74. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 7, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 4:20 p.m.
SUBJECT
Gene Black in Cairo
Gene Black will seek an appointment with you when he comes back about February 16, but I thought you might wish a preliminary report on his talk with Nasser./2/
/2/Black's meeting with Nasser on February 4 was reported in telegrams 1563, February 6, and 1571 and 1572, both February 7, from Cairo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US, POL 15-1 UAR, and IT 11-16 UAR, respectively)
On the subject of resuming relations, Black told Nasser he understood that discussions on mechanics were going on and simply expressed his view that resumption of relations would be a good thing for both of us. Nasser agreed but said he would need a little time to inform the other Arab states of his intentions. He said it would be a little harder to resume relations with the US than it had been with the UK because we have not made the same sort of gestures friendly to the Arabs as the British had.
We will just have to wait and see whether Nasser is really moving ahead or stalling. Don Bergus sees his Foreign Minister contact tomorrow and that may shed more light.
Black also reports that Nasser was interested in the fact that Secretary McNamara will shortly take over as head of the World Bank. He may suggest that Bob visit the UAR soon.
We will wait until we hear Black's full report before doing anything further.
Walt
75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/
Washington, February 9, 1968, 0048Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by James H. Bahti (NEA), cleared by Brewer and Atherton, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Jidda.
112564. Subject: Tiran Island. Following based on uncleared memcon. Noforn, FYI and subject revision.
1. In course farewell call by Israeli Ambassador Harman, Secretary said he was disappointed by GOI reply (State 111432)/2/ to his January 17 letter to Eban on Tiran Island./3/ Secretary said he viewed response as thinly-disguised "no." Added he thought it unreasonable to expect SAG promise island would remain permanently uninhabited. Evacuation island was tiny gesture Israel could easily make.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 47.
/3/See Document 47.
2. Harman replied potential danger of island must not be overlooked. Guns located there could close Strait Tiran. Secretary replied militarization was not issue; GOI was seeking SAG assurance island would never be inhabited.
3. Harman asked whether SAG agreeable leave Tiran demilitarized. Secretary said this point covered in his letter to Eban. Harman said he would convey Secretary's concern to Foreign Minister.
Rusk
76. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 10, 1968, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, Jordan, 000.1-333. Secret. Drafted by Schwartz and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in McNamara's office. This memorandum of conversation was summarized in telegram 113633 to Amman, February 11, and the text of the attached draft memorandum of understanding was transmitted in telegram 113634 to Amman, also February 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)
SUBJECT
Secretary of Defense Meeting with General Khammash
PARTICIPANTS
U.S. Side
Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Honorable Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Mr. Harry H. Schwartz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Jordanian Side
Major General Amer Khammash, Chief of Staff, Jordan Armed Forces
Mr. McNamara expressed his admiration for the King which General Khammash said was reciprocated; Mr. McNamara also apologized for the length of time that the General had been kept waiting in the United States and General Khammash indicated that he understood why. Mr. McNamara invited the General to expose his views on the situation in Jordan.
General Khammash made reference to the enormous pressure under which the King is now living, including the division of the country and almost daily clashes on the border, and he alluded to the restlessness of the Jordanian army. He hoped that what would be offered him would be something the King could approve. But he was worried about the results if the King did not because he considers that this mission is the last chance the King will give him in the United States. He asked for help and made the point that the maximum good political effect will flow from the rapid arrival in his country of arms from the U.S. He asked in this connection concerning air shipment of some items and the possible negotiability of the package.
The Secretary of Defense made clear that General Khammash's original list of items was for us a very tough one and would cause us most serious problems with the Congress. He pointed out also that Jordan and the U.S. have the same basic objective of stable relations between countries of the area and that this was an objective which would not primarily be met by arms. We are limited in what we can do with respect to arms particularly because of the need to justify supplying arms to both Jordan and Israel just after they have had a war. Also there is the problem of diversion of resources from economic development which the purchase of arms causes.
Mr. McNamara then briefly outlined what we could do:
1. 12 F-104s by June (possibly air-shipped, if this seems necessary) and 6 more by December.
2. We propose an annual review of the problem. In the course of such an annual review we could consider the possibility some time in the future of 18 more such aircraft.
3. We would ship the suspended MAP items, and
4. The remaining ground equipment from past sales (both of these could be shipped at an early date by sea).
5. Replace ground equipment losses, except for tanks and heavy artillery.
Mr. McNamara then pointed out that we had gotten some very recent information from the British on the availability of Centurions, specifically, that if 200 were really what Jordan needed, they could be bought in Britain, that the spares and ammunition were available-and would be available well into the 70's--that they could be converted to 105mm guns in Jordan. General Khammash's lack of interest in tanks from the British, however described, was clear. Mr. McNamara then responded that we could only make available 88 M48A1s (and this number was inserted in the draft Memorandum of Understanding/2/ which General Khammash took with him).
/2/The attached memorandum of understanding is not printed.
General Khammash expressed a strong need for 7 to 10 155mm guns which he had lost during the war and Mr. McNamara promised to see what we could do for him in this respect./3/
/3/Harry Schwartz called Khammash later in the afternoon on February 10 to say that there were no 155-mm guns available in the United States. He added that U.S. officials would try to find some elsewhere. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, Jordan 333)
6. Mr. McNamara went on to point out that the payments would be spread over a period of 2-1/2 years and that the cost of the package described would be between $80 and $85 million, including the $10 million Jordan has on deposit here. He said that we would need $22 million, in addition to the $10 million on deposit, before July 1, 1968.
When General Khammash asked what negotiating latitude there was on the planes, Mr. McNamara replied that in our opinion the
F-104 is a good plane for Jordan and that others are either not available, or not as applicable to Jordan's requirements as the F-104.
He said, in response to the General's question, that a Presidential Determination under the Conte-Long Amendment would not change the type of plane which we are considering. Mr. McNamara did say, however, that, once the 18 F-104s are delivered, we could consider some time in the future another 18. As to the negotiating flexibility of other items Mr. McNamara said that, as to tanks, this depended on the acceptability of British tanks. On other items, there was some but not much because of financial considerations.
Finally, the Secretary of Defense suggested that General Khammash take the draft Memorandum of Understanding with him, ask us any questions he had, and then present it to the King. He pointed out that it could be signed in Jordan by our Ambassador if General Khammash wished to avoid making another trip to the United States.
General Khammash thanked the Secretary for all the work that had been done in his behalf and said he would now see what he could do with the King.
77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/
Washington, February 11, 1968, 0636Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton, cleared by Atherton and Walt Rostow and in substance by Sisco and Davies, and approved by Richard W. Finch (S/S-O). In a February 10 memorandum to the President, Rostow also cleared the telegram with the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Jordan--8/1/67-7/31/68)
113645. For delivery to the Ambassador at opening of business.
You are authorized to deliver the following letter from the President to King Hussein. Begin text, "His Majesty, King Hussein, Amman, Jordan. Your Majesty: I send you this personal word in advance of the report General Khammash will give you. The General has argued your case well.
Our two countries have enjoyed a warm, close, mutually beneficial relationship for a long period. There are few other countries in the world with which we have worked as closely as with Jordan. I assure Your Majesty that it is our policy and our interest to continue that relationship and our support of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. While the June war has created strains and problems for both of us, it has never altered our fundamental policy towards Jordan.
Despite the current heavy demands on our resources, General Khammash is returning with an arms package which we consider to be a substantial response to your request for us to meet your legitimate arms requirements. We intend this package to be a strong reaffirmation of our support.
I also assure you that we have not altered our firm resolve to extend our full diplomatic and political support of Ambassador Jarring to reach a just and durable settlement in the Middle East. During your visit here in November, we explained to you our position on the West Bank and Jerusalem. We have not changed that position. As Ambassador Jarring makes progress, we hope and expect that there will be opportunities for us to support his efforts in more specific ways.
Your Majesty, we are both passing through a critical period in the history of our two countries. With patience, wisdom and mutual trust, I am sure that we can solve our problems and obtain the objective we both so fervently desire-a peaceful Middle East in which a united Jordan can play its historic role.
With all good wishes, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson."
Rusk
78. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, February 12, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret.
SUBJECT
Getting Israel to Accept UN Resolution
Here is the scenario for our next campaign to bring the Israelis around to accepting the November 22 resolution:
1. Rodger Davies laid the groundwork with Evron today at lunch by describing Egyptian frustration over Israeli evasiveness. Rodger cited primarily a conversation earlier today with the Egyptian Minister here who also quoted his recent telegrams from Cairo.
2. Joe Sisco is calling Eppie in this afternoon to go over with him in detail the Egyptian reactions as reported by Don Bergus. NEA rightly feels that IO and USUN should be the ones to do battle on the special considerations of the Israeli position.
3. Another Goldberg approach to the Israelis in New York would be the logical followup to Joe's talk with Eppie, but this is not specifically scheduled yet.
4. A message from Secretary Rusk to Eban has just cleared NEA on its way to the Secretary. It is cast in the general framework of the instructions the President gave the Secretary when Eshkol was here to follow up in finding peace initiatives. It comes down hard on the need for Israel to accept the UN resolution more straightforwardly. It also takes up the Jerusalem problem, starting with the Jordan threat a week ago to take this into the Security Council.
5. After the Sisco-Evron talk, we will have a clear formulation of the pitch we would like Goldberg to make in New York. State will ask you informally to make the same pitch to Eppie. I will give you something further on this as soon as we have a clear picture of the best line to take.
Hal
79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/
Washington, February 13, 1968, 0120Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and Day on February 12; cleared by Battle, Sisco, and Andrew L. Steigman in S; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to USUN, Amman, and Cairo.
114277. 1. Please deliver following message from Secretary to Foreign Minister Eban:
"Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:
During Prime Minister Eshkol's recent visit to the United States, he and President Johnson agreed that it would be useful if you and I consulted on specific steps which our governments might take to advance the cause of peace. In the spirit of this agreement, I would like to review with you at this time the status of the talks being conducted by Ambassador Jarring.
I believe that the essential thing in this current stage is to begin actual negotiations on substantive issues, in a form acceptable to both sides, as promptly as possible. Our strenuous efforts throughout the summer and fall in the General Assembly and the Security Council had as a principal objective the creation of conditions that would make such negotiations possible.
I therefore noted with much interest the position which you gave to Ambassador Jarring on February 1./2/ Although it seemed to me this represented some progress, I think it is only a partial step. I urge you to maintain the momentum of this move by going one step further. Israel, in my view, would risk nothing and would gain advantage by stating to Jarring unequivocally that it accepts the resolution as a whole in accordance with the interpretations put on it by its sponsor, and on the understanding that the resolution will be implemented through discussions under Jarring's auspices. I agree with your assessment that there are varying views among the Arabs themselves, and I think it is important through steps such as this to strengthen the position of those who advocate peaceful negotiations.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 68.
