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entitled 'Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods 
and DOT's Enforcement Approach' which was released on January 15, 2003.



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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 

Representatives:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



January 2003:



Aviation Safety:



Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT’s Enforcement 

Approach:



Aviation Safety:



GAO-03-22:



GAO Highlights: 



Highlights of GAO-3-22, a report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on 

Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 

Representatives:



January 2003:



Aviation Safety:



Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT’s Enforcement 

Approach:



Why GAO Did This Study: 



When shipments of dangerous goods (hazardous chemical substances that 

could endanger public safety or the environment, such as flammable 

liquids or radioactive materials) are not properly packaged and 

labeled 

for air transport, they can pose significant threats because there 

is 

little room for error when something goes wrong in flight. To better 

understand the risks posed by improper (“undeclared”) air shipments, 

we assessed what is known about their nature and frequency, what key 

mechanisms are in place to prevent their occurrence, and what the 

Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Postal Service do to 

enforce 

federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air.



Figure 1 shows how DOT regulates the air transport of dangerous goods 

in the United States. 



What GAO Found: 



Little is known about the nature and frequency of undeclared 

shipments 

of dangerous goods. While major carriers and the Postal Service 

believe 

such shipments are rare, their belief is based mainly on inspections 

of 

problem shipments, such as those that leak. Statistically valid, 

generalizable data are not available and would be difficult to obtain, 

not only because more inspections would entail costly delays for 

carriers but also because Constitutional protections limit DOT’s and 

the Postal Service’s inspection authority. DOT is seeking greater 

authority to open potentially problematic shipments for inspection, 

but its efforts are not limited to air transport and would not enable 

DOT’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to obtain statistically 

valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency of undeclared 

air shipments. A change in the law requiring that shippers consent to 

the opening of packages for inspection might be appropriate for air 

transport and would enable FAA to obtain such data. FAA could then 

identify the resources and actions needed to address the problem.



Federal regulations create a framework for transporting dangerous 

goods safely, and outreach to shippers and carriers helps to prevent 

undeclared shipments. Private industry does business primarily with 

“known shippers” (those that have shown they comply with the 

regulations). The Postal Service cannot restrict its business to 

known shippers, but it requires customers to bring packages weighing 

16 ounces or more to a post office for screening. Carriers and the 

Postal Service both train their employees to screen for undeclared 

shipments.  



The Postal Service and FAA monitor and enforce compliance with federal 

regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air. However, the 

Postal Service cannot fine violators and seldom takes criminal 

action, since most violations are inadvertent. FAA’s enforcement 

guidance calls for documenting the reasons for any changes in the 

fines its inspectors initially propose. GAO’s review of enforcement 

case files indicates that the reasons for changes were not always 

documented. FAA largely attributes changes to the results of 

penalty negotiations. Because FAA is not always following its 

guidance, it cannot ensure that its fines are appropriate or 

consistent. 



Figure 1: Air Transport of Dangerous Goods Authorized by DOT:



[See PDF for image]



Sources: Research and Special Programs Administration, Department of

Transportation, and 1998 Nova Development Corporation.



What GAO Recommends:



GAO recommends that DOT improve its enforcement approach by (1) 

determining whether the unique characteristics of air transport 

warrant the development of a legislative proposal that would enhance 

DOT’s authority to inspect packages shipped by air and (2) requiring 

FAA to strengthen its policy on documenting the reasons for changes 

to the amounts of the recommended fines.



www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-22.



To view the full report, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Gerald Dillingham at (202)-512-2384 

or dillinghamg@gao.gov.



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



Shipments of Undeclared Dangerous Goods Can Have Serious Consequences, 

but Their Nature and Frequency Are Difficult to Estimate:



Government and Industry Rely on Several Mechanisms to Prevent Dangerous 

Goods Shipments from Compromising Safety:



For DOT, Inadequate Documentation, and for the Postal Service, Lack of 

Civil Penalty Authority Hamper Enforcement of Dangerous Goods 

Regulations:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Scope and Methodology:



Appendix I: FAA’s Dangerous Goods Informational Brochure 

for Passengers:



Appendix II: Mailability of Dangerous Goods, by DOT Class:



Appendix III: Data Collected by DOT Agencies on Dangerous 

Goods Incidents and Enforcement Actions:



Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:



GAO Contacts:



Acknowledgments:



Tables:



Table 1: Dangerous Goods Classes and Descriptions:



Table 2: DOT Databases Tracking Information on the Air Transportation 

of Dangerous Goods:



Figures:



Figure 1: Air Transport of Dangerous Goods Authorized by DOT:



Figure 2: Dangerous Goods Cargo Containers:



Figure 3. FAA’s Dangerous Goods Enforcement Process (for Civil Penalty 

Cases):



Abbreviations:



AAIRS: Airport and Air Carrier Information Reporting System: 

 

C.F.R.: Code of Federal Regulations: 

 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 



EIS: Enforcement Information System: 



FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 



GAO: General Accounting Office: 



HMIRS: Hazardous Materials Information Reporting System: 



HMR: Hazardous Materials Regulations: 



RSPA: Research and Special Programs Administration: 

 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

 

UNISHIP: Unified Shipper Enforcement Data System:



Letter:



January 10, 2003:



The Honorable William O. Lipinski

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Aviation

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives:



Dear Mr. Lipinski:



Each day, businesses, individuals, and government agencies package and 

ship dangerous goods on ships, trains, trucks, and airplanes.[Footnote 

1] Dangerous goods are by definition chemical, including infectious, 

substances (or anything containing such substances) that pose a threat 

to public safety or the environment during transportation. When these 

goods are properly packaged, labeled, and stowed onboard, they can be 

transported safely, but when they are not, they can pose significant 

threats to people and property. Improper, or “undeclared,”[Footnote 2] 

shipments of dangerous goods are particularly dangerous in air 

transport because there is little room for error or time to take 

corrective action if a problem occurs in flight--a lesson learned 

tragically in 1996 when a ValuJet plane crashed in Florida after oxygen 

generators caught fire in the plane’s cargo compartment.



To better understand the overall risks that undeclared shipments of 

dangerous goods can pose to aviation safety, we examined the Department 

of Transportation’s (DOT) and the U.S. Postal Service’s monitoring of 

the transportation of dangerous goods by commercial cargo and passenger 

aircraft, although we focused primarily on cargo aircraft. As agreed 

with your office, we addressed three researchable questions:



* What do DOT, the Postal Service, and others involved in the 

commercial air transport of dangerous goods know about the nature and 

frequency of undeclared shipments?



* What are the key mechanisms the federal government and private 

industry have in place to prevent dangerous goods shipments from 

compromising aviation safety?



* What do DOT and the Postal Service do to enforce federal regulations 

for shipping dangerous goods by air?



We focused our review primarily on the shipments of dangerous goods 

onboard cargo aircraft, in part, because more types and quantities of 

dangerous goods are permitted on cargo aircraft than on passenger 

aircraft. To address these questions, we analyzed recent reports by DOT 

on its dangerous goods programs and on the threat that carrying such 

goods can pose, particularly when the shipments are undeclared. We 

reviewed research on methods that might be used to estimate the 

frequency of undeclared shipments, and we consulted with both GAO and 

academic experts in these methods. To determine the extent to which 

undeclared shipments may occur, we interviewed officials of four major 

carriers that handle over 60 percent of annual air freight traffic in 

the United States, and we visited the premises of three of these 

carriers to review their procedures for identifying and preventing 

undeclared dangerous goods shipments. We also reviewed the results of a 

joint effort by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. 

Customs Service, which has the authority to inspect and search 

international shipments, to detect, among other things, undeclared 

dangerous goods shipments. We interviewed Postal Service, FAA, and 

other DOT officials with various oversight responsibilities for 

dangerous goods transportation. To evaluate FAA’s enforcement strategy, 

we examined the agency’s assessments in 30 cases. These cases were 

randomly selected to fairly represent the full range of over 2,000 

cases in the database. While the number of cases we tested was too 

small for us to estimate the extent to which FAA’s enforcement strategy 

was followed in the entire database, our examination allowed us to 

describe the types of practices that occur at critical points in the 

penalty assessment process. Our detailed scope and methodology appears 

at the end of this report.



Results in Brief:



DOT, the Postal Service, and major carriers know that undeclared air 

shipments of dangerous goods occur and can have serious consequences, 

but they lack statistically valid, generalizable data to reliably 

estimate the nature and frequency of such shipments, assess their 

risks, profile potential violators, and allocate resources optimally 

for prevention, detection, and correction. DOT researchers have 

concluded that data are not available to reliably estimate the nature 

and frequency of dangerous goods shipments or assess their risks. 

Carriers maintain that such shipments are rare, but their views are 

based almost entirely on the occurrence of incidents--shipments that 

were opened after a leak, spill, odor, or other anomaly suggested a 

potential problem--rather than on information about shipments that gave 

no cause for opening. Technological, economic, and legal hurdles 

combine to make estimates of undeclared dangerous goods shipments 

difficult. The current less intrusive screening equipment is not 

designed to detect many types of dangerous goods, and therefore opening 

packages is the only reliable means of obtaining information on 

undeclared shipments. While carriers generally obtain the consent of 

shippers to open packages that they accept for shipment, they seldom 

open packages because doing so is too slow and costly to be practicable 

except when incidents occur. Under the Fourth Amendment to the 

Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, DOT 

may generally not open and inspect packages without a search warrant or 

the shipper’s consent. The Postal Service treats First Class or Express 

mail packages traveling by air as being sealed against inspection and 

protected by the Fourth Amendment. Without the authority to open 

packages for inspection, neither DOT nor the Postal Service is in a 

position to gather data on undeclared shipments of dangerous goods.



