Unit IX-B 

 

COURSE TITLE 

Building Design for Homeland Security TIME 150 minutes 

 

UNIT TITLE 

 

Site and Layout Design Guidance 

 

OBJECTIVES 

 

1. Identify site planning concerns that can create, reduce, or eliminate 
vulnerabilities and understand the concept of “Layers of Defense”. 
2. Recognize protective issues for suburban site planning. 
3. Compare the pros and cons of barrier mitigation measures that 
increase stand-off or promote the need for hardening of buildings at 
risks. 


4. Understand the need for keeping up with the growing demand for 
security design. 

5. Understand the benefits that can be derived from appropriate 
security design. 

6. Understand the benefits of adopting a creative process to face 
current design challenges. 

7. Understand the benefits of including aesthetic elements compatible 
with security and architecture characteristics of building and 
surrounding environment. 

8. Apply these concepts to an existing site or building and identify 
mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities 


SCOPE 

 

The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

 

1. Land use considerations both outside and inside the property line 
2. Site planning issues to include site design, layout and form, 
vehicular and pedestrian circulation, and landscape and urban design 
3. Creating stand-off distance using perimeter controls, non-exclusive 
zones, and exclusive zones along with the design concepts and 
technology to consider 


4. Design considerations and mitigation measures for site security 

 

REFERENCES 

 

1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 2; Checklist at end of Chapter 1 
2. FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components 
in Architectural Design (when available) 
3. FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 5-1 to 5-16 





4. Case Study – Appendix B: Urban, HazardCorp Building 
5. Student Manual, Unit IX-B (info only – do not list in SM) 
6. Unit IX-B visuals (info only – do not list in SM) 


REQUIREMENTS 

 

1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
2. FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components 
in Architectural Design (one per student when available) 
3. FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
3. Instructor Guide, Unit IX-B 
4. Student Manual, Urban Case Study (one per student) 
5. Overhead projector or computer display unit 
6. Unit IX-B visuals 
7. Risk Matrix poster and one box of dry-erase markers (one per team) 
8. Chart paper, easel, and markers 




 

 

UNIT IX-B OUTLINE 

 

Time

Page

IX-B. Site and Layout Design Guidance 

 

150 minutes 

IG IX-B-1

1. Introduction and Unit Overview 
Layers of Defense 

 




10.5 minutes 

IG IX-B-5

2. First Layer, Survey Surroundings 


3 minutes 

IG-IX-B-11

3. First Layer, Access Points 


4.5 minutes 

IG-IX-B-12

4. First Layer, Sidewalks and Curbs 


6 minutes 

IG IX-B-14

5. First Layer, Street Furniture 


4.5 minutes 

IG IX-B-17

6. First Layer, Barriers and Bollards 


21 minutes 

IG IX-B-18

7. Second Layer, Yards and Plazas 


9 minutes 

IG IX-B-25

8. Second Layer, Gatehouses 


1.5 minutes 

IG IX-B-28

9. All Layers, Parking 


4.5 minutes 

IG IX-B-28

10. All Layers, Signage 


1.5 minutes 

IG IX-B-30

11. Second Layer, Security Lighting 


1.5 minutes 

IG IX-B-31




 

12. First Layer, Sensors/CCTV 


1.5 minutes 

IG IX-B-31

13. Campus/University 


10.5 minutes 

IG IX-B-33

14. Best Practices 


1.5 minutes 

IG IX-B-38

15. Activity: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
[45 minutes for students, 15 minutes for review] 

 




60 minutes 

IG IX-B-40



 

 

PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 

 

• Tailoring Content to the Local Area: This is a generic instruction unit, but it has great 
capability for linking to the Local Area. Local Area discussion may be generated as students 
have specific situations for which they would like to determine vulnerabilities or 
vulnerability rating prompted by points brought up in the presentation. 


 

• Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit, except Student Activity 
questions that are applicable to the selected Case Study (Suburban or Urban) – Urban in this 
case. 


 

Group Roundtable / Plenary / Discussion session can occur after Unit IX with regular 
student activity for Unit IX being combined with Unit X at end of Unit X. In certain 
course offerings the experience of well-qualified students can enhance learning through 
cross pollination of lessons learned, impediments, successes, etc. Students may consider 
doing some parts of Unit IX student activity for homework. [Hidden slide at end of 
Visuals IX-B cover this and replaces existing last slide.] 

 

This Group Roundtable is an excellent approach to generating Local Area discussion 
when the class expertise warrants it. 

 

• Activity: The students will continue familiarizing themselves with the Case Study materials. 
The Case Study is a risk assessment and analysis of mitigation options and strategies for a 
high-rise commercial office building located in an urban environment. The assessment uses 
the DoD Antiterrorism Standards and the GSA Interagency Security Criteria to determine 
Levels of Protection and identify specific vulnerabilities. Mitigation options and strategies 
will use the concepts provided in FEMA 426 and other reference materials. 


 

• Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 


 

• Direct students to the appropriate page in the Student Manual. 


 

• Instruct the students to read the activity instructions found in the Student Manual. Note that 
this Student Activity is extensive with 41 questions and the only way the students can 



accomplish it is as a team is with each member taking a block of questions to answer in the 
first 2/3 rd of available time (30 minutes for 5 to 8 questions/student) and then bringing all 
team members up to speed in the last 1/3rd of student activity time (15 minutes). 


 

• Since this activity expands upon Unit IV and takes the vulnerability assessment of the 
building to a greater depth with expanded understanding of problems and mitigation options, 
the team may consider adjusting the Risk Matrix poster scores for vulnerability rating, with 
resultant changes to risk rating. 


 

• Tell students how long they have to work on the requirements. 


 

• While students are working, all instructors should closely observe the groups’ process and 
progress. If any groups are struggling, immediately assist them by clarifying the assignment 
and providing as much help as is necessary for the groups to complete the requirement in the 
allotted time. Also, monitor each group for full participation of all members. For example, 
ask any student who is not fully engaged a question that requires his/her viewpoint to be 
presented to the group. 


 

• At the end of the working period, reconvene the class. 


 

• After the students have completed the assignment, “walk through” the activity with the 
students during the plenary session. Call on different teams to provide the answer(s) for each 
checklist section of questions, in summary fashion or select representative questions in each 
section as the starting points of discussion. Then simply ask if anyone disagrees. If the 
answer is correct and no one disagrees, state that the answer is correct and move on to the 
next requirement. If there is disagreement, allow some discussion of rationale, provide the 
“school solution” and move on. 