As you know, there has in recent days been increasing talk among the Arabs to the effect that the dispute should be returned to the Security Council or at least that the question of Jerusalem should be raised in the Council. I fear that for the Council to take up any aspect of the problem at this stage would likely bring Jarring's mission to a close. This would have the most serious implications for peace in the Middle East. In addition, as I am sure you will agree, a Security Council session in such circumstances would hold great difficulty for both our governments. It would be particularly unfortunate if the question went to the Security Council in a situation in which the Arabs were depicted as accepting the resolution and being prepared to implement it, while Israel's position appeared to be ambiguous. The positive results achieved in the November Security Council resolution would be jeopardized as would the broad support and sympathy for Israel's position. The possibility that the Arabs might take this course of action makes it even more important that Ambassador Jarring be able to show progress in his efforts.
Similarly, the possibility that the Arabs might return the issue to the Security Council strengthens our conviction that great restraint is needed in Israel's policies respecting Jerusalem. We have succeeded in persuading the Jordanians, at least for now, not to raise Jerusalem in the Council. I fear, however, that this possibility will continue to plague us so long as your Government pursues policies and actions which increasingly foreclose hopes that some meaningful accommodation on Jerusalem is possible in the context of a peaceful settlement-an accommodation not only to the interests of the international religious community, on which your Government has given clear assurances, but to the interests of the Government of Jordan as well.
I must in all frankness say that without such accommodation we seriously doubt there can be a settlement. It was to underline our deep concern in this matter that I recently asked Ambassador Barbour to reiterate to you our views on the Jerusalem question. I would not want to leave the impression that our position is merely a formal one. I am firmly convinced that it goes to the heart of the problem of achieving a settlement and would appreciate an indication from you that your Government understands the depth of our concern.
I raise these matters with you in the interest of our common goal of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and in the spirit of frank understanding which characterized Prime Minister Eshkol's recent talks with President Johnson. Those talks dealt with the closely related themes of peace and security. To assist Israel in its efforts to achieve a satisfactory degree of military security we have, as you know, recently agreed to increase the number of Skyhawk aircraft we are supplying Israel above the number agreed to during the Prime Minister's visit. Now I believe we must focus our attention on the search for peace, since it seems clear to me that it is in this direction that the only true security for Israel lies. This is my purpose in writing you today. I look forward to having your thoughts on these and other ways in which our two countries can contribute to the cause of peace."
2. In delivering foregoing message, you should stress importance we attach to receiving truly substantive response to Secretary's letter. In this connection you should make point that, if Jerusalem despite our best efforts is again raised in the Security Council, it is by no means clear that USG will be able to stand with Israel on this issue as we have up to now. Moreover, this is also case in event Security Council considers ME question in circumstances where onus for failure of Jarring Mission was largely on Israeli shoulders due to their failure to put forward a forthcoming "acceptance" formula regarding Nov. 22 res.
Rusk
80. Memorandum From Eugene R. Black to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. No classification marking. Rostow sent copies of this memorandum to Rusk and Katzenbach on February 23 at the President's request. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Reconnaissance in the Middle East
I have met with the Heads of State in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. I saw all Prime, Foreign and Finance Ministers. I met with leaders in public and private sectors plus officials of the USG and other US nationals residing in these countries.
I emphasized that I was on a "private trip" through the area. However, I told the leaders that I would be seeing you upon my return to Washington and therefore would appreciate their candid expressions concerning:
1. The current stand of this government on the Arab-Israeli question.
2. The posture of the individual and/or his government towards the USG.
My soundings may be summarized as follows:
A. The prevailing mood in the Arab states is one of bitter frustration. It is at the moment a negative and destructive mood and therefore a dangerous one.
B. I am personally deeply discouraged by the reactions I received on the trip and feel violence lurks just beneath the surface.
1. All the principals in the Arab states referred to the USG policy in the Middle East as the "No Policy." (non-existent policy.) From the socio-economic-political points of view this region is in turmoil and the USG position is at a nadir.
2. Israel on the other hand is strong, resilient and enjoying the fruits of victory. Israel is far ahead of her neighbors on all fronts--especially the personal motivation quotient which has made this small state a remarkable example of "self help."
C. The Arab world is far from monolithic. A degree of political solidarity was achieved at Khartoum, however this was short-lived and the old divisions and some new ones are evident. This disarray is leading directly into the hands of the USSR. (See J.)
D. The Arabs hold the USG as the scapegoat. Note: No one of importance any longer believes the USG intervened directly in the war but everyone--including the most pro-western (Feisal-Hussein) believes the USG does and can control Israel and Israeli policy.
E. Nasser, Feisal, Hussein, Emir of Kuwait and Crown Prince Jaber of Kuwait (Jaber is real power in Kuwait) feel that there is a widespread revulsion among all classes against what seems to them a complete identification of the USG with Israel. Each have specific grievances. The grip of each of the above remains strong with their rule appearing to be highly personal.
F. The "Refugee Problem" in Jordan is appalling. There is nothing that I have seen in any country on this globe which is as tragic as the destitute condition these hundreds of thousands of persons are living in and under. I visited a number of camps in the Valley and was shocked at the bitterness expressed by old and particularly young refugees against the USG. (See Recommendation Number 2.)
G. Old Jerusalem is an "open sore" with all Arabs in all Arab states. GOI's posture on this is inflammatory. Mayor Kolleck seems an able administrator. However, there are numerous complaints from the Arabs re the Israeli occupation-both in Jerusalem as well as on the West Bank. The shut down of the commercial banks has caused hardship and is a festering problem. Border incidents are up markedly and the action by the GOI is directed at and into the refugee camps. GOI Chief of Staff Bar Lev admits this is ugly but a necessary measure in order to stop provocative acts by Arabs.
H. The attitude throughout area towards the "Jarring Mission" is one of doom. Little hope is given for a meaningful solution that will provide the so-called "lasting peace." Note: I met with Jarring in Cairo and he gave me impression he, too, was most discouraged. I fervently pray that this Mission will be successful because if it fails the reaction would/could be disastrous.
I. Israel--I met with all the leaders. I will not report on this section as I feel you must be fully cognizant of the positions and posture of the GOI after the visit by Eshkol in January. In short, their attitudes represent the "other side of the coin."
J. Military--see "C".
1. USSR has substantially rebuilt her position in Arab world by rearming Egypt, Syria and Iraq.
2. The USSR naval buildup in eastern Mediterranean is new factor and a dangerous one.
3. The strategic aim of USSR is to thrust south through the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The USSR is actively working at establishing and maintaining a "presence" in Yemen and South Arabia (Aden). The closing of the Canal is a major deterrent to this scheme.
4. The USSR buildup is patently political. It is designed to capitalize on the continued USG association with Israel in the eyes of the Arabs and the weakness of the UK.
5. All Arabs spoke of their concern about the increasing Russian "presence". The flow of "technicians" and "advisors" into region is alarming even to Nasser. This is, of course, anathema to Kuwait, Feisal and Hussein.
K. Suez Canal--Estimates vary from man to man.
1. M. Younes who is Minister in charge stated Canal could be open in 50-60 days to free the 15 ships. However, to be fully open for business it would require 4-6 months. General Dayan disagrees with this and believes Canal could be open much sooner.
2. Plans are being studied by Egypt to deepen/widen Canal to handle 200,000 ton tankers. Also authorities studying feasibility of constructing 42 inch pipeline from Suez to Port Said.
3. Shooting incident on January 30 was ugly and bad omen for early opening of Canal. I visited Ismailia and saw UAR boat which had been fired on. Also saw damage to city which is extensive.
Conclusions:
A. The Arab world is desperately in need of high level attention by the President and the USG. Time is of the essence in making some positive forward gesture.
B. Israel is far ahead of her neighbors on all fronts.
C. The UK withdrawal from the Gulf is alarming. The vacuum must be filled before the USSR gains the advantage.
Recommendations:
1. You appoint a high level, experienced and internationally prominent US citizen to act as a "Personal Representative of the President of the USA" or a "Special Ambassador" to the Arab States.
A. This person would not undercut the existing USG Ambassadors but would complement the USG team.
B. The Representative should make periodic "hand holding" missions to the area and review with each Head of State their individual problems. This would be a manifest example of good faith and intentions of USG.
2. Dispatch at an early opportunity, if available, Ambassador Graham Martin (Secretary Rusk's Special Assistant for Refugee Affairs) to the area. Time is short on the "human bomb" with these hundreds of thousands of homeless, helpless people. Action is needed immediately on this problem--perhaps (hopefully) the action would be independent of UNRWA which is now a bureaucracy within a bureaucracy. If Martin not available then someone of his caliber.
Brief Sketch
1. Economies
A. Kuwait: Booming--in spite of heavy losses due to devaluation.
B. Saudi Arabia: Continues to develop but a critical shortage of trained manpower has slowed the implementation of the development programs. These programs also being slowed due to large financial assistance being given to Egypt and Jordan.
C. Egypt: Taking a nose-dive. USSR seems ready to provide assistance. However, situation appears hopeless. UAR is highly dependent on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya for financial assistance.
D. Jordan: In a state of flux due to occupation of West Bank. USG's decision to give GOJ military assistance was very wise and timely.
E. Israel: In relatively A-1 condition although naturally GOI suffered financially from war.
81. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/
Tel Aviv, February 14, 1968, 1125Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Amman and USUN.
2524. Jarring Mission. Ref: State's 114277./2/ Department pass Cairo.
/2/Document 79.
1. At Israelis' invitation I met early last evening (Feb. 13) with Foreign Minister Eban and MFA DirGen Rafael to discuss latest Jarring Mission developments. During course hour talk with both and separate following conversation with Rafael: (A) I conveyed the Secretary's personal message (Eban read it, but said he would have to study it further before commenting). (B) Eban gave me copy modified GOI position he had provided Jarring February 12, explained rationale for modification and suggested what US could do to help. (C) Eban and Rafael speculated re Jarring next steps and discussed relation of Jordan to current moves. (D) At outset conversation Eban remonstrated about Department officer's remarks in recent conversations on Jarring state of play and I reminded him of some of our apprehensions at continued lack of progress in recent discussions of UAR and Israeli position.
2. Following is text describing Israeli position given Jarring February 12. GOI agreeable that full text be passed by Jarring to pass para (F).
"(A) Israel has cooperated and will cooperate with you in your mission. We accept the Security Council's call, in its resolution of November 22, 1967, for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of peace with secure and recognized boundaries.
(B) Once agreement is reached on a peace settlement it will be faithfully implemented by Israel.
(C) As I indicated to you on 1 February 1968, Israel is prepared to negotiate on all matters included in the Security Council resolution which either side wished to raise. Our views on the problems of peace and our interpretation of the resolution were stated by me in the Security Council on November 22, 1967.
(D) The Prime Minister of Israel, in a statement on January 8, indicated Israel's respect for the Security Council's resolution as an expression of the international interest in an agreed and final peace settlement. We now understand that the U.A.R. too is prepared to respect the Security Council's resolution and to establish a just and lasting peace, and for this purpose to discuss the resolution taken as a whole.
(E) The next step should be to bring the parties together. I refer to the agreement which I expressed to you on 14 February for the special representative of the Secretary-General to convene the two governments.
