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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA, and 
Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST: 

Thursday, February 8, 2007: 

Federal Oversight Of Food Safety: 

High-Risk Designation Can Bring Needed Attention to Fragmented System: 

Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States: 

GAO-07-449T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-449T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA, and Related Agencies, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Each year, about 76 million people contract a foodborne illness in the 
United States; about 325,000 require hospitalization; and about 5,000 
die. While the recent E. coli outbreaks highlighted the risks posed by 
accidental contamination, the attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened 
awareness that the food supply could also be vulnerable to deliberate 
contamination. This testimony focuses on the (1) role that GAO’s high-
risk series can play in raising the priority and visibility of the need 
to transform federal oversight of food safety, (2) fragmented nature of 
federal oversight of food safety, and (3) need to address federal 
oversight of food safety as a 21st century challenge. This work is 
based on previously issued reports. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO’s high-risk series is intended to raise the priority and visibility 
of government programs that are in need of broad-based transformation 
to achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, 
and sustainability. In January 2007, as part of our regular update of 
this series for each new Congress, GAO designated the federal oversight 
of food safety as a high-risk area for the first time. 

While this nation enjoys a plentiful and varied food supply that is 
generally considered to be safe, the federal oversight of food safety 
is fragmented, with 15 agencies collectively administering at least 30 
laws related to food safety. The two primary agencies are the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), which is responsible for the safety 
of meat, poultry, and processed egg products, and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), which is responsible for other food. In many 
previous reports, GAO found that this fragmented system has caused 
inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use 
of resources. For example: 

* Existing statutes give agencies different regulatory and enforcement 
authorities. Under current law, thousands of USDA inspectors must 
examine all slaughtered carcasses and visit all processing facilities 
at least once during each operating day. However, federal law does not 
mandate the frequency of inspection for foods that are under FDA’s 
jurisdiction.
* Food recalls are generally voluntary. While USDA and FDA provide 
guidance to companies for carrying out voluntary recalls, they do not 
know how promptly and completely companies carry out recalls and do not 
promptly verify that recalls have reached the entire distribution 
chain. In addition, they use procedures that may not be effective to 
alert consumers to a recall. 
* Federal agencies are spending resources on overlapping food safety 
activities. USDA and FDA both inspect shipments of imported food at 18 
U.S. ports of entry but do not share inspection resources at these 
ports. 

Integrating the fragmented federal food safety system is a significant 
challenge for the 21st century, particularly in light of the nation’s 
current deficit and growing structural fiscal imbalance. To help 
Congress review and reconsider the base of federal spending, GAO framed 
illustrative questions for decision makers to consider in 21st Century 
Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government. Among these 
questions are how agencies can integrate and share accountability for 
their activities on crosscutting issues and how they can adopt more 
innovative methods to contribute to the achievement of national 
outcomes. While framing these questions, GAO specifically cited the 
myriad of food safety programs managed across several federal agencies. 

What GAO Recommends: 

While many of GAO’s recommendations to promote the safety of the 
nation’s food supply have been acted upon, others that are not yet 
addressed could help Congress and the executive branch transform the 
federal oversight of food safety. For example, GAO recommended that 
Congress enact comprehensive, uniform, and risk-based food safety 
legislation, and analyze alternative organizational food safety 
structures. GAO also recommended that the executive branch reconvene 
the President’s Council on Food Safety to facilitate interagency 
coordination. Finally, the development of a governmentwide performance 
plan could help ensure agencies’ goals are complementary. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-449T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Lisa Shames at (202) 512-
3841 or ShamesL@gao.gov. 

[End o section] 

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the designation of federal 
oversight of food safety as a high-risk area in the January 2007 update 
to our High-Risk Series. Let me state at the outset that this nation 
enjoys a plentiful and varied food supply that is generally considered 
to be safe. However, each year, about 76 million people contract a 
foodborne illness in the United States; about 325,000 require 
hospitalization; and about 5,000 die, according to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. In addition, as we have repeatedly 
reported, our fragmented food safety system has resulted in 
inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use 
of resources. With 15 agencies collectively administering at least 30 
laws related to food safety, the patchwork nature of the federal food 
safety oversight system calls into question whether the government can 
more efficiently and effectively protect our nation's food supply. As a 
result, we added the federal oversight of food safety to our list of 
programs needing urgent attention and transformation in order to ensure 
that our national government functions in the most economical, 
efficient, and effective manner possible.[Footnote 1] 

Our high-risk status reports are provided at the start of each new 
Congress to help in setting congressional oversight agendas and to help 
in raising the priority and visibility of government programs needing 
transformation. These reports also help Congress and the executive 
branch carry out their responsibilities while improving the 
government's performance and enhancing its accountability for the 
benefit of the American people. In this regard, I recently provided 
congressional leadership with a set of recommendations based on GAO's 
work, including work on some areas we have designated as high risk, for 
its consideration in developing the oversight agenda of the 110th 
Congress.[Footnote 2] Together, the high-risk update and the 
recommendations for oversight can help congressional decision makers 
focus on the programmatic challenges facing the nation. 