 

• If time is short, simply provide the “school solution” and ask for questions. Do not end the 
activity without ensuring that students know if their answers are correct or at least on the 
right track. Note, there are no right or wrong answers, but all answers must be justified with 
rationale. 


 

• Ask for and answer questions. 


 

 


Unit IX-B-1 

 

Unit IX-BSite and Layout Design 
GuidanceBUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 


 

Introduction and Unit Overview 

 

This is Unit IX, Site and Layout Design 
Guidance. This lecture will examine site level 
considerations and concepts for integrating 
land use planning, landscape, architecture, site 
planning, and other strategies to mitigate the 
design basis threats. The students will gain an 
understanding of the myriad options available 
to enhance site design taking into account 
many environmental challenges. 

Unit IX-B-2 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-2Unit ObjectivesIdentifysite planning concerns that can create, 
reduce, or eliminate vulnerabilities and 
understand the concept of “Layers of Defense.”
Recognizeprotective issues for urban site 
planning.
Comparethe pros and cons of barrier mitigation 
measures that increase stand-off or promote the 
need for hardening of buildings at risks. 


 

Unit Objectives 

 

At the end of this unit, the students should be 
able to: 

 
1. Explain the concerns of basic land use 
planning that affect vulnerabilities to 
threats and hazards due to terrorism and 
technological accidents. 


2. Understand the concept of “Layers of 
Defense” which will be applied throughout 
this instruction unit and the next. 

3. Recognize protective issues for suburban 
site planning so as to aid in selecting 
appropriate mitigation measures. 

4. Compare the pros and cons of barrier 
mitigation measures that increase stand-off 
and the need for hardening buildings at 
risk. 



 

 


 

Unit IX-B-3 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-3Unit ObjectivesUnderstand the following critical 
issues:
..Need for keeping up with the 
growing demand for security 
design
..Benefits that can be derived 
from appropriate securitydesignReferencesFEMA Building 
Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist, 
Chapter 1, page 1-46, 
FEMA 426Site and Layout Design 
Guidance,Chapter 2, 
FEMA 426FEMA 430, Primer for 
Incorporating Building 
Security Components in 
Architectural Design 


 

Unit Objectives (cont.) 

 
5. Understand the benefits in keeping up with 
the growing demand for security design 
issues. The technology and manufacturing 
continues to improve. 


6. Understand the benefits that can be derived 
from appropriate security design. Meeting 
security design can satisfy other 
requirements at the same time. 

 

FEMA 426 and FEMA 430 contain 
architectural and site planning considerations 
for new design or renovation of existing. 

Unit IX-B-4 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-4Unit ObjectivesUnderstand the following critical 
issues (continued):
..Benefits of adopting a creative 
process to face current design 
challenges
..Benefits of including aesthetic 
elements compatible with 
security and architectural 
characteristics of building and 
surrounding environmentReferencesFEMA Building 
Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist, 
Chapter 1, page 1-46, 
FEMA 426Site and Layout Design 
Guidance,Chapter 2, 
FEMA 426FEMA 430, Primer for 
Incorporating Building 
Security Components in 
Architectural Design 


 

Unit Objectives (cont.) 

 


7. Understand that there are benefits to 
adopting a creative process to face current 
design challenges. While many criteria are 
prescriptive, there are many techniques to 
meet the spirit, intent, purpose, and 
performance sought. 

8. Understand that design can include 
aesthetic elements that are compatible with 
security and architectural characteristics of 
the building and surrounding environment. 
Blending security so that it does not look 
like security so that buildings feel open and 
friendly should be a goal. 



 

 


 

Unit IX-B-5 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-5Layers of DefenseFEMA 452, Figure 2-2: Layers of Defense, p. 2-3 


 

From FEMA 452 

 

The layers of defense is a traditional 
approach in security engineering and use 
concentric circles extending out from an area 
or site to the building or asset that requires 
protection. They can be seen as demarcation 
points for different security strategies. 
Identifying the layers of defense early in the 
assessment process will help you to 
understand better the assets that require 
protection and determine your mitigation 
options. Figure 2-2 shows the layers of 
defense described below. 

 

First Layer of Defense. This involves 
understanding the characteristics of the 
surrounding area, including construction 
type, occupancies, and the nature and 
intensity of adjacent activities. It is 
specifically concerned with buildings, 
installations, and infrastructure outside the 
site perimeter. For urban areas, it also 
includes the curb lane and surrounding 
streets. The building owner has little or no 
control outside of working with the city or 
municipality. The first layer of defense 
should be designed to prevent large bombs 
or weapons into the site and control access 

Layers of Defense 

 

There should always be multiple layers of 
defense in order to deter and detect potential 
threat elements that attempt to access critical 
assets to their benefit and everyone else’s 
detriment. There may be an additional layer 
applied around a building when a site is large 
or one or more additional layers inside a 
building when a building has functions at 
various levels of security. The intent is to deter 
first, then detect sufficiently quickly to have a 
response force engage the potential threat 
elements prior to reaching the next layer. 

 

The first layer is the demarcation between 
control and no control. Outside the first layer 
the local, regional, and national police and 
intelligence forces work to track, detain, and 
arrest the potential threat elements before they 
can initiate an incident. This should be a 
controlled perimeter whose intent is to keep 
large threats outside by deterrence or detect 
them at this point and prevent entry. If the 
weapon activates at this layer the effectiveness 
is reduced if sufficient stand-off exists. 

 

The second layer keeps any smaller weapons 
that may slip past the first layer from getting 
close enough to the critical asset to cause 
damage. This layer should mitigate the 
effectiveness of tactics, reduce the impact due 
to insider action, and controls the stand-off 
from the building for the smaller weapons that 
may get through. 

 

The first and second layers are primarily the 
venue for site and layout design, the basis for 
this unit. 

 

The third layer (usually 3 layers are the 
minimum found) is the building envelope 
which also deters and detects, but if an incident 
occurs this layer is the only one that provides 




of personnel. 

 

Second Layer of Defense. This refers to the 
space that exists between the site perimeter 
and the assets requiring protection. It 
involves the placement of buildings and 
forms in a particular site and understanding 
which natural or physical resources can 
provide protection. It entails the design of 
access points, parking, roadways, pedestrian 
walkways, natural barriers, security lighting, 
and signage. For urban areas, it refers 
specifically to the building yard. The 
building owner has control of this layer. 
The second layer controls stand-off from 
the building which provides protection 
from weapons that may slip through the 
first layer of defense. 