(F) We do not consider that accepted settlements of intricate problems can be reached by a procedure which avoids the establishment of contact. Apart from our views on the principle of negotiation, we cannot commit our most vital interests to an inefficient procedure."
3. This, Eban said, was a statement Israel was ready to defend before world opinion. Israel had used words in this formulation it understood were necessary to get things moving: "accept," "respect," "implement." The essential element was agreement. Israel could not return to 1957 type formulations. For Arabs the key seemed to be "implementation;" very well, this was mentioned in the Israeli statement. But we must always come back to idea of agreement. The SC res mentioned it. The GOI speaks the same language as that resolution: we are ready to "reason together."
4. The GOI, Eban continued, is hopeful that the USG will regard this as a forward movement. It represented quite an effort on the GOI's part in view of the fears of what others were trying to read into the UNSC res. He hoped that the US could consider using its influence on behalf of an efficient negotiating procedure. Jarring, he said, was afraid that Egypt would want to keep him running./3/ Jarring thinks this is technically impossible. (Later, separately, Rafael, "strictly off the record" said he gathered from his discussion with Jarring that latter felt he had enough substance on which to build a formula for convening the two parties; and that he close to point of inviting reps of parties to Nicosia; he could not go on with this game of ping pong with himself as the ball.) Eban noted that there was no mention of direct negotiations in the Israeli statement. In answer to my question as to whether the Israelis remained willing to have a meeting convened by Jarring have the appearance of the two parties talking to Jarring rather than to each other, Eban replied that they had reaffirmed their readiness to begin talks on the Bunche-Rhodes formula./4/ He said that during the first week of those talks the two parties had sat in the same room but had not addressed their remarks to each other. After about a week this all changed and there were direct talks with Bunche continuing in the chair. Rafael said the Israeli desideratum for talks was "same time, same space."
/3/Jarring met with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in Cairo on February 13 and conveyed the Israeli position as put forward by Eban on February 12. Riad responded that he saw no progress in the Israeli position. He stated that the UAR would have nothing to add until Israel indicated a willingness to implement Resolution 242 and reiterated that the UAR would not engage in direct negotiations with Israel. (Telegram 1636 from Cairo, February 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
/4/See footnote 4, Document 61.
5. At the beginning of our talk Eban said that recent conversations in Washington had given him cause for concern. According to their report Dep Asst Sec Davies had described to Evron Department's understanding of stiff and unyielding Egyptian position (no formal peace, no negotiation, no formal recognition of Israel, no Israeli canal navigation until refugee problem solved), without expressing any Department reservations and in terms seeming to advise acceptance of Egyptian formulations.
If this was Department understanding of Egyptian position, it was all the more disturbing to have report of Asst Sec Sisco-Evron conversation/5/ in which Sisco suggested that unless Israel accepted Egyptian formula there might be Security Council meeting in which Israel could not assume US support. This was surprising to Eban, he said; he was not aware that the US and Israel had departed from their common views. The tone was not a tone of partnership; it seemed to suggest that "we should all fall down and accept what the UAR wants." As a matter of fact, Jarring had said that Egypt was doubtful about going back to the Security Council. "Our estimate is that if this were to happen the Council would not draft a new decalogue." The point was that the US seemed to be trying to get Israel to accept Egyptian formulas. At the same time, Eban continued, the Israelis had reports that Egypt was telling third parties that Egypt had been given the understanding that the US was exercising pressure on Israel. This was very disturbing and might explain why the Egyptians had held out on the Israelis' February 1 formula.
/5/This conversation, which took place on February 12, was summarized in telegram 114278 to Tel Aviv, February 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
6. Eban then went on to specific objections to the Sisco suggestions. Israel, he said, could not accept the November 22 res "in accord with interpretations put on it by its principal sponsors." One of the sponsors, the UK, was notably "wobbly" of late, though it seemed to be trying to get back on firmer ground. Israel had to interpret the resolution as it understood it and Egypt could accept or reject this interpretation as it wanted. Israel had had enough bad historical experience along this line. Besides, Jarring himself would not like this idea; with each side quoting its own interpretative authority, he could get caught in the middle of a dispute between the powers, which he clearly wanted to avoid.
7. I told the Foreign Minister that I thought there had been a misinterpretation of Asst Sec Sisco's views and I reviewed with him State 114278 (we have not yet received a report of the Davies-Evron conversation). We were concerned that the UAR and even Jordan was making hay in the world's capitals out of the continuing Israeli refusal to accept the SC res. The Arabs have told us that the Israelis were playing with words: right or wrong, their arguments were cogent to a degree. Our apprehensions re Jordan were heightened by the fact that the factual situation regarding Jerusalem, of such concern to them, was being eroded. We were concerned about a return of Middle East problems to the Security Council where, as Sisco put it, the Arabs would try to re-write history, where the pressure of shifting world opinion would make it difficult to achieve a resolution as favorable as that of November 22. Eban expressed the doubt, as he was to do again later in the conversation, that the Arabs would take affairs to the Security Council again. I assured the Minister that we were not buying the Arab line but I reiterated our concern about world opinion and our desire to avoid Israel's being in an indefensible posture if there is another SC session.
8. Later, with Rafael, I asked where Jordan stood in all of this. He said that Jarring reported that he was sure that if Egypt were to agree to attend a Jarring convened meeting, then Jordan would follow immediately. Jordan did not feel it could move first but it certainly did not want to be left behind. Rafael said that the GOI had authorized Jarring to convey the Israel February 12 formula. The Israelis had asked him also suggest that the Jordanians look a little more closely at the Israeli agenda for talks originally presented and rejected by Jordan. There [were listed items?], for the Jordanian interests in Jerusalem in addition to interests of religious authorities. Jarring, he said, was glad to have this. Rafael went on to ruminate that if the Jordanians thought this was a good time to take the Israelis to the Security Council under conditions favorable to Jordan, they were mistaken. There was great pressure in Israel, Rafael said, to take care of Israel's current security problems along the Jordan border on strictly military terms. He hoped Jordan would not try to seek a political advantage through Security Council action.
Comment: I, of course, expressed pleasure at the new Israeli formulation and agreed with Eban in hope that some of the concern we have felt and which was evinced in the Department conversations he referred to will be alleviated by knowledge of the modifications that the Israelis have effected. It will be noted that the Israelis still have not simply accepted the resolution. However, especially from Rafael, I thought I detected a cautious but real optimism that these latest concessions from earlier Israeli positions will be enough to get talks going in Cyprus. He expressed the hope that we might be able to stimulate Jarring to decision to formulate proposal to parties but I, of course, noted that Jarring not directly in touch with us and consequently, there difficulty in our taking such steps.
Barbour
82. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/
Amman, February 14, 1968, 1650Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
3417. Subject: Hussein's reaction to Jordan arms package.
1. Summary: King Hussein's reaction to our arms package is that as it stands it is insufficient in terms of quantities (particularly tanks), delivery dates, and financial terms. He requested we give urgent consideration to corresponding changes he wishes incorporated into our draft memorandum of understanding/2/ to take care of these deficiencies. King also indicated he will reluctantly have to consider other sources if we cannot go further to meet his politico-military needs.
/2/See Document 76.
2. King Hussein asked I call late on the thirteenth. As I expected, he wanted to discuss the arms package which he had spent most of day discussing with General Khammash and various other GOJ officials. Crown Prince Hassan and General Khammash were present throughout our conversation.
3. King began by expressing warm thanks for President's letter (State 113645)/3/ and said he would be responding in similar spirit. He also expressed thanks for time and attention given to General Khammash during his talks in Washington and for opportunities for Khammash to discuss Jordan's problems with key US officials. He then said he was quite disappointed that length of time and nature of discussions had not produced a more acceptable package in terms of his political and military needs. If package brought by General Khammash represented best we could do, he was still faced with question whether it was not in Jordan's best interest to seek arms from another source. He hoped that he would not have to go to that other source because he still did not consider it to be in Jordan's long-term interest, nor for that matter in the interest of the US. Nevertheless, fact remained that arms package that had been brought back by Khammash did not satisfactorily meet Jordan's political and military requirements.
/3/Document 77.
4. The King then specified deficiencies in terms of quantities and delivery dates. He first laid great stress on insufficient number of tanks included in package. He referred to fact we had said we were in general replacing losses suffered by JAA in June hostilities. Jordan has lost 152 American tanks of which 124 were M48s and the remainder M47s. Yet we were offering Jordan only 88 M48 tanks to make up this loss. These 152 tanks were apart from the Centurion tanks that had been lost. The King noted bitterly that 142 of the American tanks lost by Jordan are now in service in Israeli Army. He then pointed out various other increased quantities of ground equipment needed by Jordan. He emphasized need for more anti-aircraft capability in terms of morale factors and deterrent effects, but it was clear tanks were his chief concern.
5. Hussein said that apart from failure of package to meet Jordan's "legitimate requirements" in terms of quantities, proposed delivery dates also greatly disturbed him because they failed to meet Jordan's political and military needs. He noted that other Arab countries have already made up their losses, whereas our proposed delivery dates, offered eight months after the June war, extend into US fiscal year 1970. He said memo of understanding provided no assurance that significant amounts of ground equipment would arrive in Jordan in 1968. He had no idea of when tanks, which were so important for morale, would begin to arrive.
6. Moving to aircraft, the King at first said that he did not want F104s under any conditions, and he asked to have 18 A4 Skyhawks substituted for 18 F104s. After some discussion, however, he said that he wanted to reconsider that part of the package for at least a further 24 hours to make up his mind as to what he should do about aircraft. His main complaint about the F104s was that they are no longer suitable for Jordan's needs. I pointed out the local and area political impact as well as the morale significance that deliveries of some F104s by June 1968 might have and the fact that his pilots are already well down the road in their training. I suggested that introduction of any other type of aircraft at this stage, whether US or non-US, would pose unknown delivery and training delays. It was after he had reflected on this that he said he wanted to reserve his position with regard to aircraft for another 24 hours./4/
/4/Symmes reported in telegram 3420 from Amman, February 14, that the King reaffirmed his interest in obtaining Skyhawk aircraft rather than F-104s. Symmes noted that one of the reasons the Jordanians were interested in the Skyhawks was because it was the same aircraft recently supplied to Israel. Symmes proposed separating the ground and air elements in the arms package while the Embassy endeavored to find out how anxious the Jordanians were to receive aircraft in the near term. He asked for an estimate of how long it would take to meet Jordan's request for Skyhawks. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)
7. Finally, the King had a number of editorial revisions that he wished made in the memorandum of understanding. Most of these, he emphasized, related to his concern in event of publicity, to appearing to have tied his hands. He said he particularly wanted to avoid being put in a position of potential embarrassment vis-a-vis other Arab states and with his own people if the memo of understanding should ever become public. In any case, he said, he probably would be forced to show the memo of understanding to some of the other Arab countries providing funds to Jordan-with obvious results. He then handed me his copy of the memo of understanding and requested I transfer his interlineations to my telegraphic copy (amended memo of understanding will be transmitted by septel)./5/
/5/Telegram 3418 from Amman, February 14. (Ibid.) 6 Telegram 113632 to Amman, February 11, provided guidance for Symmes' use in discussing the proposed arms package for Jordan. Symmes' report of his discussion with the King indicates that he incorporated all the Department's suggestions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)
8. Bearing in mind points in State 113632,/6/ I responded to Hussein that while I could see package did not contain everything he wanted, I thought he might have overlooked how much it did contain. It seemed to me that it represented a very substantial meeting of his stated military requirements. Most important, it represented tangible and significant proof of US intention to support Jordan and to promote close and cordial relations we have had. I said we had hoped he would proceed immediately to sign the agreement and that I thought it would be important to move ahead now on the arms package in order to obtain the political benefits I saw coming from his acceptance of the package. For example, the morale of his army could be improved immediately. Moving ahead quickly with the package would enable him to ask now for the evacuation of Saudi and Iraqi troops and thereby to exert greater control over the terrorists who have been the primary cause of the recent incidents in the Valley. It would also improve the general psychological atmosphere necessary for him to proceed towards a Middle Eastern settlement.
