Documents 1-25
The Ball Missions and Meetings at Washington,
January-June 1964
1. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 24, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Koren and approved in S on February 8.
SUBJECT
Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
Nigel Trench, Counselor, British Embassy
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Henry T. Koren, SEA
The Ambassador said that the outlook both for the London conference/2/ and the situation on the island was very black. The Greeks and Turks in London were poles apart, and the Cypriot Turks were very nervous about their position. If there were a breakdown in London and a flare-up in Cyprus, very strong measures would have to be taken. He asked the Secretary's opinion on the relative merits of a UN "peace-keeping" mission and a force drawn from NATO countries. He mentioned that the Greek Foreign Minister had suggested a NATO force.
/2/Reference is to the January 15-February 5 meeting of representatives of the Government of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots, and representatives of the three guarantor powers: Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
The Secretary replied he wasn't fully advised on the question and could not give a final answer now, but he could see advantages in discussing it in NATO, which might produce some pressure on the Greeks and Turks. If the three guarantor powers plus Cyprus so requested, he could see some advantage in using troops from NATO powers. He thought it would probably be best not to have any such force under the NATO label, but it might be better to draw on the NATO nations rather than put the matter to the UN. The Secretary said he could give no answer on the question of a U.S. contingent. He pointed out we have some 17,000 troops in Turkey and if our troops were in Cyprus shooting at Turks, we might run into some serious trouble in Turkey, where they might begin shooting at us. He also mentioned our interest in the security of our important installations on Cyprus.
The Secretary continued he hoped they could keep talking in London. The Ambassador reiterated that the situation in the island was bad and the talks deadlocked. If fighting broke out Turkey might take some precipitate action. Mr. Burdett said that EUR's feeling was that the gravity of the situation and the many complications of using troops from NATO countries made it desirable that Cyprus be a first priority for UK troops. The Secretary observed that there should be a note of caution on priorities in view of the serious and spreading situation in East Africa. If the situation quickly went bad UK troops were the only and best way; but otherwise troops from some NATO countries acceptable to both the Greeks and Turks might be used. He mentioned Norway as an example.
2. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
Washington, January 25, 1964, 2:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ball, January 25, 1964, 2:05 p.m., Tape F64.07, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
GWB:/2/ any bad news from any other part of the world, but the situation in Cyprus has been getting worse in the last few days.
/2/The recording of the conversation begins in mid-sentence.
LBJ: Yeah, I'm reading it.
GWB: The British Ambassador was in to see me this morning/3/ and he said that they're not prepared to continue alone to try to carry this because of the political problem they find themselves in--the history of the hatred of the British on both the Greeks' and Turks' side as far as the local population is concerned. And that he wanted us to agree with them on a proposal to try and internationalize the arrangement. Now, this would mean one of two things--
/3/At a noon meeting, Ambassador Ormsby Gore reported on the lack of progress at the London four-power talks and on the "disturbing" situation on Cyprus. He informed U.S. representatives that the British Government wanted to internationalize the problem either through NATO or U.N. intervention in the crisis. A memorandum of conversation of this meeting is ibid. Ball passed the substance of the meeting to President Johnson in a 2:10 p.m. telephone conversation. The President directed Ball to "try to get NATO--not the U.N." (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus Pre-Trip)
LBJ: NATO going in or the UN?
GWB: No. Getting a NATO force to go in or going to the UN. The UN would be very bad because it would--
LBJ: I'd try to get NATO to go in if I could.
GWB: Well.
LBJ: I think that the British are getting to where they might as well not be British anymore if they can't handle Cyprus.
GWB: Well, I've, they're--we put it to them very strong as to whether this was on the basis that they were spread too thin in which case we might relieve some of their forces from, even from Germany. But the--what Ormsby Gore says--and this checks with our own advice--is that putting additional British forces in is probably just going to make the situation worse rather than better.
Now, I'm meeting with Bob McNamara at five o'clock./4/ In the meantime, we're having this thing looked at by the Joint Chiefs--
/4/See footnote 2, Document 3.
LBJ: I'll be available and I'll talk to you--
GWB: We'll have a recommendation--
LBJ: --and I would say off-hand that I would have NATO--try to get NATO in there. And I think the UN's out, but I'd tell the British that there might as well not be a Britain anymore if they can't handle Cyprus.
GWB: Right. Well, this is--what we're taking a hard look at--
LBJ: And I'd let them relieve whatever they needed in Germany to put there rather than NATO. But they won't do it, then we go to NATO. I don't agree that it's going to make it worse, because they can--I'm ashamed of them, but go ahead and let's take NATO.
GWB: Well, we'll have a recommendation for you. Bob and I are getting together at five and [unintelligible].
[Here follows discussion of the situation in Panama.]
3. Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 25, 1964, 6:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith.
SUBJECT
Cyprus
OTHERS PRESENT
Acting Secretary Ball, Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Mr. Valenti, Mr. Komer, Mr. Bromley Smith
Prior to the meeting with the President, the following met in the Cabinet Room from 5:00 to 6:30 PM:/2/
/2/A memorandum of this discussion is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
State: Acting Secretary Ball, Under Secretary Harriman, Mr. Cleveland, Mr. Talbot, Mr. Burdett, Mr. Chayes, Mr. Jernegan
Defense: Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Mr. William Bundy, Admiral Chew, Captain Conkey, Mr. Sloan
CIA: General Carter
White House: Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Komer
Acting Secretary Ball reviewed the current situation in Cyprus and the British request that we send U.S. troops as part of an allied force to Cyprus./3/ The discussion centered around the attached draft telegram/4/ as being the preferred course of action because of disadvantages associated with taking the question to the UN or taking it to the North Atlantic Council.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 2.
/4/Not found.
Mr. Ball reviewed for the President the planning which had been done in the State and Defense Departments since the British démarche. He recalled that the British had been told of our great reluctance to consider the use of U.S. combat troops, but that the British Prime Minister had again requested us to participate in an allied force as the only way to alter a rapidly deteriorating situation in Cyprus which the British were not prepared to continue to deal with alone.
Secretary Ball said an appeal to the UN had been ruled out as the worst possible alternative. The UN might set up a peacekeeping force which would be beyond our control and in which the Russians and the Yugoslavs would undoubtedly want to participate. A NATO solution was not possible because Cyprus is not a member of NATO even though, if the worst happened, two NATO allies would be fighting each other. The tripartite negotiations of the three guarantor powers, U.K., Greece and Turkey, have broken down in London. Prime Minister Inonu is in charge of a weak government in Ankara and may have trouble keeping civilian control of the Turkish military. In Athens, where there is a caretaker government, there may be a military coup. The prospect of such a coup would be greatly increased by serious fighting in Cyprus.
Mr. Ball recommended that we ask the British government to send a ranking military officer to Washington tomorrow in order to obtain more information about their proposed allied intervention force. He said the group would postpone until tomorrow at least making a recommendation on whether or not we should join the U.K. in seeking to establish a military force composed of troops from NATO countries. He suggested that the President might want to talk to the leaders of Congress tomorrow. He summarized the guidelines which would govern our participation in an allied force as follows:
1. The U.S. would make a token contribution--a battalion of 1200 men.
2. The bulk of the force would be British.
3. Two other NATO allies would make token contributions equal to the U.S. contribution.
4. The force would not go into Cyprus until it was large enough to be "adequate" to the need. We do not now know whether the British figure of 10,000 men would be adequate.
5. The military mission of the force would be specifically defined. The British would command the force.
Mr. Ball discussed whether General Lemnitzer should go to Ankara and later to Athens. He said the Turkish military may move in the next two or three days. The Turks have promised us that they will consult before they intervene in Cyprus. But if there were a massacre involving a large number of Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish military might jump off immediately. The civil government in Turkey is very weak and the military may force its hand.
President Makarios may on his own take the case to the UN Security Council. We doubt that any serious resolution could come out of the Security Council unless major fighting broke out or unless the Turkish government intervened militarily.
Ambassador Bruce has reported that the British consider the Cyprus situation more serious and much more important than the Malaysia crisis. They recall the agony of the last time they attempted to keep peace in Cyprus. They have two major bases in Cyprus which they intend to defend. If civil strife outside the bases becomes too great for them to handle, their present plan is to withdraw their troops within the bases and wait out the situation. If major reenforcements of British troops were sent to Cyprus, the Conservatives know that they would be severely attacked by the Labor Party in an election period. The British are also sensitive to the fact that they were the colonial power prior to their withdrawal from Cyprus and that, therefore, they are a hostage to the past.
The President said if the British had election problems, he had problems with the U.S. citizens of Greek background.
Mr. Ball replied that the Greek Government had favored the intervention of allied forces.
The President referred to the fact that our elections are coming and that the prospect of sending U.S. troops into Cyprus is one to face only as a last resort.
Secretary McNamara said that the unfortunate part of the situation was that the only solution to the problem in Cyprus was to force the Greek Cypriots to do something they did not want to do, namely, not increase their control over the Turkish Cypriots by revising the existing Constitution and agreements.
The President asked everyone to go slow on any plan to use U.S. troops in Cyprus. He said there is nothing we can do which will not end up in our losing. Mr. Ball acknowledged that there was no good solution to the problem. He said that if it were necessary to reenforce the original U.S. complement, all participants would contribute to the reenforcement in the same percentage. Secretary McNamara said that if we do go in, the percentage of our participation is the extent of our share of the operation. He thought that 6500 men would have to be put in by others and he did not know where these troops were coming from. Our share would be no more than 1200 men.
General Taylor said that if we do put in our troops, we would provide our own supplies and our own logistic backup. We would ask that each participant do the same.
The President said that perhaps we would have to go through a blood bath in Cyprus before we could take any U.S. military action. He asked whether it were not possible for someone else to go in, such as a neutral or Nasser.
Mr. Ball responded by saying that Makarios wants a neutral such as Nasser or a UN group with neutrals because he is convinced that the neutrals will favor him over the Turks in Cyprus.
The President said General Lemnitzer could tell the Turks not to go into Cyprus and the same thing to the Greeks. We have been holding up numerous situations around the world and we are not going to walk out, but we don't expect others to walk out either. General Lemnitzer should tell Inonu how we feel. Mr. Ball suggested that General Lemnitzer also talk to the military directly because Inonu may not be in full control of the Turkish military.
The President said we should give no encouragement to the U.K. to think that we would join in an allied force. He then asked what would happen if we did not go in.
Mr. Ball replied that the situation might blow up with the result that two NATO allies would be fighting each other. It was also possible that Makarios would ask the UN to come in and a UN peacekeeping force would have Communist elements in it.
Secretary McNamara pointed out that the Greeks in Cyprus outnumber the Turks four to one. He repeated his earlier statement that a political settlement would mean forcing the Greeks to do something they did not now wish to do.
The President asked what else we could do--was a conference possible? Could we get people discussing their problems around a table? Mr. Ball replied that the London tripartite conference had blown up. The U.S. had no status in that conference because it was composed of the three guarantor powers. It is difficult to talk to the Greeks and the Turks because of the weakness of these governments. The views of the Greeks and the Turks are more crystallized and farther apart as the result of the conference in London than before.
The President said it would be necessary to shove him very hard to get him to agree to send U.S. troops to Cyprus. We must do more in a diplomatic way than we have so far.
Mr. Ball said that both the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers were in London and it would be possible for Ambassador Bruce to talk to them there./5/ The President agreed.
/5/Bruce reported on his talks with British officials in telegrams 3499 from London, January 25, and 3510 from London, January 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP) Details on the talks and Bruce's views are in the Bruce Diary, January 26 and 27, 1964. (Ibid., Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)
The President said we should ask the British to send more troops to Cyprus. We have helped them in the past and they must now continue to carry this burden in Cyprus./6/ We should hold off replying to the British until after we hear from General Lemnitzer.
/6/Ball told Ormsby Gore during a meeting at 7:15 p.m. that the United States was not prepared to commit troops to a Cyprus operation, but would provide the United Nations with logistical support. The memorandum of their conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
Bromley Smith/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
4. Editorial Note
At approximately 6:35 p.m., January 28, 1964, Acting Secretary of State George Ball called President Johnson with the outline of a "plan" for Cyprus that would involve sending to Cyprus a contingent of 1,200 U.S. soldiers as part of a 10,000-man NATO peacekeeping force designed to facilitate mediation of the crisis by separating the warring parties. Ball indicated that the plan had the approval of Secretary of Defense McNamara. The President expressed continued skepticism about the utility of sending U.S. troops to the island:
LBJ: Why do we want to put something in?