 

Third Layer of Defense. This deals with the 
protection of the asset itself. It proposes to 
harden the structures and systems, 
incorporate effective HVAC systems and 
surveillance equipment, and wisely design 
and locate utilities and mechanical systems. 
Note that, of all blast mitigation measures, 
distance is the most effective measure 
because other measures vary in effectiveness 
and can be more costly. However, often it is 
not possible to provide adequate standoff 
distance. For example, sidewalks in many 
urban areas may be less than 10 meters (33 
feet), while appropriate stand-off may require 
a minimum of 25 meters (82 feet). The 
building owner has control of this layer 
and its main mitigation measures are 
hardening against blast and security 
sensors/CCTV as final access control. 

 

any level of protection during the tactic and 
weapon release. The third layer is the venue 
for building design which will be found in the 
next instruction unit. 

 

It is important to remember that the nature of 
any threat is always changing. Consideration 
should be given to accommodating enhanced 
protection measures in response to future 
threats that may emerge. Asset protection must 
be balanced with other design objectives, such 
as the efficient use of land and resources, and 
must also take into account existing physical, 
programmatic, and fiscal constraints. 



 


 

Unit IX-B-6 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-6Layers of DefenseBuilding yards many not exist in urban areasOverheadUnderneath 


 

The layers of defense are not predetermined and 
they may vary from site to site and from building 
to building. If a particular building requiring 
protection is part of a campus or located in a 
rural, semi-rural, or urban area, a similar analysis 
may be applicable for all cases when determining 
the importance of the asset. However, the security 
elements necessary to protect the building can be 
entirely different, depending on its location. The 
approach suggests establishing different 
demarcation points in order to identify sound 
security strategies. The layers of defense 
concept proposes that each designer study a 
particular site and determine critical assets 
that need to be protected and how protection 
should take place. 

 

Note: Layers of Defense will be during this 
and the next two instruction units to illustrate 
the elements: 

 
• Deter 
• Detect 
• Deny 


• Devalue 

 

 

Layers of Defense 

 

The layers of defense convey the idea of using 
concentric circles extending out from an area or site 
to the building that requires protection. They are 
used as demarcation points for different security 
strategies. The objective of layers of defense is to 
create succeeding more difficult layers to security 
to penetrate, provide additional warning and 
response time, and allow building occupants to 
more into defensive positions or designated Safe 
Haven protection. 

The layers of defense defines sites and projects 
as follows: (While the previous slide is a 
generic explanation, this slide shows the urban 
situation where there are fewer options to the 
layers of defense and inherently less stand-off 
to provide protection): 

 
• The first layer addresses the characteristics 
of the surrounding area and the public 
realm. It starts at the site perimeter and 
outward. The building owner has very 
limited or no control to implement 
mitigation measures. In the urban 
environment the first layer consists mainly 
of the sidewalk, the curb lane, and the 
street. 


o Protection in this area will require 
coordination with local municipal police, 
public works, and urban planning 
organizations. 
• The second layer is concerned with the 
space and physical barriers at the perimeter 
of the site to keep explosives at a distance 
to protect buildings. It comprises the space 
between the site perimeter and building. 
The building owner has the authority and 
control to implement mitigation measures. 


o This layer consists of the building yard 
or plaza, or may be non-existent with the 
building directly on the property line. 
• The third deals with the protection integral 
to the building itself. The building owner 







 

 

Instructors may want to relate to a castle – 
First layer of defense is clearing all trees and 
vegetation out to the effective range of 
arrows and crossbows. Second layer of 
defense is moat and initial castle wall. Third 
layer of defense is the castle keep where the 
last defensive position exists with its 
additional walls. 

 

has certain level of control to implement 
mitigation measures. Incorporating the 
protection in initial design, whether blast 
hardening or security, is the least expensive 
approach. Retrofitting after the building 
has been constructed can cost up to 30% of 
the original construction, if the retrofitting 
can be done. 
o Due to limited stand-off in the urban 
environment, building hardening, 
barriers, additional security (sensors, 
CCTV, and personnel) and street closure 
are considerations based upon threats 
and the timing of these threats. 




Unit IX-B-7 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-7Layers of DefenseThird LayerSecond LayerFirst LayerLayers of DefenseSurvey SurroundingsAccess PointsSidewalks and CurbsStreet FurnitureBarriers and BollardsYards and PlazasGatehouses / ScreeningParkingSignageSecurity LightingSensors / CCTVSite Utilities 


 

Layers of Defense 

 

There are many mitigation techniques available 
that can be used at one or more layers of 
defense. This instruction unit concentrates on 
site and layout design, thus it looks primarily at 
the first and second layers of defense and 
emphasizes the predominant layer of defense 
considered. 

 

Here are general mitigation considerations for 
the urban environment and this presentation 
will follow the flow of these measures from left 
to right – starting with Survey Surroundings on 
the left and ending with Site Utilities on the 
right. 

 

The flow also follows the general assessment 
approach of looking from outside to inside and 
going from general information to specific 
information. 



 


 


 

Unit IX-B-8 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-8Survey Surroundings / 
Data Collection:
•360 degrees -all directions•Overhead –structures that 
can collapse and strike 
building of interest 
•Underneath –subways, 
roadway tunnels, and 
utilitiesFirst Layer of Defense 


 

Survey Surroundings – Data Collection 

 

In an urban environment, this action literally 
considers what may be a threat or vulnerability 
in all directions. 

 

Understanding the surroundings includes any 
structures above and under the building and 
site of interest as to their impact on design or 
assessment. 


• What can fall on the building? 

• Where are vantage points for looking into 
the building? 

• Where are different approaches for getting 
access to the building? 

• Problems in installing mitigation measures 
because of location, temporal changes, or 
conflicting existing structures? 

Unit IX-B-9 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-9Data Collection --use 
GIS to help determine:
..Approaches to site/building
..Personnel
..Vehicles
..Potential collateral damage 
near facility
..Buildings and infrastructure 
of concern nearby
..Important geographic and 
topographic elementsFirst Layer of Defense 


 

Survey Surroundings – Data Collection 

 

A 5-mile perspective around the urban building 
or site of interest is also needed to understand 
interaction of the building’s critical functions 
and critical infrastructure against utilities, 
response capability, and other support provided 
in the local community. Included should be 
potential targets in the area to determine the 
potential for collateral damage and choke 
points that may restrict response or evacuation 
capability. 