/6/Telegram 113632 to Amman, February 11, provided guidance for Symmes' use in discussing the proposed arms package for Jordan. Symmes' report of his discussion with the King indicates that he incorporated all the Department's suggestions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)
9. Hussein interrupted to say that unfortunately the quantities and the delivery dates in the package would not be sufficient to enable him to hold up his head with the officers of his own army. He therefore needed to know as soon as possible whether we would meet his requirements as he had outlined them. When he had our final answer, he intended to send General Khammash to King Faisal to see what, if anything, Faisal is prepared to do in terms of further financial assistance before he considers other sources.
10. I told the King I believed that in constituting our package we had tried to go as far as possible to meet all of his requirements. I was not yet informed, of course, on details of Washington's views on various elements of the package, particularly with regard to detailed provisions of the memo of understanding. I said I would surmise that quantities therein represented the best mix possible, given presumed availability of the items involved and the funds that Jordan had available. I stressed that our capability to extend credit had been drastically modified by Congress. I noted also that we have always tried to exercise restraint with regard to arms deliveries to all states in the area and that no states had obtained everything they wanted when they had come to us for arms. Khammash had said Secretary McNamara told him he would take another look at helping Jordan to find some 155mm guns. With regard to delivery dates, I pointed out that the memo of understanding in para IV-C referred to US fiscal years and not calendar years, which would take six months off the 1970 date. On the other hand, I thought that it would be unrealistic to expect everything to be delivered in calendar year 1968 in view of funds available to Jordan, our own credit limitations, as well as perhaps the limited availability of some of the equipment. I referred to Secretary McNamara's mentioning to Khammash that he would look again at the possibility of shipping some items out by air. The important thing was that Jordan had a quite substantial military package. I would have hoped this in itself would be enough to take care of morale in his army and public opinion in Jordan and elsewhere, particularly once it became known publicly that items were coming in and that Jordan's "legitimate requirements" were being met by the US.
11. Specifically on tanks, I mentioned our understanding British might have up to 200 Centurions available which could easily be upgunned in Jordan with spares available well into 1970. Both King and Khammash said most emphatically they do not want any more Centurions. Khammash added that if he could get additional M48s they need to make up their US tank losses he would happily dump existing Centurions in Gulf of Aqaba--if that were a US condition. Principal argument against Centurions, he said, is Jordan's need to standardize. Now it had very complicated supply and maintenance as well a training problems. Given obsolescence of Centurions and Britain's position today, he thought it would be folly to standardize on British tanks and mixing simply is not feasible.
12. As I responded the King kept returning to his original statements with regard to the acceptability of the quantities and delivery dates of the package and his need to know as soon as possible what we are prepared to do to make up for the deficiencies that he sees in it. He wants to send Khammash to see Faisal as soon as possible.
13. With regard to credit and funds, I asked the King if he thought King Faisal would be willing to advance Jordan additional funds if necessary to speed up deliveries or, assuming the additional items might be available, to obtain our agreement to increase some quantities in the package. The King turned to Khammash, who said Faisal had told them to come back before they went to any other source and they had no clear idea of what he was prepared to do for them. Khammash said he would hope that at the very least, however, there might be some way to arrange for Saudi Arabia to put up an acceptable loan to Jordan or loan guarantee to us that would then enable the USG to provide financing or credit arrangements that would take care of the delivery and quantity problems they had just discussed with me.
14. Comment: Hussein was more relaxed and friendly today than he has ever been with me. It was clear he had been cheered up by our willingness to go as far as we had. He saw this as a real political plus, but there was no lack of determination in his statements with regard to the present deficiencies he sees in our package and his intention to go elsewhere if necessary. At this stage I feel unable to say whether he will be willing to compromise on less than his total asking price. My present estimate is that there must be some sweetening of the package to gain his acceptance. I believe that the critical sweetener would be some more tanks. Anti-aircraft is also a major concern. Beyond that I think we need to develop a set of options on the other items that he can present to his army as a global indication of what we are prepared to do-subject actually, of course, to his finding additional funds or credit either from us or from the Saudis. We will present our detailed ideas in a following message./7/
/7/Symmes provided additional detail about Hussein's reaction in telegram 3440 from Amman, February 15. Hussein was pleased by President Johnson's letter and the uniform support for Jordan Khammash reported receiving in Washington, but he was disappointed with the terms of the U.S. offer. Hussein's reaction grew out of a concern over losing influence with and control over the army. Khammash urged that the U.S. offer be expanded even if it should prove ultimately impossible to deliver fully on the offer, in order to give Hussein and Khammash a package to which the army would respond favorably. (Ibid.)
15. Suggest Dept repeat to Jidda FYI only.
Symmes
83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 15, 1968, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret.
SUBJECT
Jordan Arms Package
This is to refresh your memory as to the details of the proposed arms agreement with Jordan. There are three main parts to the package: (1) about $10 million worth of equipment we had agreed to send to Jordan before the war broke out last June; (2) about $38 million in new ground equipment including 88 Patton tanks; and (3) 18 F-104 jet fighters ($33 million). Just in case you want more details, I've attached a more complete list./2/ On a lot of the smaller items there are specifics which no one has yet tried to work out.
/2/Not printed.
King Hussein has expressed initial disappointment with the package and the draft memo of understanding we proposed. Our first response will be to help out with his problems in the wording of the memo and to urge him to accept the package as is and get on with delivery. However, we may have a little more bargaining to do yet. He is obviously relieved that we have come this far, and we should be able to bring him around.
Walt
84. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/
Amman, February 16, 1968, 1355Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN. Secret; Nodis.
3461. Subj: Jordanian request for anti-infiltration equipment. Ref: Amman 3047,/2/ State 104263./3/
/2/Document 54.
/3/Telegram 104263 to Amman, January 25, informed the Embassy that the Jordanian request for assistance in controlling terrorist activity was being studied in Washington. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN)
1. After events of the past few days/4/ it is clear we need to move forward in any way possible to help Jordanians to exercise better control of terrorist infiltrations. I consider it particularly important to respond quickly to request for anti-infiltration equipment reported in reftel. In addition to providing effective additional control measures, such equipment, if available, could provide Jordanian leadership a much needed encouragement to intensify their present efforts. This initiative by the Jordanians might also be used as evidence to Israel of Jordanian will to act on the matter.
/4/On February 8 an exploding mine killed three Israeli civilians and wounded two others. The incident triggered daily artillery exchanges across the Jordan River cease-fire line, and attacks by the Israeli Air Force which caused heavy Jordanian casualties in a refugee camp. (Memorandum from George C. Denny to Secretary Rusk, February 14; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
2. We appreciate equipment discussed in our telegram of Jan 19 might not be available or that it may be too technical to lend itself to expeditious installation in the Jordan Valley terrain. If we have no suitable equipment available, or if for some reason we do not wish to make it available, I would like to be informed expeditiously. It is time we responded in some way to the Jordanians on this matter. Our continuing silence may be interpreted as indifference to Jordanian request or even an unwillingness to help. I am sure that Washington is well aware of nature of terrain we are talking about. It might be well to keep in mind, however, that we are talking about a limited number of fords across river and transit areas in Jordan. We would hope we could find some kind of equipment to monitor these major transit areas even though we could not expect completely to curtail terrorist crossings./5/
/5/The Department responded on February 22 in telegram 119314 to Amman, a joint State/Defense message. The Jordanian request was receiving sympathetic and urgent consideration, but it was judged that a substantive response would have to depend on more specific information concerning the type of anti-infiltration system desired and the number and type of devices which would be most suitable. (Ibid., POL 23-8 JORDAN)
Symmes
85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/
Washington, February 17, 1968, 0122Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Houghton on February 16; cleared by Sisco, Battle, and Bahti; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv and to USUN.
117102. Ref: Amman 3373,/2/ Tel Aviv 2481./3/
/2/In telegram 3373 from Amman, February 12, the Embassy reported that the Jordanian Government received an emissary from the Israeli Government who asked why Colonel Muhammad Daoud, who had previously handled liaison matters with the Israeli military, had not assumed the liaison function at the Allenby Bridge. The Embassy noted that Daoud was sick, but added that King Hussein was concerned about an adverse public reaction if he were to engage in the type of direct contact the Israelis were proposing. He did not feel that such talks could be kept secret for long. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 2481 from Tel Aviv, February 11, reported that the Israeli Government sent an emissary to Amman to propose direct discussions at the Chief of Staff level concerning the terrorism problem. (Ibid.)
1. In light dangerous situation in Jordan Valley, Department strongly favors meeting between Israeli and Jordanian military at higher level than Colonel to establish more effective means of communication between two armies for use inter alia in arranging ceasefires and possibly for controlling terrorism. Along with stationing of UN observers in Jordan Valley, we feel such a meeting could make significant contribution to defusing of situation. Accordingly, we request following courses of action:
2. For Embassy Tel Aviv. You should inform GOI that we are urging Government of Jordan to accept meeting with Israelis between officers of General rank. As Israelis aware, such a meeting presents serious political risk for Jordan. We consequently urge Israeli acceptance of meeting with UN officer present. We cannot see how this could in any way jeopardize Israeli position and it presumably would make meeting which Israelis and Jordanians desire possible./4/
/4/Barbour made this suggestion in a conversation with Bitan of the Foreign Office. Bitan's response was that a UN presence at talks between Israeli and Jordanian military officers would cause them to speak for the record rather than seriously address problems. (Telegram 2559 from Tel Aviv, February 17; ibid., POL ARAB-ISR)
3. For Amman. You should urge Jordanians to appoint officer of General rank to meet with Israelis in presence UN officer. You may inform GOJ that we are urging Israelis to accept UN presence at meeting./5/
/5/Symmes questioned whether the Department wanted him to suggest the appointment of a general officer to King Hussein. Unless the Israelis were prepared to accept a UN presence at the proposed talks, he did not think that Hussein would agree. He suggested that Colonel Daoud might prove to be the best the Israelis could expect as an effective point of contact with the King. (Telegram 3479 from Amman, February 17; ibid., POL ISR-JORDAN)
4. For USUN. Suggest Goldberg inform Bunche of our intended approaches to GOI and GOJ. He may wish to inform General Bull. Assume Bunche will appreciate sensitivity of efforts to establish such high-level talks, particularly from point of view of Jordan.