Because of your continuing interest in the effective use of food safety 
resources, I will focus on three key points: (1) the role of GAO's High-
Risk Series in raising the priority and visibility of the need to 
transform federal oversight of food safety, (2) the fragmented nature 
of federal oversight of food safety, and (3) the need to address 
federal oversight of food safety as a 21st century challenge. My 
testimony is based on published GAO products that were developed in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix I includes highlights of selected reports. 

GAO's High-Risk Series Raises the Priority and Visibility of the Need 
to Transform Federal Oversight of Food Safety: 

Overall, our High-Risk Series has served to identify and help resolve 
serious government weaknesses in areas that involve substantial 
resources and provide critical services to the public. Since we began 
reporting on high-risk areas, the government has taken high-risk 
problems seriously and has made long-needed progress toward correcting 
them. With that in mind, we designated the federal oversight of food 
safety as a high-risk area to raise the priority and visibility of the 
need to transform the federal government's oversight system. 

Since 1990, GAO has reported on government operations that we 
identified as high risk and has periodically reported on the status of 
progress to address high-risk areas and updated our high-risk list. 
Historically, high-risk areas have been so designated because of 
traditional vulnerabilities related to their greater susceptibility to 
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. As our high-risk program has 
evolved, we have increasingly used the high-risk designation to draw 
attention to areas needing broad-based transformations to achieve 
greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and 
sustainability of selected key government programs and operations. 

In determining whether a government program or operation is high risk, 
we consider whether it has national significance or a management 
function that is key to performance and accountability. Further, we 
consider qualitative factors, such as whether the risk: 

* involves public health or safety, service delivery, national 
security, national defense, economic growth, or privacy or citizens' 
rights; or: 

* could result in significantly impaired service, program failure, 
injury or loss of life, or significantly reduced economy, efficiency, 
or effectiveness. 

Clearly, these factors weighed heavily into our deliberations to place 
the federal oversight of food safety on our high-risk list. 

We remove a high-risk designation when legislative and agency actions, 
including those in response to our recommendations, result in 
significant and sustainable progress toward resolving a high-risk 
problem. Key determinants include a demonstrated strong commitment to 
and top leadership support for addressing problems, the capacity to do 
so, a corrective action plan, and demonstrated progress in implementing 
corrective measures. The sustained attention and commitment by Congress 
and agencies to resolve serious, long-standing high-risk problems have 
paid off; because of sufficient progress, we were able to remove the 
high-risk designation from 18 areas--more than half of our original 
list. As we have with areas previously removed from the high-risk list, 
we will continue to monitor these programs, as appropriate, to ensure 
that the improvements we have noted are sustained. 

For areas that remain on our high-risk list for 2007, there has been 
important--but varying levels of--progress. Top administration 
officials have expressed their commitment to ensuring that high-risk 
areas receive adequate attention and oversight. The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) has led an initiative to prompt agencies to 
develop detailed action plans for each area on our high-risk list. 
These plans are intended to identify specific goals and milestones that 
address and reduce the risks we identified within each high-risk area. 
Further, OMB has encouraged agencies to consult with us regarding the 
problems our past work has identified and the many recommendations for 
corrective actions we have made. While progress on developing and 
implementing plans has been mixed, concerted efforts by agencies and 
ongoing attention by OMB are critical. 

In addition to the programs that remain on the list, we recently 
designated three new areas as high risk, including the need to 
transform federal oversight of food safety. For these recently added 
areas, along with those remaining on the list, we expect that continued 
perseverance will ultimately yield significant benefits. To begin to 
address the weaknesses in federal oversight of food safety, executive 
agencies can start by implementing our recommendations intended to 
improve the problems we previously identified. Further, continued 
congressional oversight, including today's hearing, and additional 
legislative action will also be key to achieving progress, particularly 
in addressing challenges in the broad-based transformation needed to 
promote the safety and integrity of the nation's food supply. 