 

GIS applications are excellent resources that 
enable designers and building owners to 
analyze various demographic, hazardous areas, 
transportation networks, access control points, 
etc., in order to identify potential threats, 
hazards, and vulnerabilities. These applications 
may depict a truer picture of the surrounding 
situation, allowing decision-makers to take 
proactive measures to mitigate potential 
vulnerabilities. 



 

 


Unit IX-B-10 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-10First Layer of DefenseAccess Points
..Ring of steel
..Temporary stand-off
..Road closure
..Temporary barriers / parked 
vehicles
..Work with local authorities 


 

Access Points 

 

The “Ring of Steel” is being installed in a core 
area of London, England. This is a first layer 
of defense similar to a military installation 
where access control and inspection of vehicles 
occurs at the installation perimeter, which 
hopefully is very far from occupied buildings. 
This approach is also being considered for 
lower Manhattan in New York City. 
• Roads entering the city are narrowed and 
have small chicanes to force drivers to slow 
down and be recorded by CCTV cameras. 
• These roads typically have a paved strip 
down the middle with a sentry box where 
police can stand guard and monitor traffic. 
• Some roads have been closed to traffic 
entirely. 


• Despite the term "ring of steel", the 
roadblocks and chicanes are actually created 
with concrete blocks, sometimes plastic 
coated, that are wedged together. 

 

The congestion charge zone in London also 
uses CCTV -- 180 cameras on the edge of the 
zone, and 50 further cameras placed within it. 


• These cameras are intended to pick up cars 
that are missed on entry and/or exit and 
those that are solely moving within the zone. 

 

To create temporary stand-off when a credible 
threat has been identified: 
• Temporary street closures 
• Temporary barriers or vetted vehicles along 
the curb lane (one situation had an armored 
car company parking around a building to 
provide a barrier system. 
• In all cases work with neighbors, local 
authorities (police, public works, and 
community planners) to plan and exercise 
the options available 




 



 

Unit IX-B-11 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-11First Layer of DefenseAccess Points
..Interruption of traffic 
pattern or street closure 
can impact a wide area
..Interruption or closure only 
justified when stand-off 
absolutely required 


 

The upper photo is closure of a service alley. 

 

The lower photo shows crowd fencing 
directing pedestrian traffic to one side of the 
street. 

 

Access Points 

 

Anytime a traffic pattern is interrupted by 
accidents, by maintenance and repair crews, or 
by deliberate street closure, there will always 
be complaints. 

 

In alleys and typical urban streets adequate 
stand-off distance is an impossibility without 
street closure. Service roads are probably the 
easiest to close as access is only required by 
the buildings served by the road. 

 

Improvised closures tend to destroy the 
attractiveness of the street with a combination 
of security personnel and ugly temporary 
barriers. 

Unit IX-B-12 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-12First Layer of DefenseAccess Points
..Control angle of 
approach 
..Turns
..Curves•Slow down approaching 
vehicles 


Upper photo was taken from roof of high-risk 
building showing a potential high speed 
approach route to the building, especially 
after all traffic has passed. 

 

Lower photo shows that the building in the 
background has a wall and parked cars 
protecting from a high speed approach, but 
the entrance to the building on the left is only 

Access Points 

 

Controlling the angle of approach and the 
length of straight-aways is important to provide 
protection to high-risk buildings. 

 

Traffic calming strategies seek to use design 
measures to cue drivers as to the acceptable 
speed for an area. These include raised 
crosswalks, speed humps and speed tables, 
pavement treatments, build outs, and traffic 
circles. Additionally, by controlling the angle 
of approach, requiring turns or providing 
curves, vehicles must slow down. 

 

In conjunction with traffic calming 
considerations, appropriate barriers to block 
moving vehicle attacks should be considered at 
high-risk buildings. 



 

 


protected by the turn required at the bottom 
of the ramp or not protected at all if traveling 
the taxi route from behind the building on the 
right. 

 

Unit IX-B-13 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-13First Layer of DefenseSidewalks and Curbs
..Most central business district 
buildings have exterior wall on 
the property line
..Stand-off distance is generally 
impossible to achieve; 
sidewalks provide less than 10 
feet
..Low curbs do not keep vehicles 
away from buildings 
..Hardening in lieu of stand-off 
can be very expensive, 
especially for existing buildings 


 

Sidewalks and Curbs 

 

With exterior walls on the property line, the 
stand-off distance is the width of the sidewalk 
in many cases. 

 

Low curbs are not a deterrent in keeping 
vehicles away from buildings as shown in the 
lower photo. 

 

Unit IX-B-14 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-14First Layer of DefenseSidewalks and Curbs
..Interruption of a 
sidewalk is only 
justified when stand-
off is absolutely 
required
..Closure can be 
temporary or 
permanent 


 

Sidewalks and Curbs 

 

Additional examples of interruptions in 
sidewalks and closure of streets. 
• Top photo shows bollards that are spaced so 
far apart that they cannot keep most vehicles 
out, so a single planter was placed to fill a 
gap. Also in the top photo, note the 
restriction to pedestrian traffic caused by the 
jersey barrier which would have been 
equally effective if placed directly behind 
the bollards or angled with the planter to 
open up the sidewalk. 




With little stand-off, increased building 
security and hardening are the expensive 
options available. 

• The bottom photo shows pedestrian traffic 
being controlled into a closed service street. 



 

Unit IX-B-15 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-15First Layer of DefenseSidewalks and Curbs
..High curbs can keep 
vehicles from departing 
roadway
..Do not remove 
curbside parking 
unless additional 
stand-off absolutely 
required 


 

Sidewalks and Curbs 

 

Sidewalks serve as the common space for 
pedestrian interaction, movements, and 
activity. Sidewalks should be open and 
accessible to pedestrians to the greatest extent 
possible and security elements should not 
interfere with circulation particularly in 
crowded locations 

 

Curbside parking should not be removed unless 
additional stand-off distance is absolutely 
necessary for high-risk buildings. Prohibiting 
on street parking or closing lanes should only 
be used as a temporary measure during times of 
increased alert. 

 

High curbs and other measures may be 
installed to keep vehicles from departing the 
roadway in an effort to avoid other security 
counter measures. 
• However, jacked up trucks with oversized 
tires might find the upper photo to be a 
nuisance, but smaller vehicles with smaller 
tires, like in Europe, would find it 
formidable (especially if curb height is at the 
axle height). 
• Watch out for Americans with Disabilities 
Act requirements at crosswalks when 
considering high curbs. 
• The lower photo shows two rows of jersey 
barriers that increase stand-off into the 
street, but drastically reduces the throughput 
on that street. 