Rusk
86. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/
Cairo, February 17, 1968, 1212Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis.
1675. Subject: Jarring Mission. Ref: State 117236./2/
/2/Telegram 117236, February 17, instructed Bergus to meet with Mohamed Riad to discuss the November 22 resolution. (Ibid.)
1. I saw Mohamed Riad at 12:30 today (Feb 17). Noted I was acting under instructions which had been sent me after Dept had had opportunity study report of last FonMin-Jarring conversation (Cairo's 1641)./3/
/3/In telegram 1641 from Cairo, February 15, Bergus referred to some new nuances in the UAR position he had gleaned from telegrams received from the Department and USUN. He noted that Jarring was expected back in Cairo and he planned to discuss the UAR position with Mohamed Riad after Jarring's meeting with the Foreign Minister. (Ibid.)
2. Recalled efforts which USG was making, in accordance its pledge, lend fullest support to Jarring Mission. This connection, we had urged Israel inform Jarring that it "accepted" Nov 22 SC resolution.
3. Matters had now developed to point where USG had two questions to put to GUAR: (A) did GUAR accept Nov 22 resolution and (B) assuming that both UAR and Israel accepted resolution, how did UAR envisage next steps?
4. As to first question, I pointed out to Mohamed that resolution must be taken as a whole. He was more aware than was I of discussion and travail which had gone into drafting of resolution and its ultimate unanimous adoption by SC. Third para of resolution had two very important words: "agreement," and "accepted solution."
5. It followed there was direct and unbreakable link between two questions I had put to him. If UAR in fact accepted resolution, it should also be prepared to take practical steps required to reach agreement and an accepted solution.
6. In all frankness, nothing which had so far appeared in UAR's reports of FonMin-Jarring conversations indicated that GUAR had so far gone this required distance. FonMin had not been explicit as to next steps. Moreover, some of his comments to the effect that vague unilateral declarations or mere citations in a report that Jarring might write would take care of problem of belligerency fell far short of requirements of para 3 of SC resolution.
7. I noted that some UAR diplomats abroad had intimated that negotiations in Cyprus under so-called "Bunche formula" would be acceptable to GUAR. FonMin, however, did not appear yet to have crossed that bridge.
8. It was essential, if US were to be in position to make most effective use of its influence with parties, that we have clear answers to questions I had posed.
9. Mohamed took careful notes and said although he felt he was in position reply to my questions, he preferred not to do so until he could discuss them with FonMin and give an answer in latter's name. He promised get in touch with me before he departs with FonMin on North African trip Feb 20.
Bergus
87. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/
Cairo, February 19, 1968, 1500Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
1686. Ref: Cairo's 1675./2/
/2/Document 86.
1. Mohamed Riad asked me call 12:30 today (Feb 19) receive answers to questions I had posed Feb 17. Riad opened conversation by repeating two questions I had put, viz.: (A) Did GUAR accept Nov 22 resolution and (B) assuming that both UAR and Israel accepted resolution, how did UAR envisage next steps? Riad then proceeded to read verbatim from lengthy statement which he had drafted and which he said he had that morning read to his FonMin who had approved it. I took full notes and will forward detailed memcon/3/ in next pouch. Since most of statement was of historical nature, however, only necessary telegraph highlights.
/3/Not found.
2. In response to my first question, Mohamed gave lengthy historical excursus beginning from fact that since my return to Egypt GUAR had made it a point keep me fully informed of all its activities re Middle East crisis and to indicate that it was seeking peaceful solution. Mohamed then quoted excerpts from various conversations with Jarring indicate that GUAR "insisted" on implementation of SC resolution in its entirety. Riad then cited information received by GUAR from me and others to effect that USG felt Israel had not clearly stated its acceptance resolution and that USG urging Israel so to do.
3. Riad then specifically referred to third para of SC resolution and said USG should have no doubt as to UAR position. When GUAR said it accepted resolution as a whole and that it should be treated as an entity, UAR has made its position very clear. Riad cited US-UAR discussions in New York prior to passage resolution where UAR accepted concept of treating resolution as a whole. He said in light of all this Egyptians asked themselves why there was any doubt in mind USG re UAR position.
4. Mohamed then turned to second question re what UAR envisaged as next step in case Israel accepts SC resolution. Mohamed said GUAR believed this was hypothetical question. He said GUAR believed it within its right to know what was Israel's position vis-a-vis resolution. As for method of implementing resolution, this was something GUAR would state after it knew Israel's reply.
5. Notwithstanding this, continued Mohamed, Egyptians had told Jarring several times and specifically in their last meeting that re method of implementing resolution, UAR was ready discuss this with Jarring. Egyptians assumed Israel would also submit its suggestions. Mohamed reiterated portions of last conversation with Jarring to effect that GUAR ready terminate belligerency, assume obligations in SC resolution relating to navigation, etc.
6. Mohamed then said "Now we ask you, what do you want? We still remember that on the record you made a statement in SC in which Ambassador Goldberg declared that US would put all its weight behind resolution and that it would in due course request parties to implement it. When I speak about the resolution we mean the resolution as adopted by the Council taking into consideration all consultations that took place prior to the adoption. We also take into consideration that US accepted from the beginning that there would be no negotiations and no peace treaty. The question is what your position will be if Israel continues in its present position of refusing to accept the resolution. This will mean the stringing out of Jarring's mission. We believe that the big powers should, at some moment if Israel persists, convene the SC for the sake of putting pressure on Israel. We think that the situation should be clarified before long and certainly before the General Assembly resumes its session in April."
7. I said I would report foregoing. I asked if Mohamed had used word "negotiations" in preceding paragraph advisedly. While it was true resolution had not referred to "direct negotiations," seemed equally valid that resolution envisaged some kind of discussion among parties as only feasible means of implementation. Mohamed made no comment.
8. Comment: Mohamed's presentation, although bordering on the tendentious at times, was throughout couched in polite and dignified language. At the same time it was made abundantly clear that GUAR suspects that USG, having encountered resistance on part Israel to principle of acceptance of SC resolution, is casting about for ways and means welsh on its November commitments. For some reason Egyptians appear sublimely and genuinely confident that Jarring is on their side in present controversy.
Bergus
88. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 20, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 63, 2/17-21/68. Secret.
SUBJECT
NSC Discussion of the Near East--Noon, Wednesday, February 21
You have heard Gene Black's description of how our position in the Near East is eroding. Your ambassadors agree, and critics are playing up Soviet gains in the area. The purpose of this meeting is to review the situation and to discuss what more we can do to reverse the trend.
We can take some steps like sending arms to Jordan or renewing relations with Cairo. But the Arabs will mainly measure us by our success in promoting an Arab-Israeli arrangement which would lead to Israeli withdrawal. In this quarter there are two main issues:
1. How to get the Jarring mission moving. Jarring is trying to persuade the Israelis and Egyptians to "accept" the November 22 UN resolution as a basis for talks. The Israelis are evasive because they fear Cairo will interpret their acceptance as agreement to withdraw before negotiating other issues like permanent boundaries. Israel wants to be sure talks will follow their acceptance. The Egyptians say they "accept" the whole resolution but won't commit themselves to talks until Israel "accepts" the resolution. Ambassadors Goldberg and Barbour and Joe Sisco are discussing the problem in detail with the Israelis, and Secretary Rusk has written Abba Eban. We don't think you need to weigh in yet, but the question is how much harder we press Israel to break this impasse.
2. How to stop Israeli incorporation of Jerusalem. The Arabs see Israeli acts in Jerusalem as proof that Israel doesn't intend to negotiate an honest settlement. The Jordanians threaten to bring the matter to the Security Council in the next few days. Secretary Rusk wrote to Abba Eban; a few days later President Shazar said publicly that Israel would never give up Jerusalem. Entirely apart from Israel's eventual negotiating position on Jerusalem, we want them to lie low on moves that further alienate the Arabs, upset Jarring and make it more difficult for us to play a constructive role. State may possibly ask you soon to weigh in with Eshkol asking him to lay aside plans for developing land in former Arab Jerusalem which Israel expropriated. There is no recommendation yet, but this discussion will give you the full picture of how these issues all fit together.
W.W. Rostow/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/
Washington, February 20, 1968, 1639Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wiley and Houghton on February 19; cleared by Battle, Davies, and Murray in DOD/ISA; and approved by Under Secretary Katzenbach.
118025. Ref: Amman 3417, 3418,/2/ 3419/3/ and 3420./4/
/2/See Document 82 and footnote 5 thereto.
/3/In telegram 3419 from Amman, February 14, the Embassy suggested revisions to the proposed arms package for Jordan, including a larger package in line with Jordanian requests, but conditioned on Jordan finding other sources of cash or credit to pay for the package, presumably from Saudi Arabia. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)
/4/See footnote 4, Document 82.
1. We are disappointed in Hussein's assessment of our arms package as being insufficient to meet his political and military requirements. We believe that further study on his part will reveal it as a substantial response to his request. With the exception of some of the tanks (and 155 mm guns which may not be available) we are offering to make up his June losses. The Russians have done no more for Syria and the UAR although admittedly they are doing it more quickly. We fully appreciate that the King has problems but he must remember that we also have problems about which he and Khammash should be fully conversant. Our offer should be viewed in this context.
2. As Khammash left Washington before we had a chance to explain our package, we believe the Jordanians perhaps do not fully appreciate all of the considerations which went into the determination of the size of the package. The arms offered to Jordan include almost every item in the spectrum of military hardware used by the Jordan Arab Army. Such a sweeping offer should be very useful to the King in explaining his policy to the army officers. It should also be noted that the illustrative items following those specifically listed in the memorandum of understanding provide for $2 million in small arms, $12.8 million in ammunition, $4 million worth of vehicles (1200), and miscellaneous communications and engineering equipment.
3. For reasons with which the King and Khammash should be familiar, it would be difficult for us to enlarge our arms package at this time. There are very real restraints in terms of quantities on what we can offer at any one time. We cannot ignore strong congressional and public feeling against (a) the supply of arms to countries where economic resources are so limited and (b) where we appear to be arming both sides of a conflict. These same restraints have influenced our response to Israeli requests as well. There is also genuine concern within the USG that Jordan's military establishment not be drastically disproportionate to its economic capacity to finance such an establishment. However irrelevant such considerations may seem to be to the King's immediate problem, these are facts of life with which we have to deal. Notwithstanding, we have offered him as an earnest of our support such politically sensitive items as tanks, planes, artillery and ammunition.
4. We should also bear in mind that our offer is the beginning of a renewed military supply relationship. It seeks to meet Jordan's legitimate military requirements as we see them at this juncture and as we are able to provide. We will be prepared to review Jordan's equipment requirements during the first annual review to be held within the next few months. In addition, he has been given strong assurances of support from the United States (State's 113645)./5/ Such assurances should not be taken lightly.