Fragmented Federal Oversight of Food Safety Led to High-Risk 
Designation: 

For several years, we have reported on issues that suggest that food 
safety could be designated as a high-risk area because of the need to 
transform the federal oversight framework to reduce risks to public 
health as well as the economy. Specifically, the patchwork nature of 
the federal food oversight system calls into question whether the 
government can plan more strategically to inspect food production 
processes, identify and react more quickly to outbreaks of contaminated 
food, and focus on promoting the safety and the integrity of the 
nation's food supply. This challenge is even more urgent since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened awareness of 
agriculture's vulnerabilities to terrorism, such as the deliberate 
contamination of food or the introduction of disease to livestock, 
poultry, and crops. 

An accidental or deliberate contamination of food or the introduction 
of disease to livestock, poultry, and crops could undermine consumer 
confidence in the government's ability to ensure the safety of the U.S. 
food supply and have severe economic consequences. Agriculture, as the 
largest industry and employer in the United States, generates more than 
$1 trillion in economic activity annually, or about 13 percent of the 
gross domestic product. The value of U.S. agricultural exports exceeded 
$68 billion in fiscal year 2006. An introduction of a highly infectious 
foreign animal disease, such as avian influenza or foot-and-mouth 
disease, would cause severe economic disruption, including substantial 
losses from halted exports. Similarly, food contamination, such as the 
recent E. coli outbreaks, can harm local economies. For example, 
industry representatives estimate losses from the recent California 
spinach E. coli outbreak to range from $37 million to $74 million. 

While 15 agencies collectively administer at least 30 laws related to 
food safety, the two primary agencies are the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), which is responsible for the safety of meat, 
poultry, and processed egg products, and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), which is responsible for virtually all other 
foods. Among other agencies with responsibilities related to food 
safety, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the Department 
of Commerce conducts voluntary, fee-for-service inspections of seafood 
safety and quality; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates 
the use of pesticides and maximum allowable residue levels on food 
commodities and animal feed; and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) is responsible for coordinating agencies' food security 
activities. 

The food safety system is further complicated by the subtle differences 
in food products that dictate which agency regulates a product as well 
as the frequency with which inspections occur. For example, how a 
packaged ham and cheese sandwich is regulated depends on how the 
sandwich is presented. USDA inspects manufacturers of packaged open- 
face meat or poultry sandwiches (e.g., those with one slice of bread), 
but FDA inspects manufacturers of packaged closed-face meat or poultry 
sandwiches (e.g., those with two slices of bread). Although there are 
no differences in the risks posed by these products, USDA inspects 
wholesale manufacturers of open-face sandwiches sold in interstate 
commerce daily, while FDA inspects manufacturers of closed-face 
sandwiches an average of once every 5 years. 

This federal regulatory system for food safety, like many other federal 
programs and policies, evolved piecemeal, typically in response to 
particular health threats or economic crises. During the past 30 years, 
we have detailed problems with the current fragmented federal food 
safety system and reported that the system has caused inconsistent 
oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. 
Our most recent work demonstrates that these challenges persist. 
Specifically: 

* Existing statutes give agencies different regulatory and enforcement 
authorities. For example, food products under FDA's jurisdiction may be 
marketed without the agency's prior approval. On the other hand, food 
products under USDA's jurisdiction must generally be inspected and 
approved as meeting federal standards before being sold to the public. 
Under current law, thousands of USDA inspectors maintain continuous 
inspection at slaughter facilities and examine all slaughtered meat and 
poultry carcasses. They also visit each processing facility at least 
once during each operating day. For foods under FDA's jurisdiction, 
however, federal law does not mandate the frequency of 
inspections.[Footnote 3] 

* Federal agencies are spending resources on overlapping food safety 
activities.[Footnote 4] USDA and FDA both inspect shipments of imported 
food at 18 U.S. ports of entry. However, these two agencies do not 
share inspection resources at these ports. For example, USDA officials 
told us that all USDA-import inspectors are assigned to, and located 
at, USDA-approved import inspection facilities and some of these 
facilities handle and store FDA-regulated products. USDA has no 
jurisdiction over these FDA-regulated products. Although USDA maintains 
a daily presence at these facilities, the FDA-regulated products may 
remain at the facilities for some time awaiting FDA inspection. In 
fiscal year 2003, USDA spent almost $16 million on imported food 
inspections, and FDA spent more than $115 million. 