To prevent dangerous goods shipments from compromising safety, the 

federal government relies on regulation, research, and outreach, and 

private industry relies on policies for dealing with “known shippers” 

(a DOT term for shippers that have demonstrated their previous business 

history), other restrictions on customers or the materials they carry, 

training, and sanctions. Federal regulations create a framework for 

transporting dangerous goods safely. If DOT finds that these 

regulations are insufficient to ensure safety, it can sponsor and has 

sponsored research to determine how it should modify the regulations. 

DOT and the Postal Service also provide information to the public on 

materials that may not be shipped by air. Carriers try to prevent 

dangerous goods shipments from compromising safety by dealing 

preferentially with known shippers. In addition, some carriers accept 

fewer types of dangerous goods for shipment than the law allows. While 

the Postal Service cannot limit its business to known shippers, it 

restricts the materials it accepts for shipment and requires shippers 

to bring packages weighing 16 ounces or more to a post office, where 

employees can ask questions about the contents. Carriers, including the 

Postal Service, also train their employees to be a first line of 

defense against undeclared shipments. Finally, carriers may require 

shippers to take remedial training or may refuse to do business with 

them if they repeatedly violate the dangerous goods regulations.



To evaluate the effectiveness of and enforce federal regulations for 

shipping dangerous goods by air, DOT collects data on incidents 

involving dangerous goods, monitors shippers’ and carriers’ 

performance, and assesses civil penalties. DOT has the authority to 

either assess civil penalties or seek criminal enforcement action 

against violators. Within DOT, FAA is responsible for enforcing 

compliance with the regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air, 

while the Transportation Security Administration, which is scheduled to 

be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security, is 

responsible for the security of cargo shipments. To ensure that 

appropriate civil penalties are assessed, FAA’s enforcement guidance 

requires the agency to consider the compliance history of violators 

across all modes of transportation. This guidance was difficult for FAA 

to follow because most operating administrations were not submitting 

current enforcement data to DOT. DOT has directed its operating 

administrations to submit current enforcement data to a centralized 

database, so that the administrations can obtain current information on 

the compliance history of violators across the modes. To ensure that 

similar cases are treated consistently and fairly, FAA’s enforcement 

guidance also requires the agency to document the reasons for any 

reduction in a recommended civil penalty. Our analysis of FAA’s case 

files indicates that the agency is not always following this policy. We 

are recommending that FAA document its penalty assessments, as 

required, so that it can demonstrate that it is handling similar cases 

consistently.



The Postal Service also collects data on actual releases of dangerous 

goods being transported, monitors the compliance of shippers and 

carriers, and can seek criminal penalties for violations of its 

regulations; however, it cannot impose civil penalties for such 

violations. According to industry officials, many dangerous goods 

violations result from ignorance. Under such circumstances, the Postal 

Service maintains, civil penalties may be appropriate and would make it 

easier to recover the sometimes substantial costs of cleanup and 

damages. DOT’s hazardous materials reauthorization proposal includes a 

provision that would allow the Postal Service to impose civil 

penalties.



This report contains recommendations to DOT that FAA evaluate the need 

for additional inspection authority to obtain statistically valid data 

on undeclared air shipments of dangerous goods and document its penalty 

assessments, as required, so that it can demonstrate that it is 

handling similar cases consistently. DOT agreed with our 

recommendations, and DOT and the Postal Service generally agreed with 

the facts in our report. Both DOT and the Postal Service provided 

clarifying and technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.



Background:



DOT regulates tens of thousands of dangerous goods, which can include 

poisons, pesticides, radioactive materials, and explosives.[Footnote 

3] About 20 percent of these goods may not travel by air at all. As 

shown in figure 1, the remainder may travel on passenger or cargo 

aircraft, or both.



Figure 1: Air Transport of Dangerous Goods Authorized by DOT:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]





Using a United Nations classification system, DOT divides all dangerous 

goods into nine general classes according to their physical, chemical, 

biological, and nuclear properties. Most of the dangerous goods that 

may not travel by air at all are the most highly explosive, toxic, 

oxidizing, self-reactive, or flammable chemical substances or articles 

in their class. In addition to prohibiting some types of dangerous 

goods from being carried by air at all, DOT restricts the types and 

amounts of other dangerous goods that any individual passenger or cargo 

aircraft may carry. For both passenger and cargo aircraft, DOT spells 

out these restrictions in four ways:



* By name--dangerous goods that represent an unacceptable hazard on 

aircraft or are known to have caused an aircraft fire or explosion, 

such as chemical oxygen generators, are specifically forbidden by name.



* By hazard class and subdivision--certain subdivisions of the classes 

of dangerous goods are known to be highly reactive or toxic (for 

example, most explosives and all spontaneously combustible materials), 

so DOT excludes them from passenger flights.



* By quantities contained per outer package--DOT restricts on passenger 

aircraft the quantity of certain substances or the number of articles 

that may be present in the outermost shipping containers in the cargo 

hold. For example, DOT allows the carriage of up to 30 liters of 

certain highly flammable liquids per outer package on cargo aircraft, 

but imposes limits of 1 liter or less on passenger aircraft.



* By packaging integrity--dangerous goods must be packaged so as to 

protect the integrity of the shipment and safeguard against accidental 

leaks or spills.



For passenger aircraft, whose cargo areas are divided into multiple 

compartments, DOT also restricts the aggregate quantities of dangerous 

goods that may be carried per cargo compartment. Figure 2 shows the 

kinds of containers in which dangerous goods typically travel in these 

cargo compartments.



Figure 2: Dangerous Goods Cargo Containers:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Dangerous goods permitted onboard passenger aircraft include dry ice 

and solvents; cargo aircraft may also carry materials such as paint or 

medical waste. Table 1 provides a complete listing of the nine classes 

of dangerous goods, their descriptions, an example for each class, and 

some of the restrictions DOT places on the carriage of each by type of 

aircraft.



Table 1: Dangerous Goods Classes and Descriptions:



Class: 1; Description: Explosives; Example(s): Fireworks; Cargo 

aircraft restrictions: Most are forbidden; Passenger aircraft 

restrictions: Most are forbidden.



Class: 2; Description: Gases; Example(s): Propane; Cargo aircraft 

restrictions: Most are permitted within quantity limitations; Passenger 

aircraft restrictions: Most are forbidden.



Class: 3; Description: Flammable liquids; Example(s): Acetone, lighter 

fluid, paints; Cargo aircraft restrictions: Most are permitted, except 

those that are toxic by inhalation; Passenger aircraft restrictions: 

Most are permitted within quantity limitations.



Class: 4; Description: Flammable solids; Example(s): Safety matches; 

Cargo aircraft restrictions: Most are permitted within quantity 

limitations; others are forbidden (for example, spontaneously 

combustible materials); Passenger aircraft restrictions: Most are 

permitted within quantity limitations.



Class: 5; Description: Oxidizers and organic peroxides; Example(s): 

Swimming pool chemicals; Cargo aircraft restrictions: Most are 

permitted within quantity limitations; others are forbidden (for 

example, temperature-controlled organic peroxides); Passenger aircraft 

restrictions: Most are permitted within quantity limitations.



Class: 6; Description: Toxic materials and infectious substances; 

Example(s): Regulated medical waste, motor fuel anti-knock mixtures; 

Cargo aircraft restrictions: Most are permitted within quantity 

limitations, exceptions for subsidiary risks[A] or those that are toxic 

by inhalation; Passenger aircraft restrictions: Most are permitted 

within quantity limitations.



Class: 7; Description: Radioactive materials; Example(s): Uranium 

hexafloride; Cargo aircraft restrictions: b; Passenger aircraft 

restrictions: b.



Class: 8; Description: Corrosive materials; Example(s): Batteries, 

cleaning compounds; Cargo aircraft restrictions: Most are permitted 

within quantity limitations; Passenger aircraft restrictions: Most are 

permitted within quantity limitations.



Class: 9; Description: Miscellaneous dangerous goods; Example(s): 

Asbestos; Cargo aircraft restrictions: Most are permitted within 

quantity limitations; Passenger aircraft restrictions: Most are 

permitted within quantity limitations.



Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, RSPA.



[A] “Subsidiary risk” means that the dangerous good also meets the 

definition of one or more other classes.



[B] For nearly all radioactive materials, the Department of 

Transportation’s Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) 

spells out restrictions in terms of the radiological reading that comes 

from the package rather than a quantity limit (as it does for other 

classes of dangerous goods).



[End of table]



According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s most recent survey on the 

movement of hazardous goods in the United States, class 3 dangerous 

goods (flammable liquids, such as paint) account for the greatest 

portion (by weight) of the nine classes of dangerous goods shipped by 

air. However, the vast majority of flammable liquids travel by other 

modes. The percentage of total shipments made by air was greatest for 

radioactive materials (class 7)--just over 8 percent of the total 

radioactive tonnage shipped in 1997 was shipped by air. According to 

FAA, cargo aircraft, such as those operated by the major delivery 

services FedEx and United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), carry about 75 

percent of the nation’s dangerous goods air shipments. The remaining 25 

percent travel onboard passenger aircraft in cargo compartments.