/5/Document 77.
5. In the circumstances, we believe that the King should accept our offer in the context and spirit in which it was made. To solve his immediate problem with his army, the important thing is for him to get on with the re-equipping of that army. You should make this clear in your talks with him. In addition to the above, you may wish to use the following points in your talks.
6. We understand why King is impatient and are aware of the urgency of his problems. He should realize, however, that senior levels of USG were faced with other serious problems concerning Vietnam and Korea during the period that General Khammash was in Washington. Our decisions in respect to Far East are serious matter not only for us but for entire international community. Since we are not a totalitarian government decisions on matters of wide political interest (such as supplying major combat items to Jordan) cannot be made overnight. In fact, in light of the other problems we were facing at the time, our decision to resume substantial arms shipments to Jordan, given the political problems created for us by Jordan's participation in the June hostilities, was reached relatively quickly.
7. In meeting our political problems, it is important to us that the total package be phased over 2-1/2 years and in establishing a delivery schedule we must take into consideration relative priorities for Vietnam where our troops are actively engaged in combat operations. The following is our initial assessment of delivery dates. We are now attempting to obtain higher priorities for some of these items.
F-104 aircraft: FY 1968
M48A1 Tanks: 1st and 2nd half FY 1969
105 mm Howitzers: 2nd half FY 1969
M113 APC's: 2nd half FY 1970
106 mm Recoilless Rifles: 25 Units FY 1968, 113 units 2nd half FY 1969
40 mm AA SP: 2nd half FY 1969
50 cal. quad AA: 1st half FY 1969
2-1/2 ton trucks: 25 units FY 1968, 15 units 1st half FY 1970
Miscellaneous vehicles: 2nd half FY 1969
Ammunition: $8 million FY 1968, $4.8 million 1st half FY 1970
Miscellaneous Small Arms: $.8 million in FY 1968, $.8 million 1st half FY 1969, $.4 2nd half FY 1969
8. In discussing these delivery schedules you may wish to point out that the King, by accepting our offer, can initiate a steady flow in the months ahead of military equipment for Jordan. As a first step the undelivered MAP FY 1966-67 and the balance of ground force equipment sold to Jordan in 1965 can be ready for shipment in the next 60-90 days. Although these categories do not contain such glamour items as tanks or artillery they do contain important communications equipment, some vehicles, ammunition and vitally needed spares for tanks, vehicles and weapons. The memorandum of understanding listed only general categories for vehicles, small arms, ammunition, spare parts, communications and engineer equipment. You may wish to be more specific. For example, the package includes 7,105 calibre 30 rifles; 1802 carbines; 732 calibre 30 machine guns; 398 calibre 50 machine guns; 1240 vehicles of 1 to 3 tons, approximately $8 million for engineer equipment and various radios, telephones, switchboards, field wire, test sets, and $12 million worth of ammunition.
9. You may also wish to point out that the Jordanians have apparently given no consideration to the rate at which the equipment requested by Khammash can be effectively absorbed into their military establishment.
10. On the subject of aircraft, we find the Jordanian reaction difficult to understand. General Khammash told the negotiating team that he wanted a supersonic multi-purpose plane but also made clear that he wanted a type which could intercept high level MACH 2 intruders. FYI. He told General Wheeler he wanted F-104's. End FYI. With the negotiating teams he refused to specify the American aircraft he had in mind. When pressed he replied, "It is for you to choose which of your aircraft is most suitable for our needs." The F-104, in addition to being an excellent high level interceptor, can be converted to carry out a tactical ground support mission. Conversion kits to add a bomb carrying capability were included in the original sales contract. The A-4 on the other hand has practically no air defense capability. It is a subsonic attack bomber. The F-5 is a possible substitute but Jordan would then lose a substantial part of the $10 million they have already paid on the F-104's. In addition, the delivery time would be much longer, perhaps 18 to 24 months. We were given clearly to understand by General Khammash that delivery time on aircraft was extremely important to him. We therefore designed a package that together with the 18 Hawker Hunters he anticipates receiving from the UK, would give him 36 good planes to fly, off Jordan's own airfields, before the end of this calendar year. If some other Arab state, such as Saudi Arabia, were willing to foot the bill, we would have no objection to Jordan purchasing Lightnings or Mirages, but they would cost two or three times as much as the F-104's with uncertain delivery times.
11. Given Jordan's present comfortable reserve position and relatively large balances of unused donations we do not believe that any credit should now be offered for arms purchases. We understand that Jordan's longer range economic future is a matter of concern to the GOJ and we are willing to discuss financing of the latter part of our package during the annual reviews. FYI. We also feel that insistence on cash injects a healthy note of self discipline into the Jordanian appetite for military equipment. End FYI./6/
/6/Symmes responded on February 21 that he would use the arguments outlined in this telegram when he met with King Hussein and General Khammash on February 22. He asked, however, if he could introduce more flexibility into the U.S. offer. He noted that there had been no negotiations in Washington with Khammash, who had been given the U.S. offer and told to take it back to Jordan to discuss with the King. Symmes expressed concern that if he took the position he was instructed to take, the King might feel he was being confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it offer that did not take into account his difficult situation. Symmes suggested that the offer of an additional 12 tanks might make a critical difference. (Telegram 3527 from Amman; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) The Department replied that the negotiating position outlined in telegram 118025 was the preferred starting point in discussions with the Jordanian Government. If additional flexibility seemed indicated, the U.S. offer might include an additional 12 tanks as Symmes had suggested. (Telegram 119271 to Amman, February 22; ibid.)
12. Our comments on the King's suggested revisions for the memorandum of understanding follow in septel./7/
/7/In telegram 117988 to Amman, February 20, the Department assessed and accepted most of King Hussein's proposed changes to the draft memorandum of understanding. Some of the provisions in the memorandum, such as the requirement for prior U.S. approval before Jordan purchased major military equipment items from other sources and the provision for U.S. approval of the Jordanian defense budget were inserted to meet the stipulations of the Conte and Symington Amendments and could not be deleted without affecting the U.S. ability to continue economic assistance to Jordan. The Department suggested that a separate classified agreement covering these matters might meet Hussein's concern about showing the basic agreement to his army or other Arabs. (Ibid.)
Rusk
90. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/
Washington, February 21, 1968, 0131Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Davies, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and USUN.
118628. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: Tel Aviv 2589;/2/ Cairo 1675./3/
/2/In telegram 2589 from Tel Aviv, February 20, the Embassy transmitted the Foreign Office text of a statement of the Israeli position on the implementation of Resolution 242, as conveyed by Eban to Jarring during their February 19 conversation. The statement emphasized the importance of "meaningful" negotiations between Israel and the Arab states to move toward a lasting peace in the area, and indicated that Israel was willing to have such negotiations at a meeting convened by Jarring, suggesting a format for the negotiations similar to that used at Rhodes in 1949. (Ibid.) The text of the Israeli statement, as conveyed by Eban to Jarring on February 19, is printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. VIII, U Thant, 1968-1971, pp. 516-517.
/3/Document 86.
1. Dept believes that formula Eban gave Jarring (Tel Aviv reftel) and which we assume by now Jarring has put to UAR meets any legitimate concerns and doubts which UAR may have had. We therefore want you to see appropriate UAR officials immediately, once you have ascertained that Jarring has in fact conveyed formula to UAR, pressing Egyptians to accept latest Israeli formulation. We were deeply concerned about UAR attitude reflected in most recent Riad presentation to Bergus, particularly unwillingness to indicate clearly and categorically that negotiations would be undertaken (we do not mean direct negotiations here) to get at specifics of SC resolution in toto and to move towards "agreement" mentioned in para 3 of SC resolution. We believe Bergus should bore in strongly to this effect since UAR seems to hold view that all that is required is "respect and implementation" of SC resolution, apparently without any explicit recognition that negotiations (discussions) are required in order to achieve agreement on specific elements, i.e., withdrawal, secure and recognized boundaries, end of belligerency, freedom of passage, demilitarization, refugees, etc., all of which resolution mentions specifically.
2. Bergus should make clear to UAR that, while we agree that there has been unfortunate amount of semantical jockeying with various formulations, present lack of clarity in UAR responses casts doubt on Egyptian willingness to face fact that some form of negotiations is necessary in order to come to an understanding. As follow up to Goldberg talk with El Kony Feb 19, Bergus should press for Egyptian acceptance of Bunche-Rhodes formula.
3. As to possible SC action on any aspect of ME problem, we feel that this would represent a serious setback to efforts being made by Jarring, would not achieve constructive results, and would only produce futile repetition of long, drawn-out propaganda statements carrying all concerned further away from prospect of peace./4/
/4/Bergus reported on February 22 that in a meeting with Mohamed Riad on February 21 he made the demarche as instructed. Riad responded that the UAR position was that it was prepared to discuss and negotiate through Jarring. (Telegram 1713 from Cairo; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
Rusk
91. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, February 21, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab 64. Secret. Drafted on February 26. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 12:37 p.m. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
National Security Council Meeting on the Near East, February 21, 1968
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara
Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler
Director, U.S. Information Agency, Leonard Marks
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms
Under Secretary of the Treasury, Joseph W. Barr
Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Price Daniel
Assistant Secretary of State, Lucius D. Battle
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Walt Rostow
Executive Secretary, Mr. Bromley Smith
Nathaniel Davis
Harold H. Saunders
This meeting evolved in three installments. Because the President was involved with UN Secretary General U Thant at the appointed hour, the meeting began in the Situation Room under the chairmanship of the Vice President. Then word came that the President would soon be available, and the Council adjourned to the Cabinet Room where further informal discussion took place before the President's arrival. Then the President came in and the discussion continued in a more formal way.
I. Mr. Katzenbach summarized the US position in the Middle East by saying that there is no blinking the fact that US influence in the area has been deteriorating. Conversely, Soviet influence has been increasing. He suggested discussing this problem under two headings-our relations with the countries of the Near East and Soviet intentions toward the area.
Speaking of our relations with the Arab world, he noted that we would have suffered some loss of influence had there been no Arab-Israeli war. He cited as the reason for this the natural growth of Arab nationalism and "the general changing face of the world." This was complicated by the US-Israeli relationship and by the extent to which Congress had restricted the resources available for use in the area. In the face of these restrictions, we have "very little elbow room."
Turning to Soviet intentions, he noted that there is not total agreement on just what Moscow is up to. The Russians themselves may not have a clear picture of their strategy. Obviously, they want to see the US position deteriorate and theirs improve, yet without a US-USSR confrontation. Over the past year, they have played their hand in the Middle East in a more traditional diplomatic way. They have done certain things to capitalize on the upheaval last June, but they have also shown some hesitancy in involving themselves in inter-Arab quarrels. They have also sought to improve the military facilities available to them in the area. In short, they are not taking any losses, but they are not jumping in with both feet either.
