The first of these questions was ultimately resolved by the issuance of a Mandela fiat – President Pierre Buyoya would preside over the Transitional government for eighteen months, and a Hutu president would take over for the second half of the Transition. This understanding was enshrined within a new Transitional Constitution and, only last week, President Buyoya, in an address to his nation, confirmed that on May 1 – four weeks from now – he will hand over presidential power to the current vice-president, Domitien Ndayizeye.

But the other critical issues remain unresolved. On December 3, 2002, a landmark cease-fire agreement was reached between the government and the principal armed rebel group, the CNDD-FDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza. This was followed, on January 27, 2003, with the signing of a memorandum of understanding on the implementation of the cease-fire between the government and three of the four rebel groups that were not party to the original Arusha Accord. Yet, the implementation of these agreements has proceeded at a snail’s pace; the promised Africa Union peacekeeping force, charged with monitoring the cease-fire agreement, has yet to be deployed; and fighting continues on the ground. In addition, the other armed rebel group that remained outside of the Arusha process, the PALIPEHUTU –FNL of Agathon Rwasa, has yet to come to the negotiating table. Finally, negotiations have not yet begun on the highly sensitive issues of security reform, the integration of military forces, and demobilization.

Thus, the decision of Buyoya to hand-over power on May 1 could not have been an easy one and, indeed, followed a brief, unsuccessful campaign he waged to secure a consensual agreement among the key players to postpone the hand-over for a short period. While the President has made the right decision – and in so doing helped sustain a vital partnership that has developed among the principal governing parties – it is imperative that the region and international community act immediately to address the concerns that motivated Buyoya’s last-minute attempt to delay the change-over of executive leadership.

It is hardly surprising that the Tutsi military command and political leadership does not look favorably on critical security issues being addressed after, rather than before, presidential power has been transferred to a Hutu president. Indeed, the original contemplation of those most deeply involved in facilitating the Burundi peace process was that both the cease-fire and the military-related issues would be fully resolved before executive power passed from Tutsi to Hutu hands. Moreover, the concerns of Buyoya and the Tutsi-led army have been greatly intensified in recent weeks by rebel actions. Taking advantage of the long delay in the deployment of a promised Africa Union peacekeeping force (to be constituted of troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa), the FDD rebels have consolidated their control of several provinces, and have continued to recruit fighters into their ranks.

Beyond the security-related issues requiring immediate attention, there are also a host of further urgent challenges that must be tackled if Burundian aspirations for a sustainable peace are to be achieved:

-- the transitional government must accelerate the implementation of the institutional reforms specified in the Arusha Accord;

-- rebel forces must be integrated not only militarily, but also in the transitional political institutions;

--the repatriation and reintegration in their home communities of an estimated 1.2 million Burundian refugees will require both organizational and political skill inside Burundi, and the mobilization of substantial financial resources from the international community;

-- and an impoverished population and devastated economy are in urgent need both of humanitarian assistance and of international economic cooperation.

What can the USG and the international community do to assist in this critical period? An excellent roadmap for the international community is provided in the excellent February 21 report of the International Crisis Group, entitled "A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi." I can not improve on the ICG’s general recommendations, but would stress a few particular points.

First, the most urgent need is for the quickest possible deployment of the Africa Union Peacekeeping force, pursuant to the cease-fire agreement of last December. It is the AU peacekeepers that will assume responsibility for the critical cantonment of the armed rebels; absent this cantonment, and related confidence-building initiatives, the fighting will continue. The South Africans have taken the lead in organizing this peace-keeping mission, and the Ethiopians and Mozambicans have also generously offered to participate. But these African nations can neither undertake – nor sustain – this critical mission without the substantial financial and logistical support of the United States, and others within the international community. This will be an expensive mission – but it is absolutely vital to the efforts Burundian themselves are taking to move from war to peace. There can be no higher priority than standing up and maintaining this peacekeeping mission.

Second, like the African Union Observers and Peacekeeping Force, so will the newly established Joint Ceasefire Commission require financial and technical support. This Commission, key to the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, can also become a major instrument for confidence-building between Army and rebel leaders.