Ensuring the safe transportation of dangerous goods by air is a shared 

responsibility of federal agencies, shippers, and airlines--the success 

of which ultimately depends on the efforts of thousands of individuals 

every day. Within DOT, the following have responsibility for dangerous 

goods:



* The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) regulates the 

transportation of dangerous goods by truck, train, ship, pipeline, and 

plane. It decides which materials to define as hazardous; writes the 

rules for packaging, handling, and carrying them; and prescribes 

training requirements for shippers’ and carriers’ dangerous goods 

employees. RSPA, along with the other DOT operating administrations 

that operate and manage dangerous goods programs,[Footnote 4] conducts 

inspections and investigations to determine compliance with dangerous 

goods laws and regulations for all modes of transportation and, where 

appropriate, initiates enforcement actions against those it finds not 

to be in compliance. RSPA maintains a database for closed dangerous 

goods enforcement actions from these operating administrations, and 

another database that tracks dangerous goods incidents from these 

operating administrations.



* The Office of Intermodalism, reporting to the Secretary of 

Transportation, is responsible for implementing recommendations from a 

March 2000 evaluation of DOT’s dangerous goods program,[Footnote 5] 

coordinating intermodal and cross-modal dangerous goods activities, and 

coordinating DOT-wide outreach activities. For example, in 2001, to 

improve awareness of dangerous goods incidents occurring during 

shipments, this office sent out letters to shippers most frequently 

identified in RSPA’s dangerous goods incident database.



* FAA carries out responsibilities for ensuring compliance with the 

rules for transporting dangerous goods by air. In addition, FAA 

assesses carriers’ operations and investigates dangerous goods 

incidents or accidents. FAA also has other responsibilities, including 

those relating to the prosecution and adjudication of enforcement 

actions against those found to have violated the dangerous goods rules.



The Postal Service is both a carrier and a shipper of dangerous goods 

because it not only carries shipments on aircraft that it leases, but 

it also sends U.S. mail onboard commercial passenger and cargo 

airlines. As a result, the airlines carrying U.S. mail rely on the 

Postal Service as a first line of defense in ensuring the safety of the 

packages they accept for transport and in preventing the shipment of 

anything that should not travel by air.



Shippers--whether they are businesses or individuals--have the primary 

responsibility for ensuring the safety of their dangerous goods 

shipments. They are required to train their employees to package their 

shipments safely and to tell the carriers to whom they deliver these 

shipments that they contain dangerous goods. Carriers share some of the 

responsibility for the safe transportation of dangerous goods. They do 

so by training their employees to handle these shipments properly, to 

identify likely instances of improper shipments (such as those 

containing undeclared dangerous goods), and to verify that the indirect 

air carriers from whom they accept consolidated cargo shipments have 

FAA-approved security programs in place to prevent explosive or 

incendiary devices from being placed onboard.[Footnote 6] Carriers are 

also responsible for reporting to DOT any instance of noncompliance 

they discover.



Shipments of Undeclared Dangerous Goods Can Have Serious Consequences, 

but Their Nature and Frequency Are Difficult to Estimate:



From tragic accidents over the years and day-to-day experience in 

handling cargo traffic, DOT and major carriers know that shipments of 

undeclared dangerous goods can have disastrous consequences. The nature 

and frequency of such shipments--and, by extension, the amount of 

effort that should be put into stopping them--are difficult to estimate 

because of data limitations. However, the inability of commercially 

available screening equipment to detect many types of dangerous goods, 

the costs of delaying shipments to inspect them, and restrictions 

against opening certain packages may preclude the collection of data.



Consequences of Carrying Undeclared Dangerous Goods Have Been Serious 

and Remain a Concern:



Undeclared and other improper shipments of dangerous goods can pose a 

high risk because of the nature of air transportation. In recent years, 

both RSPA and FAA have expressed concern about undeclared dangerous 

goods shipments. In its departmentwide March 2000 evaluation of the 

dangerous goods program, DOT reported that the United States has a 

relatively good safety record, given the amounts of dangerous goods 

that are shipped by all modes of transportation each year. However, DOT 

added that the potential still remains for dangerous goods incidents 

with catastrophic consequences, and, even though relatively small 

amounts of dangerous goods travel by air (compared with other modes of 

transportation), a single mishap can have serious consequences. For 

example, FAA has reported the following incidents:



* In 1996, a major passenger airline carried undeclared dangerous 

goods--calcium hypochlorite and liquid bleach--on a flight from 

California to Jamaica. Upon arrival, airport personnel discovered smoke 

coming from the aircraft’s cargo doors and encountered toxic fumes when 

they opened the cargo compartment. The box of undeclared dangerous 

goods was leaking and burst into flames shortly after the airport 

personnel removed it from the cargo hold.



* In 1998, an undeclared shipment of electric storage batteries 

(considered “wet” because they contain either electrolyte acid or 

alkaline corrosive battery fluid) burst into flames while en route by 

truck to an airport, where it had been scheduled to be placed aboard a 

major passenger carrier’s aircraft.



* In 1999, a major cargo carrier transported an undeclared shipment of 

liquefied petroleum gas from Portland, Oregon, to New York on a 

regularly scheduled cargo flight. One day after arriving in New York, 

the package burst into flames at the carrier’s sorting facility.



Three of the four major carriers we interviewed and DOT expressed 

concern about the safety of carrying dangerous goods. According to 

these three carriers, even though they discover relatively few 

undeclared shipments, their greatest safety concern in the air 

transportation of these goods is prompted by the undeclared shipments-

-particularly those they do not detect before accepting them. They 

expressed this concern over not knowing how much of the volume of 

undeclared dangerous goods they do not find, because these shipments 

present a greater risk than do those that shippers properly declare.



The major cargo carriers we interviewed and the Postal Service agreed 

that ignorance or misunderstanding of the rules for transporting 

dangerous goods is by far the most common reason why shippers fail to 

properly declare their dangerous goods shipments. According to one 

carrier, in very limited instances, shippers will deliberately not 

declare their shipments even when they know they are breaking the 

rules. However, no carrier cited cost as a reason why shippers fail to 

declare their shipments, even though shipping costs are usually higher 

for dangerous goods than for nondangerous goods. An official from one 

carrier stated that he had never seen a case of a shipper willfully 

failing to properly declare a dangerous goods shipment because of cost 

concerns. Furthermore, at the Postal Service, it is doubtful that cost 

is a cause of undeclared shipments, because the Postal Service does not 

charge more for carrying these shipments than it does for carrying 

those that are not hazardous; all of the Postal Service’s charges are 

based on weight and class, regardless of the contents.



Data Limitations Make Estimates of Undeclared Dangerous Goods Shipments 

Difficult:



According to a 1999 threat assessment published by DOT’s Volpe 

Center,[Footnote 7] three types of data that are needed to thoroughly 

assess the risks of carrying declared and undeclared dangerous goods by 

air were unavailable. These were:



* what amounts of dangerous goods are shipped by class and division 

(for all modes of transportation),



* how often incidents related to dangerous goods involve undeclared 

shipments, and:



* what amounts and what types of undeclared dangerous goods are shipped 

by air.



Without these data, the Volpe Center was limited to assessing the 

threat from dangerous goods instead of the risk. The danger associated 

with a specific item is its “threat,” while the likelihood that the 

threat will actually result in harm is its “risk.” Assessing risk, 

according to the Volpe Center, requires some indication of the 

likelihood that dangerous goods will be present on an aircraft--and the 

data to determine this likelihood were not available.



Volpe Center officials attempted to find or compile data sources that 

would allow them to estimate the total amount of various dangerous 

goods that might be shipped (for example, over the course of a year), 

but they were unsuccessful. They found no single source of such data 

and were not able to piece together data sources. For example, Volpe 

Center staff attempted to compile data from chemical manufacturers to 

identify the total amounts of their products that move by air and the 

related distribution chain (that is, the amounts that move by other 

modes); this information would enable them to identify aggregate 

amounts of certain dangerous goods that shippers should be declaring, 

which would be a first step in working toward an estimate of undeclared 

shipments. However, the industry sources the Volpe Center consulted 

considered such information proprietary and would not share it. Volpe 

Center staff also considered assembling cargo manifest information from 

the airlines, because these records indicate for each flight the 

amounts and types of dangerous goods the aircraft is carrying. However, 

Volpe Center staff said the airlines informed them that these data are 

not in a form usable for such an analysis. Even if the manifest 

information were available, data on the overall amounts of dangerous 

goods shipments (such as the Volpe Center sought from the chemical 

industry) would still be necessary before this manifest information 

could be useful for estimating undeclared dangerous goods shipments.



According to Volpe Center staff, the limitations in the amount and 

quality of data on dangerous goods shipments make estimating how many 

shipments contain undeclared dangerous goods more difficult. Our 

experts in applied research and methodology agreed, noting that certain 

“hidden populations” methods might be useful for estimating the amount 

of undeclared dangerous goods shipments,[Footnote 8] but only if data 

limitations such as those the Volpe Center identified were overcome. A 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology expert in transportation research 

with whom we met agreed that none of the known methods for estimating 

hidden populations would be feasible for undeclared dangerous goods.



The major carriers we interviewed said they most commonly identify 

undeclared dangerous goods (after accepting them for shipment) when 

some occurrence prompts them to open a package or, in the case of the 

Postal Service, to set the package aside for further investigation 

(because the Postal Service generally cannot open such a package 

without a search warrant). Most often, this happens when a package 

leaks, spills, breaks open, or emits an odor, and the carrier or Postal 

Service employees identify the occurrence as potentially a dangerous 

goods incident.[Footnote 9] One carrier also indicated that 

occasionally packages open as a result of handling or must be opened 

when they lose their address labels. In some of these instances, the 

company has discovered undeclared dangerous goods. This same company 

also noted that, on rare occasions, it learns of undeclared dangerous 

goods from informants--employees of either the company that shipped the 

package or competitors of that company.