GWB: I think that, the word we've had all through the day is that there's danger of a blow up. That the situation.
LBJ: That's the danger. They're just trying to make us move and get into something we can't get out of, I think.
GWB: Well, the point of this plan is that if we move in a very limited liability manner.
LBJ: I'd like to move you or Harriman or somebody--Bobby Kennedy, or Bob McNamara or somebody--I'd like to move them over there and let them make an all out diplomatic effort. Maybe put an airplane carrier or two there, but not. That island's already overcrowded.
In response Ball stressed that the United States should avoid becoming the mediator in Cyprus: "Anyone who settles this is going to come down hard on the Greeks." The United States should stay in the background. Ball then outlined a proposal for a Western European mediator, a 3-month cease-fire to permit mediation to proceed, and the inclusion of a 1,200 man U.S. contingent in the peacekeeping force. After answering a number of questions regarding the activities of U.S. officials, the President authorized further exploration of the Ball plan. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Acting Secretary Ball, January 28, 1964, 6:35 p.m.?, Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 1)
At 6:45 p.m. the President telephoned Secretary McNamara to get his views on the Ball plan. The Secretary of Defense suggested that no decision be made until "we've heard from Lem" [General Lyman Lemnitzer]. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, January 28, 1964, 6:45 p.m., Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 2)
The President telephoned Ball to relay McNamara's views at approximately 6:48 p.m. Ball responded: "Fine." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Acting Secretary Ball, January 28, 1964, 6:48 p.m.?, Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 3)
5. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Lemnitzer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Paris, January 30, 1964, 2134Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to USDOCOSouth for Admiral Russell, Athens, and Ankara and passed to the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy. The Chairman of the JCS had requested that Lemnitzer visit Athens and Ankara to "calm the situation" in telegram 4559, January 27. (Ibid.)
ALO 17. 1. I arrived in Athens at 1145 local, 29 January, where I was met by General Pipilis, Chief of the Defense General Staff, and the various service chiefs. After a short press conference at the airport with a large number of press, I departed for a conference with Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos with the understanding that General Pipilis was to accompany me. When we arrived in the Prime Minister's office, Pipilis was summarily dismissed, and the conference, which lasted about an hour, consisted only of the Prime Minister with an interpreter and myself and my executive officer. As a result of his dismissal from my conference with the Prime Minister, General Pipilis later expressed the fear that the Prime Minister might be pursuing a different line than the Defense Ministry and my executive officer was specifically queried by him regarding content of the Prime Minister's remarks.
2. After lunch with Defense Minister Papanikolopoulos and the Chiefs of Staff, I had a two-hour discussion with them at the Defense Ministry, followed by a one-hour conference with the Crown Prince substituting for his father, who was ill. All parties concerned voiced views which were substantially the same.
3. In opening all my conferences, I explained the purpose of my visit along the same lines as I had the day before with the Turks,/2/ highlighting, of course, the disastrous consequences of a military clash over Cyprus between two NATO allies.
/2/Lemnitzer reported on his talks with Turkish officials in an unnumbered telegram to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 29. (Ibid.)
4. The common thread which the Greeks pursued in all of our conversations was that the Turks were determined to abrogate the 1955 treaty/3/ and that they would settle for nothing less than full self-determination for Turkish Cypriots and partition of the island of Cyprus. Furthermore, the Greeks maintained that the Turks were pushing things to an explosive state by their large concentration of forces at Iskenderun and by their continuing inflammatory remarks in the state-controlled press and radio. As a consequence, Greek public opinion has been greatly aroused and has now reached the fever pitch of 1940 when neither the King, nor the government, nor anyone else, could hold the Greek people in check.
/3/Apparently a reference to the 1959 agreements establishing an independent Cyprus; for texts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 765-775.
5. To reduce these tensions and to resolve the current crisis, the Defense Minister listed the following requirements:
a. Dispersion of the heavy concentration of forces in southern Turkey, or, failing that,
b. Introduction of an allied force to Cyprus of sufficient size to maintain peace and security.
c. Stationing of the Sixth Fleet around Cyprus to police the waters and prevent a Turkish invasion.
6. Of these requirements, the dispersal of Turkish forces at Iskenderun is regarded by the Greeks as the most imperative and the most immediate since they look upon this concentration as a Sword of Damocles which could prevent any productive steps. If however, none of the requirements is met, then the Greeks would be compelled to take prompt counter-action. The precise nature of this counter-action was not disclosed.
7. With regard to the allied force, Greece is quite willing to withdraw its forces from Cyprus if the Turks will do likewise. In response to my specific question as to whether they would object to leaving both Turkish and Greek forces there if an allied force went in, the Defense Minister responded that he would have no objection to this if it were necessary. As to command of the allied force, the Defense Minister stated that the question had not been thoroughly studied but that they would prefer to see an American commander.
8. I informed the Greeks that I had been notified through appropriate NATO Commanders of Turkish movement of forces and that I was convinced that I would continue to be kept informed. I stated that even though naval units of both Greece and Turkey were not under NATO command, I had received notification of the movement of Turkish naval units from the Black Sea to Iskenderun. With regard to the build-up of ground forces, I stated that there was not any repositioning of additional combat units in the Iskenderun area, but that any increase in combat strength there related only to the build-up to 100 percent strength of the 39th Division which was normally based at Iskenderun. I stressed the importance of Greece following the NATO procedures for reporting and consultation and was assured that such procedures would be followed and that, in no case, would Greece take any unilateral action without prior consultation.
9. In general, I did not find Greek officials as calm as the Turks. Emotion is running high, aggravated by a sense of frustration stemming from the all-too-obvious military advantages of the Turks in the Cyprus area and the feeling among the military that they cannot look to their caretaker government for decisive leadership. On the other hand, they gave every indication that they sincerely hope to find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. The disadvantages under which they labor are likely to militate against any precipitate, unilateral moves by Greece.
10. I departed Athens at 1830 local and arrived in Paris at 0100 30 Jan. En route I stopped at Naples for a conference with Admiral Russell to give him more detailed information regarding my visits./4/
/4/The Embassy in Athens reported in telegram 1122, January 30, that Lemnitzer had succeeded in "lowering temperature" in Athens. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2)
6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Washington, February 8, 1964, 8:41 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by Ball, and approved by Talbot.
781. Personal for Hare from Ball. Embtel 1002./2/ I am deeply concerned by the delay in Turkish reply and indications they want to do some legalistic nitpicking. In working out revised proposals, we were particularly concerned that any rewording, or any revising of plan should not compromise Turkish interests./3/
/2/Telegram 1002, February 8, reported Turkish objections to any further concessions to the Government of Cyprus on the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping force. (Ibid.)
/3/On January 31, the United States and United Kingdom made a joint proposal to the parties concerned for the establishment of a peacekeeping force in Cyprus drawn from NATO countries. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 556.
When reply is delivered, if it appears Turks are presenting their "objections" because of resentment at Sandys-Kyprianou conversation and misinterpretation of "Sandys proposals", emphasize that nitpicking at this time is disastrous course.
Their worry over getting relief supplies through can be alleviated more rapidly by getting the international force on the island immediately rather than haggling over terms of reference. We cannot understand their objection to "international force". Main point of forces from NATO countries with possibly a non-NATO country (which would have to be acceptable to GOT) is preserved. Committee of Ambassadors from first meant representatives of governments having forces stationed on the Island. It was always planned that liaison with Government of Cyprus and with two communities would take place in Cyprus. There is nothing in the proposal in our view that prejudices either Turkey's treaty rights or the position of the Vice President under the constitution.
Seek to have Turks concur in presentation to Makarios and Kutchuk and phrase their "objections" as observations or points as GOG did in first go-round. If they insist on tampering with details as conditions they must understand they are endangering whole operation.
Rusk
7. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, February 9, 1964, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to London. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
1004. For Ball from Hare. Deptel 781./2/ Immediately on receipt reftel I went see Erkin and we had very down to earth talk. In essence his line was similar that of Tuluy, maintaining GOT had agreed original proposals despite sacrificing very important points. Fact that Makarios had done opposite and that adjusted proposals drafted so as take his conditions into consideration necessitates GOT present its views in order regain balance. Furthermore GOT has Parliament looking over its shoulder and already under pressure for having been too supine. Paper giving GOT response would be given me and British Ambassador at two o'clock./3/ He said most important points would be application of all treaty provisions (para numbered two of Embtel 1002)/4/ and reference to "Government of Cyprus", existence of which GOT does not recognize, should just refer to Archbishop Makarios and Dr Kucuk by name (para numbered four of Embtel). I commented along following lines:
/2/Document 6.
/3/The text of the note was transmitted in telegram 1005 from Ankara, February 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
/4/See footnote 2, Document 6.
1) Revision of proposals made with Turkish interests in mind and represents no derogation of them.
2) GOT may have problems re proposals but so do we. Matter is urgent and if time lost discussing detailed points whole effort could collapse, including our own steps to be helpful.
3) Purpose of presenting revised proposals was to obtain GOT acquiescence in order present them to Cypriots. In so doing we of course expected GOT would make comments and observations as Greeks had done but I trusted these would not involve changes in document itself but would rather be for information and clarification.
4) Point re general validity of treaty provisions represents no substantive problem since it has been our view from beginning that proposals do not affect such provisions. We have so stated repeatedly and I could now say so again under authority of message from Ball.
5) Point re "Government of Cyprus" was quite another matter since, regardless of GOT reservations, we just could not put ourselves in position of challenging legal status of GOC. We recognize that GOC not functioning normally but that is practical, not legal, consideration. Fact that proposals had been submitted to Kucuk as well as Makarios was illustrative this point.
At end, Erkin said GOT reply would cover number of points, including proposed revisions of text but that point regarding general application of treaty provisions was most important.
Referring to my previous warning re danger of delay involved in redrafting, I asked whether these suggestions would be in the form of requirements for GOT acquiescence or as expression of what they would want if possible arrange. Erkin replied that we would be given paper and would be up to us what to do with it. I asked what this meant in terms of submission of proposals to GOC. To be specific, could paper go forward even if decided changes inadvisable? Erkin replied "What else can you do?"
This not too satisfactory but better than expected. At any rate your message afforded timely opportunity to get crack at Erkin and give him time do a little thinking before seeing him this afternoon.
Hare
8. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/
London, February 9, 1964, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to Athens for Ball. Relayed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
3824. Following is uncleared memcon of Under Sec Ball's talk with Cypriot FonMin Kyprianou:
1. Under Sec and Amb Bruce met 1730 today with Kyprianou at AmEmbassy. Kyprianou was accompanied by Cyprus HICOM in London Soteriades. Under Sec explained US concern with Cyprus problem prompted primarily by our concern with peace. We believe establishment peace-keeping force, coupled with mediator concept, offers best way to proceed. US participation in force depends on working out acceptable arrangements to avoid entangling problem in cold war and on willingness of GOC to accept and request such force. Under Sec asked for GOC's frank views re US participation.
2. Kyprianou affirmed GOC reply given earlier remains basic GOC view./2/ GOC has no objection in principle to participation by any country. It is not the force that will provide permanent peace. If it is necessary have such a force because UK not prepared assume full responsibility, GOC believes it should be under Security Council. GOC has no wish create further complications. In its view, however, such force needed primarily for external purposes. Once danger of intervention is removed, atmosphere will automatically improve. Greeks will know no need exists to prepare for invasion; Turks will know they cannot hope for intervention. Influence and interference of outsiders primarily responsible for present troubled situation. Turkey more to blame than Greece. While primary purpose of such force should be to deter outside aggression, internal peace-keeping obviously also desirable. Force should assist GOC restore normal conditions.
/2/In a February 2 statement to the London conference, Kyprianou announced that the Government of Cyprus accepted the idea of a NATO peacekeeping force in principle, but insisted that it operate under the authority of the United Nations. Subsequently, President Makarios outlined further objections to a NATO force under U.N. aegis. For text of Makarios' February 4 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 557.
3. If these are to be missions of force, it preferable force be under Security Council. Cyprus is small country with bitter past experience. If force under Security Council aegis, Cypriot public opinion will find it much more palatable. Kyprianou stressed GOC not trying blackmail. It remains ready discuss question before going to SC. Once agreement reached on composition of force, GOC wonders why US and UK should consider it dangerous go to Security Council.