* Food recalls are voluntary, and federal agencies responsible for food 
safety have no authority to compel companies to carry out recalls--with 
the exception of FDA's authority to require a recall for infant 
formula. USDA and FDA provide guidance to companies for carrying out 
voluntary recalls. We reported that USDA and FDA can do a better job in 
carrying out their food recall programs so they can quickly remove 
potentially unsafe food from the marketplace.[Footnote 5] These 
agencies do not know how promptly and completely companies are carrying 
out recalls, do not promptly verify that recalls have reached all 
segments of the distribution chain, and use procedures that may not be 
effective to alert consumers to a recall. 

* The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have heightened concerns 
about agriculture's vulnerability to terrorism. The Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 assigned DHS the lead coordination responsibility for 
protecting the nation against terrorist attacks, including 
agroterrorism. Subsequent presidential directives further define 
agencies' specific roles in protecting agriculture and the food system 
against terrorist attacks. We reported that in carrying out these new 
responsibilities, agencies have taken steps to better manage the risks 
of agroterrorism, including developing national plans and adopting 
standard protocols.[Footnote 6] However, we also found several 
management problems that can reduce the effectiveness of the agencies' 
routine efforts to protect against agroterrorism. For example, there 
are weaknesses in the flow of critical information among key 
stakeholders and shortcomings in DHS's coordination of federal working 
groups and research efforts. 

* More than 80 percent of the seafood that Americans consume is 
imported. We reported in 2001 that FDA's seafood inspection program did 
not sufficiently protect consumers.[Footnote 7] For example, FDA tested 
about 1 percent of imported seafood products. We subsequently found 
that FDA's program has improved: More foreign firms are inspected, and 
inspections show that more U.S. seafood importers are complying with 
its requirements.[Footnote 8] Given FDA officials' concerns about 
limited inspection resources, we also identified options, such as using 
personnel in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 
(NOAA) Seafood Inspection Program to augment FDA's inspection capacity 
or state regulatory laboratories for analyzing imported seafood. FDA 
agreed with these options. 

* In fiscal year 2003, four agencies--USDA, FDA, EPA, and NMFS--spent a 
total of $1.7 billion on food safety-related activities.[Footnote 9] 
USDA and FDA together were responsible for nearly 90 percent of federal 
expenditures for food safety. However, these expenditures were not 
based on the volume of foods regulated by the agencies or consumed by 
the public. The majority of federal expenditures for food safety 
inspection were directed toward USDA's programs for ensuring the safety 
of meat, poultry, and egg products; however, USDA is responsible for 
regulating only about 20 percent of the food supply. In contrast, FDA, 
which is responsible for regulating about 80 percent of the food 
supply, accounted for only about 24 percent of expenditures. 

Federal Oversight of Food Safety Should Be Addressed as a 21st Century 
Challenge: 

We have cited the need to integrate the fragmented federal food safety 
system as a significant challenge for the 21st century, to be addressed 
in light of the nation's current deficit and growing structural fiscal 
imbalance.[Footnote 10] The traditional incremental approaches to 
budgeting will need to give way to more fundamental reexamination of 
the base of government. While prompted by fiscal necessity, such a 
reexamination can serve the vital function of updating programs to meet 
present and future challenges within current and expected resource 
levels. To help Congress review and reconsider the base of federal 
spending, we framed illustrative questions for decision makers to 
consider. While these questions can apply to other areas needing broad- 
based transformation, we specifically cited the myriad of food safety 
programs managed across several federal agencies. Among these questions 
are the following: 

* How can agencies partner or integrate their activities in new ways, 
especially with each other, on crosscutting issues, share 
accountability for crosscutting outcomes, and evaluate their individual 
and organizational contributions to these outcomes? 

* How can agencies more strategically manage their portfolio of tools 
and adopt more innovative methods to contribute to the achievement of 
national outcomes? 

Integration can create synergy and economies of scale and can provide 
more focused and efficient efforts to protect the nation's food supply. 
Further, to respond to the nation's pressing fiscal challenges, 
agencies may have to explore new ways to achieve their missions. We 
have identified such opportunities. For example, as I already 
mentioned, USDA and FDA spend resources on overlapping food safety 
activities, and we have made recommendations designed to reduce this 
overlap. Similarly, regarding FDA's seafood inspection program, we have 
discussed options for FDA to use personnel at NOAA to augment FDA's 
inspection capacity. 

Many of our recommendations to agencies to promote the safety and 
integrity of the nation's food supply have been acted upon. 
Nevertheless, as we discuss in the 2007 High-Risk Series, a fundamental 
reexamination of the federal food safety system is warranted. Such a 
reexamination would need to address criticisms that have been raised 
about USDA's dual mission as both a promoter of agricultural and food 
products and an overseer of their safety. Taken as a whole, our work 
indicates that Congress and the executive branch can and should create 
the environment needed to look across the activities of individual 
programs within specific agencies and toward the goals that the federal 
government is trying to achieve. 