The carriers we interviewed reported that, although they have the 

consent of shippers to open packages that have been accepted for 

shipment, they seldom discover undeclared dangerous goods. Although 

they did not cite a specific percentage, they described shipments of 

undeclared dangerous goods as “very rare” and “a handful.” The numbers 

are believed to be similarly small for the Postal Service--officials 

estimated that declared dangerous goods represent less than one-tenth 

of 1 percent of their shipments, and the percentage of these shipments 

that is undeclared is “very small.” The Volpe Center reported in a 1999 

threat assessment that undeclared dangerous goods shipments made up 

about 0.05 percent of the shipments of several large cargo carriers, 

but this estimate was based on the recollections of the carriers of how 

many incidents they typically report to RSPA.



Because estimates by the Volpe Center, major carriers, and the Postal 

Service are based on reported incidents or memory, they are incomplete. 

Moreover, these estimates refer only to those undeclared shipments that 

resulted in dangerous goods incidents--they do not include undeclared 

shipments that never gave carriers cause to open them. As a result, 

according to the Volpe Center, there are no valid figures for the 

numbers of dangerous goods shipments that do not comply with 

regulations for transportation by air.[Footnote 10]



Additionally, when a carrier reports an incident to DOT, RSPA does not 

currently require the carrier to report whether the shipper properly 

declared the dangerous goods. Consequently, the estimates of undeclared 

shipments reported by the Volpe Center and by carriers to us may not 

include all of the incidents carriers discovered, because the estimates 

are based on memory and are therefore subject to error. RSPA plans to 

remedy this limitation by requiring carriers to report whether 

dangerous goods shipments involved in incidents were declared or 

undeclared. To do so, RSPA is modifying its incident-reporting 

paperwork (Form 5800.1) to more systematically collect and analyze 

information on undeclared shipments. RSPA expects to complete this and 

other ongoing revisions to its incident-reporting form by spring 2003.



Technological, Economic, and Legal Hurdles Also Make Estimates of 

Undeclared Dangerous Goods Shipments Difficult:



Technological limitations complicate efforts to estimate the incidence 

of undeclared dangerous goods shipments. Ideally, technologies 

generally considered to be less intrusive, such as X-ray or explosives-

detection equipment, could be used to identify and characterize 

undeclared shipments. The Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA)[Footnote 11] is currently using this equipment to screen 

passenger carry-on and checked baggage for weapons and explosives, and, 

under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,[Footnote 12] TSA 

must ensure that a system is in operation to screen, inspect, or 

otherwise provide for the security of all air cargo to be transported 

in all cargo aircraft as soon as practicable. However, X-ray and 

explosives-detection equipment is not designed to detect many types of 

dangerous goods.[Footnote 13] In the future, technology may enable the 

rapid, less intrusive screening of packages, but in the near term, 

opening packages remains the best way to obtain information on the 

nature and frequency of undeclared shipments.



Economic obstacles--particularly the costs of opening packages after 

accepting them--also make it difficult to estimate the nature and 

frequency of undeclared dangerous goods shipments. According to each of 

the major carriers we interviewed, the volume of cargo that these 

airlines carry each day is tremendous. For example, the carriers stated 

that they carry from at least 1.3 million to more than 2 million 

shipments each night, a small fraction of which contain dangerous 

goods. Because the carriers typically guarantee delivery on nearly all 

of the shipments they carry (such as within 24 hours or 2 business 

days), anything that slows their ability to move shipments could 

compromise their ability to meet their guarantees to their customers 

and, as a result, hurt their competitive position in their industry.



Although the carriers we interviewed told us that they obtain the 

consent of shippers to open packages, they also said they seldom do 

open packages. Carriers and an association representing cargo and 

passenger airlines stressed that they are not in the business of 

opening packages, particularly when shippers are primarily responsible 

for ensuring the integrity and proper declaration of those packages. 

The carriers indicated that they have confidence in and place a great, 

ongoing emphasis on their up-front screening to prevent shippers from 

offering them undeclared dangerous goods in the first place. Opening 

packages without probable cause to do so would also be costly to the 

carriers because they would be responsible for repackaging anything 

they found to be properly declared--and dangerous goods require 

special, more expensive packaging than other shipments. Although 

carriers remain concerned about the possibility of undeclared shipments 

they may miss, to date the frequency with which they discover shipments 

of undeclared dangerous goods does not, in their view, justify a step 

as disruptive and costly as systematically opening a random or targeted 

selection of shipments.



Because the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits unreasonable 

searches and seizures and neither DOT nor the Postal Service has 

obtained the consent of owners to have their packages opened for 

inspection, neither agency may conduct or require random or targeted 

intrusive inspections of domestic cargo shipments to look for 

undeclared dangerous goods. Although FAA may remove a package from an 

aircraft and take such emergency actions if it reasonably believes that 

the package presents an immediate threat, it has no authority, 

generally, to open and inspect a package without a warrant or without 

the owner’s consent.



The Postal Service may inspect Parcel Post packages. However, packages 

sent as First Class or Express mail traveling by air may not be 

inspected.[Footnote 14] The mail classification schedule recommended by 

the Postal Rate Commission and adopted by the Postal Service does not 

distinguish between letters and packages, treating both as “sealed 

against inspection” and protected by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, these 

packages are protected to the same extent as letters, and all First 

Class and Express mail is treated as protected by the Fourth Amendment.



DOT Has Teamed with the U.S. Customs Service to Obtain Information on 

Undeclared Dangerous Goods in International Shipments:



To obtain more information on the nature and frequency of undeclared 

dangerous goods in air transport, FAA has teamed with the U.S. Customs 

Service, which has the authority to inspect and search international 

cargo (imports and exports). Specifically, the Customs Service can and 

does randomly open and inspect international cargo for purposes such as 

ensuring that shippers have paid the proper tariffs. Most recently, in 

June and July 2000, the U.S. Customs Service and FAA together conducted 

inspections of passenger carry-on and checked bags and cargo aboard 

flights that were entering or departing from the United States at 19 

domestic airports.[Footnote 15] This series of inspections found that:



* 8 percent of targeted cargo shipments (those whose tariff codes 

indicated that their contents might be hazardous) contained undeclared 

dangerous goods,



* 1 percent of passenger carry-on bags contained undeclared dangerous 

goods, and:



* just under 0.5 percent of passenger checked baggage contained 

undeclared dangerous goods.



The undeclared dangerous goods in the cargo shipments included 

flammable liquids, fuel control units, aerosols, fire extinguishers, 

and devices powered by flammable liquid. In the passengers’ checked and 

carry-on bags, the Customs-FAA teams found aerosols, lighters, 

flammable liquids, safety matches, compressed flammable gases, and 

automotive batteries. The Customs-FAA team randomly selected the 

passenger baggage it inspected, but for the cargo, the team matched 

tariff codes for commodity imports and exports with a dangerous goods 

trigger list to determine which shipments to inspect.[Footnote 16]



Increased Inspection Authority That DOT Is Seeking Would Not Produce 

Statistically Valid Data and Does Not Distinguish between Air and Other 

Modes of Transportation:



DOT has tried several times to clarify and expand its authority to 

inspect and open certain packages when its inspectors suspect a 

violation of the dangerous goods regulations. In its 1997, 1999, and 

2001 reauthorization proposal, DOT sought the authority to access, 

open, examine, and, if need be, remove a package from transportation if 

it had an objectively reasonable and articulable belief that the 

package might contain undeclared dangerous goods.[Footnote 17] 

According to DOT, this authority, which is specific to all modes, would 

require its officers or inspectors to have a “particularized and 

objective basis” for suspecting a violation, such as a pattern of 

shipping undeclared dangerous goods, in order to open an unmarked 

package. DOT further stated that this enhanced authority would enable 

it to more effectively detect potential violations and to ensure that 

it took the appropriate remedial actions. According to DOT officials, 

its reauthorization proposal has not been enacted for reasons unrelated 

to the merits of its request for additional inspection authority.



Because DOT’s reauthorization proposal applies equally to all modes of 

transportation, it would, if approved, allow DOT to follow up on 

problem shippers across the modes. However, the proposal would also 

extend the government’s inspection authority without regard to the 

differences inherent in transporting dangerous goods by different 

modes. The same distinctions between air and the other modes that 

justify more stringent regulations for transporting dangerous goods by 

air might also justify greater inspection authority for packages 

shipped by air.



A primary objective of DOT’s reauthorization proposal has been to 

improve the ability of its inspectors to monitor and enforce the 

dangerous goods regulations. The proposal has not been designed to 

obtain better information about the nature and frequency of undeclared 

air shipments. Because it would require a “particularized and objective 

basis” for opening packages, it would not allow DOT to identify a 

random sample of packages and conduct inspections whose results could 

be generalized to all packages in air transport. Thus, its usefulness 

as a tool for gathering data to estimate the nature and frequency of 

undeclared air shipments and to profile and target violators would be 

limited. DOT officials agree that their proposal would not generate 

statistically valid data, and they have indicated their willingness to 

modify the proposal so that it would yield more useful information.