What can we do? Mr. Katzenbach felt there would not be a great problem if the Jarring mission succeeds. If that happened, some of the Congressional restraints would be relaxed, and we would be able to keep some influence in the Arab world. He would not put chances of Jarring's success particularly high, but because of the serious consequences for us if Jarring fails, we should put everything we have into making it succeed. He recognized the risk of backing a failing effort but he felt that if Jarring fails we will be left with a situation that is "absolutely intolerable." He pointed out that this raises serious questions about what we should do if Jarring fails. These are not questions that need to be settled now, but they are serious.
He concluded by pointing out that there are natural limitations on Soviet ability to increase influence in the area. He felt the normal situation in the Middle East would be for us both to be operating there.
Mr. Battle added that we are, in addition to these problems, also faced with the British withdrawal from the area and the consequent decline of general Western influence in the Middle East.
Mr. Rostow reported that he had just had a talk with Ralph Bunche. Bunche, as a veteran of Rhodes, thinks that Jarring is now in a position to declare that all parties accept the UN resolution and to invite them to a meeting on Cyprus. Bunche recognized from his own experience that tactically and in substance Jerusalem is the most explosive issue. If it came to the Security Council now, it could destroy Jarring's effort. Operationally, aside from nudging the UAR and Israel toward talks, the big question for us is when and at what level we lean on Israel on Jerusalem.
Mr. Katzenbach opined that Jerusalem in the Security Council would be less likely to sabotage the Jarring mission if Jarring is conducting talks. Mr. Battle pointed out that the danger is that Jerusalem will come to the Security Council just at a point when the Jarring mission appears to be near a breakdown. He would like to see Israel stop all activities in Jerusalem which make it appear that Israel is steadily incorporating former Jordanian Jerusalem into the Israeli sector.
Mr. Marks asked how hard we had leaned on Israel. Mr. Battle indicated that we had leaned quite hard for accepting the UN resolution. At that point word came that the group should move to the Cabinet Room, and Mr. Battle did not have a chance to answer the question as it related to Jerusalem.
II. In the informal discussion which continued around the Cabinet table while the Council waited for the President, Mr. Battle and the Vice President discussed our relations with Nasser. The Vice President said that we had tried to get along with Nasser but he had finally concluded that "Nasser just did not like us." Mr. Battle felt that the reason for the failure of our policy 1962-1965 was that we had mounted a policy that we could not sustain without Nasser's cooperation. As long as Nasser made speeches lambasting the US, we could not hope to win Congressional support for a policy of supporting him. The Vice President questioned whether we should resume relations and thereby tend to support Nasser's continuation in office. He felt there were people in the area who would know how to "bring Nasser down." Mr. Battle suggested that we were not sure that leaders who followed would not be worse, although there were still pro-Western people around Nasser to whom we would still like to hold out a hand.
The Vice President then noted the difficulty of explaining to the American Jewish community how much we had done over the past year in support of Israel. He felt that stories of our plane sales had not reached the average member of the Jewish community and that many members felt that we were pursuing a half-hearted policy toward Israel.
III. At this point the President entered and Mr. Rostow summarized the discussion to this point.
The President noted that Eugene Black had reported to him that our position in the Near East was deteriorating. Mr. Black had recommended more contact with Nasser. He had recommended, in reference to the false charges levied against us last June, that we accept the idea that Nasser had been misinformed. Unless we do, resumption of relations is hopeless.
Mr. Katzenbach said that we were prepared to resume relations if we had an opportunity. We did not expect too much to follow from resumption of relations. He felt that perhaps the problem of the "big lie" would be taken care of by Mr. Attwood's interview with Nasser in Look magazine./2/ Mr. Battle pointed out that we still want Nasser to take the initiative in resuming relations, and the President did not disagree.
/2/On March 19 Look published the text of an interview with Nasser in which William Attwood posed a question concerning the UAR accusation that U.S. planes had participated in the Israeli attack on the UAR during the June war. Nasser said that the UAR had merely repeated information he had received in a telephone call from King Hussein. In response to another question, Nasser agreed that the accusation resulted from suspicion and faulty information.
The President asked whether we were any nearer to working out some arrangements with the USSR on arms limitation, or is that in limbo?
Mr. Katzenbach said it was pretty much in limbo. Ambassador Thompson had talked with Kosygin, and Secretary Rusk had raised the matter with Ambassador Dobrynin the previous Thursday.
The President said that he had "played for time" with the Israelis. He had hoped before Secretary McNamara left to have discussions on the ABM with the Soviet Union. He felt that Kosygin had agreed at Glassboro to have such discussions.
A brief exchange followed on exactly what Kosygin had agreed to at Glassboro. The President felt that he had pressed over and over for a date to begin these discussions. He said that he had just talked to U Thant about achieving some sort of arms limitation and about registering with the UN arms shipments to the Middle East. He said all he had done at the Ranch with Prime Minister Eshkol was to postpone our decision in hopes that some of this could take place. Did anybody have any suggestions?
Mr. Katzenbach felt that a good deal depends on Ambassador Jarring. If he succeeds, then arms limitation can be discussed.
The President asked whether there was any chance that Jarring would succeed. Mr. Katzenbach felt that the chances were "less than even." Secretary McNamara said he was "very pessimistic" and rated chances for his success as perhaps "one in four."
Mr. McNamara further noted the shortage of US resources for this area. He felt that the Middle East should be given very high priority for our resources. When the President asked whether this would be from existing funds or from a supplemental appropriation, Mr. McNamara said both, but felt that, as far as Defense was concerned, needs could be met largely from existing appropriations.
Mr. McNamara and Mr. Barr noted that the Export-Import Bank had come out very well and that some arms could be sold on Ex-Im credits with support in both the Senate and the House.
When Mr. McNamara said that we should not let a few dollars stand in our way, the President said he would "not object to a little more money."
The President concluded the meeting by suggesting that we do three things:
1. He asked that the Vice President and the Secretary of State be fully briefed on Eugene Black's report./3/ Then State should pursue the resumption of relations with Nasser.
/3/Document 80.
2. State and Defense should get together an estimate of resources we should need if the worst happened-appropriations that we would need if Jarring's mission failed.
3. We should go back to Ambassador Thompson and instruct him to talk further with the Soviets about arms limitation and ABMs. We should also urge reporting arms shipments to the UN. We should make it clear to the USSR that if they act unilaterally, we would have no choice but to do the same.
The meeting adjourned.
Harold H. Saunders
92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/
Washington, February 24, 1968, 1908Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret, Exdis. Drafted by Atherton on February 23, cleared by Davies and H. Eugene Bovis, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, and USUN.
120292. 1. During call Feb 23 on Under Secretary Rostow, Israeli Ambassador-Designate Rabin made presentation along following lines:
A. USSR influence in Middle East had increased. Soviets wanted neither real settlement nor renewal of hostilities and were seeking to follow policy of step-by-step blackmail. Their tactic was to separate elements of Security Council resolution and deal with it in phases. Israel believed, however, that if it withdrew without settlement nothing would be achieved.
B. Important thing was to bring Arabs to negotiations. Once that accomplished all could be settled. Recalling his experience during 1949 Rhodes negotiations, Rabin said it had not mattered that discussions began in separate rooms. Once under way, parties were soon sitting at same table.
C. While UAR was playing its hand cleverly, seeking implementation by unilateral actions, Rabin believed Egyptians engaged in psychological warfare and did not really want to scuttle Jarring mission. Israel continued to hope that view would be accepted that all elements of resolution must be dealt with together.
2. Rostow commented that GOI and USG remained united on fundamental question of peace. Issues on which we had problems would come up and have to be dealt with in negotiations. UAR had torpedoed possibility of phased solution by linking Canal passage with refugee problem. Jarring mission had been delayed by unnecessary preoccupation with question of "acceptance" of resolution. We had thought a simple formula could be found which could protect Israeli position. This problem may now in any case have been overcome since according our latest information from Cairo, UAR seemed to be accepting idea of talks on Cyprus. If this true, Jarring would be reporting it to GOI and we did not want to get in middle.
3. Rabin asked whether this meant "direct negotiations." Rostow said it did not mean meeting in the same room but thought that would come in time. What Jarring wanted now was to get parties to Cyprus. To Rostow's comment that we had done our best to make clear the importance of "accepting" resolution, Rabin replied that this problem now solved. Rostow said it was our understanding that Jarring would now try to produce piece of paper himself for parties to accept.
4. Rostow noted question had arisen whether Russians controlled situation in UAR. Rabin said he did not think so; Nasser had freedom of action to decide if he had will to do so.
5. Rostow noted we were concerned about situation in Jordan. Hussein was in trouble because of his statement on terrorism and, while he wanted to move toward settlement, did not dare do so alone. Rabin replied that hopefully Hussein had learned at last that, if he wanted to survive, he must control terrorism. Admitting that Hussein faced risk either way, Rabin thought on balance control of terrorism would increase Hussein chances of surviving since, if terrorists got upper hand, Hussein would eventually lose control of country. Hussein must make clear to Jordanian people that in the end they are the victims of terrorism. If Hussein exerted sufficient force, he could survive.
6. On Syria, Rabin said no one could be sure what was happening there. He speculated, however, that removal of Chief of Staff Sweidani, while not reflecting trend toward moderation, could represent attempt to check further leftward swing.
Rusk
93. Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States/1/
Moscow, February 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 64, 2/22-29/68. No classification marking. A note on the message indicates that it is an unofficial translation. This message, conveyed by Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Rusk on February 27 as an oral message, was a reply to the message conveyed to the Soviet Government by Ambassador Thompson on January 22 (see Document 58). A memorandum of Rusk's subsequent conversation with Dobrynin concerning the prospects for a peace settlement in the Middle East is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 64, 2/22-29/68.
In the oral message, conveyed through Ambassador Thompson on January 22, you touched upon the question, which has been already within our sight and on which the position of the USSR was laid down in the Soviet draft resolution of the Security Council of November 20, 1967, concerning the questions of political settlement in the Middle East. Had the Government of the United States wished to put the discussion of this matter on the practical plane then a proper opportunity would have been presented by the provisions of the Soviet draft, which stated, in particular, about taking measures for limitation of useless and wasteful arms race on the condition of withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories.
The Soviet Government, as before, agrees under certain conditions to an exchange of views on the question of limiting the delivery of arms to the Middle East and would be ready to discuss this matter with the leaders of the friendly Arab states. However, we are deeply convinced that the main link of the whole complicated knot of the Middle East problems does not lie now in this. The clue to a settlement of the present crisis in the Middle East is in the speediest withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories, in the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression. You will agree, Mr. President, that it would be pointless to speak of ending arms race in the Middle East while Israel, using armed force, is retaining and even trying to secure the occupation of Arab territories seized by her.