To that end, we have recommended, among other things, that Congress 
enact comprehensive, uniform, and risk-based food safety legislation 
and commission the National Academy of Sciences or a blue ribbon panel 
to conduct a detailed analysis of alternative organizational food 
safety structures.[Footnote 11] We also recommended that the executive 
branch reconvene the President's Council on Food Safety to facilitate 
interagency coordination on food safety regulation and programs. 

These actions can begin to address the fragmentation in the federal 
oversight of food safety. Going forward, to build a sustained focus on 
the safety and the integrity of the nation's food supply, Congress and 
the executive branch can integrate various expectations for food safety 
with congressional oversight and through agencies' strategic planning 
processes. The development of a governmentwide performance plan that is 
mission-based, is results-oriented, and provides a cross-agency 
perspective offers a framework to help ensure agencies' goals are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. Further, this plan can help 
decision makers balance trade-offs and compare performance when 
resource allocation and restructuring decisions are made. 

As I have discussed, GAO designated the federal oversight of food 
safety as a high-risk area that is in need of a broad-based 
transformation to achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, 
accountability, and sustainability. The high-risk designation raises 
the priority and visibility of this necessary transformation and thus 
can bring needed attention to address the weaknesses caused by a 
fragmented system. GAO stands ready to provide professional, objective, 
fact-based, and nonpartisan information and thereby assist Congress as 
it faces tough choices on how to fundamentally reexamine and transform 
the government. Lasting solutions to high-risk problems offer the 
potential to save billions of dollars, dramatically improve service to 
the American public, strengthen public confidence and trust in the 
performance and accountability of our national government, and ensure 
the ability of government to deliver on its promises. 

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 
pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the 
Subcommittee may have. 

Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For further 
information about this testimony, please contact Lisa Shames, Acting 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment at (202) 512-3841 or 
ShamesL@gao.gov. Key contributors to this statement were Erin 
Lansburgh, Bart Fischer, Alison O'Neill, and Beverly Peterson. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Highlights of Selected GAO Food Safety Reports: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-213, a report to congressional requesters: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

GAO has documented many problems resulting from the fragmented nature 
of the federal food safety system and recommended fundamental 
restructuring to ensure the effective use of scarce government 
resources. In this report, GAO (1) identified overlaps in food safety 
activities at USDA, FDA, EPA, and NMFS; (2) analyzed the extent to 
which the agencies use interagency agreements to leverage resources; 
and (3) obtained the views of stakeholders. 

What GAO Found: 

Several statutes give responsibility for different segments of the food 
supply to different agencies to ensure that the food supply is safe. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) have the primary responsibility for regulating food safety, with 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) also involved. In carrying out their 
responsibilities, with respect to both domestic and imported food, 
these agencies spend resources on a number of overlapping activities, 
such as inspection/enforcement, training, research, or rulemaking. For 
example, both USDA and FDA conduct similar inspections at 1,451 dual 
jurisdiction establishments—facilities that produce foods regulated by 
both agencies. Under authority granted by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, 
FDA could authorize USDA inspectors to inspect these facilities, but it 
has not done so. Furthermore, USDA and FDA maintain separate training 
programs on similar topics for their inspectors that could be shared. 
Ultimately, inspection and training resources could be used more 
efficiently.

Common Elements of UDSA and FDA Inspections: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

GAO identified 71 interagency agreements that the agencies entered into 
to better protect public health and to coordinate their food safety 
activities. However, the agencies have weak mechanisms for tracking 
these agreements that, in some cases, lead to ineffective 
implementation. Specifically, USDA and FDA are not fully implementing 
an agreement to facilitate the exchange of information about dual 
jurisdiction establishments, which both agencies inspect. In addition, 
FDA and NMFS are not implementing an agreement designed to enable each 
agency to discharge its seafood responsibilities effectively.

GAO spoke with selected industry associations, food companies, consumer 
groups, and academic experts, and they disagree on the extent of 
overlap and on how best to improve the food safety system. Most of 
these stakeholders agreed that laws and regulations should be 
modernized to more effectively and efficiently control food safety 
hazards, but they differed about whether to consolidate food safety 
functions into a single agency.