An alternative to DOT’s proposal, based on the premise that additional 

and perhaps unique measures are needed to protect air commerce, would 

require that shippers consent to DOT’s opening packages shipped by air 

for inspection. This would allow the department to select and open a 

random sample of packages in order to gather statistically valid data 

on undeclared air shipments.



Government and Industry Rely on Several Mechanisms to Prevent Dangerous 

Goods Shipments from Compromising Safety:



To prevent dangerous goods shipments from compromising aviation safety, 

the federal government relies on regulation, research, and outreach, 

while private industry depends on policies for dealing with known 

shippers, other restrictions, training, and sanctions.



The Federal Government Depends on Regulations, Research, and Outreach 

to Prevent Problems:



Federal regulations provide a framework for transporting dangerous 

goods safely by air. As discussed in the background section of this 

report, these regulations define dangerous goods, identify those that 

may and may not travel by air, and specify how the materials are to be 

packaged, handled, and carried. In addition, the regulations prescribe 

initial and recurrent training for shippers’ and carriers’ employees, 

and require shippers and carriers to test their employees’ 

understanding of the material covered in the training. The training, 

which is designed to increase dangerous goods employees’ safety 

awareness and to reduce the frequency of dangerous goods incidents, is 

important because insufficient understanding of the rules is often a 

factor contributing to such incidents. For example, in 17 of 25 

dangerous goods enforcement cases we reviewed involving businesses, FAA 

identified employees’ lack of training as a contributing 

factor.[Footnote 18]



To monitor the effectiveness of its regulations in promoting safety, 

RSPA collects information on dangerous goods incidents occurring in the 

air, water, rail, and truck modes through its Form 5800.1. Nonetheless, 

the form is not designed to collect all the information that would be 

useful in monitoring the effectiveness of DOT’s dangerous goods 

regulations. As previously noted, the form does not ask whether a 

problem shipment was declared or undeclared--a key question in 

assessing effectiveness. [Footnote 19] In addition, the form does not 

include data fields that precisely identify the different types of 

packaging deficiencies. While the form has space for written comments, 

there is no mechanism for standardizing and entering the information 

from the comments into DOT’s databases. RSPA is revising the form to 

overcome these limitations. Once carriers begin collecting information 

on dangerous goods incidents using this revised form, better 

information on the incidence of undeclared shipments and reasons for 

packaging deficiencies should be available to FAA and the other 

operating administrations.



In the course of such monitoring, DOT sometimes identifies safety 

issues that require further research. For example, DOT is currently 

evaluating ways in which it will strengthen the regulations for 

shipping batteries, because its analysis indicated that the existing 

dangerous goods regulations for these shipments may not be sufficient. 

Beginning in the early 1990s, FAA identified a number of incidents 

associated with batteries, particularly lithium batteries, aboard 

aircraft in which the batteries caused fires, smoke, or extreme heat--

precisely the kind of effects that make dangerous goods dangerous. In 

response to these and other concerns, RSPA has taken a number of 

actions designed to improve the regulations for the transportation of 

lithium batteries.[Footnote 20]



FAA’s monitoring of reports on incidents involving dangerous goods also 

led to further work on packaging standards. In examining nearly 3,000 

reports from 1998 and 1999, FAA found that 60 percent of the incidents 

involved properly declared shipments, indicating that the shipments 

complied with the existing packaging standards. Yet just over half 

(873) of these properly declared shipments had problems because their 

packaging failed--that is, their closures or seals leaked. These data 

prompted FAA to attempt to determine the adequacy of packaging 

standards for air transportation and the likely causes of leaking 

closures and seals. Observing an increase in the number of package 

failures in the past 3 years, FAA questioned whether the existing test 

methods simulate the realistic combined effects of pressure, 

temperature, and vibration. As a result, FAA contracted with Michigan 

State University to study packaging in air transportation. The results 

of that study, which FAA recently received, indicate that closures are 

continuing to leak in packages marked as complying with existing 

packaging standards. Subjecting packages to both high altitude and 

vibration resulted in a package failure rate of 50 percent. RSPA is 

reviewing these results.



To help prevent dangerous goods incidents aboard passenger aircraft, 

FAA and RSPA conduct outreach to the public. For example, FAA worked 

with RSPA to develop for air travelers a brochure that lists items 

prohibited in passenger baggage (see app. I). The brochure also 

explains that in-flight variations in temperature and pressure can 

cause seemingly harmless items to leak or generate toxic fumes during 

air travel. RSPA requires that signs be posted in airport terminals and 

at check-in counters listing items prohibited in air travel, some of 

which passengers may not recognize as hazardous in air transportation. 

In addition, FAA has placed kiosks with information on dangerous goods 

at 24 major airports to better inform the general public about items 

that are considered hazardous onboard aircraft.



The Postal Service also does consumer outreach to better inform the 

public about the materials that may and may not be sent through the 

mail. According to Postal Service officials, there are posters in all 

of its facilities that warn customers about shipping restricted 

dangerous goods. In addition, for any customer who ships or requests 

information about shipping dangerous goods, Postal Service retail 

employees provide an informational brochure summarizing the applicable 

rules as well as the shipper’s responsibilities.



Major Carriers Rely on Known Shipper Policies, Other Restrictions, 

Training, and Sanctions to Prevent Undeclared Shipments:



To prevent undeclared dangerous goods shipments, major carriers limit 

their business to known shippers and may impose other restrictions. 

They also train their employees to be a first line of defense against 

undeclared shipments, and may apply sanctions to shippers who have 

violated dangerous goods regulations.



Carriers Deal with Known Shippers and Impose Other Restrictions:



To ensure that they are dealing with legitimate businesses that are 

more likely to properly train their employees to comply with dangerous 

goods rules, the major carriers we interviewed rely on TSA’s “known 

shipper” requirements or establish formal, contractual relationships 

with their shippers that mirror the known shipper 

requirements.[Footnote 21] According to officials of one of the 

carriers, the steps involved in becoming a known shipper reduce to an 

acceptable level the risk that the shipper presents to the 

carrier.[Footnote 22] By contrast, the carriers have found, casual or 

one-time shippers are more likely to offer undeclared dangerous goods 

for shipment. Three of the four carriers said they try to limit their 

business with casual or one-time shippers and do not advertise to them. 

Rather, two of the carriers said, they target business-to-business 

shippers that typically have experience with shipping high volumes of 

dangerous goods and may have long-standing relationships with the 

carriers. The fourth carrier said that it does not accept dangerous 

goods from casual shippers at all and, for other shippers, requires the 

establishment of a dangerous goods-shipping agreement, or contract, 

that spells out obligations for shippers, such as recurring employee-

training requirements. Officials of this carrier believe that these 

contractual obligations reduce the incidence of undeclared shipments.



Besides limiting their business primarily to known shippers, the major 

carriers we interviewed may try to prevent undeclared shipments by 

limiting the types of materials they will carry and the places where 

they will accept dangerous goods shipments. Three of the four carriers 

said they accept fewer types of dangerous goods for shipment than DOT 

authorizes to travel by air. For example, the carriers said they refuse 

to carry materials such as toxic or infectious substances, certain 

explosives, and organic peroxides. In addition, one of the carriers 

said it would not accept dangerous goods shipments at its retail 

establishments. This carrier said it would accept such shipments only 

when its own drivers picked them up from established customers. This 

carrier’s policy is designed to screen out the casual shippers that 

might use its retail establishments. According to the carrier, this 

policy also allows it to rely on its drivers’ experience with dangerous 

goods shipments, their training, and their long-standing relationships 

with established customers as a first line of screening against 

undeclared shipments of dangerous goods.



While the Postal Service cannot limit its business to known shippers, 

it accepts fewer dangerous goods for shipment than DOT authorizes to 

travel by air. In general, the Postal Service limits the dangerous 

goods it will accept for shipment to certain quantities of consumer 

commodities that typically present a limited hazard in transportation 

because of their form, quantity, or packaging.



In addition to limiting what dangerous goods it will carry, the Postal 

Service, as part of its aviation mail security program, requires 

customers to bring any package weighing 16 ounces or more to a post 

office for shipment. The intent of this program is to prevent 

explosives in the mail, but Postal Service officials indicated it has a 

residual benefit in helping to prevent undeclared shipments of 

dangerous goods. Specifically, by requiring customers to bring packages 

that weigh 16 ounces or more to a post office for shipment, Postal 

Service employees can inspect packages, ask questions about their 

contents to determine whether they contain anything prohibited, and 

ensure proper handling for packages containing dangerous goods that may 

be mailed.



Carriers Train Their Employees to Monitor Compliance with Dangerous 

Goods Requirements:



The major carriers we interviewed emphasized that the training they 

provide for their employees is a key component in their efforts to 

prevent shippers from offering undeclared dangerous goods, 

supplementing their use of restrictions or the known shipper 

requirements to guard against such shipments. This training provides 

information on dangerous goods requirements and procedures for drivers 

and employees who handle, sort, and load shipments. Through this 

training, the carriers expect that employees throughout their 

distribution chain will be able to identify problems such as 

declaration paperwork that is missing information about the contents of 

a package labeled as dangerous.



Carriers rely particularly on their drivers to draw on their training 

to, in effect, extend the known shipper concept to their day-to-day 

interactions with shippers. Training, plus a working knowledge of a 

company’s established customers, helps the drivers detect inadvertent 

failures to properly declare a shipment. For example, a driver picking 

up a shipment from a customer who typically sends some dangerous goods 

would be expected to raise questions if the customer did not label or 

declare any of the packages as dangerous. In such an instance, the 

shipper may have made a mistake or forgotten to declare the dangerous 

goods.