 



 

Unit IX-B-16 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-16First Layer of DefenseSidewalks and CurbsAn alternate to visible 
barriers or bollards is 
collapsible sidewalks using 
low-strength concrete 


 

Sidewalks and Curbs 

 

Another unobtrusive approach for providing a 
vehicle barrier is combining collapsible 
sidewalk with a small wall that will catch a 
vehicle bumper. The sidewalk is made of low-
strength concrete that takes pedestrian weight 
but not vehicle weight. 

 

These graphics are of the Rock Twelve 
Security Architecture Tiger Trap TM and their 
product literature information: 

 

• Designed to reduce the impact of 
security on public space, this innovative 
vehicle arrest system utilizes a subgrade 
compressible material that lowers the 
elevation of an attacking vehicle and a 
low wall that then halts the lowered 
vehicle. 

• The subgrade compressible material 
allows the rear wall to be as low as a 
bench or even completely below grade. 

 

• The compressible material combined 
with a decorative covering surface 
supports pedestrian loads, but fails under 
the weight of a vehicle. 

 



 


 

Unit IX-B-17 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-17First Layer of DefenseStreet FurnitureNCPC Streetscape CatalogueStreetscape can be used to 
increase security. Hardened 
elements that become security 
elements
..Parking meters
..Streetlights
..Benches
..Planters
..Trash receptacles 


 

Street Furniture 

 



Planters, bollards or decorative boulders can be 
designed to resist the impact of a weapon-laden 
vehicle in a much more aesthetically pleasing 
manner than a hardened (strengthened) wall or 
fence. The wall or fence may be more 
appropriate in a suburban setting, but the 
hardened street furniture may be the only 
options in the urban setting. 

 

The streetscape can included hardened versions 
of parking meters, street lights, benches, 
planters and trash receptacles that act as 
barriers to moving vehicles. 

 

The National Capital Planning Commission 
(NCPC) provides a catalog that shows several 
examples of hardened streetscape furniture. 

 

Unit IX-B-18 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-18First Layer of DefenseStreet FurniturePlace streetscape security 
components at least 24 
inchesfrom edge of curb
..Allow for opening car 
doors
..Allow for pedestrian 
movement from car to 
sidewalk 


Street Furniture 

 

The scale of the streetscape should be 
appropriate to its primary users and it can be 
manipulated to increase the comfort level of 
desired users while creating a less inviting 
atmosphere for users with malicious intent. 

 

It is critical to maintain important functions 
such as adequate space for pedestrian 
circulation and appropriate distances between 
vehicles and security barriers. The 
recommended distance to place streetscape 
security components is at least 24 inches from 
the edge of the curb to allow for the opening of 
car doors and pedestrian movement from car to 
sidewalk. 

 

Well planned barriers can also assist in clearly 
defining areas of public and private space and 
in protecting pedestrians from traffic. 

 



 


 

Unit IX-B-19 

 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-19•Treatment of security 
elements should be 
compatible with existing 
elements•Perimeter barriers can go 
hand-in-hand with streetscape 
improvements and plantings•Appropriate design can blend 
security into existing 
streetscape; serving as 
amenities for tenants and 
neighborsFirst Layer of DefenseStreet Furniture 


 

Street Furniture 

 

Numerous urban design elements present 
opportunities to provide security. Even at the 
pedestrian scale, certain operational 
requirements must be accommodated. For 
example, although efficient pedestrian and 
vehicle circulation systems are important for 
day-to-day living, they are also critical for 
emergency response, evacuation, and egress. 
Furthermore, despite an emphasis on 
downsizing the scale of the streetscape, it is 
critical to maintain the maximum stand-off 
distance possible between vehicles and 
structures. 

 

Unit IX-B-20 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-20First Layer of DefenseBarriers and Bollards -PassiveFrom US Army Field Manual 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, 1992 


 

Barriers and Bollards – Passive Barriers 

It is one thing to provide a passive barrier; it is 
another to ensure the barrier will provide the 
level of protection sought. We have talked 
about controlling vehicle speed approaching 
access points and buildings. Essentially, any 
barrier will stop a given level of kinetic energy 
which is ½ mass * velocity squared. Thus, the 
bigger the vehicle and the higher its speed the 
stronger the barrier must be as shown by this 
chart. 

 

The greater the barrier mass and reinforcement 
and the deeper it is connected to the earth, the 
higher its rating. 

 

Notice the jersey barrier has the rating listed 
only if there are four rebar pinning the barrier 
at least 18 inches into pavement. Alternately, a 
1-inch steel cable linking the jersey barriers 
would be an alternate technique, but with some 
penetration. 

 



 


 

Unit IX-B-21 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-21First Layer of DefenseBarriers and Bollards -PassiveSource: YodockWall Company 


 



Barriers and Bollards – Water Barriers 

 

Water-filled barriers are another approach as 
they are lightweight and easy to deploy. The 
photo shows the stopping power of this barrier 
when properly installed. Filling the barriers 
with sand make them less portable. 

 

As with jersey barriers, linking the barriers 
with 1-inch steel cable improves their 
performance, but with additional penetration 
(less mass). Also, these barriers must be 
checked periodically for leaks, especially if 
allowed to freeze when filled with water. 
Without water or sand these would lack critical 
needed mass. 

 

Unit IX-B-22 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-22First Layer of DefenseBarriers and Bollards-ActiveFrom US Army Field Manual 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, 1992Source: Delta Scientific Corporation 


 

Barriers and Bollards – Active Barriers 

 

As with passive barriers, active barriers also 
have different levels of kinetic energy stopping 
power, based upon mass and connection to the 
earth. 

The advantage of active barriers is that access 
points and building access to loading docks or 
for maintenance can allow vehicles to pass or 
not based upon authorization. 

 

One company is marketing a turntable that 
allows the fixed bollards to be turned 90 
degrees to the vehicle path, then rotated back to 
block vehicle traffic. 

 



 


 

Unit IX-B-23 

 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-23First Layer of DefenseBarriers and Bollards-Active 


 

Barriers and Bollards – Active Barriers 

 

 

An active barrier can be activated in seconds (1 
to 3) and should be either always up (sally port 
concept) or deployed upon identification that 
the gate is being crashed (taking into 
consideration response time, maximum vehicle 
speed and activation speed. 