What GAO Recommends: 

Recognizing the statutory constraints under which the agencies operate, 
GAO, among other things, recommends that (1) if cost effective, FDA use 
available authority to enter into an agreement to commission USDA 
inspectors at jointly regulated facilities; (2) USDA and FDA consider 
joint training programs; and (3) USDA, FDA, EPA and NMFS inventory, 
evaluate, and update active interagency agreements. USDA generally did 
not appear to agree with GAO’s recommendations but recognized the 
benefits of joint training for food inspectors. HHS (FDA) agreed with 
GAO’s recommendations to inventory, evaluate, and update the 
interagency agreements and with GAO’s recommendation to use USDA’s 
foreign country evaluations, but it disagreed with others. NMFS agreed 
with GAO’s recommendations, and EPA took no position.

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-213].

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Robert A. Robinson at 
(202) 512-3841 or robinsonr@gao.gov.

[End of Highlights for GAO-05-213] 

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-51, a report to congressional requesters: 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Two large food recalls completed in 2003 were associated with 8 deaths 
and nearly 100 serious illnesses in at least 16 states. Manufacturers 
voluntarily recall potentially unsafe food by notifying their customers 
to return or destroy it. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), for 
meat, poultry, and egg products, and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), for other food, have programs to monitor voluntary food recalls, 
verify that companies contact their customers, and maintain recall 
data. GAO (1) examined the recall programs and procedures USDA and FDA 
use to protect consumers from unsafe foods and (2) compared their food 
recall authority with the authority of agencies to recall other 
consumer products.

What GAO Found:

Weaknesses in USDA’s and FDA’s food recall programs heighten the risk 
that unsafe food will remain in the food supply and ultimately be 
consumed. Specifically, USDA and FDA do not know how promptly and 
completely the recalling companies and their distributors and other 
customers are carrying out recalls, and neither agency is using its 
data systems to effectively track and manage its recall programs. For 
these and other reasons, most recalled food is not recovered and 
therefore may be consumed. GAO’s analysis of recalls in 2003 showed 
that about 38 percent and 36 percent of recalled food was ultimately 
recovered in recalls overseen by USDA and FDA, respectively. These 
agencies also told GAO of instances in which companies were slow to 
reveal where they had distributed the food or provided inaccurate 
customer lists. That distribution information is critical because 
USDA’s and FDA’s primary role in recalls is to monitor the 
effectiveness of a company’s recall actions. To do so, the agencies 
contact a sample of the distribution chain from these lists to verify 
that customers in the food distribution chain received notice of the 
recall, and that they located the food and removed it from the 
marketplace. However, the methodology that the agencies use for 
selecting the customers to check can result in entire segments of 
complex distribution chains being overlooked. Moreover, GAO found that 
the agencies did not complete verification checks for some recalls 
before the shelf life of the food expired. In addition, consumer groups 
and others question the usefulness of USDA’s and FDA’s efforts to 
communicate with the public, suggesting alternatives such as posting 
notices in grocery stores and direct notification of consumers.

Agencies responsible for the safety of products, such as toys, heart 
pacemakers, and automobiles, have specific recall authority not 
available to USDA and FDA for food. This includes the authority to (1) 
require a company to notify the agency when it has distributed a 
potentially unsafe product, (2) order a recall, (3) establish recall 
requirements, and (4) impose monetary penalties if a company violates 
recall requirements. For example, by law, companies must promptly 
notify the Consumer Product Safety Commission after learning that a 
product may pose an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death, or 
face penalties of up to $1.65 million. Likewise, FDA has recall 
authority for unsafe biological products, medical devices, radiation 
emitting electronic products, and infant formula. Moreover, in contrast 
to its inability to penalize a company that is slow to conduct a food 
recall, FDA can impose penalties of up to $100,000 per day for a 
company that fails to recall a defective biological product, such as a 
vaccine.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO proposes that Congress consider legislation requiring a company to 
notify USDA or FDA if it discovers it has distributed unsafe food and 
giving agencies authority to order food recalls, and recommends that 
the agencies take actions to ensure prompt, complete recalls and better 
recall monitoring. USDA said the report was generally accurate and its 
May 2004 directive will address weaknesses GAO found. FDA did not 
believe its system lengthened recalls or its processes reduced 
recovery. FDA disagreed with some recommendations. GAO continues to 
believe its recommended actions are needed to protect consumers.

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-51].

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Lawrence J. Dyckman at 
(202) 512-3841 or dyckmanl@gao.gov.