Third, the next urgent priority will be the disarmament of all rebel groups. The retention of arms by the cantoned CNDD/FDD fighters (explicitly permitted by the December 3, 2002 cease-fire agreement) will inevitably be viewed as evidence of the rebel organization’s determination to keep its options open – thereby making much more difficult the important task of deepening the trust and confidence of those who must now work together to integrate and reform the national Army. Moreover, as long as the rebels are cantoned with their arms, the UN will be reluctant to assume any leadership of the peacekeeping effort; that is why the Africa Union was forced to assume the initial peacekeeper responsibility.

Fourth, the still recalcitrant PALIPEHUTU-FNL must be pressed by regional states, and by the international community, to abandon the war option, and enter negotiations for a durable political settlement. Recently, there have been reports of contacts and conversations between FNL leaders and the Burundian army. It is to be hoped that these are the prelude to more formal negotiations.

Fifth, the World Bank has estimated that the demobilization and reintegration of combatants will cost some $90 million over four years. The Multi-Donor Regional Trust Fund for Great Lakes Demobilization and Reintegration, administered by the World Bank, has funds set aside for a Burundi program – but additional financial support will be required.

Sixth, one of the most daunting tasks faced by Burundi in its post-war reconstruction will be the reintegration of over 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons. Given the absence of required infrastructure, and the collapsed state of the Burundian economy, this will be a monumental challenge – requiring generous financial as well as technical support from the international community. How effectively this challenge is addressed will go a long way to determining whether the Burundian peace can endure.

Seventh, it is time for international donors to honor pledges made over the past few years to actively assist in Burundi’s economic and social recovery. Significant sums have been pledged at three donor roundtables held since the August 2000 signing of the Arusha agreement – a total of $l.1 billion -- but no more than 20% of the pledged amounts has reportedly been delivered. A release of these funds now is imperative – so that the Burundian population may at last experience a concrete "peace dividend." Intensified international engagement now will contribute significantly to the momentum for peace.

Eighth, as the ICG emphasizes, it will be vitally important that, in structuring their economic assistance to Burundi, donors keep in mind that one of the principal underlying causes of the Burundian conflict has been the remarkable concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a few. As the ICG correctly observes, international aid has often had the effect of reinforcing state control over the economy and unintentionally supporting the unbalanced distribution of resources and discriminatory policies that consolidated power in the hands of the elite. The international financial institutions and bilateral donors who wish to assist in Burundi’s post-war reconstruction must be attentive to this history, conditioning economic assistance on urgently needed economic liberalization and on structural reforms required to overcome significant economic and social inequities.

Ninth, the international community must remain committed to a long-term engagement with Burundi – both diplomatically and economically. The Burundi peace process has made significant strides in recent months – but the process remains fragile. Notwithstanding their deep yearning for an end of the violence and the creation of a more peaceful future, Burundians remain deeply suspicious and mistrustful of one another. This should not be surprising, given the horrendous death toll inter-communal violence has produced since Burundi’s independence in 1960. The active involvement of outsiders – whether manifested in the South African-led facilitation, or the presence of the South African security protection force, or the pending deployment of African Union peacekeepers, or the presence of USAID and other bilateral donors in Bujumbura, or in the World Bank-supported Leadership Training Project – has had a significant calming impact. And the knowledge that the international community is now deepening its economic cooperation with Burundi will help to strengthen the confidence of those Burundians who are courageously working to establish the conditions for a sustainable peace.

Tenth, it is vitally important that all countries concerned with the Burundi peace process work to coordinate not only their diplomacy – to insure that there will be no mixed messages in this critical period – but also their economic cooperation. Time and resources are too limited to permit a duplication of effort or anything less than a strategic approach to Burundi’s national economic recovery.

While I have concentrated in this testimony on the significant obstacles that lie in the way of the consolidation of the Burundi peace process, and the urgently needed assistance of the international community, I want to close on a more positive note. For there can be little doubt that Burundi has come a long way since the ugly inter-communal violence that exploded following the October 1993 assassination of Burundian President Melchior Ndadaye. Burundians today desperately want peace. They are tired of war and of the constant state of insecurity in which they have lived these many years. Leaders on both sides of the ethnic divide appear determined to do whatever they can to keep the peace process on track.