4. Under Sec explained part of problem revolves about meaning of "under Security Council." We do not object to some connection with Security Council. We are seeking work out with other objective and competent countries establishment of force able to provide both power and a psychological framework designed to restore calm while political solution is being sought. Rather than inject question of composition of force into cold war politics at UN, we believe composition should be pre-arranged before going to Security Council. Formula by which link with Security Council is established is important. We do not wish make force subject of Soviet veto. Also, it is impractical to organize force if Security Council is going to be asked finance it because of already existing controversy revolving about Article 19. To get into this range of questions will merely delay its organization. We think it possible agree with GOC on a force where each participating govt pays its own way. We would also agree with GOC on what nations should participate. Thereafter, we see no reason why matter could not be brought to Security Council in manner where Soviet veto and cold war confrontation are avoided.
5. Kyprianou disclaimed GOC responsibility for present situation. He then alluded to various other factors which allegedly increased tension. Manner in which proposal prepared and projected in Cyprus, with other nations and press apparently apprised before GOC, increased suspicions. Under Sec noted original idea was Greek. HMG had called Greek proposal to our attention. In order to test its feasibility, we have explored it with other govts. Kyprianou insisted GOC equally interested party and should have been consulted earlier. Greeks had told GOC it was not their proposal, although GOC knows it was. With respect to force itself, Kyprianou said once agreement is reached on composition, GOC wants to go to Security Council. It would explain its desire is to place pre-arranged force under Security Council control. He wondered if Soviets would in fact veto such force since they appear to be trying assist GOC.
6. Under Sec pointed out "under Security Council" can embrace Security Council "taking note," "reporting," etc. What did GOC have in mind? Kyprianou replied Security Council should authorize SYG to have the right to control the force within the scope of agreed terms of reference. Security Council should be competent to take decisions with respect to the force if called upon to do so by SYG, GOC or the participating countries. The Security Council might also have the mission of working out terms of reference for the force. He envisaged a two-stage procedure. The Security Council should first pass a resolution asking all states to refrain from threatening independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. GOC would inform Security Council that talks are also taking place on the composition of a force about which it would report back to Security Council once agreement is reached. Such procedure would have a calming effect in Cyprus. Security Council endorsement, in GOC's view, is a deterrent. Kyprianou added he was thinking of going to New York on Wednesday or Thursday to initiate Security Council action, although his trip might be postponed until Saturday. Under Sec said we will have to examine Kyprianou's idea. Meanwhile, he hoped we might move forward on composition and terms of reference of force.
7. Kyprianou also suggested SYG might, even in absence any specific proposal, go to Cyprus himself for a day. He need have no specific mission, but would simply seek inform himself of situation. This too would have calming effect. Kyprianou said he had instructed Rossides to sound out SYG on this. Did we have any objection?
Under Sec said he would want to consider this further with his UN experts. His initial impression was that there should be no objection.
8. With respect to US participation, Kyprianou thought this would be inadvisable. GOC would not object, but US participation would adversely affect the "popularity" of the US in Cyprus and could give rise to public feelings against the US. Under Sec pointed out that we must consider if any force can in fact be organized on viable basis if US does not participate. If force could be organized without us, we would prefer it. We have been inclined to doubt that it can. Many nations who speak boldly of peace-keeping force become less so when it comes to paying for it. Some states have said they will join only if US does so. In any case, there is no intention of taking any action without full agreement of GOC.
9. Kyprianou contended that, psychologically, if force had come in context of political settlement, it might not have been viewed differently in Cyprus. Fact is, however, that it developed while London talks were taking place, thereby heightening Cypriot suspicions. He asked Under Sec if US has formed any views re political settlement.
Under Sec replied that on basis our knowledge of Cyprus situation, we have not felt able to contribute any useful suggestions at this time. Kyprianou then asked what purpose of mediator would be? Under Sec pointed out it was not proposed he try to put American ideas into effect. His task would be to sound out all interested parties and seek to persuade them come to some mutually agreeable settlement. Kyprianou was skeptical about mediator's prospects. He opined that if there were some way to get Greece and Turkey out of picture, chances of success would be greater. He recalled that ten years ago enosis might have been better arrangement. Through no fault of Greek Cypriots, it could not be worked out. Such "radical solution" probably not possible now.
10. Under Sec told Kyprianou he planned meet with Sandys again and, together with Sandys, might perhaps be able to hold second meeting with Kyprianou later. During subsequent talk with Sandys, it became clear that further discussions with Greeks desirable before saying anything more to Kyprianou. Under Sec then telephoned Kyprianou to explain his inability meet with him again today and his wish to reflect further on Kyprianou's observations. Under Sec said he hoped be in Nicosia sometime Tuesday and suggested Kyprianou might wish to consider meeting him there. Kyprianou will probably do so.
Bruce
9. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, February 10, 1964, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
1197. For Secretaries of State and Defense and Ambassador Stevenson from Under Secretary.
I have had useful detailed discussions today with Hare, Labouissse and Wilkins. In sum, they reinforce and support the tentative views of the overall situation I expressed yesterday. (Athens 1184)/2/
/2/Telegram 1184, February 10, reported Ball's view that the United States should not put troops in Cyprus and should avoid taking a firm public position on the issue so that the United Kingdom, Greece, or Turkey would not back off from their commitments. (Ibid.) A summary of this telegram was provided to President Johnson in a February 10 memorandum from Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Lunch with President)
1. I am now even firmer in my view that the US should not put troops in Cyprus. Wilkins (who supports wholeheartedly views contained in Athens 1184)/3/ together with his Army Attaché [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are all convinced Makarios does not want Americans. They fear US forces would be special target of hit and run tactics of Greek Cypriots. According to Wilkins, Pickard also agrees that US troops would be singled out more than other Western powers because of our position of leadership in NATO.
/3/In telegram 685 from Nicosia, February 8, Wilkins warned that the British plan would fail to win Cypriot acceptance and urged U.S. support of a peacekeeping force under U.N. aegis with the participation of forces from both Greece and Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
We explored possible ways that US military support might be provided while minimizing exposure of US forces on assumption some form of US involvement may be useful or even necessary to keep Turks from standing down. This included possibility of putting US troops in British bases on standby basis. However, we concluded this not desirable since US unit would be thrown into breach at such time as serious fighting broke out, which would be worse than being in from beginning.
2. Today's discussion highlighted importance and delicacy of handling Turks so as to minimize adverse repercussions on our relations and to dampen any desire they may have to intervene in Cyprus unilaterally. As a result, it is more than ever important that responsibility for our non-participation be placed squarely on Makarios' back. As Hare puts it, US failure to participate in an international force would remove keystone to arch, so far as Turks are concerned.
It seems increasingly likely that Makarios will cooperate with us on this since opinion of our Nicosia [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is that Makarios could not survive acceptance of US troops. He believes Cypriot "fighters" would throw him out if he tried it.
3. What are the alternatives to plan as presently agreed by all but GOC? We concluded best alternative we can probably hope to achieve is modest international force under UK com and made up of Benelux, Scandinavian countries, Canada and possibly Ireland.
Force would be approved by SC but not put under its control. While such force not as effective militarily as original concept, it would provide political deterrent and help spread responsibility as UK desires. If Makarios wants such a force--and there is still real doubt that he wants any international force at all--a prearranged deal along these lines might be feasible. Hare is clear, however, that this fallback--while probably the best we can hope for--would cause Turks great anguish.
4. If we are to keep the Turks from feeling we have sold them down the river, we must make strongest effort to avoid any suggestion we are weakening in our decision to contribute US contingent to international force. Any leak or suggestion from any US source indicating such weakening would be catastrophic./4/
/4/In telegram 789 to Ankara, February 10, Secretary Rusk responded: "First purely personal reaction your telegram is that Turks might be saved if there is U.S. naval or air participation not involving U.S. ground troops." (Ibid.)
5. Kyprianou told me in London that GOC was planning--before dealing with question of international force--to seek Security Council confirmation of "territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus". This was confirmed by Greek FonMin this afternoon/5/ who added information that Makarios planned to go personally to New York for that purpose but had agreed to defer this junket until after Greek election next Sunday (February 16). I described to FonMin how I am tentatively planning to deal with this proposal when I meet Makarios. However, I would appreciate suggestion of Ambassador Stevenson and Department as to best tactic. I have in mind saying following to Makarios:
/5/Ball reported on his meeting with Foreign Minister Palamas in telegram 1199 from Athens, February 10. (Ibid.)
a. We have been the major support of the United Nations from the beginning while certain other nations that make great pretense of interest in Cypriot situation have consistently sabotaged UN and failed to provide financial support for its peacekeeping efforts.
b. We are practical nation and trust that Makarios will take a hard look at the practical consequences of his proposed action.
c. A move toward the Security Council on this issue will almost certainly result in the interjection of cold war politics. It will provide the forum for charges of genocide against Cypriots while speeches in Security Council will only serve to inflame passions that are already too high.
d. We must concentrate on first things first and that means getting agreement on international force before involving Security Council.
Obviously this ploy may not work. Makarios apparently has naive idea that Security Council is like General Assembly and filled with Afro-Asian pals. If he insists on going ahead, however, we could probably not frontally oppose kind of resolution Cypriots have in mind. We should seek to finesse it by developing formulation we could support. In that event, each member of Council would put its own interpretation on language. Net result might be resolution putting Security Council on record that all parties concerned must keep their shirts on and avoid action that would exacerbate situation.
6. We also grappled briefly and inconclusively with nature of long-term settlement. All were in full agreement we should not get into middle of mediating process. If there is a solution it is certainly not in sight in near future. Movement of population within federation seems offer some possibility but has the great draw-back of being rational and therefore not feasible. Best we can hope for in foreseeable future is to help keep lid on boiling cauldron and thus prevent southern wing of NATO from blowing up.
Tomorrow I go to Ankara to begin process of preparing Turks for turn down by Makarios and possible modest UN force alternative described above.
I plan to see Makarios Wednesday./6/ I have asked Wilkins to get categoric assurances from Makarios there will be no demonstration as condition precedent to my visit./7/
/6/In telegram 793 to Ankara, February 11, the Department of State commented that Makarios had an "exaggerated idea" of what he could get from a Security Council meeting without U.S. and British support and provided Ball with a series of talking points designed to impress on Makarios the limits and dangers of over-reliance on this approach. (Ibid.)
/7/In telegram 355 from Nicosia, February 11, Wilkins reported that he had Makarios' assurances that no demonstrations would take place during Ball's visit. (Ibid.)
Labouisse
10. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, February 11, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Nicosia, London, USUN, and Athens. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
1017. From Under Secretary. We met this morning first with Foreign Minister Erkin and then went with him for session with PM Inonu. In both cases, I explained our interest in problem of Cyprus, our concern over its dangers and our support for peacekeeping-mediator proposals. At same time I made clear we and other non-guarantor powers could only participate if Makarios agreed, and I indicated considerable concern at what I understood to be his rather negative attitude. Said I was going to Nicosia tomorrow and intended to press hard for his agreement. They asked what could be done if he refused, to which I replied that this would depend upon nature of his refusal. We had no specific present plans in this regard.
I also discussed report that Makarios plans to appeal to UN after Greek elections are over and seek resolution warning against aggression or interference with independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Assured them I intended try to dissuade him from this and make point that there should be reference to Security Council only after full agreement reached among parties concerned. Turks agreed premature Security Council debate would be harmful and wished me well in my efforts.
I emphasized that continuing tense situation on island and Makarios' idea of rushing to UN made it imperative for us to get quick decision and that I would work hard to this end. Was prepared stay over day or two in Nicosia if satisfactory answer not forthcoming tomorrow.
Erkin asked about Greek position. I said they supported peacekeeping plan but had told me they had little influence on Makarios. Erkin questioned latter statement, but we said our own information from various sources confirmed it. He commented some Greek moves had been displeasing to Turkey, but government exercised restraint despite heavy pressures on it to act, including severe criticism by Parliamentary opposition. I said we appreciated this and told him Greek Foreign Minister Palamas had himself expressed admiration for restraint displayed by Inonu.
Erkin indicated he fully realized dangers Turkish intervention, saying British would withdraw and Greeks would intervene "not with us but against us".
He asked whether we intended answer Soviet note. I said we were studying question, thought British answer was good one./2/ Erkin commented Turkey would have something to say about note/3/ and referred to TASS articles criticizing Turkish position, which he said were particularly annoying because Soviet Ambassador had promised his government would support Turkey.