The Postal Service trains its retail employees, who accept packages 

from the public, to screen packages and prevent those with undeclared 

or improperly packaged dangerous goods from entering the mail system. 

According to Postal Service officials, as of August 2002, the agency 

had trained all 131,000 of its retail employees in procedures for 

preventing the acceptance of any package containing prohibited 

materials. These procedures include (1) asking shippers a series of 

questions about the contents of their packages, including whether the 

packages contain anything hazardous; (2) visually inspecting packages 

to look for signs of problems, such as leaks, the lack of a return 

address, or markings indicating that a package contains something a 

shipper may not know is hazardous; and (3) referring to a reference 

guide for assistance in answering shippers’ questions about items that 

may or may not be permissible in the U.S. mail. (See app. II for a 

summary of DOT’s dangerous goods classes and the materials or 

quantities from each that are allowed in the U.S. mail.) While the 

retail employees may be the first to deal with shipments entering the 

mail system, the Postal Service also provides dangerous goods training 

to its non-retail employees (such as postal inspectors or employees at 

business mail entry units), who also handle or carry dangerous goods or 

respond to incidents involving them.



According to the official responsible for the Postal Service’s 

dangerous goods program, the agency has to rely on its retail employees 

to screen out unacceptable items because it has limited authority to 

open mail that has been accepted for shipment. These officials believe 

that face-to-face questioning reduces the anonymity associated with 

depositing a letter in a mailbox. And reducing anonymity, this official 

says, improves their confidence in shippers’ statements about the 

contents of packages. To test its retail employees’ performance in 

specific aspects of customer service, the Postal Service has an ongoing 

“mystery shopper” program in which its employees pose as customers. In 

late 2001, the Postal Service began including in the mystery shopper 

tests a determination of whether the retail employees were following 

requirements for asking the question about dangerous goods. To date, 

the Postal Service’s tests indicate that the retail employees asked the 

required screening question 69 percent of the time. When the retail 

employees failed to ask the dangerous goods question, Postal Service 

officials said they provided feedback and retrained the employees. 

These officials also told us that they provided this feedback to each 

postal office manager and have incorporated targets for improved 

performance on the mystery shopper tests into the managers’ performance 

goals. Officials say these results are slowly and steadily improving.



Carriers May Impose Sanctions for Shipping Undeclared Dangerous Goods:



A shipper who fails to properly declare a dangerous goods shipment can 

face serious consequences from a major carrier, particularly if the 

shipper is a business or other operation with an ongoing need for the 

carrier’s services. Two of the major carriers we interviewed may, 

depending on the seriousness of the violation, require a shipper to 

provide additional remedial training in shipping dangerous goods; apply 

more stringent terms for accepting shipments from the shipper; or, in 

more serious instances, permanently terminate the business relationship 

with the shipper. Officials from one of the carriers stated that their 

company’s requirements for remedial training in these instances exceed 

DOT’s requirements for shippers. Similarly, officials from another 

carrier told us that an inadvertent violation of the rules governing 

the declaration of dangerous goods would, in most cases, result in a 

minimum suspension of 60 days, pending the shipper’s completion of 

training or any other steps the carrier chose to require before again 

accepting packages from that shipper. This same carrier’s officials 

said that when they suspect that a shipper may have sent undeclared 

dangerous goods through their system, they will begin an investigation 

to determine whether the shipper knew or should have known that it was 

doing so. Until the carrier completes that investigation, the shipper 

must agree to let the carrier’s staff open and inspect every shipment 

before accepting it. If this carrier determines that the shipper 

knowingly offered undeclared dangerous goods, it terminates its 

business with that shipper.



For DOT, Inadequate Documentation, and for the Postal Service, Lack of 

Civil Penalty Authority Hamper Enforcement of Dangerous Goods 

Regulations:



To evaluate the effectiveness of and to enforce federal regulations for 

shipping dangerous goods by air, DOT collects data on dangerous goods 

incidents, monitors shippers’ and carriers’ performance, and assesses 

civil penalties. Within DOT, FAA is primarily responsible for enforcing 

the regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air. To ensure that 

the penalties it imposes for violations of dangerous goods regulations 

are appropriate to shippers’ and carriers’ complete compliance 

histories, FAA, together with DOT’s other affected operating 

administrations, is required to consider the compliance history of 

violators in all modes of transportation when assessing penalties 

against them. This guidance was difficult for FAA and others to follow 

because, until very recently, with the exception of RSPA, DOT’s 

operating administrations were not submitting their enforcement data in 

a timely manner to DOT’s centralized enforcement database. Finally, to 

further ensure that appropriate civil penalties are assessed and that 

similar cases are treated consistently and fairly, FAA requires that 

the reasons for any reduction to a recommended civil penalty be 

documented. Our analysis of FAA’s enforcement case files found that FAA 

is not always documenting its assessments.



Like DOT, the Postal Service collects data on dangerous goods 

incidents, but it lacks DOT’s authority to assess civil penalties for 

violations and therefore takes few enforcement actions. Legislation 

proposed by DOT would allow the Postal Service to assess civil 

penalties.



FAA Collects Data to Monitor and Enforce Compliance:



To monitor and enforce compliance with DOT’s dangerous goods 

regulations, FAA collects data on dangerous goods air incidents and 

discrepancies through its Airport and Air Carrier Information Reporting 

System (AAIRS). RSPA’s regulations define incidents as reportable 

releases of hazardous materials, including those that are unintended 

and unanticipated. “Discrepancies” are defined in the Hazardous 

Materials Regulations (HMR) as instances in which dangerous goods are 

found to be undeclared, misdeclared, or improperly packaged.[Footnote 

23] In addition, FAA collects data on closed dangerous goods 

enforcement cases through its Enforcement Information System. (See app. 

III for more information about FAA’s and DOT’s incident and enforcement 

databases.):



FAA Could Not Readily Consider Complete Compliance Histories When 

Assessing Penalties:



To ensure that appropriate civil penalties are assessed, FAA’s 

enforcement guidance requires the agency to consider the compliance 

history of violators across all modes of transportation. Until 

recently, FAA had difficulty complying with this guidance because, with 

the exception of RSPA, DOT’s operating administrations were not 

submitting their closed enforcement action data in a timely manner to a 

central database--the Unified Shipper Enforcement Data System 

(UNISHIP), maintained by RSPA. DOT developed this database in response 

to a 1991 GAO report.



RSPA is working with DOT’s affected operating administrations to ensure 

the timely submission of enforcement data. On July 17, 2002, the Office 

of the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum calling for the 

implementation of required procedures for entering data on dangerous 

goods enforcement actions into UNISHIP. If the database is kept up to 

date, FAA inspectors can obtain compliance information by querying the 

central database.



FAA Is Not Documenting Changes to Recommended Civil Penalties as 

Required:



Our analysis of FAA’s case files indicates that FAA is not always 

documenting the reasons for reductions to recommended civil penalties, 

as its guidance requires. We found cases in which the proposed civil 

penalty was changed, but either no documentation or incomplete 

documentation was provided to explain the reasons for the reduction. An 

FAA official stated that it was FAA’s policy to include documentation 

for civil penalty changes in the case files. To help ensure that 

appropriate civil penalties are assessed and that similar cases are 

treated consistently and fairly, it is important that FAA document the 

reasons for any reduction to a recommended civil penalty.



The enforcement process begins when FAA inspectors obtain indication of 

a violation (see fig. 4.). The inspector then determines whether the 

violation warrants administrative action (such as a warning notice or 

letter of correction), legal enforcement action (such as the imposition 

of a civil penalty), or referral for criminal prosecution. When the 

inspector finds that a civil penalty is appropriate, he or she must 

determine the amount of the civil penalty by consulting FAA’s sanction 

guidance policy. Legal staff in the regional office or headquarters 

then review the strength of the evidence, the type of enforcement 

action, and the amount of the civil penalty, if any. Next, a notice of 

proposed civil penalty is issued that is consistent with the 

inspector’s report and the review. The alleged violator then has an 

opportunity to reply to the civil penalty assessed. If the alleged 

violator provides convincing evidence that it did not commit the 

violation, FAA dismisses the case. If FAA and the alleged violator 

agree on an appropriate fine, FAA issues an order assessing a civil 

penalty that binds the violator to pay the agreed-upon amount. If no 

agreement is reached, the case is litigated.



Figure 3: Figure 3. FAA’s Dangerous Goods Enforcement Process (for 

Civil Penalty Cases):



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



In 15 of the cases we reviewed, the assessed civil penalty differed 

from the proposed civil penalty, but FAA included either no 

documentation or incomplete documentation in the case files to account 

for the changes. For example:



* In 2000, the assessed civil penalty on a chemical company for not 

properly shipping flammable paint was reduced from $75,000 to $15,000, 

but no reason was provided in the file for the change.



* In 2000, the assessed civil penalty on a paint company for not 

properly shipping flammable paint was reduced from $59,500 to $37,500, 

but no reason was provided in the file for the change.



In addition, in one case involving the shipment of an oxygen generator 

by an air carrier in 1997, the recommended civil penalty was reduced by 

20 percent, even though oxygen generators were responsible for the 

ValuJet aircraft crash in 1996. This penalty was reduced for reasons 

that were not documented. The reduction was not consistent with the 

known risks of oxygen generators.