 

Pop-up barriers can create serious damage to 
vehicles, especially if deployed when a vehicle 
is above the barrier. Consider manual 
activation to avoid unnecessary damage (avoid 
magnetic vehicle loops to redeploy a barrier 
that will catch a tailgating vehicle). 

 

Unit IX-B-24 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-24First Layer of DefenseRotating Drum, Drop Arm, and Rotating Plate Vehicle Barriers 


 

 

Here are various examples to control vehicle 
access to a building or a street. 

• The drop arm barriers in the upper photo 
have low stopping power and are suitable 
where snow is a concern. 

• The rotating drum in the left photo is a very 
capable barrier with great stopping power, 
but has problems with water, snow, ice, and 
foreign matter entering the drum 
mechanism. 

• The portable rotating plate barriers in the 
lower right photo are very good for effective 
street closure against large, fast moving 
vehicles. 

Improvised closures tend to destroy the 
attractiveness of the street with a combination 
of security personnel and ugly temporary 
barriers. However, they provide strong 
deterrence, which is equally important during a 
high-threat situation. 

 



These photos show retractable bollards 
stopping a substantial truck with very little 
penetration. 

Barriers and Street Closure 


 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-25First Layer of Defense<= 3.35015,000K12<= 3.34015,000K8<= 3.33015,000K4Distance Past 
Barrier (ft)
Vehicle Speed 
(mph)
Vehicle Weight 
(lbs.)
RatingBarriers and BollardsDepartment of State periodically issues list of manufacturers and 
model numbers certified in meeting prescribed testing criteria 
(March 2003)
Check site utilities, water runoff, and other subterraneanConditions when installing bollards and barriers 


 

Department of State Barrier Ratings 

 

Department of State barrier ratings are more 
suitable to an urban environment where 
stand-off is limited -- the 3.3 feet distance 
allowed past the barrier is for the leading edge 
of the cargo area of the truck (where the bomb 
is most likely being carried). 

 

Also, Department of State has found that diesel 
trucks have greater penetration capability, so 
their tests now require the use of diesel trucks 
vice gasoline powered trucks. 

 

Unit IX-B-26 

 

 

Department of Defense Barrier Ratings 

 

Department of Defense barrier ratings use the 
old Department of State criterion that allows 
the front of the vehicle to penetrate a given 
distance past the barrier. This would be more 
suitable in a suburban environment where there 
is greater distance between the barrier and the 
nearest building than in the urban environment. 

 

Unit IX-B-27 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-27First Layer of DefenseBarriers and Bollards•Fixed bollards•Retractable bollards•PlantersFixed bollards 


 

Sidewalks serve as the common space for 
pedestrian interaction, movements, and 
activity. 

 

Extending barriers into sidewalks, streets or 
parking lanes may provide additional stand off 
distance. While this is technically possible, this 
approach often creates negative impacts within 
the public realm, which may make this an 
unfeasible solution. Be sure that introduced 
security measures are effective. 

 



Unit IX-B-25 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-26First Layer of Defense50 to 1001510,0000 to 505010,000<=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1)5015,000<=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1)4015,000<=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1)3015,000Distance Past Barrier 
(ft)
Vehicle 
Speed (mph)
Vehicle Weight 
(lbs.)
Barriers and BollardsDepartment of Defense periodically issues list of manufacturers 
and model numbers certified in meeting prescribed testing 
criteria (August 2003) 


Barriers and Bollards 


 

Bollards and other barriers are ideally the first 
layer of defense in the urban environment so as 
to obtain the most stand-off possible. 

 

Unit IX-B-28 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-28First Layer of DefenseBarriers and BollardsRetractable 


 

 

Retractable bollards are an excellent (though 
expensive) solution when the use of security 
elements is critical and the width of the street 
does nor allow their permanent placement. 

 

Effective bollards must be carefully engineered 
with deep foundations and the additional depth 
required for retractability may cause problems 
with underground utilities and services, 
building basements extending under sidewalks 
in urban areas, and other structures that may 
exists under sidewalks that affect retractable 
bollard performance. 

 

Unit IX-B-29 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-29First/Second Layer of Defense•If well designed, planters can be an element of beautification•Ensure barriers are properly anchored to stop vehicles and 
configured to reduce fragmentationPlantersBarriers and Bollards 




Barriers and Bollards – Retractable 
Bollards 

 

Barriers and Bollards -- Planters 

 

Bollards and planters can help create an 
appealing streetscape depending upon their 
design and the current environment in which 
they are installed. 

 

When placed, make sure that they accomplish 
their function and distance between them is 
appropriate. The distance must allow free flow 
of pedestrians, but restrict flow of vehicles. 

 

Fragmentation is always a concern with any 
barrier system, whether caused by bomb blast 
or vehicle impact. 

 




 

Unit IX-B-30 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-30Avoid designing barriers 
that impair access by first 
responders:
..Intersection with 
driveways and gates
..Crossing of pedestrian 
paths and 
handicapped ramps
..Fire hydrantsFirst Layer of DefenseBarriers and Bollards 


Barriers and Bollards – Jersey Barriers 

 

Least desirable of barrier types 

• Difficult to place and move 

• No vehicle stopping capability unless tied 
to pavement with at least 4 pieces of #4 
(1/2-inch diameter) rebar into pavement 
about 18 inches deep and/or tied together 
with steel cable (3/4 to 1-inch) 

• Can cause sidewalk failure due to 
concentrated load and fact that sidewalk 
may be hollow underneath for storage or 
utilities 

• Adds to fragmentation (barrier shatters) if 
vehicle bomb explodes next to barrier 

• They impede access – pedestrians and first 
responders 

o Utilities (if placed on top of manholes) 

o Emergency access (fire trucks, 
ambulance, police) 

o ADA (Americans with Disabilities 
Act) access – crosswalks and ramps 

 



 

Unit IX-B-31 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-31First Layer of DefenseBarriers and BollardsEnsure barriers are properly anchored to stop vehicles 


 

Barriers and Bollards 

 

Other examples of architecturally pleasing 
barriers and planters. But even architecturally 
pleasing barriers require proper anchoring to 
ensure effectiveness. The planters on the left 
are in question as they look like they have 
forklift 

 

The barrier on the left is by Rock Twelve 
Security Architecture 




 

Unit IX-B-32 

 

 

Barriers and Bollards 

 

Bollards and planters can help create an 
appealing streetscape depending upon their 
design and the current environment in which 
they are installed. 