/2/For text of the Soviet note and the U.S. reply, see Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1964, pp. 446-448. For text of the British reply, see The New York Times, February 9, 1964.
/3/The Turkish reply was released on February 25. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Cyprus.
Both Inonu and Erkin remarked position Turkish community in Cyprus was getting worse rather than better, "massacres" still continuing. Longer international force delayed, worse situation would get, because Makarios and associates have "no scruples left". Inonu added, Turks have no confidence in guarantee enforced solely by British, although British have enough troops on island for purpose. Problem was British instructions to their troops. They were instructed not to shoot but confine themselves to giving advice which was not enough. Asked if British could not be induced to act more effectively, I said I would talk to them about it.
They asked for our suggestions for proposed mediator, and I mentioned names of van Roijen, Plimsoll, van Kleffans. Said Spaak and Lange probably out of consideration because both occupied in important full time positions. Inonu said he was not familiar with first three names but made no suggestions of his own. Expressed hope man chosen would have full opportunity to learn facts and would realize Turkish community cannot be left to mercies of Makarios.
Erkin asked our reactions to proposed Turkish changes in joint proposals. I said we had given them consideration and thought we had been able to meet most important points. Jernegan would meet later with Foreign Office officials to explain what we had done.
Hare
11. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, February 13, 1964, 1:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
732. Dept pass White House and Defense. For President, Secretaries of State and Defense and Ambassador Stevenson from Under Secretary.
1. In the last few days, we have succeeded in clearing our Cyprus proposals with the British, Greek and Turkish Governments. This has required a substantial output of persuasion.
2. I spent the day today largely with Archbishop Makarios and his colleagues. I had two long meetings--one this morning and one this afternoon./2/
/2/Detailed reports of the morning discussions were transmitted in telegrams 726 and 727 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.) Ball presented Makarios with an "adjusted proposal." The text of this proposal was transmitted in circular telegram 1482, February 12. (Ibid.) The Embassy provided a detailed report on the afternoon discussions in telegrams 728 and 731 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.) Makarios presented Ball with the text of the Cypriot proposal "preconditioning" acceptance of an international peacekeeping force. This document was transmitted in telegram 742 from Nicosia, February 13. (Ibid.) Ball also met with Vice President Kuchuk in the interval between his two sessions with Makarios. The Embassy reported on this meeting in telegram 729 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.)
3. While we were meeting, fighting was going on at various points in the island yielding a number of dead and wounded, both Greek and Turk. This is a daily occurrence. Cyprus is a battlefield. We travel about Nicosia with police escorts, followed by RAF units with sub-machine guns. There is a pervasive atmosphere of imminent crisis.
4. Our morning meeting consisted largely of my own long and hard-boiled presentation. Makarios seemed willing to consider our proposal. This afternoon the psychotic element in the Cyprus drama fully emerged and the atmosphere chilled.
5. At the conclusion of lengthy technical discussions, Makarios indicated that in spite of my most vigorous arguments he was going ahead with his foolish plan of sending an expedition to ask the Security Council to try to undermine the Treaties of Guarantee by seeking a resolution reaffirming the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus. He indicated quite casually that he would deal with the creation of an international force at some later date.
6. In view of the fact that the murder rate is rising steadily and that the tempo of fighting is increasing, such conduct by Makarios is criminally foolhardy.
7. In view of this, the British High Commissioner and I told off Makarios and his extremist ministers in a manner unfamiliar to diplomatic discourse. In an exchange which lasted 45 minutes or more, we painted a lurid picture of the consequences that would entail from the folly he has proposed.
8. When the discussion got past the boiling point, I proposed that we adjourn until Thursday morning, to which the Archbishop agreed.
9. I think we shook the Archbishop. Even his beard seemed pale. But the big question is whether he is really in command of the situation. The two ministers who led the discussion on the Cypriot side--Clerides and Papadopoulos--are fanatical and over the edge. They reflect the death wish that seems endemic in this wretched island. Both also have some Communist coloration in their backgrounds.
10. The question we face tonight is who is in charge? If the Archbishop is as scared as I think he is, we may be able to salvage something tomorrow morning. I plan to see him alone before the meeting. But if he is a prisoner of his own folly--which seems likely--he will commit Cyprus in the morning to a disaster course.
11. The issue that must be faced is the only simple question in this complex situation. Is the Cypriot Government prepared to work with us and other countries in organizing an international force immediately? Or does it want to throw the issues into the United Nations in the hope of attracting enough Soviet bloc and Afro-Asian support to embarrass the Turks while the island continues to fall apart?
12. As of tonight, Cyprus is very near civil disintegration. I talked with the Commander of the British Forces, General Young, this noon and he felt despondent and frustrated: A battle occurred today in a town that has heretofore been quiet; something on the order of 5,000 Turks are encircled. There have been casualties on both sides. The pace is accelerating and a general bloodbath just over the horizon.
13. Against this background, I told Makarios that if he did not proceed immediately to organize an international peace force, he would condemn his country to total anarchy. But I have little confidence that he is enough of a free man to act rationally--even if he had the will to do so.
14. I have sent him word through covert channels that if he would agree to the organization of an international force immediately, we and the British would help him achieve one. We would call on the Commonwealth countries and on some of the Western European neutrals. If he would postpone throwing his problems into the Security Council until after such a force had been agreed, order might be restored and the situation salvaged. In that event, we would talk to the Turks and try to hold up their hand while efforts were made to develop a formula for a general settlement. Such a force cld not involve US troops.
15. I hope we can agree on something but I am not too sanguine.
16. The position of Turkey in this affair is a critical one. From my talks in Ankara, I am persuaded that if Makarios is enough of a fool to go to the Security Council and try for a resolution designed to hamstring the Turks in exercising their rights of intervention, without first dealing with the internal situation through the organization of an international force, he is likely to trigger an incisive Turkish reaction. The Turks may move, and the Greeks will respond.
17. Our only hope, it seems to me, is to scare Makarios sufficiently to compel him to concentrate on the creation of an international force that will stop carnage. If he does not do so--and I will know tomorrow--we have some hard decisions to make. I have promised the Turks and Greeks to report on our meetings here.
18. One possibility of preventing a Greco-Turkish war is to persuade both governments to exercise the rights of unilateral intervention granted them under the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and move into Cyprus peacefully and together in order to stop the destruction of the Greek and Turkish communities. This obviously would not be feasible until after the Greek elections which take place on Sunday.
19. For the moment, we have considerable influence with Inonu, who has made clear to me his gratitude for the US manifestations of interest in the Cyprus situation. Hopefully we may be able to establish a relation of confidence with whatever new government emerges from the Greek elections.
20. I have the impression that Britain, as the third guarantor power, would be willing to associate itself with a peaceful joint intervention by Greece and Turkey and would simultaneously increase present British troop strength in Cyprus.
21. To arrange a common action by Greece and Turkey would require considerable diplomatic skill and the maximum use of our leverage. Yet I am inclined tonight to think this may be about the only remaining hope of preventing a major collision of two of our NATO allies--if, as I fear he will, Makarios turns out to be a prisoner or a fool or both.
22. I am sending you this cable tonight not with the thought of immediate instructions, since it is hard to make a definite plan until we know the full results of tomorrow's meeting with Makarios. I must emphasize, however, that the atmosphere at this end of the Mediterranean is supercharged and that an explosion may be imminent. I shall try tomorrow to send you more considered recommendations as to the options open to us and the immediate actions we should take.
Wilkins
12. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 13, 1964, 10:55 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Knox and approved in S on February 20 and in the White House on February 24. The meeting was held in the White House. The source text is marked "Part I of II." Prime Minister Home visited the United States February 12-14.
SUBJECT
Situation in Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
British
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of Great Britain
R.A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office
N. Henderson, Private Secretary to Mr. Butler
Tom Bridges, Second Private Secretary to Mr. Butler
Denis Greenhill, Minister, UK Embassy
M. Hadow, Press Secretary, Foreign Office
US
The President
The Secretary of State
Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Richard I. Philips, Director, P/ON
M. Gordon Knox, Deputy Director, BNA
Secretary Rusk reviewed the situation in Cyprus. He pointed out that Archbishop Makarios had seemed willing to see a peace-keeping force composed not of troops from NATO states (except for the UK), but from the Commonwealth and from nations like Sweden. Mr. Butler remarked that the idea of such an alternative force was hopeful. Secretary Rusk said that Mr. Ball would see Makarios again the morning of the 14th. Meanwhile, reports of heavy fighting in the southern part of the island were disturbing, however, and Secretary Rusk stated that Mr. Ball would proceed on the 14th to Ankara to counsel prudence to the Turkish government.
Mr. Butler remarked that the Cypriot government would surely bring the issue before the Security Council and the Cypriot delegate, Rossides, would introduce a resolution. If it were unreasonable, the British and the US could be negative and would have the votes. If the resolution were reasonable and two-sided, we could be reasonable about it.
Secretary Rusk remarked that the best and most likely kind of resolution which would get a majority at the Security Council was one of the "don't fight, talk" resolutions which are customary in the Security Council under circumstances such as now prevail in Cyprus. The US and UK could back such a resolution in order to head off other ones of the sort the Cypriot government would want. Namely, one to cast a shadow on the Treaty of Guarantee.
Sir Alec doubted that Makarios can control matters in Cyprus any longer. He hoped that Canada would continue to be one of the states making up the peace-keeping force.
Secretary Rusk referred to the fact that the Turks, Greeks and British have forces on the island by right; this could be a concept which could be used to keep Makarios from calling in forces from Egypt or the Soviet Bloc, for example, which have no right on the island.
Sir Alec supposed that if the Turkish army invaded Cyprus, the British government would call on it to stop at a certain line. The British forces certainly would not fight a NATO ally.
The President suggested that it would be important to have the Turkish and Greek armies agree not to fight each other, should their governments decide to send forces to occupy portions of Cyprus. It would also be desirable that each side should protect the other's minority population. He recalled that Queen Frederika of Greece had told him during her recent visit to Washington that the Greek Army would move to Cyprus if the Turkish Army did./2/
/2/Queen Frederika visited Washington on January 27. Her comments on Cyprus were reported in a memorandum from Komer to the President, January 27. (Johnson Library National Security File, Country File, Greece, Vol. 1)
He then asked Sir Alec what motivates Makarios.
Sir Alec called Makarios a stinker of the first water. He wants a central government in Cyprus which would rob the Turkish minority of its rights. Makarios seemed to rely on a Soviet promise that it will keep the Turks from invading the island.
Sir Harold Caccia stated that any action of this sort by Russia against Turkey would bring NATO into action.
Mr. Rusk observed that this was a matter of extreme danger. Before there would be a response to a Soviet action affecting the Soviet-Turkish border the question would be in the Security Council.
13. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, February 14, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Athens, London, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
1031. For Read from Hainy. Following uncleared memo of conversation with Makarios. From Under Secretary. Mr. Pickard and I called on the Archbishop this morning./2/ I reiterated the concern of the USG for the situation in Cyprus not merely because of the loss of life on the island but the threat to peace which was posed. I expressed my disappointment that we had not been able to arrive at an agreement on concrete measures but stated that my government was not prepared to abandon efforts to contribute to an alleviation of the dangers that threatened.
/2/Sir Cyril Pickard, Assistant Under Secretary of State for the Commonwealth Relations Office, was Acting U.K. High Commissioner for Cyprus. Pickard's report to his government on this meeting was transmitted in telegram 748 from Nicosia, February 14. (Ibid.)
I said that I had been instructed to return to Washington today by way of the capitals of Turkey and Greece. I would try to use what influence we had to persuade the governments in Ankara and in Athens to exercise restraint. Of course, the effectiveness of that would depend on the absence of any incidents on the island. Before leaving I had been asked to obtain the assurances of the Archbishop that he would make a public declaration of the determination of his government to restore peace and order and to take effective measures toward that end.
I said that I did not intend to discuss further the question of the application by the GOC to the Security Council but could only reiterate my regret that they were pursuing this course before taking effective steps to bring about an international force that could contribute toward peace. I said also that the Archbishop and I had established, I thought, a basis of personal friendship during the past three days and that I felt it necessary to say to him that the debate in the Security Council in the manner in which the issue was being presented by the GOC would have a lamentable effect on the world's conception not merely of the Government of Cyprus but of the leadership of the Archbishop.