Certainly, if the United States also adopted the position answering the interests of peace in the Middle East and supported the legitimate demands for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops to the lines existed before June 5, 1967, Israel would--and there is no doubt about it--release the seized territories, the Suez canal would be opened and the unsolved problems would be settled. There can be neither peace nor political settlement in the Middle East without the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. This is the first and basic point regarding which there must be full clarity. Without it the wishes for the limitation of arms race in the Middle East have no real ground. So long as the Israeli leaders, enjoying the support from the outside, adhere to the position of annexation of the Arab territories the friends of the Arab countries and the partisans of lasting peace in the Middle East will help the victims of aggression, since in doing so they are fulfilling their duty in accordance with the U.N. Charter and the interests of maintaining peace.
At the same time we would like to stress at this instance again that, as before, we are firmly standing for lessening tension in the Middle East, for turning this area into a zone of lasting peace, and no one should have any doubts about that.
94. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 29, 1968, 2:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret; Limdis. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:45 p.m.
SUBJECT
The Israelis Say They Need More Aircraft
You should know that the Israelis are claiming that a major change is taking place in Soviet-Egyptian military relations. They believe that 50 or more Soviet pilots are now flying with the Egyptians, that the Russians are in the process of taking over the air defense system, and that arrangements have been made for sending five more squadrons of MIG-21's to Egypt. From this information they conclude that Israel is losing its air superiority, and the Air Force commander is talking in terms of needing a hundred more planes. So far, they haven't made any formal request.
The Israelis are making the strongest possible case out of the information, but if their facts are right, it isn't a bad case. Our intelligence people are unable to confirm what the Israelis are telling us, but they admit that Israeli sources could be better than ours. They are trying to get a clearer picture, but at this point they just don't know whether the Israelis are telling the truth./2/
/2/A handwritten note by Rostow reads: "Tell Israel they better work out peace plan." This comment apparently was the President's response to this memorandum.
Walt
95. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/
Amman, March 1, 1968, 1510Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE.
3648. Subject: Jordan arms. Ref: Amman 3570./2/
/2/Telegram 3570 from Amman, February 24, reported on a February 23 meeting between Symmes and General Khammash during which Khammash made counterproposals to Symmes' presentation of the previous day. Symmes concluded that "we may be over the hump" if the United States could agree to limited increases in tanks and anti-aircraft artillery. Symmes felt it would also be necessary to help Jordan get additional financial assistance from Saudi Arabia to help meet the costs of Jordan's military requirements. (Ibid.)
1. Summary: Gen Khammash has confirmed that they wish to leave F-104s in the package and are ready to sign, assuming the adjustments requested in the ground package will be granted. It appears that the arguments supplied by the Department and which we have been using in favor of F-104s have borne fruit. These have been reinforced by the apparent unwillingness of Faisal to help on aircraft and by favorable reports on the F-104 obtained from the Pakistanis. Khammash now asks only for reassurance that the $2.8 million ground control system included in our package will be adequate. (Khammash still does not wish to have the F-104's stationed in Jordan and superficially combat ready at too early a date.) Request therefore that F-104 aircraft portion be left in whatever rewrite of memo of understanding is being done.
2. Elaborating on the foregoing, Khammash explained that basic problem of Jordan's acceptance of F-104 aircraft has been negative feeling among Jordanian pilots towards this model. Crash of two 104s during College Run project last year, against background of German air force losses, confirmed their suspicions F-104 was unsafe aircraft.
3. Khammash said he had been doing some quiet propaganda on his own in favor of F-104 over past several weeks. He sent Jordanian Air Force Chief Colonel Kurdi to Pakistan last weekend to discuss F-104s with Paks. Kurdi, who had been dubious both about safety of this plane and whether it would serve Jordanian purposes, returned with considerably less negative outlook. He also brought news that Paks had said they would try to be helpful should Jordanians need any extra indoctrination and on the job training or maintenance.
4. Khammash said his trip earlier this week to Saudi Arabia (Amman 3570) had made him very dubious that Faisal would be willing to underwrite purchases of Mirage aircraft or turn Saudi Lightnings over to Jordan. Further argument Khammash had adduced for the F-104s, therefore, in session Feb 29 with King and Kurdi was economy. Lacking assurance from Faisal that Saudi Arabia would assist and in view probability Jordan stood to lose several million dollars already paid down on F-104 training and rehabilitation, he argued Kingdom could not afford to choose any other model.
5. In course of several hours meeting Feb 29 with King and Kurdi, foregoing points had been discussed as well as aircraft availabilities and costs. It was decided that it was essential Jordan should be able to state it was getting aircraft in relatively near future. Fact that delivery time for Mirages and Lightnings could be as much as three years away would seriously diminish credibility of King's posture that he doing utmost to re-equip Jordanian armed forces. (Khammash, however, made clear to Emboff that he continued to have some doubts as to advisability having F-104s stationed in Jordan as early as this summer both because he might be expected to use them and because the airfields and ground control equipment would not be ready and personnel fully qualified.)
6. Kurdi conceded that given all these arguments and his trip to Pakistan he felt with careful indoctrination of Jordanian pilots, which should include orientation visits to USA and Pakistan, the pilots could be brought around to accept this aircraft. He therefore would withdraw his objection to acquisition of F-104s. King said that this change in Kurdi's position removed his, Hussein's, only serious objection to the F-104. Hussein said he would not have forced an unacceptable aircraft on Jordan's air force: to do so would only create further problems. Khammash, Kurdi, and Hussein thereupon agreed to accept F-104s and carry out further pilot indoctrination to increase the pilots' confidence in the aircraft. Khammash said he hoped we would help out in this indoctrination because there could be a lingering problem if not resolved.
7. Khammash said he had only one outstanding question in connection with aircraft sale. In regard to $2.8 million ground control radar system for F-104 and Hawker Hunter aircraft which we had undertaken to supply, he said he would like insurance that this system would be adequate to do the job and not just a shoestring operation tailored to fit Jordan's budget. He said it was in neither Jordan's nor US interest to attempt to operate F-104s with deficient ground control system.
8. Recommendation: That aircraft not be deleted from whatever rewrite of memorandum of understanding may be in process.
Symmes
96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/
Washington, March 2, 1968, 0307Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Precht on March 1; cleared by Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Betty Jane Jones (IO/UNP), Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer, Atherton, Bovis, and Wiley; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN.
123868. Ref: State 114277./2/
/2/Document 79.
1. Ambassador Rabin February 29 delivered Eban's reply/3/ to Secretary's letter of February 13. Summary follows. Text by pouch.
/3/The full text of Eban's reply was forwarded to Rusk on March 1 under cover of a joint memorandum from Handley and Sisco. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
2. Jarring mission and modalities--Eban summarizes Israeli steps to advance Jarring mission, including agenda for peace, their most recent language on acceptance of UNSC Res and their willingness for Jarring to convene parties according to Rhodes formula of 1949. Eban agrees interruption of Jarring mission by UN debate would be unfortunate but adds Israel on basis its record would face world opinion in confident mood.
3. Eban emphasizes it would be counterproductive to pursue semantic wrangle any further on acceptance of UNSC Res. In his opinion UAR has either raised this issue as parliamentary or propaganda maneuver or as means of securing parallel, informal, and noncommittal implementation of Resolution without direct negotiations, agreement or recognition. Eban says Israel insists on (1) face-to-face negotiations, (2) contractual agreement, and (3) permanent peace, not mere suspension of belligerency.
4. In accepting Rhodes formula, Eban says Israel would not allow its representative to go to Cyprus hotel for purpose of being ostracized and shunned by Arabs but would expect to meet them together and constantly with Jarring. At Rhodes in 1949, Eban asserts, UN Representative firmly insisted on latter procedure.
5. Jerusalem--Eban reiterates Israeli position that Jerusalem should not again be divided but does not foreclose hopes of meaningful accommodation to any legitimate interest. "In conversation with Ambassador Barbour on 14 July 1967,/4/ Prime Minister Eshkol indicated a possible opening." (We cannot locate report of this conversation here and would appreciate transmission of identifying reference or Embassy's record.) Eban also refers to possible access agreement with Jordan. Criticizing GOJ behavior in former Jordanian sector of Jerusalem Eban rejects Jordan's search for veto on municipal development while refusing negotiations and agreement. Eban suggests Jordan would benefit with respect to Jerusalem and regional cooperation from direct talks with Israel.
/4/This conversation was summarized in telegram 167 from Tel Aviv, July 14, 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII)
Rusk
97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/
Washington, March 2, 1968, 0319Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Day and Precht; cleared by Sisco, Leonard C. Meeker, Davies, Houghton, Atherton, and Bovis; and approved by Secretary Rusk. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, and USUN.
123872. Ref: State's 114277;/2/ USUN 3926./3/ From Secretary for Ambassador.
/2/Document 79.
/3/The reference is in error. The correct reference is telegram 3936 from USUN, February 28. With an eye to facilitating the success of the Jarring Mission and preventing an appeal by Jordan to the UN Security Council on the issue of Jerusalem, Goldberg recommended that the United States should "weigh in decisively and at a high level" with Israel to suspend all expropriation and construction activities in occupied Jerusalem. Goldberg suggested that the United States point out to Israel that these were unilateral acts that were undermining the Jarring Mission. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
1. I fully concur in Ambassador Goldberg's recommendations concerning Jerusalem. Please call on FonMin Eban and reiterate to him the conviction I expressed in my recent letter (State reftel) that great restraint is required in Israel's policies respecting Jerusalem. This conviction has been reinforced both by the somewhat improved prospects for meaningful negotiations under Jarring's aegis and by the increasing sense of frustration over Jerusalem on the part of the Arabs which continues to jeopardize this hopeful trend. According to our information, Israel has continued with expropriations of land and with the related new construction projects in the eastern part of Jerusalem. It is precisely these activities, however, which understandingly give rise to concerns that the character of this part of Jerusalem is being irrevocably changed and that the possibilities of negotiating about its future are being foreclosed. I believe, therefore, that a suspension of the expropriation proceedings and of the related construction is essential to preserve a situation in which negotiation about the Middle East problem as a whole can take place. I strongly urge that the Government of Israel take this important step, in addition to refraining from any new measures which prejudice the future of Jerusalem.
2. You should inform Eban that I have just received his reply/4/ to my letter and will of course study it carefully. On first reading, however, although I welcome his indication that concerning Jerusalem Israel does not "foreclose hopes of a meaningful accommodation to any legitimate interests," I continue to believe that without the steps we are asking Israel to take, chances for the settlement Israel is working to achieve will be seriously jeopardized./5/
/4/See Document 96.
/5/In telegram 123937 to Tel Aviv for the Ambassador from the Secretary, Rusk put forward another argument, instructing Barbour to remind Eban of U.S. cooperation with Israel in seeking an equitable solution to Middle Eastern problems. It would, Rusk felt, be difficult to continue to do so if the United States continued to be subjected to surprise announcements concerning Jerusalem that adversely affected the hopes for peace. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
3. In addition foregoing presentation, you should make points suggested by Ambassador Goldberg in para 2 USUN 3936. You may also wish to use legal analysis of Israel's action contained para 3 Deptel 116833./6/
/6/Not found.
4. Amman authorized to inform GOJ of this demarche. British Ambassador raised question of Jerusalem with me February 26 and we are also informing him.
Rusk
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