Postal Service Lacks Authority to Impose Civil Penalties for 

Violations:



The Postal Service’s standards for mailing dangerous goods are similar 

to DOT’s detailed specifications for packaging, marking, and labeling 

dangerous goods, although the mail is subject to many additional 

limitations and prohibitions, which are imposed by provisions of 

criminal statutes.[Footnote 24] Yet in contrast with DOT, which can 

assess civil or pursue criminal penalties for violations of its 

standards, the Postal Service can only pursue criminal penalties. This 

leads to little enforcement, because many violations are unintentional 

and involve situations that are inappropriate for criminal sanctions. 

At the same time, the high cleanup and damage costs associated with 

dangerous goods violations are time-consuming, and damages may be 

difficult to recover absent authority to assess civil penalties. For 

example, in a 1998 incident, the Postal Service incurred costs of 

$87,000 and the carrier incurred damages of $1.4 million when a 

Priority mail shipment containing four bottles of mercury was found to 

be leaking upon removal from the aircraft. Another costly incident 

occurred in 2000, when 3 gallons of gasoline were illegally shipped in 

a motorcycle gas tank and the tank leaked during the flight, requiring 

the plane to be taken out of service and cleaned. As part of its 

proposal to reauthorize the hazardous materials transportation program, 

DOT has included a provision that would allow the Postal Service to 

collect civil penalties and to recover costs and damages for dangerous 

goods violations.[Footnote 25] The Postal Service has been actively 

working with DOT, and it supports this provision. Yet others have 

raised concerns about possible conflicts between the Postal Service’s 

current law enforcement authority and its effect on fair competition 

between the Postal Service and other shippers. The question of whether 

changes should be made regarding the Postal Service’s law enforcement 

responsibilities continues to be discussed as the Congress and others 

revisit the Postal Service’s mission and roles as part of broader 

postal reform efforts.



Conclusions:



Without statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and 

frequency of undeclared dangerous goods in air transport, DOT does not 

know to what extent such goods pose a threat to aviation safety, or 

what resources should be allocated to address that threat. Eventually, 

affordable diagnostic screening technologies may enable carriers and 

DOT to monitor dangerous goods shipments efficiently and 

nonintrusively. Until then, greater inspection authority would enable 

DOT to randomly select and open packages; gather statistically valid, 

generalizable data; and profile and target potential violators, thereby 

possibly enhancing aviation safety. A change in the law requiring that 

shippers consent to the inspection of packages shipped by air might 

help to accomplish these objectives. The legislation that DOT has 

proposed seeking greater inspection authority has not to date been 

limited to the air mode and has not been designed to obtain 

statistically valid data. However, the distinctions between air and the 

other modes that justify more stringent regulations for transporting 

dangerous goods by air, along with the potential benefits to aviation 

safety that could accrue from better data on undeclared air shipments, 

might warrant the development of a proposal that would enable DOT to 

obtain such data.



The Office of the Secretary’s recent memorandum to the operating 

administrations, calling for the timely submission of closed 

enforcement action data to DOT’s centralized enforcement database, 

should strengthen FAA’s ability to take appropriate enforcement action 

against violators of DOT’s dangerous goods regulations. Provided that 

the operating administrations continue to follow the memorandum, FAA 

should be able to identify high-risk or problem entities, consider 

their compliance histories in all modes of transportation as its 

enforcement policy guidance requires, and ensure that the penalties it 

assesses against them are appropriate to their histories. Yet FAA still 

needs to do more to demonstrate that it has assessed appropriate civil 

penalties. Until it fully documents the reasons for its assessments, or 

for changes to its initial assessments, as its guidance requires, it 

cannot provide assurance that the penalties are appropriate or that it 

has handled similar cases consistently.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



In order to strengthen DOT’s enforcement of dangerous goods 

regulations, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation 

determine whether the unique characteristics of air transport warrant 

the development of a legislative proposal that would enhance DOT’s 

authority to inspect packages shipped by air.



Depending on the results of his determination, we further recommend 

that the Secretary direct the FAA Administrator to develop a 

legislative proposal that would require shippers to consent to the 

opening for inspection of packages shipped by air. Such a proposal 

would not only enhance FAA’s inspection authority but would also enable 

FAA to obtain statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and 

frequency of undeclared air shipments of dangerous goods.



Finally, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Administrator to 

ensure that FAA better communicate and enforce its requirement to 

document the justification for any substantial changes to an initially 

proposed penalty before issuing a final order assessing a penalty.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



We provided DOT and the U.S. Postal Service with a draft of this report 

for their review and comment. We met with DOT officials, including the 

Director of RSPA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Enforcement and the 

Manager of FAA’s Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security Enforcement 

Program, to receive their comments. The U.S. Postal Service provided 

comments via E-mail. DOT and the Postal Service generally agreed with 

our report and provided clarifying and technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.



In our draft report, we recommended that the Secretary of 

Transportation direct the DOT administrations that operate and manage a 

dangerous goods program to submit their enforcement data to RSPA’s 

centralized database. According to our audit work, the administrations 

were not submitting the data and, therefore, FAA could not readily 

comply with its guidance requiring it to consider the compliance 

history of violators in all modes of transportation. However, when we 

discussed the draft report with DOT officials in October 2002, they 

provided a July 17, 2002, memorandum from the Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation directing the operating administrations to submit the 

data. In addition, in October 2002, DOT furnished evidence that three 

of the five administrations subsequently provided current data. We 

therefore deleted this recommendation from the final report. DOT agreed 

with our other recommendations, acknowledging that its legislative 

proposals seeking greater inspection authority have not been designed 

to obtain statistically valid data on undeclared shipments of dangerous 

goods. DOT further noted that FAA’s upcoming reauthorization 

legislation could serve as a vehicle for a proposal to expand FAA’s 

inspection authority, so that the agency could obtain better data on 

undeclared air shipments. While indicating that changes to initially 

proposed civil penalties sometimes occur as a result of penalty 

negotiations, DOT agreed that documenting the justification for changes 

is important for providing assurance that final penalties are 

appropriate and consistent.



Scope and Methodology:



To determine what DOT, the Postal Service, and others involved in the 

air transport of dangerous goods know about undeclared shipments, we 

identified relevant studies and interviewed DOT, Postal Service, 

industry, and industry association officials. We reviewed the documents 

and reports we obtained, visited DOT’s John A. Volpe National 

Transportation Systems Center and FAA’s William J. Hughes Technical 

Center, and conducted additional interviews with the researchers who 

had carried out critical studies. We also interviewed officials at four 

of the major cargo carriers, and conducted site visits at three of 

their facilities.



To determine the key mechanisms that the federal government and private 

industry have in place to prevent dangerous goods from compromising 

safety, we interviewed agency and industry officials and federal 

researchers. We also reviewed relevant reports and documents in order 

to identify recent developments in screening technology.



To determine what DOT and the Postal Service do to foster compliance 

with federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air, we 

interviewed agency officials and reviewed reports and documents. We 

also examined FAA’s practices for assessing civil penalties by testing 

30 randomly selected cases from FAA’s Enforcement Information System, 

which contains a database of over 2,000 cases.[Footnote 26] These cases 

were randomly selected to fairly represent the full range of over 2,000 

cases in the database. While the number of cases we tested was too 

small to enable us to estimate the extent to which FAA’s enforcement 

strategy was followed in the entire database, these 30 cases permit us 

to describe the types of practices that occur at critical points in the 

penalty assessment process.



We performed our work from September 2001 through November 2002, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 

after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the 

Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Chairman of its Subcommittee 

on Aviation; other appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary 

of Transportation; the Postmaster General, United States Postal 

Service; the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, 

Transportation Security Administration; the Administrator, Research 

and Special Programs Administration; and the Administrator, Federal 

Aviation Administration. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.



Please call me at (202) 512-2384 if you or your staff have any 

questions about the information in this report. Key contributors to 

this report are listed in appendix IV.



Sincerely yours,



Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.

Director, Physical Infrastructure:



Signed by Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.



[End of section]



Appendix I: FAA’s Dangerous Goods Informational Brochure for 
Passengers:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



[End of section]



Appendix II: Mailability of Dangerous Goods, by DOT Class:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



[End of section]



Appendix III: Data Collected by DOT Agencies on Dangerous Goods 

Incidents and Enforcement Actions:



FAA collects data on dangerous goods air incidents, discrepancies, and 

enforcement actions through two databases. Its Airport and Air Carrier 

Information Reporting System (AAIRS) collects basic incident and 

discrepancy information such as the mode, date, and location of the 

incident or discrepancy, the carrier and shipper involved, the hazard 

class of the spilled material, and the consequences of the incident or 

discrepancy. (See table 1.) FAA’s Enforcement Information System (EIS) 

collects information on closed dangerous goods enforcement cases. It 

contains data such as the incident date, the regulations violated, the 

sanction initially recommended, and the final sanction. These 

enforcement data are used to monitor and enforce compliance with DOT’s 

dangerous goods regulations.



Table 2: DOT Databases Tracking Information on the Air Transportation 

of Dangerous Goods:



Database name: Hazardous Material Incident Reporting System (HMIRS); 

Database custodian: RSPA; Description: DOT’s HMIRS is the primary 

source of national incident data for the federal, state, and local 

government agencies responsible for the safety of dangerous goods 

transportation. Carriers of dangerous goods supply these data through 

their reporting of dangerous goods incidents..



Database name: Unified Shipper Enforcement System (UNISHIP); Database 

custodian: RSPA; Description: UNISHIP contains information on closed 

enforcement actions taken against shippers and freight forwarders in 

all modes of transportation, including air..