Pickard then went on to say that he had also proposed to his government that he should return to London via Ankara and Athens to discuss the future of the British peace-keeping force on the island. He said that it was impossible for the British forces to carry out their tasks in present circumstances unless it was clear beyond all doubt that it was the intention of the Government of Cyprus to restrain their forces and avoid such attacks as have happened in Limassol.
The Archbishop had previously given assurance that the government forces would not retaliate even if attacked. In fact, however, an attack had been carried out in Limassol with very little provocation from the Turks. Peace could only be kept by the Cypriots themselves and no force however it was composed could do the job keeping the peace unless it was the intention of the Cypriots to find a peaceful basis of living together.
The Archbishop again reiterated his assurances about the peaceful intentions of the Cypriot Government. He agreed, however, that the present basis for peace-keeping was totally inadequate and that there must be discussion of practical measures to restore the life of the community on a normal basis. He undertook to proceed with such discussions immediately on Pickard's return from London and to do his utmost to establish a basis of confidence with the Turks which would enable a return to normal conditions on the island.
Pickard stressed that this required compromise on the Greek side as well as on the side of the Turks. There was no question of forcing the Turks to comply with Greek requirements. What was required was an overall negotiated agreement on practical measures for restoring life on the island to normal. It was only on the basis of such a settlement that a peace-keeping force would have any reality.
The Archbishop accepted all this and undertook as a practical first step himself to visit Limassol in order to give public expression to his concern that the peace should be kept on both sides.
We left the meeting on the basis of a firm undertaking from the Archbishop that he will get to work at once on practical ways of reassuring and finding a basis for returning conditions to normality on the island.
The Archbishop also promised to make some form of public declaration asserting his government's intention to keep the peace.
The Archbishop was undoubtedly sincere and on the face of it the proposal of working out the details of practical measures for peacekeeping is a sensible next step. It would, however, be a mistake to underestimate the great difficulties of bringing any such discussions to a conclusion acceptable to both sides.
I did not discuss the compromise plan at all with Makarios, and in view of Turkish and British anxieties, I believe the less said regarding it the better for the moment.
Hare
14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Washington, February 14, 1964, 8:48 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by Burdett, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Athens and repeated to London, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
817. Following highlights telecon between Secretary and Under Secretary (in Ankara) February 14, 1830Z, are in addition verbatim portion sent action Paris repeated info other posts./2/
/2/A transcript of the telephone conversation is ibid.
Under Secretary reported meetings with Inonu and Erkin showed PriMin under enormous pressure which greatly intensified after bloody Limassol affair. However he determined act in consultation with US and wishes withhold any decisive action until after disposition Cypriot case in UN provided there no new incidents. It clear situation extremely precarious but Under Secretary trusts PriMin's assurances he will not move before telling US unless something occurs making intervention imperative.
Under Secretary stated PriMin presented several questions and wants answers before Monday:
1. What will US reaction be if Russians want intervene?
2. How should GOT act during UN consideration this matter?
3. If US advises patience, what will be advice to all other parties concerned in order maintain even temporary peace and security?
4. Will US release Turkey's troops from NATO command to be available and ready?
5. In case nobody intervenes except Turks, may GOT expect attitude benevolence and neutrality US Government?
6. Wish clear-cut indication as soon as possible US's UN tactics and close cooperation with Turk Ambassador Washington who will handle in UN.
In addition, two questions put to British Ambassador: if troubles go on in Cyprus what will UK do? Is UK ready exercise its right intervention with Turkey?
Commenting on UN tactics (transmitted separately)/3/ Under Secretary said this exactly right course which can make major contribution hold back Turks. Stated he had made clear to PriMin it would disastrously prejudice chances defeating Cypriot UN move if Turks took action giving credence GOC claim Cyprus was in imminent danger Turk aggression, and that request to NATO for release Turk NATO contingents on standby basis would be exploited by GOC in UN and make efforts defeat GOC tactics immensely more difficult. He had told PriMin emphatically US would never support resolution questioning Treaty Guarantee and expressed confidence that by working together we can defeat GOC ploy, and assured PriMin closest consultation.
/3/Ball's comments were transmitted in telegram 816 to Ankara, February 14. (Ibid.)
Under Secretary asked if Turks could be told of plans for preemptive move to SC on Saturday.
Secretary noted Caccia and Dean were with him and that Limassol casualties not as great as first reported. Gave first reaction some of GOT questions as follows:
See no prospect Russians would attempt intervene Cyprus but assume Western powers including US would find way prevent. Noted other possibility of Soviet pressure on Turkey in event Turkey moved unilaterally under Treaty would raise gravest questions for NATO generally and underscores necessity finding answer Cyprus problem which would prevent that contingency.
Believe US and Turkey should act in closest harmony during period UN consideration and all parties, especially UK, should make maximum effort keep situation calm.
Added that presumably British will shortly answer questions put to British Ambassador since PriMin has returned London.
Re UN tactics, Secretary stated we contemplate British letter will go SC President Saturday afternoon but no SC meeting before Monday because of Greek elections. Said Turks must not give publicity to British letter since could have adverse effect on Greek elections.
Emphasized importance that Greeks not be informed of British letter before its approximate time of delivery which roughly 1430 Saturday NY time.
Noted that possibility Soviet pressures on Turkey underscored necessity closest Turkish consultation in NATO re Cyprus. Mentioned planned Saturday meeting NAC on Cyprus and suggested Turks should keep closest touch with Secretary General Stikker.
Secretary suggested Under Secretary proceed on itinerary to Athens. British Ambassadors Athens Ankara would inform GOG and GOT at appropriate time Saturday re British letter to SC./4/ Ambassador Hare could at same time give suggested assurances to Turks, and that Under Secretary need not discuss British SC letter either capital.
/4/In telegram 1227 from Ankara, February 15, Ball reported that he had explained the "preemptive initiative" to Turkish officials during an evening meeting. (Ibid.)
Rusk
15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, February 18, 1964, 5:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Komer for the White House. Repeated to Ankara and Athens.
5185. Please deliver the following letter from the President to Prime Minister Douglas-Home: Begin verbatim text.
Dear Prime Minister:
I have had a good talk with George Ball about the impressions he gained on his trip and we have given further thought to the explosive situation stemming from the troubles in Cyprus.
George Ball reports he had a particularly useful meeting with Rab Butler and Duncan Sandys and I am glad to find that there is no difference in our appraisals of the Cyprus crisis./2/
/2/Ball reported on this meeting in telegram 3969 from London, February 16. (Ibid.)
I think you were wise to beat the Cypriots to the Security Council./3/ It seems very likely that we should be able to prevent the use of the Council to scrap the guarantee treaty. I hope we can also obtain a satisfactory resolution for the creation of an international force. However, the Council may well be heading into a mean and protracted debate, and I fear that an international force will not be landed in Cyprus quickly.
/3/On February 15, following Makarios' formal rejection of the U.S.-U.K. proposals for an international military force, the British Government requested a Security Council meeting to discuss Cyprus. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 561-562.
Meanwhile, there is the increasing nervousness of the Turks. In more than three hours of conversation with Inonu, George Ball came away convinced, as you know, that the Turks are poised to intervene and that they will certainly move if a further nasty incident like Limassol should occur. In that event, we would be in for deep trouble since the Greeks have made it clear that they will not stand down.
I conclude from all this that we cannot safely depend merely on the results of the Security Council action. Even an international force may not secure order in Cyprus. As your own people on the Island have pointed out quite perceptively no peacekeeping force will be able to maintain order unless something can be done to change the attitude of the two communities--and the encouragement each is getting from the mainland. Yet Turkish passions will not subside, even with a force in being, if the killing continues.
For that reason, I would strongly urge you to give serious thought to convening the guarantor powers under Article IV of the Treaty for a summit conference within the next few days. There are clear advantages in acting promptly. First, we need immediate insurance against a unilateral Turkish move. Second, we have, at long last, a Greek Government with a solid majority. Papandreou is rumored in the press this morning as possibly intending to get together with the Turks as his first order of business. This may well be the psychological moment for an effort to break the impasse.
I should think that the subject matter of such a summit meeting could well be the security problem in Cyprus and support for the international force in the United Nations. At the same time, I think you might use such a meeting to develop standby contingency arrangements against the possibility that the Turks may be stimulated by events into a unilateral move.
Such arrangements could take the form of a pledge from each of the guarantor powers that, if one party felt compelled to move, it would confer with the other two powers to make arrangements by which the move would be made on a tripartite basis. Military representatives of the three countries could work out plans for some kind of a combined operation--perhaps along the lines suggested in a paper which George Ball gave to Rab Butler and Duncan Sandys in London./4/
/4/Ball flew to London on February 14. His "Action Plan for Cyprus" was transmitted in telegram 3961 from London, February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
If such a meeting were to be held, it might be useful to ask the United States to send observers in order that we could add our influence to yours in injecting some rationality into the present situation. If you thought this a good idea, I would be glad to send George Ball and perhaps General Maxwell Taylor.
Of course, it is important that whatever the guarantor powers do as a group should reinforce rather than cut across the current effort in New York to establish the basis for an international peacekeeping force. Both the draft resolution you expect to put into the Security Council and the ideas floated by U Thant include the provision that the guarantor powers should reach agreement, along with the Government of Cyprus, on details of a peacekeeping plan. I have no doubt that a meeting of guarantor powers could be fitted into the track now being pursued in the United Nations.
With my strong feeling that time is of the essence, I am at your disposal to help in any possible way to avoid the fearful consequences of a Greek-Turkish war. Sincerely, End verbatim text.
Rusk
16. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Papandreou/1/
Washington, February 20, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Cyprus. Secret. A copy of the message was transmitted in telegram 943 to Athens, February 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP) The President also addressed similar letters on the Cyprus issue to Prime Minister Inonu and President Makarios. The text of the February 21 letter to Makarios is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Cyprus. The text of the letter to Inonu was transmitted in telegram 848 to Ankara, February 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
I have sent you separately my congratulations on your landslide victory in the elections./2/ We are particularly happy that a government can now be formed soonest with a clear majority, because of the grave crisis which confronts the Western Alliance over Cyprus.
/2/A copy of Johnson's message is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Greece, Papandreou. In telegram 1261 from Athens, February 19, the Embassy commented that the main characteristic of the new Papandreou government was its "moderate nature," noting that Papandreou had placed conservatives in key positions. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 GREECE)
Truly, this is a time which requires the closest collaboration of all the allies concerned if we are to surmount the crisis. The US, because of its deep commitment to the NATO alliance, will do whatever it can to help. Nor are we pressing for any specific long-range solution. On the contrary, as we have repeatedly sought to make clear, the United States has no position on terms of any final settlement. What we all need immediately is the reestablishment of law and order so that the parties can proceed to the search for solutions acceptable to all.
And let me assure you that we are neither favoring Turkey at the expense of Greece nor vice versa. Our interest is--as it has been since 1947--that of supporting the security and well-being of two close NATO allies. As we see it, the common need of Greece, Turkey, the US, and the UK to stick together is paramount.
It will take the highest statesmanship on all sides, but especially in Athens and Ankara, to prevent a wholly unnecessary debacle--and one which threatens the very security of both Greece and Turkey--from being precipitated by the Cypriot extremists of both sides.
For this reason I am grateful that you won by a majority that gives you the necessary freedom of action, because we count heavily on the wise heads of you and Inonu to help find some way of stopping the drift toward communal tragedy. I have seen with interest reports that you may have been considering a new effort in partnership with Inonu, and while I do not know the details of what you may have in mind, I do want to say that in principle nothing could be more helpful than joint action by the leaders of Greece and Turkey in the spirit which I am sure you have in mind.
In this critical period it is important that our representatives keep in close touch with each other, in Nicosia and New York as well as Athens and Washington. We recognize the special responsibilities which Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom must continue to bear, but you may count on us as well./3/
/3/In a February 27 response, Prime Minister Papandreou stated his opposition to direct negotiations between himself and Inonu, reaffirmed his opposition to the use of force to settle the Cyprus issue, and called for close consultations. (Ibid., POL 23-8 CYP)
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
17. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, February 21, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to USUN, Ankara, London, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, COA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
1272. Cyprus.
1. I called on PriMin last night. I found him looking tired but mentally alert. After I extended our congratulations on his great political victory, we immediately got down to discussion Cyprus problem.