During my recent visits to Burundi, I have been struck by the extraordinary contrast in the current political atmosphere from that I encountered during my initial encounters with Burundi in 1995-96. Where, in 1995-96 the political polarization was so severe that in conversations with Burundians one hesitated even to use the terms, "Hutu" and "Tutsi," today Burundian discourse on issues of war and peace is remarkable for its openness and its candor. It was not so long ago that the concept of "negotiations" with armed rebel groups was absolutely taboo; yet, today, not only are negotiations being pursued on all fronts, but persons and organizations previously demonized by one another as "killers" or "genocidaires" are now contemplating their military and political integration.

I distinctly recall, in the 1995-96 period, how my conversations with my Burundian interlocutors would invariably invite only the most strident of political polemics; today, what is distinctive about these conversations is their pragmatic and realistic tone. While all Burundians acknowledge continuing mutual mistrust and suspicions among the key players, the common yearning for peace is palpable. Most Burundian leaders appear to be engaged in a search for compromises that will keep the peace process on track. And within the transitional government, people are talking to one another – and collaborating – as never before.

There are two developments that, in my view, provide the most concrete evidence that Burundians are at last moving from the logic of war to the logic of peace. The first is the acceptance by most Tutsi civilian and political leaders both of South Africans to provide security protection for returning Hutu leaders and of an African Union peacekeeping force to oversee the implementation of the recent cease-fire agreement. In the past, Tutsi leaders vehemently opposed any such external military intervention, fearing that such intervention would seriously compromise the ability of Tutsis to determine their own political and military fate. That Tutsis are now as supportive as Hutus of external military intervention is reflective of the major change that has occurred in the mind-set of most Tutsis leaders.

The second development I would cite is the remarkable embrace by virtually all Burundian sectors of thenew leadership training initiative that has been launched by the Woodrow Wilson International Center, with funding from the World Bank. The Burundian Leadership Training Project seeks to develop a sustainable network of a diverse cross-section of 100 Burundian leaders that will be able to work collaboratively in developing a common vision for Burundi’s future, and in providing leadership for the development and implementation of concrete projects of economic recovery. The first leadership training workshop, involving 34 Burundian leaders, was held in Ngozi, from March 11-16. The participants, who were invited in their individual capacities and not as representatives of their respective organizations, was ethnically diverse (14 Tutsi, 18 Hutu, 2 Twa), and included 11 women. They were drawn from all institutional sectors – government and non-government, civilian and military. Two leading Army officers – a general and a colonel – were joined by persons identified with six of the seven rebel factions. The major political parties were all represented, as were many elements of "civil society" – the churches, the business community, academia, and the media. The social and political diversity of the group that was assembled – and the remarkable cohesion that emerged from their six-day experience -- provide eloquent testimony to the desire of Burundians everywhere to fashion a new means of relating to one another.

Many analysts have noted that the Burundi peace process in some ways put the proverbial cart before the horse. First it produced an agreement – the Arusha Accord. Now it must produce the peace -- and the trust and mutual confidence -- that normally are the pre-conditions of sustainable political agreements. That is a tall order. Even as we approach the second half of Burundi’s 36-month Transitional period, the violence on the ground continues. And there are many Burundians who remain deeply anxious about what their political future. Yet, there can no longer be any question about the courage and political will of Burundians on both sides of their ethnic divide to work for a more peaceful and a more secure future.

At several different points in the last several years, Burundian leaders have taken significant risks for peace. Now the international community must provide the moral and material support required to consolidate the important gains that have been made. In the words of the International Crisis Group, "Responsible aid would consolidate the credibility of the transitional government and become the engine for the reforms outlined in Protocol IV [of the Arusha Accord]. It would address the structural causes of the conflict and build peace. If donor countries do not provide the full political and financial support necessary to implement Arusha, they can anticipate having to face the consequences of its collapse."

Thank you for your attention. I would be pleased to take any questions members of the Committee might have.