Return-Path: <nifl-assessment@literacy.nifl.gov> Received: from literacy (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by literacy.nifl.gov (8.10.2/8.10.2) with SMTP id i4I0d8m22894; Mon, 17 May 2004 20:39:08 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 17 May 2004 20:39:08 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <20040517.203710.6398.0.socrates555@juno.com> Errors-To: listowner@literacy.nifl.gov Reply-To: nifl-assessment@literacy.nifl.gov Originator: nifl-assessment@literacy.nifl.gov Sender: nifl-assessment@literacy.nifl.gov Precedence: bulk From: "George E. Demetrion" <socrates555@juno.com> To: Multiple recipients of list <nifl-assessment@literacy.nifl.gov> Subject: [NIFL-ASSESSMENT:561] postpositivism X-Listprocessor-Version: 6.0c -- ListProcessor by Anastasios Kotsikonas X-Mailer: Juno 1.49 Status: O Content-Length: 5936 Lines: 100 Perhaps the following might add a little more to our discussion of postpositivism, which I am suggesting as a mediating approach to social science research that takes into account both the ideal of exacting analysis and maximum precision consistent with the topic at hand and supportive data, and the complexity of the social and cultural dimensions of such an applied field as education. The following is a draft version of the introduction to an essay I am proposing to write. Whether, in the final analysis I can bring out within a single essay the three strands of postpositivist research that I suggest in the last paragraph remains to be seen, as I may ultimately need to choose just one of the three for special focus. Be that as it may, and I believe the piece will be stronger if I can handle all three, I am suggesting there is much to consider in the development of a broad-based postpositivist temper that might at least modulate some of the culture wars that characterize current discussions in adult literacy theory and research. Please feel free to reach me either at socrates555@juno.com or gdemetrion@msn.com if you would prefer to comment off-line. George Demetrion _______________________________________________________________ The Mediating Vision of Postpositivist Science: Three Perspectives May `17, 2004, Draft Version The quest for a scientific grounding for social science research has been a pervasive theme of 20th century scholarship. While the search for an exacting methodology has marked the century's efforts in the positivist mode, criticism of this position has also been perennial. The problem of reductionism is the underlying concern in the challenge to claims for any foundational basis of scientific analysis based on inductionist theories of verification through objective observation of given empirical data, or a priori rational principles of logic. Critics have noted that perception is theory-laden from inception and that both the selection of and even definition of what counts as data is a construct that cannot be accepted simply as given. Additional concerns include the problem of the underdetermination of theory by evidence that undercuts high levels of generality allegedly discerned through positivistic methodologies, as well as challenges to claims that analysis can be simply broken down into component parts given the ubiquity of situational contexts in which data is embedded, defined, and constructed through and within. Critics also point to the centrality of the social dimension of social science research in which "variables" complexly interact, making problematic the sharp separation of individual factors of causation, which is a central objective of the positivistic quest for precision (Phillips and Burbules, 2000, pp. 14-25). Notwithstanding the sophistication of the various anti-positivist critiques, given the allure of precision as a siren call of those seeking an exacting social science of human behavior, positivism in its several variants has continued to maintain a prominent position in social science research. Still, the criticism persists that the "human factor" cannot be calibrated into some precise equation, even as the counter pulls have sometimes led to a relativism in which science itself is viewed as simply another "metannarative." In the current era, a mediating school of thought has emerged with postpositivism, defined in the scholarly literature in varying ways, from that of an elaborated and up-to date form of positivism, which might be more accurately referred to as neopositivism (Mertens, 1998), to a sharp critique of scientific rationality itself characterized through the pejorative term "scientism" (Hawkesworth, 1988). Fischer (1998) provides one mediated picture, linking postpositivism with a coherent theory of truth and the realm of practical deliberation in the "anticipat[ion] and draw[ing] out of the multiple interpretations that bear on the explanation of social and political propositions". In this he gravitates toward the cultural axis of the postpositivist research tradition even in his quest for maximum rigor. Phillips and Burbules (2000) provide a more rigorous definition in linking postpositivsm more to the scientific pole of critical analysis. Drawing substantially on Dewey and Popper, Phillips and Burbules (2000) embrace the concept of truth as a "regulative ideal." For them, the quest for "reliable answers" (p. 2), what Dewey refers to as "warranted assertions," honed through "rigorous inquiry" (p. 3), and capable of standing up to the test of falsification, is both a feasible project for the human sciences and essential if such research is to lead to the progressive resolution of complex social problems. As the authors point out, such competent inquiries" (Dewey, 1938/1991, p. 16) require both exacting rigor and an adequate accounting of the complexity of the subject matter at hand. This paper seeks to extend the work of Fischer and Phillips and Burbules through an exploration of three philosophical chords of 20th century philosophy congruent with the postpositivist temper. Specifically, I draw on pragmatic functionalism via the experientially-premised epistemology of John Dewey, a correspondence theory of truth via Karl Popper's anti-positivist critical realism, and a coherence ( "optimal systematic fit-- with the data," p.181) theory of truth, articulated by contemporary philosopher Nicholas Rescher (2001). Through this tri-partite analysis several approaches and related issues to the postpositivist quest for scientific rigor will be explored, as all three authors reject both positivism and a more relativistic "interpretive" theory of social science that averts the problem of probing into truth, at the least as a regulative ideal. Tensions between the scientific and cultural poles of postpositivist philosophy are also examined.
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