 

When placed, make sure that they accomplish 
their function and distance between them is 
appropriate. The distance must allow free flow 
of pedestrians, but restrict flow of vehicles. 

 

Fragmentation is always a concern with any 
barrier system, whether caused by bomb blast 
or vehicle impact. 

 

Unit IX-B-33 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-33First Layer of DefenseBarriers and BollardsLong expanses of bollards should 
be carefully designed and sited 
to avoid monotonyBollard spacing should 
ensure no vehicles can 
get through 


 

Barriers and Bollards -- Bollards 

 

 

Bollards placed in long unbroken rows present 
a monotonous appearance and may appear as a 
wall from some angles. 

 

In an urban environment, bollards and barriers 
are ideally the first layer of defense to obtain 
the most stand-off possible. 

 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-32First Layer of DefenseBarriers and BollardsProperly anchored barriers stop vehicles and reduce fragmentation 
during blast 


When placed, make sure that they accomplish 
their barrier function with an appropriate 
distance of not less than 4 feet-between them. 


 

Unit IX-B-34 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-34Second Layer of Defense
..Buildings with 
front yards
..Buildings with 
plazasYARDPLAZA 


 

Yards and Plazas 

 

Three generic site types will be found in the 
central business district of any large city. 

 

• Buildings with zero setback and alleys. 
The building face is on the property line. 
An alley is a narrow street that divides a 
city block and provides service access to 
the side or rear of the building. 

• Buildings with front yards. The building 
is set back from its property line and the 
space is usually landscaped. The building 
yard includes pedestrian entries and 
loading docks. 

• Building with plazas. The building is 
placed within an open space that is 
publicly accessible. 

 

Unit IX-B-35 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-35Small yard with wide pavement that 
provide some useful stand-offNarrow yard incorporating low 
stone wall and metal fence
..Generally small
..Usually provided for 
governmental & institutional 
buildingsBuilding YardSecond Layer of Defense 


 

Building Yard 

 

Some buildings have a “yard” between the 
building face and the sidewalk. The yard is 
within the property line and typically consists 
of a grassy or planted area adjacent to the 
building. 

 

Yards are typical, narrow, of the order of 10 to 
20 feet, providing some stand-off distance. 

 

The yard may be flush or raised above the level 
of the sidewalk. A raised yard can provide a 
barrier to vehicles. 

 

 

Sometimes small yards (within the property 



 

Major public buildings may have wide yards 
that are more of a landscaped forecourt that can 
offer reasonable stand-off distance. Yards are 
usually provided for governmental or 
institutional buildings in which coverage of the 
entire property may not be economically 
critical as is the case for private development. 


line) are matched with a wide sidewalk 
provided by the city. 

 

Unit IX-B-36 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-36Low planting makes a 
moderate barrierHigh stepped yard on sloping 
site make a strong barrierSecond Layer of DefenseBuilding Yard 




 

Building Yard 

 

A typical raised, low planter that can act as a 
bench (or plinth wall that holds back soil or 
rock), as shown in the left photo, presents a 
significant barrier to small and medium-sized 
vehicles. The high stepped yard in the right 
photo, which is along the side of the building, 
is a significant barrier and could also act as a 
deflector of blast from a curbside vehicle. 

 

Unit IX-B-37 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-37Second Layer of DefenseBuilding Yard.
Monumental yards make 
excellent barriers and 
elements of beautification 


 
Building Yard 


 

Security elements within the building yard 
should complement the building architecture 
and landscaping and should be designed so as 
to appear as well designed landscape objects 
rather than expressing security. The security 
elements should be located near the outer edge 
of the yard to maximize stand-off. 

Good examples of this are shown in these 
photos. 

 



 


Unit IX-B-38 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-38Plaza
..An expanded building yard
..Moved out from the 
controlled building access
..A developer provided 
public space
..A well designed plaza can 
provide visual interest at 
same time providing good 
stand-offSecond Layer of Defense 


 

Plaza 

 

Extensive business district development with 
very large buildings began after World War II. 
The straight tower with no setbacks became 
fashionable, but new ordinances permitted 
building developers to construct taller 
buildings, with greater floor area, if a public 
plaza was incorporated. In fact, in Tokyo, new 
high-rises must ensure they do not completely 
block the sun from surrounding buildings. 



 

In effect, the plaza became an expanded 
building yard. It was moved outside the 
controlled access space of the building and 
became public space provided by the 
developer. 

 

The additional space provided by plazas 
enables a more effective second layer of 
defense to be achieved. Often an acceptable 
stand-off distance can be created on one or 
more faces of the building depending on the 
plaza /building layout. 

 

Unit IX-B-39 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-39Second Layer of DefensePlaza with sculptured barrier formsPlaza 


 

Plaza 

 

Here are additional examples of plazas with 
built-in barriers needed for terrain and security. 




 

Unit IX-B-40 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-40Second Layer of DefenseGatehouses
..Access control 
with human 
intervention 
..Hardened as 
determined by 
threat
..Protection 
from elements 


 

Gatehouses 

Gatehouses are to assist the screening of 
vehicles and pedestrians to ensure they have 
proper authorization for access. This can be at 
the first layer of defense (normally) or at any 
restricted perimeter 

• Depending on the threat the gatehouse 
should be hardened, but at the very least 
PPE (personal protective equipment, like 
bullet-resistant vests) should be worn 

• The elements – wind, rain, heat, cold make 
this job difficult enough that the gatehouse 
should provide a refuge with water, heat, 
and air conditioning, including a rest room 

• Proper placement so that the guard can 
interact with drivers without having to cross 
the traffic lane and adequate throughput so 
that queues will not form waiting for access. 
Note that this gatehouse requires the guard 
to leave the gatehouse to check driver 
credentials. 

 

Unit IX-B-41 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-41All Layers of DefenseParking
..Parking can be applicable 
to all layers of defense 


 

Parking 
Parking at the building, at an adjacent building, 
in a nearby parking garage have limited stand-
off distance in the urban environment. 
Hardening considerations come into play for 
each situation, whether it is the building face, 
adding bollards to maintain stand-off, or taking 
access control and column hardening actions in 
an urban parking garage. 




 


 Unit IX-B-42 




BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-42All Layers of Defense
..Develop plan for delivery and 
queuing
..Coordinate with civic 
authorities as necessary
..Place barriers, guardhouse, if 
possible
..Avoid parking too close to 
building even after screeningParking –Delivery / 
Loading Dock 


 

Significant structural damage to the walls and 
ceiling of the loading dock may be 
acceptable; however, the areas adjacent to the 
loading dock should not experience severe 
structural damage or collapse. 