[End of Highlights for GAO-05-51] 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-214, a report to congressional requesters: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

U.S. agriculture generates more than $1 trillion per year in economic 
activity and provides an abundant food supply for Americans and others. 
Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, there are new concerns about the 
vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to the deliberate introduction of 
animal and plant diseases (agroterrorism). Several agencies, including 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Defense 
(DOD), play a role in protecting the nation against agroterrorism. GAO 
examined (1) the federal agencies’ roles and responsibilities to 
protect against agroterrorism, (2) the steps that the agencies have 
taken to manage the risks of agroterrorism, and (3) the challenges and 
problems that remain. 

What GAO Found: 

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal agencies’ 
roles and responsibilities were modified in several ways to help 
protect agriculture from an attack. First, the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 established DHS and, among other things, charged it with 
coordinating U.S. efforts to protect against agroterrorism. The act 
also transferred a number of agency personnel and functions into DHS to 
conduct planning, response, and recovery efforts. Second, the President 
signed a number of presidential directives that further define 
agencies’ specific roles in protecting agriculture. Finally, Congress 
passed legislation that expanded the responsibilities of USDA and HHS 
in relation to agriculture security.

In carrying out these new responsibilities, USDA and other federal 
agencies have taken a number of actions. The agencies are coordinating 
development of plans and protocols to better manage the national 
response to terrorism, including agroterrorism, and, along with several 
states, have conducted exercises to test these new protocols and their 
response capabilities. Federal agencies also have been conducting 
vulnerability assessments of the agriculture infrastructure; have 
created networks of laboratories capable of diagnosing animal, plant, 
and human diseases; have begun efforts to develop a national veterinary 
stockpile that intends to include vaccines against foreign animal 
diseases; and have created new federal emergency coordinator positions 
to help states develop emergency response plans for the agriculture 
sector.

However, the United States still faces complex challenges that limit 
the nation’s ability to respond effectively to an attack against 
livestock. For example, USDA would not be able to deploy animal 
vaccines within 24 hours of an outbreak as called for in a presidential 
directive, in part because the only vaccines currently stored in the 
United States are for strains of foot and mouth disease, and these 
vaccines need to be sent to the United Kingdom (U.K.) to be activated 
for use. There are also management problems that inhibit the 
effectiveness of agencies’ efforts to protect against agroterrorism. 
For instance, since the transfer of agricultural inspectors from USDA 
to DHS in 2003, there have been fewer inspections of agricultural 
products at the nation’s ports of entry. 

Burning Carcasses during the 2001 U.K. Outbreak of Foot and Mouth 
Disease: 

What GAO Recommends: 

To enhance the agencies’ ability to reduce the risk of agroterrorism, 
GAO recommends, among other things, that (1) USDA examine the costs and 
benefits of developing stockpiles of ready-to-use vaccines and (2) DHS 
and USDA determine the reasons for declining agricultural inspections. 
USDA, DHS, and HHS generally agreed with our recommendations. DOD and 
EPA made technical comments but took no position on the report’s 
recommendations.

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-214].

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Robert Robinson, 202-512-
3841, Robinsonr@gao.gov.

[End of Highlights for GAO-05-214]

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-04-246, a report to congressional requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

More than 80 percent of the seafood that Americans consume is 
imported. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for 
ensuring that imported seafood is safe and produced under sanitation 
and safety systems comparable to those of the United States. Since GAO 
reported in 2001 that FDA’s seafood inspection program did not 
sufficiently protect consumers, additional concerns have arisen about 
imported seafood containing banned substances, such as certain 
antibiotics. In this review, GAO was asked to evaluate (1) FDA’s 
progress in implementing the recommendations in the 2001 report and 
(2) other options to enhance FDA’s oversight.

What GAO Found: 

Since GAO’s January 2001 report, FDA’s imported seafood safety program 
has shown some improvement. FDA inspects more foreign firms, and its 
inspections show that more U.S. seafood importers are complying with 
its requirements. FDA also slightly increased the number of seafood 
products it tests at U.S. ports of entry to just over 1 percent. 
However, FDA still has not established equivalence agreements with 
seafood exporting countries as GAO recommended in its 2001 report. 
Equivalence agreements that commit U.S. trading partners to maintain 
comparable food safety systems are an efficient way to ensure imported 
seafood safety. Unlike the U.S. Department of Agriculture, FDA is not 
legally required to certify that countries exporting food products to 
the United States have equivalent food safety systems. According to a 
panel of nationally recognized experts that GAO convened to address 
this and other issues, establishing these types of agreements would 
shift some of FDA’s burden for ensuring seafood safety to foreign 
governments. This shift, in turn, would allow FDA to focus its limited 
resources on seafood products from countries with less advanced food 
safety systems. 