2. I recalled to him that our only interest was reestablishment law and order so that parties concerned could work out political solution in atmosphere of calm. For our part, we had no pre-conceived ideas of what ultimate solution should be--this was matter for parties concerned. Papandreou indicated he understood and appreciated our position, but said that many considered we were supporting Turks. He smilingly added that if the US fully supported the "right", we would have to take sides--Greece's--for London-Zurich Accords had created impossible situation. I suggested one of reasons for public misunderstanding was irresponsible and wholly misleading articles in Greek press which led the public to believe that US either had ulterior motives or was supporting Turkey versus Greece. I pointed out that Paraskevopoulos caretaker govt had either been unwilling or unable tell facts to public.
3. While on the subject of our support of GOT position, I said that it was obvious we could not accept the view--apparently advanced by Makarios--that the SC could amend or nullify treaties. This could only be accomplished through negotiation of the interested parties. Papandreou nodded assent. I stressed that, even though we took above position on treaty, we had been using very strong pressure on GOT not to exercise "right of intervention."
4. I then went on to say that, during these past days, the situation on the island had deteriorated and was extremely dangerous. Not only was Makarios apparently acting on very bad advice, but individual guerrilla bands were growing in strength and independence. Consequently it was of transcending importance that peacekeeping force be organized and despatched quickly and, meanwhile, that every effort be made to prevent further violence on the island. In view great danger confronting us all, I added that it was indeed fortunate that Papandreou had achieved his overwhelming electoral victory, for this put him in key position to play constructive and decisive role on Cyprus question; his election could well prove turning point in history as he was probably only man who could move problem toward solution.
5. After we agreed on need for peace force and also on fact this only temporary expedient, I said it seemed to me only hope for any solution, long or short term, was agreement between Greece and Turkey--certainly no permanent solution could be found without their agreement. Meanwhile, what could Papandreou do to get Makarios in hand and also control Greek-Cypriot irregular leaders? This was essential and extremely urgent.
6. Papandreou said first that he already moved to gain control over Greek Cypriots as he had told me he would do if elected. He repeated his statement to me of last week (Embtel 1205)/2/ that it was inadmissible for Greece's future to be decided by Makarios and stated firmly that he intended to enforce discipline on Greek Cypriots. To achieve this, he had been in touch with Makarios and had also just that afternoon met with General Grivas and a "representative" of Cypriot Interior Minister Georgatzis; he expected Georgatzis to arrive during the night. He also said he was contacting Sampson, Lyssarides and the Commander of the Greek forces in Cyprus, Col. Petridies. He said he would demand that Greek Cypriots undertake no violence against Turk Cypriots unless attacked first. He stressed importance GOT holding Turk Cypriots in check. Otherwise, he seemed confident that he could exert the necessary control over the Greek Cypriots to create an atmosphere leading to negotiations.
/2/Dated February 11. (Ibid.)
7. The PriMin agreed completely that first step was to bring about peace and calm atmosphere in which negotiations could take place. However, he said long-term solution requires removal of Greek and Turkish forces from Cyprus; their presence there, facing one another was unnatural and created constant tension. Their place should be taken by an international force, he continued, that would stay as long as needed. Long term solution would require "international" guarantee rather than present impossible system. He did not spell out "international" but seemed to have in mind a UN guarantee of some sort (I don't think he would rule out NATO) which would give "complete" guarantees to Turk Cypriots for protection of their minority rights (he repeated word "complete" several times).
8. Papandreou said he thought time had come when Grivas could play constructive role in Cyprus; he observed that as Makarios' prestige was going down, Grivas' was going up. However, he emphasized that he did not want to play one off against the other, and that it was essential that they cooperate or the Communists would gain. He apparently had not thought through how Grivas' appearance on scene would affect British or Turks. He seemed to be toying with idea that Grivas would pull all irregular elements together and ensure discipline, leaving Makarios as President--for the moment at least. This is all in "feeling out" stage and I doubt that Papandreou sees clear path ahead as yet.
9. I stressed again that it was vital that there be understanding between Greece and Turkey. He agreed and said that if he were to meet Inonu, he would tell him that it is insane to consider war between Greece and Turkey; however, he added that if Turks "open door to insane asylum, then he would have to accompany Inonu inside." I did not press him on meeting with Inonu, since I thought it would be counter-productive to do so at that particular moment. However, I have very definite impression he would go along with meeting if we can set proper stage. President's letter to Brit PriMin may show the way, but this should be researched by Brits.
10. Papandreou expressed optimism about outcome of talks at UN; he said info he had received during afternoon sounded promising. He strongly favors giving U Thant proposals a good try.
11. Comment: I was impressed by speed with which Papandreou has started action aimed at gaining control of Greek Cypriots as he had told me he would in our meeting last week. He seemed fully cognizant of dangers involved in Cyprus crisis and said several times he wanted to move Cyprus from the "danger" status to the "problem" status. Whether he can really gain control of Greeks on island remains to be seen, but he apparently is confident that he can and is going to make real college try. Meanwhile, I urge that we restate to Turks importance controlling their brethren on island in order prevent incidents such as those mentioned in Nicosia's 405./3/
/3/Telegram 405 from Nicosia, December 29, 1963, reported the Ambassador's talk with Clerides. (Ibid., POL 25 CYP)
Labouisse
18. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, February 24, 1964, 8:46 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buffum and Sisco; cleared by Bracken, Talbot, and Cleveland; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and USUN.
933. We are pleased to see from urtels 1279 and 1280/2/ that Papandreou (a) aware of Communist dangers in Cyprus; (b) working on Makarios to accept U Thant proposal; and (c) agrees that main thing now is for Greeks and Turks to sit down together and work out solution.
/2/Telegrams 1279 and 1280, February 20, reported on discussions with Papandreou regarding Cyprus. (Ibid.)
Dept gratified at constructive dialogue which you have conducted with Papandreou since election. We are anxious have you continue full and frank exchange with him on all aspects of Cyprus problem both to establish mutual confidence and to create positive atmosphere for eventual Greco-Turkish (or tripartite) meeting. This connection, we wish give him our appraisal of current situation in New York, as follows:
As we read situation at UN, there has been substantial agreement among all concerned on same basic elements accepted in earlier US-UK proposal, to wit, need for international peacekeeping force and need for mediator. However, in our judgment, prospects are extremely remote that SC session will result in any kind of action giving reality to either of these two concepts. Reason for this perfectly clear: Makarios remains obdurate in opposing any UN resolution which does not have effect of negating Treaty of Guarantee. He presumably has Soviet veto in his pocket and we assume will not hesitate to use it. We and the UK, on the other hand, are equally determined that SC shall not be exploited to nullify Treaty of Guarantee, and most members of Council agree this should not be the case. We are not seeking get SC reaffirm Treaty of Guarantee; however, we cannot agree to type of resolution sought by Makarios which by completely ignoring Treaty and by giving an international force mandate that appears to be directed against Turkish intervention has effect of negating Treaty.
We hope GOG is under no illusion about futility of Makarios' efforts get kind of action from Council he wants. (We assume Bitsios has so reported to Athens.) Only way we can see to prevent total impasse at UN is if Makarios relents in his position. We hope GOG doing what it can get him adopt more flexible attitude toward SC resolution. SC President Bernardes (Brazil) is now consulting with non-permanent SC members in hope of working out a formula which both sides can accept. We wish them well in this endeavor, but looking at problem realistically, we are convinced Bernardes will fare no better than U Thant has unless Makarios prepared abandon his objective of getting SC to vitiate Treaty.
Our present assessment is that efforts to get an acceptable resolution in Council may run for another two or three days. But we deeply concerned that if SC produces nothing, as we anticipate, vacuum may be created in which there will be further violence in Cyprus and renewed temptation for Turks to move in. We would be interested in any thoughts Papandreou has on possible lines of approach to Inonu. We glad he planned to see Turkish Ambassador and would be interested to learn whether he did so and what came of meeting. If US, as friend of both sides, can in any way facilitate Greek-Turkish dialogue, we shall be most happy to do so.
With future course of events in Cyprus murky in face of almost certain Council inaction, we would warmly welcome any thoughts Papandreou has on steps that might be taken now to avoid a dangerous vacuum when deadlock reached in SC.
FYI: We think an early Papandreou-Inonu meeting would be best next step. This could be without prejudice to later participation of UK (and US) if this proves desirable. We believe such meeting could provide vehicle for keeping lid on situation in Cyprus and convincing Makarios to accept international peacekeeping force along lines of Thant Plan./3/ Possible outcome of such meeting could be to: (a) address an appeal to Makarios to take all possible measures to maintain law and order; (b) urge him to accept international force along lines of Thant Plan; and (c) reassure Makarios, as in Allied Plan, that rights of intervention under Treaty of Guarantee would be suspended for period during which international force operating and while mutually-agreed mediator was seeking political solution. We also believe that Makarios' willingness accept international peacekeeping force along lines of Thant Plan would be decisively influenced if the Greeks and Turks could make clear to him that alternative to such an international peacekeeping force would be tripartite military intervention under Treaty of Guarantee. Confronted with choice between international force along lines of Thant Plan and tripartite military intervention, Makarios might well see former as lesser of two evils.
/3/This plan, which was rejected, proposed establishment of an international peacekeeping force and provided for a mediator under special circumstances. For text, see U.N. Doc. S/5554, February 15, 1964.
We have outlined the above rather fully to give you the flavor of our present tentative thinking. We leave it to your discretion as to how much of this would be appropriate for you to reveal to Papandreou at this time. We would like you to see Papandreou soonest, largely in context of an exchange of views on where we are in New York, and to have you probe further possibility of an early high-level meeting./4/ End FYI.
/4/In telegram 1298 from Athens, February 26, Labouisse reported he had passed on the Department's views to Papandreou who outlined his efforts to restrain Makarios and stressed the need for the United States to restrain Turkey. (Ibid)
Rusk
19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, February 26, 1964, 6:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Burdett and Jernegan. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, USUN, DOD, and the White House.
5393. For Ambassador from Under Secretary. Would you please deliver the following message from me to Messrs. Butler and Sandys:
Begin verbatim text
Denis Greenhill has told me/2/ of your plan to approach the Greek and Turkish Governments tomorrow to urge a meeting between Papandreou and Inonu. I told him that we would ask our Ambassadors in the two capitals to coordinate with yours in order to give whatever reinforcement seemed useful.
/2/At a noon meeting at the Department of State; a memorandum of their conversation is ibid.
While I see great virtue in a bilateral meeting, I am not at all sanguine it can be achieved at this point. Our own tentative soundings have indicated that it will be difficult for either Papandreou or Inonu to move without at least some third party invitation and a juridical excuse for conferring.
I would strongly urge, therefore, that if the answer is negative--as I fear it will be--you consider going back promptly with a request for tripartite consultation under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guaranty. As I read this Article, consultation is not merely a privilege, but an obligation of the parties--if there is reason to believe that the state of affairs under the constitution has been altered. In order to bring the Greeks along it might well be necessary to suggest that Makarios and Kutchuck be invited to participate in the consultation.
Alternatively, we might propose to Inonu that the Turks themselves extend the invitation for tripartite consultation. This would have, however, two disadvantages. First, based on my conversations with Erkin, I doubt that the Turks would be prepared to call for a tripartite consultation unless it were clearly understood that this was a prelude to tripartite intervention. Second, the Greeks might be less responsive to a Turkish request for consultation than to an invitation from your Government.
I feel more than ever that some move of this kind is imperative. It seems evident that the Greek Cypriot game is to try to keep the United Nations proceedings going. This is a forum where they can draw support from their Communist friends. It provides them with insulation against a Turkish move while eroding Turkish intervention rights.
Bernardes, the President of the Security Council, is trying to work out a compromise resolution before Thursday afternoon. If the Cypriots continue to dig in, however, I think it may become apparent by then that no resolution can be forthcoming. The Cypriots are exploiting to the maximum Soviet and Czech support. Kyprianou has played the Council skillfully, and there is developing evidence of softness on the part of the Ivory Coast and Morocco. The increasing pro-Makarios line being pursued by Bitsios is having its effect on the Council members.
Meanwhile, in Cyprus Makarios is moving with his characteristic Byzantine deviousness. The regularizing of 5,000 irregulars looks to us as an effort to lay a basis for a request that your troops be withdrawn. There is plenty of evidence that Makarios does not want a peace-keeping force of any kind. By asking the withdrawal of British forces, he would probably discourage countries from contributing components even if the Security Council should produce a satisfactory resolution.