Database name: Airport/Air Carrier Information Reporting System 

(AAIRS); Database custodian: FAA; Description: AAIRS has been used 

since 1996 to track inspections of airports and air carrier stations. 

It includes dangerous goods incidents (which are also reported to 

HMIRS) and discrepancies (dangerous goods discoveries that occur 

through avenues other than faulty packaging, such as luggage 

inspection)..



Database name: Enforcement Information System (EIS); Database 

custodian: FAA; Description: The EIS contains entries of violations 

found during inspections or through other means (such as police 

inspections or public complaints) that initiate enforcement cases..



Source: RSPA and FAA.



[End of table]



RSPA collects dangerous goods incident and enforcement data through two 

databases. Its Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) 

collects dangerous goods incident information across all transportation 

modes, not just the air mode. This information is similar to that 

collected in FAA’s AAIRS database, but it does not include 

discrepancies. RSPA tracks closed hazardous materials enforcement cases 

through its Unified Shipper Enforcement System (UNISHIP). This database 

tracks closed enforcement actions across all transportation operating 

administrations, not simply air.



RSPA collects data on dangerous goods incidents from all transportation 

modes through DOT Form F 5800.1, which captures basic information on 

incidents such as the mode, date, and location of the incident; the 

carrier and shipper involved; the hazard class and shipping name of the 

spilled material; and the consequences of the incident (including 

deaths, injuries, product loss, and damage). RSPA uses the data and the 

information it collects on dangerous goods incidents to (1) evaluate 

the effectiveness of existing regulations, (2) assist in determining 

the need for regulatory changes to cover changing transportation safety 

problems, and (3) determine major problem areas so that attention can 

be more suitably directed to them. In addition, both the government and 

industry use this dangerous goods incident information to chart trends 

and identify training inadequacies and packaging deficiencies.



In addition to RSPA, UNISHIP serves the enforcement programs of the 

Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, 

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, 

and the Inspector General by providing a history of compliance for the 

companies contained in the system.



[End of section]



Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:



GAO Contacts:



Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834

Belva M. Martin, (202) 512-2834:



Acknowledgments:



In addition to those named above, Elizabeth R. Eisenstadt, Arthur L. 

James, Bert Japikse, David Laverny-Rafter, Bill MacBlane, Kieran 

McCarthy, Richard Scott, and Katherine Wulff made key contributions to 

this report.



FOOTNOTES



[1] The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, as amended, principally 

governs the transportation of dangerous goods. It is codified at title 

49, chapter 51, of the United States Code.



[2] We use the term “undeclared” to describe two types of improper 

shipments of dangerous goods: (1) those that a shipper has explicitly 

denied are hazardous or has not identified as hazardous and (2) those 

that a shipper has identified as hazardous but has otherwise 

misrepresented (for example, the shipper has understated the quantity 

so that the materials can be shipped by passenger aircraft rather than 

by cargo aircraft). 



[3] Each time someone ships dangerous goods, the contents of the 

shipment must be identified by using 1 of over 3,400 different shipping 

names. A shipping name can refer to a specific material that DOT has 

identified as dangerous; it can also be a generic description for a 

material that meets the overall criteria for a dangerous goods class, 

but for which there is not a division (within that class) to more 

precisely identify it. According to DOT, because many materials are 

identified using the generic descriptions within each class, the actual 

number of dangerous goods is much greater than the 3,400 shipping names 

that DOT spells out. 



[4] The DOT operating administrations that operate and manage dangerous 

goods programs include the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the Federal Railroad 

Administration, the Research and Special Programs Administration, and 

the United States Coast Guard.



[5] U.S. Department of Transportation, Departmentwide Program 

Evaluation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Program, Final 

Report (March 2000). 



[6] An indirect air carrier accepts and delivers cargo to commercial 

airlines for transport. An example of an indirect air carrier would be 

a freight forwarder that consolidates shipments from a large number of 

shippers and then transports them via the cargo compartments of 

commercial aircraft. Because the U.S. Postal Service uses commercial 

aircraft to ship the mail, the FAA also considers it an indirect air 

carrier. 



[7] The John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center is part of 

RSPA. It provides policy support, strategic planning, and analysis to 

customers within as well as outside DOT in areas such as strategic 

investment and resource allocation. Its work addresses issues in air 

and other modes of transportation. 



[8] The term “hidden populations” refers to those that are difficult to 

count by traditional means because, for example, they involve illegal 

or undesirable conditions that people are unlikely to self-report. For 

example, illegal aliens or intravenous drug users would be considered 

“hidden populations,” as would persons deliberately shipping undeclared 

dangerous goods. 



[9] A dangerous goods incident is an event that results in a release, 

including an unanticipated or unintentional release, of hazardous 

material during the course of transportation. RSPA requires carriers to 

report incidents as soon as possible when they involve certain serious 

consequences, such as deaths or a change in the operational flight 

pattern of an aircraft. RSPA requires carriers to report all other 

incidents to the agency within 30 days of their occurrence. 



[10] Recently, RSPA received comments on the frequency of undeclared 

shipments in response to an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. 

RSPA received these comments under Docket HM-228, which considers 

changes to the regulations on the transportation of hazardous 

materials. According to an RSPA official, the agency is analyzing these 

comments and expects to complete its analysis by the end of October 

2003. 



[11] The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, provides that TSA 

be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. The Under 

Secretary for Border Transportation and Security has responsibility for 

TSA.



[12] P.L. 107-71, November 19, 2001.



[13] We do not describe how this technology works because TSA considers 

this to be sensitive security information.



[14] The Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d), addresses the 

issue of letters sealed against inspection. It states, “The Postal 

Service shall maintain one or more classes of mail for the transmission 

of letters sealed against inspection… No letter of such a class of 

domestic origin shall be opened except under authority of a search 

warrant authorized by law, or by an officer or employee of the Postal 

Service for the sole purpose of determining an address at which the 

letter can be delivered, or pursuant to the authorization of the 

addressee.”



[15] Final Report of Operation Clear Sky, Joint Inspection Activity, 

United States Customs Service/Federal Aviation Administration, June 26-

July 21, 2000. 



[16] The Customs-FAA inspections focused on international cargo and 

passenger baggage because the Customs Service has the authority to open 

and inspect shipments coming into or leaving the United States. Beyond 

the border, neither agency has the authority to open and inspect 

domestic cargo or passenger baggage without a search warrant. 



[17] In this report, we are not expressing an opinion on potential 

constitutional issues related to DOT’s proposal.



[18] The remaining 5 cases of the 30 we reviewed involved individuals 

not engaged as HAZMAT employees, to whom the rules regarding initial 

and recurrent training do not apply. 



[19] Two DOT initiatives--the Flagship Initiative on Hazardous 

Materials Handling/Incidents and the DOT-wide program evaluation--

cited a better understanding of the frequency and impact of undeclared 

shipments as essential. 



[20] In response to an incident at Los Angeles International Airport in 

1999, the National Transportation Safety Board issued five safety 

recommendations to RSPA for improving the transportation of lithium 

batteries. In response to these concerns, RSPA published safety 

advisories in the Federal Register, worked with the lithium battery 

industry to adopt voluntary safety standards, undertook a study on the 

transportation of lithium batteries, and initiated changes to domestic 

and international regulations on the transport of lithium batteries.



[21] We have not included a detailed description of the criteria that 

shippers must meet for carriers to consider them “known” because TSA 

considers this to be sensitive-security information. 



[22] Recent media reports as well as work by the DOT Inspector General 

have raised concerns about the extent to which (1) the known shipper 

procedures are a reliable deterrent to criminal attacks and (2) 

selected carriers were adequately complying with regulations requiring 

them to, among other things, properly screen packages from unknown 

shippers. Most recently, virtually all of the cargo carriers the 

Inspector General tested were complying with the requirement, put in 

place after September 11, 2001, to take no packages from unknown 

shippers. However, the Inspector General raised additional serious 

concerns about weaknesses in FAA’s procedures for individuals or 

businesses to become approved indirect air carriers. (A carrier using 

the known shipper requirements must verify that shippers have such 

approval from FAA.)



[23] An incident is defined in RSPA’s regulations as an event that 

results in a reportable release of a hazardous material, including 

unintended and unanticipated releases that otherwise require reporting 

under 49 C.F.R. §171.15 or §171.16. As used in the Hazardous Materials 

Regulations, the term “discrepancies” describes instances of undeclared 

dangerous goods (material found in transportation that was not 

identified as dangerous goods) and instances of misdeclared or 

improperly packaged dangerous goods. 



[24] The mail is subject to the restrictions in title 18 that prohibit 

the mailing of any matter that is outwardly or of its own force 

dangerous to life, health, or property, and to restrictions defined in 

the Postal Service’s rules. However, the Postal Service is not subject 

to the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act or to the HMR. We also 

note that while commercial carriers are subject to the federal 

regulations set forth in title 49, C.F.R., the Postal Service operates 

under title 39, C.F.R. The USPS hazardous material regulations are set 

forth in the Domestic Mail Manual (39 C.F.R. Part 111) and further 

explained in Publication 52, Hazardous, Restricted, and Perishable 

Mail.



[25] S. 1669 and H.R. 3276, Hazardous Material Transportation Safety 

Reauthorization Act of 2001. 



[26] The Enforcement Information System contains entries of violations 

found during inspections or through other means (such as police 

inspections or public complaints) that initiate enforcement cases. It 

contains detailed information on the status and resolution of each 

enforcement case and allows field, regional, and headquarters staff to 

enter and retrieve data. 



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