FDA also made little progress regarding the recommendation GAO made in 
2001 that FDA communicate to U.S. port-of-entry personnel serious 
deficiencies identified during inspections so that potentially 
contaminated imported seafood is examined before it enters the United 
States. GAO found that FDA continues to experience long delays between 
finding deficiencies and taking action. For example, GAO’s review of 
foreign firm inspection records found that it took an average of 348 
days for FDA to alert port-of-entry personnel about serious safety 
problems identified at six foreign firms. Moreover, GAO found that FDA 
does not prioritize enforcement actions when violations that pose the 
most serious public health risk occur or have an automated system to 
track the time involved in documenting, reviewing, and processing 
enforcement actions. 
 
FDA officials acknowledged some of the problems that GAO identified 
regarding FDA’s current imported seafood inspection program, but they 
also raised concerns about limited inspection resources and competing 
priorities, such as the recent need to implement provisions of the 
Bioterrorism Act of 2002. GAO identified several options that FDA 
could consider to augment its resources and enhance its current 
program, including (1) commissioning seafood inspectors from the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Seafood 
Inspection Program, (2) using state regulatory laboratories and/or 
private laboratories to augment FDA’s testing of imported seafood, and 
(3) developing a program to use third-party inspectors to augment its 
program.

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that FDA (1) work toward developing a memorandum of 
understanding with NOAA to use NOAA’s resources; (2) make it a 
priority to establish equivalence or other agreements, starting with 
countries having high-quality food safety systems; (3) develop a 
system to track the time involved in processing enforcement actions; 
(4) give enforcement priority to violations posing the most serious 
risks; (5) consider accrediting private laboratories; and (6) explore 
the potential for certifying third-party inspectors. FDA generally 
agreed with all but the recommendation on making it a priority to 
establish equivalence or other agreements.

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-246].

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Lawrence J. Dyckman 
at (202) 512-3841 or dyckmanl@gao.gov.

[End of Highlights for GAO-04-246]

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase the 
Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease. GAO-06- 
644. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006. 

Oversight of Food Safety Activities: Federal Agencies Should Pursue 
Opportunities to Reduce Overlap and Better Leverage Resources. GAO-05- 
213. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2005. 

Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries in Consolidating Their Food 
Safety Systems. GAO-05-212. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2005. 

Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete 
Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51. Washington, D.C.: 
October 6, 2004. 

Antibiotic Resistance: Federal Agencies Need to Better Focus Efforts to 
Address Risk to Humans from Antibiotic Use in Animals. GAO-04-490. 
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004. 

School Meal Program: Few Instances of Foodborne Outbreaks Reported, but 
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Outbreak Data and Food Safety Practices. 
GAO-03-530. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2003. 

Food-Processing Security: Voluntary Efforts Are Under Way, but Federal 
Agencies Cannot Fully Assess Their Implementation. GAO-03-342. 
Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2003. 

Meat and Poultry: Better USDA Oversight and Enforcement of Safety Rules 
Needed to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses. GAO-02-902. Washington, 
D.C.: August 30, 2002. 

Genetically Modified Foods: Experts View Regimen of Safety Tests as 
Adequate, but FDA's Evaluation Process Could Be Enhanced. GAO-02-566. 
Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2002. 

Food Safety: Improvements Needed in Overseeing the Safety of Dietary 
Supplements and "Functional Foods." GAO/RCED-00-156. Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2000. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2007). 

[2] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, GAO-07-
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006). 

[3] GAO, Overseeing the U.S. Food Supply: Steps Should be Taken to 
Reduce Overlapping Inspections and Related Activities, GAO-05-549T 
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004). 

[4] GAO, Oversight of Food Safety Activities: Federal Agencies Should 
Pursue Opportunities to Reduce Overlap and Better Leverage Resources, 
GAO-05-213 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2005). 

[5] GAO, Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and 
Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food, GAO-05-51 (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 6, 2004). 

[6] GAO, Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture 
from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain, GAO-05-214 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2005). 

[7] GAO, Food Safety: Federal Oversight of Seafood Does Not 
Sufficiently Protect Consumers, GAO-01-204 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 
2001). 

[8] GAO, Food Safety: FDA's Imported Seafood Safety Program Shows Some 
Progress, but Further Improvements Are Needed, GAO-04-246 (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004). 

[9] GAO, Overseeing the U.S. Food Supply: Steps Should Be Taken to 
Reduce Overlapping Inspections and Related Activities, GAO-05-549T 
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005). 

[10] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal 
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 

[11] GAO, Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes Needed to 
Ensure Safe Food, GAO-02-47T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 10, 2001). 

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