If Makarios can keep the matter going in New York, he probably feels that he can deal with the Turkish Cypriots without much fear of Turkish intervention--particularly with his exaggerated belief in the nature of Soviet assistance.
Against this background, we see his call for the disarmament of the population as laying the basis for a move to disarm the Turkish Cypriots. In this connection we have good report that Papadoupulos made speech on the 24th to the Patriotic Front Deputies saying GOC has decided definitely to rely fully on Soviet support having lost hope in UN.
All these events in Nicosia have certainly not been lost on Ankara, which is presumably feeling an increasing claustrophobia. I do not think we can count on Inonu holding the line, once it becomes clear that an international force is not on. And, if the Turks sense the erosion of their treaty rights to intervene, they may feel compelled to move before it is too late.
All of these considerations seem to me to urge a tripartite meeting if Bernardes is not successful and if we cannot secure the promise of an immediate bilateral Greek-Turkish dialogue. Such a meeting would seem to offer several opportunities:
(a) To convince Makarios that the Turks mean business and that he is playing too risky a game;
(b) To press Makarios to accept and support an international peace-keeping force along the lines of the Thant plan; and
(c) To undertake contingency planning for a possible tripartite intervention as an alternative to unilateral Turkish move.
I do not think I am being alarmist in feeling a deep sense of urgency. I cannot believe that the arms build-up in Cyprus can continue much longer without grave danger of an explosion.
I think it very likely that if the Security Council fades out and the Cypriots prove unable to secure an emergency General Assembly meeting the present superficial calm will give way to a bloodbath. End verbatim text./3/
/3/In telegram 4189 from London, February 27, Bruce reported that he delivered Ball's message to Caccia who outlined British doubts about the utility of a guarantor powers' meeting and suggested that a Makarios-Inonu summit might jolt the Greek Cypriots to their senses. (Ibid.)
For Ankara: Would appreciate your comments on foregoing together with results your soundings with GOT on its views and possible actions as result of developments in Security Council and on Cyprus./4/
/4/In telegram 1090 from Ankara, February 28, the Embassy reported that Turkish patience with Makarios was wearing thin, but the Turks remained receptive to the idea of a "high level meeting" with Greek officials. (Ibid.)
For Athens: You are requested to comment similarly./5/
/5/In telegram 1306 from Athens, February 27, the Embassy reported that Papandreou was unwilling to enter into direct high-level talks with the Inonu government and would probably oppose any proposal involving action by the guarantor powers. (Ibid.)
Rusk
20. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, February 27, 1964, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and USUN. Relayed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
1302. 1. I think we have reached a stage which warrants reevaluation of some aspects of our policy and tactics dealing with the Cyprus question. Our main concern has been to prevent a situation from developing which would embroil two of our allies, thus precipitating NATO disaster. To this end, our basic drive thus far has been to gain time and keep the Turks from making a military move on Cyprus which the Greeks would inevitably feel bound to counter. We have consequently worked for measures which would effectively suppress violence on the island and thus deprive the Turks of the provocation which might trigger off a legally justified intervention on their part. In order to avoid antagonizing either of these two allies of the US, we have studiously avoided taking a position as to the form or the shape of a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. We have said many times that the solution is a matter for the parties concerned. This was probably the proper stand for us to take at first, but is it right and is it good enough to meet the situation which faces us today?
2. It must no doubt be difficult for the more sophisticated to believe that the US has been willing to accept an important role in the efforts to bring peace to the island without also attempting to form a considered judgment as to how the matter ought to be settled on a long-term basis. In our conversations, PriMin Papandreou has been probing for a US position and obviously does not believe that we do not have one. In fact (as has become increasingly clear during UN debate) our studious avoidance to take a position is in itself a position--one that is inevitably interpreted as favoring the existing set of arrangements rather than acknowledging the pace of events and the impetus to change the agreements which have been established and theoretically govern Cyprus. Moreover, while continuing to adhere to this noncommittal attitude of neutrality on the question of a long-term solution, we have been supporting--in effect if not in words--the Turkish insistence that the Treaty of Guarantee affords the Turks a legal cover for intervention. We are thus inevitably taken to be supporting not only the Treaty of Guarantee but the other aspects of the London and Zurich Agreements as well--in short, the status quo.
3. It has already been vividly and painfully demonstrated that the present arrangements for Cyprus do not work and will in due course have to be changed. In Cyprus, in Greece, and at the UN, the pressure for "self-determination" is increasingly strong. I do not see how the US can ultimately escape agreeing to the application of more self-determination for Cyprus than is presently permitted in the existing arrangements without laying itself open to the charge of moral inconsistency. Only last Saturday the communiqué issued after President Johnson's meeting with Pres. Lopez Mateos reaffirmed "support of the principle of self-determination of all peoples and of its corollary, non-intervention. They agreed . . . to promote the acceptance of such principles, not only with words but with deeds, in the Americas and throughout the world."/2/
/2/For full text of the statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book I, pp. 303-305.
4. Much more will be heard in UN halls and out, from the Soviet and Afro-Asian blocs, and indeed from the Greeks, on the necessity for applying the principle of self-determination to Cyprus. Will it not then become increasingly embarrassing for us to avoid taking stand? In the end our strategy of neutrality (generally interpreted as support of the existing arrangements) will not only hurt us in the UN but spread the wrong impression about US policy around the world. Here in Greece, adherence to this strategy over a long period of time, with the resulting vocal reactions in the press, among the public and in government circles, may do serious and lasting damage to US-Greek relations that will have repercussions more far-reaching than Cyprus.
5. Since it seems to me that we will inevitably be driven to conceding in the end that the present arrangements cannot be made to work, would it not be well to make a virtue of necessity by saying at once that, in our opinion, the agreements will, in due course, have to be altered by negotiations between the interested parties? I believe that this would clear the air considerably, put us in a less uncomfortable position to deal with Makarios, the Greeks and the neutral and Soviet blocs--thus improving the chances for the creation of a peace force--and give some negotiating substance to future discussions between Greeks and Turks. While, in the recent past, the cruelty of the Greek Cypriot irregulars toward the Turkish minority and the deviousness of Makarios have damaged the majority's case for control by it of the island's affairs, the fact remains that the Greek Cypriot 82 percent majority has the right to a preponderant voice in determining what the island's government and policies ought to be.
6. Obviously, the Turks will hardly welcome this evolution in our position. We can, I believe, relieve some if not all of their concern by emphasizing that our position in favor of modifying the agreements is rigidly conditioned on complete protection of the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority--rights which, however, cannot include a veto over the 82 percent majority's right to control its foreign affairs, defense and taxes. This guarantee of the rights of the minority would, in the first stage, have to be insured by the presence and appropriate authority of an international force. Such a force would have to stay on the island long enough to make sure, for the future, that the Government of Cyprus would not and could not use the principle of self-determination as a means of destroying or oppressing the Turkish minority.
7. While the course of action proposed may not curb overnight the neutralist and leftward drift of the island's present government, I believe that it would somewhat restore the position of the West in Cyprus and make the island a less open target for Communist intrigue and penetration. It would make it easier for the US to maneuver amidst changing events. Our first step ought to be an acknowledgement that the present arrangements have less chance than ever to become workable in practice. (The setting up of the London conference and the subsequent Anglo-American suggestions for appointing a mediator implied, in a sense, that changes were needed.) Our main goal should continue to be the elimination of communal strife through the dispatch of an international force or in any other way that might appear practicable. Looking further ahead, it may be that, in the end a NATO guarantee or some other form of association of the island with the West will become desirable and feasible--for a Cyprus remaining a permanent apple of discord between Greeks and Turks would continue to be a grave threat to Western and US interests.
8. The foregoing observations and recommendations have been set down in full awareness that
(a) A shift in our public position in the direction of self-determination will be taken as a victory for Makarios (who bears such heavy responsibility for the present impasse), and
(b) That if the Turkish minority were to continue to be permitted to retain a degree of control over the island's affairs out of proportion to its voting strength, it might help frustrate neutralist and leftist tendencies on the island. (The Greeks, of course, argue forcefully that continuation of present situation is driving Cyprus into Communist arms.)
Although these considerations are important and must be weighed, I firmly believe that the United States stands to lose less by modifying our position along lines suggested./3/
/3/Telegram 880 from Nicosia, February 29, endorsed Labouisse's arguments, adding that the United States "should not abandon hope of finding basis of cooperation with Greek Cypriots" that would permit a settlement protecting the legitimate interests of both Cypriot communities. In telegram 906 to Athens, March 4, Ball responded that while Cypriot constitutional arrangements appeared unworkable, the United States continued to insist that changes could not come through Security Council actions. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Labouisse
21. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, March 3, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to USUN, Ankara, Athens, London, and Paris for USRO. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
898. Makarios told me this morning GOC had decided accept draft SC resolution on Cyprus submitted by five non-permanent members (USUN's 3246 to Department)./2/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid.) For text of Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), adopted unanimously on March 4 (U.N. Doc. S/5575), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 566-567. The resolution recommended that the Secretary-General create a peacekeeping force in Cyprus and designate a mediator to promote a peaceful solution.
He said Clerides had telephoned him from New York last night to recommend some minor changes. Clerides had told him USSR very disturbed about provision that commander of peace-keeping force would be appointed by and report to SYG because USSR felt bound by Congo precedent in that commander should be appointed by and report to SC. Makarios commented he would ask Soviet Ambassador Ermoshin request USSR not to veto resolution on this basis.
Since Makarios obviously expected some reply, I commented that it was quite understandable USSR would take such a position because it could thus hope, through threat or use of SC veto, to exercise continuing, if negative, influence on development of Cyprus problem for its own purposes. After mentioning Soviet abuse of veto in past, I reminded Makarios of analogous situation existing under Constitution of Republic of Cyprus. Under this constitution Turkish minority in House of Representatives could never by themselves procure adoption of legislation but were in position, through exercise of veto, to prevent adoption of legislation which majority of House considered necessary for good of country. Makarios nodded agreement.
Makarios, who usually appears reposed, seemed unusually relaxed today but did not, it will be noticed, miss opportunity to discredit a pretender (Clerides) in American eyes.
McKiernan
22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus/1/
Washington, March 7, 1964, 6:26 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Jernegan and cleared by Komer for the White House. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN.
621. After interview with Secretary reported separate telegram,/2/ Kyprianou, Clerides, and Rossides had brief talk with President March 6. President expressed hope machinery set up by SC would be sufficient to work out Cyprus problem. Thought it was best we could hope for and stressed extreme importance of peaceful settlement, remarking that most people would rather talk things out than fight. He expressed regret there had been misunderstanding of U.S. attitude. Sent his regards and best wishes to Makarios.
/2/Telegram 619 to Nicosia, March 7. (Ibid.)
As in prior talk with Secretary, Kyprianou emphasized need for unitary state in Cyprus "with everyone equal" and understanding that Greece and Turkey should have nothing to do with Cyprus.
President commented that unfortunately neither Greek Cypriots nor Turkish Cypriots seemed to think this way. Greek Cypriots thought of themselves as Greek just as much as Turkish Cypriots thought of themselves as Turkish. Feelings ran high on both sides not only on island but in Greece and Turkey as well. Kyprianou stuck to his position.
Conversation was amicable throughout.
Rusk
23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, March 9, 1964, 9:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum and Moffitt, cleared by Jernegan and Cleveland, and approved by Ball. Also sent to Nicosia and repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Dublin, and Ottawa.
2377. There are number important points which we believe need to be pursued re establishment and operation of UN Force in Cyprus:
1) Three month period for which force established is absolute minimum within which we can reasonably expect mediator to make any headway toward permanent settlement. It therefore desirable that date at which writ for force starts to run not begin prematurely. We note that Cypriots themselves consider logical date for three-month period to begin is date of placement of UN troops in Cyprus rather than date res adopted. We hope Thant will bear this in mind by formally designating establishment of force only when he has sizable contingents (2,000 to 3,000 non-UK troops) on the ground. If UK has not yet turned over British units to SYG control, as London's 4357/2/ would indicate, this should give U Thant additional time to maneuver on effective date on which UN force becomes operative.
/2/Dated March 6. (Ibid.)
2) Septel deals with question size UK contribution to UN./3/ In discussions with SYG and Bunche, you authorized draw on this message to indicate our views on this subject.
/3/In telegram 5722 to London, March 9, the Department expressed concern about the size of the proposed British troop contribution to the peacekeeping force. (Ibid.)
3) We understand Sweden insists it not be only neutral country and hope SYG continuing press Irish and Finns to contribute at least some troops. (We understand Brazil will probably not contribute troops because of domestic considerations, and in view of their extraordinarily high per diem requirements would not be disposed to push them to participate.)
4) We concerned that as things are now going SYG will not be able muster minimum force of 10,000 men unless UK keeps all its present forces in Cyprus and we assume they will be most reluctant if not totally unwilling to do so. We find it difficult believe that Cypriots would not accept Danish contingent if they can accept UK and Canada. Since Danes apparently willing and eager serve, we think SYG should at least urge Cypriots reconsider question Danish participation.
5) Major problem which will confront force once it established is precise terms of engagement under which it will operate. We note that Canadians, Swedes, and UK concerned on this score. It is unrealistic to expect that countries will put their troops into field under SYG's command until they know more clearly than they are told in SC res what ground rules are under which troops will be used.
One of most difficult questions likely to be what UN force should do re armed irregulars and Greek Cypriot police. Makarios will undoubtedly try use UN Force to help disarm Turkish Cypriots. Any such move, of course, would be totally unacceptable in Ankara. Since dispute in case is between two communities in Cyprus, UN would need to operate in even-handed fashion and can hardly lend itself to disarming one party to dispute while leaving other in control of security force. Alternatively, Makarios might try use his augmented police force to disarm Turkish Cypriots while UN Force is on the ground, assuming latter will restrain Turks from invading Cyprus. This would pose much more difficult problem since Makarios would argue this is exercise of sovereign powers of GOC. In fact, of course, Constitution gives Turkish Cypriots veto power in field of security, and use of police force clearly falls within this provision. UN could refuse permit disarming of Turk Cypriots by police since this would inevitably lead to violence between communities and SC res calls on UN Force to prevent recurrence fighting.
6) With a mandate of only 3 months and resolution directing force "to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and as necessary contribute to maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions", UN's role would be that of UN policeman. That is, UN Force should interpose itself between two communities preventing hostilities, arranging cease-fires and taking any other steps it finds necessary to maintain law and order. This will involve certain amount initiative on part of UN Force and necessitate practical cooperation from both communities.
7) We assume that--unlike Congo where use of force authorized in certain specified circumstances--UN Force in Cyprus would use force only in self-defense.
8) There may also be danger that Makarios will seek to exploit the phrase "return to normal conditions" as meaning that Turkish Cypriots will have to be moved back to domiciles where they were located before current fighting began; he may argue that de facto partition has been created and must be abolished if "normal conditions" are to prevail. We assume UN would not lend itself to any effort at forced population movement. Turk Cypriots deserted mixed villages in fear for their lives and would resist any attempt send them back. For UN to do anything to abet such effort would be widely regarded as pro-Makarios move.
Request USUN discuss foregoing questions as appropriate with U Thant, Bunche and Rikhye, urging that they clarify UN policy as soon as possible so that potential contributors will know what to expect re utilization their forces.
For Nicosia
Appreciate any comments you have on foregoing./4/ In addition without going into details of above, request you seek Pickard's views on problems to be anticipated in connection with UN Force and suggestions for coping with them.
/4/In telegram 936 from Nicosia, Belcher expressed his view that Makarios would seek to limit the powers of the peacekeeping force. (Ibid.)
Rusk
24. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, March 10, 1964, 2:13 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN, Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
1143. Embtel 1136./2/ I had rather expected that completeness with which reftel and Embtel 1134/3/ covered GOT misgivings re Cyprus would give breathing space for their consideration but on contrary I was again called in by Erkin this morning for presentation which, from standpoint of intensity and gravity, unequalled since that of Christmas day.
/2/Telegram 1136, March 8, reported Turkish concerns about the Secretary-General's proposals for a Cyprus settlement. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 1134, March 7, reported on Barnes' farewell talks with senior Turkish officials. (Ibid.)
As I came in Erkin had report in his hand of new attacks this morning by Greeks in western part of Cyprus using mortars, bazookas, heavy machine guns, etc. At first I assumed this was immediate cause of his agitation but it later came out that he had asked see me before receiving this report on basis of general deterioration of situation on island, including presumed death of large number of Turk hostages, and increased dissatisfaction with implementation of resolution. Specific points mentioned were:
1. GOT had always assumed that Turkish contingent would be included in peace force but it now learns that GOG has told SYG it prepared withdraw its contingent and that, at their instigation together with GOC, SYG has confirmed he considering their recommendation that withdrawal of Greek contingent be accompanied by that of Turks. GOT is lodging strong protest with SYG on this point.
2. Report received yesterday which causes GOT have increased reservations re Gyani/4/ since appears that he has made statements to effect that Turks must as minority give in to Greeks; that he has seen much of Makarios and Greek Ministers but Kucuk practically ignored; that he has been available to Greek journalists but only received Turks reluctantly, etc. In circumstances, GOT will advise SYG it remains unconvinced that Gyani man for job but will give him benefit of doubt for time being. However, if events should give reason for dissatisfaction, GOT will say so publicly and give reasons.
/4/Lieutenant General Prem Singh Gyani, the Secretary-General's Personal Representative in Cyprus since January 17 and his nominee to command the peacekeeping force.
3. Specification of qualification for mediator mentioned reftel will now be followed by clear-cut refusal to accept [garble--Gyani?].
4. Deterioration of situation in Cyprus is direct result of SC resolution. We can now see what "additional measures" mentioned in Article 2 really mean.
5. GOT addressing notes to SYG, UK and US stressing need for British forces in Cyprus being more effective in peacekeeping until new force arrives.
6. Cabinet met this morning and was very dissatisfied with way things going.
7. GOT listened to our advice re exerting restraint and then accepting resolution, only to find itself in steadily deteriorating situation.
8. Throughout crisis Inonu has been very patient but this morning he said for first time that situation approaching point where Turkey would be forced intervene unless effective measures taken to bring it under control, and asked Erkin so advise me.
I spent some time trying reassure Erkin and at same time ferret out what had happened since we talked on Saturday to generate so much heat. Among other things I stressed danger of becoming overly exercised re reports from Cyprus which had been notoriously inaccurate in past; observed that BBC and VOA this morning credited Gyani with having been helpful in effecting a cease-fire in Paphos area; said I still felt GOT had been wise accept resolution and would be stretching things pretty far for GOC to attempt justify recent incidents under Article 2, etc./5/
/5/Reference is to Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee signed at London on February 19, 1959. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, p. 770.
In end Erkin was perhaps a little less tense but there was certain note of finality on which conversation closed that was disturbing. I hope I am not imagining things but impression Erkin seemed to be trying convey was that GOT had gone long way with us but was now finding situation very hard to bear and might have to strike out on own unless present trend reversed both in New York and in Cyprus.
British Amb Allen immediately followed me and we compared notes afterward. Apparently conversation covered same points including message from Inonu, and, although Erkin had begun on lower key, he had ended on bitter note that GOT now in backwash of resolution it should not have approved and at loss defend itself before Turkish people and Parliament. (Fact that High Military Council opened semi-annual meeting here this morning and had Cyprus as first item on agenda may have been another contributing factor.)
Allen and I carefully checked our memories on Inonu message concerning possible intervention and agreed it did not reflect indication of intention to intervene but rather that intervention could become necessary unless something done to avert present deterioration in New York and Cyprus and that it was especially up to UK and US to see that action taken.
Comment: It is possible that conversation which Barnes happened have simultaneously with SecGen Bayramoglu/6/ may cast some light on what troubling Turks, at least as far as we concerned. After expressing similar unhappiness re resolution and other developments, Bayramoglu wondered whether we still as interested in Cyprus as before or whether now that resolution was passed, we would not be inclined pull out. If, as possible, this may be doubt which Erkin hesitated mention, it could partially explain vigor of his approach, i.e., to try to keep us interested while at same time seeking goad British to bear down harder until peace force arrives.
/6/Barnes' talk with Bayramoglu was reported in telegram 1134.
In sum, this may not be crisis but no doubt that we have some very restive Turks on our hands and that it would be helpful if we could do something to make them feel our interest is continuing and active./7/
/7/In telegram 934 to Ankara, March 10, the Department replied that while it agreed with the Turkish position on the right to intervention, it believed that more attention needed to be paid to putting a peacekeeping force into place. The telegram also urged the Embassy to stress the need for cooperation with the U.N. efforts to establish a peacekeeping force and outlined steps the United States had taken to promote peaceful resolution of the problem. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Hare
25. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts/1/
Washington, March 12, 1964, 11:06 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Cleveland, cleared by Burdett, and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to the White House, JCS, and CIA.
1675. 1. Critic Message from Ankara,/2/ repeated to you by Department, told of warning Turks have given to Makarios,/3/ that they would move if attacks on Turkish Cypriots did not stop. Ambassador Hare asked for 24 hours consultation, and Erkin said he would so recommend.
/2/Dated March 12. Hare reported that the Turkish Government had sent an ultimatum to the Cypriot Government to impose an immediate cease-fire or face unilateral intervention by Turkey. (Ibid.)
/3/The text of the Turkish message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1161 from Ankara, March 13. (Ibid.)
2. Secretary spoke with Ralph Bunche at UN Headquarters directly. Bunche reported substance of above to SYG and Canadian FonMin Paul Martin who there with SYG at the time.
3. In subsequent telecon directly with Paul Martin, Secretary gave him substance of Ambassador Hare's reports, and asked him to start Canadian troops moving toward Cyprus, even if they had to stage through some Near Eastern base or British sovereign bases in Cyprus. (When President called Prime Minister Pearson earlier in day, Pearson had said only obstacle immediate movement ready Canadian battalion was need for SYG's assurance some other countries (other than British) would also be participating in international force.) Martin said he would "see what we can do immediately."
4. In absence British Ambassador, Under Secretary called in British Minister Greenhill Thursday evening, gave him substance of report from Ankara and indications of Turkish troop movements. Under Secretary said we should move along several lines simultaneously. Rapid formulation of UN force was one route being vigorously pursued. But seemed to us moment had now come for calling of summit conference under Treaty of Guarantee, Greece, Turkey, UK (and possibly Makarios and Kutchuk) previously agreed with UK to be useful fall-back at some stage of game.
5. Greenhill said as we knew London had been thinking along same lines. He asked where we thought conference should be held. Under Secretary said he remembered British suggestion was to hold it in Geneva. Under Secretary and Greenhill agreed Makarios and Kutchuk would need to be invited, and Greenhill mentioned also representative of SYG. (If held in Geneva, Spinelli would be obvious choice.)
6. Under Secretary noted Makarios in Athens for funeral. British said their understanding was Archbishop intended stay in Athens until Friday but British had offered fly him back to Nicosia via RAF whenever he wished. Greenhill, as own idea, suggested SYG might go to Nicosia to help calm things down. US reaction to this idea was inconclusive. Under Secretary said regardless of what was done, summit meeting nevertheless was not in conflict with any UN moves at this juncture.
For London: Ambassador Bruce should press British on immediate summit as political deterrent to Turkish action./4/
/4/In telegram 4474 from London, March 13, Bruce reported that the British Government did not think a Greek-Turkish summit meeting would prove useful. (Ibid.)
For Nicosia and Athens: You should convey to Makarios and Papandreou and Clerides our judgment that Turks are serious, and that immediate turning off of violence is essential./5/ Note that Greek Cypriots demonstrated during entire period of Security Council session that they had sufficient control to insure relative absence of bloodshed on Island.
/5/In telegram 1392 from Athens, March 13, Labouisse reported that Costopoulos was irritated with the Turkish action but had cautioned moderation on the Cypriot Government. (Ibid.) In telegram 956 from Nicosia, March 13, Belcher reported that Acting President Clerides stated that every effort was being made to secure a cease-fire. (Ibid.)
For Paris USRO: Ambassador Finletter may inform Stikker of developments stressing that it is for his personal information only and not for NATO action.
For Ottawa: Press Canadians for immediate action moving troops toward Cyprus. Martin said he would let us know through Embassy Ottawa what action being taken./6/
/6/Telegram 1196 from Ottawa, March 13, recommended inviting the Canadian Government to any peace conference on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
Rusk
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