 

The top photo is a street closure that limits 
access to a service road with loading dock. 
The bottom photo is a large moving van 
parked on an urban street, probably waiting 
to get to a loading dock. The weapon yield 
capacity of this van is in the mid-5 figures 
range. 

 

Parking – Loading Docks 

 

Loading docks and service access areas are 
commonly required for a building and are 
typically desired to be kept as invisible as 
possible. 

 

Since larger vehicles can carry larger weapons, 
the issue is to screen the vehicles away from 
the urban area and escort them from the 
screening to the building. 

 

 

Use barriers and gatehouses for access control 
to allow final approach of vehicles to the 
loading dock. 

 

Unit IX-B-43 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-43All Layers of Defense
..Restrict parking and access between buildings 
..Consider one-way circulation in parking lots 
..Well-lit, with security presence, emergency 
communications, and/or CCTV
..Open, observable, no hiding places
..Restrict parking underneath buildings
..Apply progressive collapse hardening to columns 
when parking garage is in buildingParking 


 

Parking 

 

When designing parking, the following should 
be taken into consideration: 

 



Schedule deliveries to avoid queuing. In 
conjunction with local authorities and building 
tenants, consider shifting deliveries to time of 
day when building is not occupied. For 
example, deliveries are done during 1900-0500 
when the building occupancy is from 0600 to 
1800. 

• Maintain stand-off distance from building 

• Restrict parking from the interior of a group 
of buildings and away from any restricted 
area 

• Avoid having parking near, within or 
underneath buildings – Consider hardening 
against progressive collapse if parking 
garage is in the building. 

• Locate parking within view of occupied 




buildings 

• If possible, design the parking lot with one-
way circulation that restricts straight-on 
high-speed approaches to buildings 

• Provide signage to clearly mark separate 
entrances for different parking lots 

• Keep parking areas well lit; use emergency 
communications, and/or CCTV 

 

Unit IX-B-44 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-44All Layers of Defense
..Unless required, do not identify sensitive areas
..Minimize signs identifying critical utilities
..Warnings signs limiting access to control areas should be 
posted at all entrances
..Signpost may be hardened and included as part of the 
perimeter barrier
..The lighting of signage should enhance nighttime safety
..Warning signs should be posted in languages commonly 
spokenSignage 


 

Whatever the strategy for signage, it is 
important that signage be developed in 
concert with other building design elements, 
be included in the building design palette, 
and designed and placed in coordination with 
all other materials. To reduce the potential of 
clutter, signage should be integrated with 
other streetscape elements and architectural 
elements. Access, maintenance, and 
adaptability should be considered in selection 
of signage systems. Periodically changes are 
required to signage content. A 
comprehensive signage plan should be 
tailored to the mission of the facility 
accompanying the FEMA 426 guidelines. 

 

Signage 

 

Building owners should determine how visible 
the project should be and corresponding 
implications for site signage. For some 
projects, a degree of anonymity may be part of 
the security strategy. 

 

• Unless required, signs should not identify 
sensitive areas. 

• Minimize signs identifying critical utility 
complexes, such as power plants and water 
treatment plants. 

• Warning signs should be posted at all 
entrances to limited, controlled, and 
exclusion areas. 

• The wording on the signs should denote 
warning of a restricted area. 

• Signs should be posted at intervals of no 
more than 100 feet or at entrance points 
only 

• Signage may be mounted on other 
elements, such as walls to reduce the 
number of posts along the street or 
perimeter. 

• Signposts may be hardened and included as 
part of the perimeter barrier. 

• The lighting of signage may also enhance 
nighttime safety to those who come to the 
site during evening or early morning hours. 

 



• Warning signs must use languages 
commonly spoken. 


 

Unit IX-B-45 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-45Second Layer of DefenseContinuous lighting
..Glare projection
..Controlled lighting (avoid glare)
..Compatible with closed circuit 
television (CCTV)
Emergency lightingSecurity Lighting 


 

Security Lighting 


 

Security lighting has different purposes – to 
blind, to allow vehicle inspection, to identify 
credentials, to support CCTV capabilities, etc. 
Thus, security lighting must be coordinated for 
all purposes. 

 

Unit IX-B-46 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-46First Layer of DefenseSensors / CCTV
..When stand-off and hardening are not 
possible, security must rely upon sensors and 
CCTV
..Look for suspicious vehicles and people, 
especially those that seem to be profiling your 
building
..Monitor access to utilities serving the building 
..Currently high tech monitoring systems need 
to be selected and placed by experts 


 

Sensors / CCTV 

 

Manned and electronic security increases 
deterrence and detection with attendant 
reduction in risk. It is the fastest technology to 
add and upgrade when selected, installed, and 
used properly. 



Security lighting should be provided for overall 
site and building illumination to allow security 
personnel to maintain visual assessment during 
darkness. Lighting is desirable around areas 
such as entrances, loading docks, parking, etc. 
At entry points, a recommended minimum 
surface lighting average of 4 horizontal foot 
candles will help ensure adequate lighting. 


 

It should cover vehicle, pedestrian, and utility 
entrances as all of these are potential 
approaches for terrorist tactics. 

 

This will be covered in more detail under 
Electronic Security Systems later. 

 




 

Unit IX-B-47 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-47Second Layer of DefenseSite Utilities
..Concealed versus exposed
..Underground versus overhead
..Protect/secure versus accessible
..Surveillance if possible 


 

Site Utilities 

 

• Top Right – Open Gate allowing access to 
Critical Cooling Unit for Computer Center 

• Lower Right – Exposed air conditioning 
systems 

• Middle – antenna system for Emergency 
Operations Center accessible from the 
ground 

• Lower Left – Exposed generator and 
natural gas regulators 

 

Concealed or underground utilities are easier to 
protect than exposed or aboveground 
constructions. Fortunately, in the urban 
environment utilities are primarily 
underground. 



 

Access to utilities should be protected or 
secure, allowing only authorized personnel 
access to perform maintenance and repair. 

 

If physical security measures cannot limit 
access, then add sensors/CCTV to provide 
added protection. 

 

The location and accessibility of site utilities 
directly impacts the vulnerability of systems to 
disruption and failure. 

 

Incoming utility systems should have two entry 
points to the building for redundancy as 
required by criticality. 

 

Looped versus radial distribution of utilities to 
the building allows for higher system reliability 
and faster repair by avoiding utility loss by a 
single incident. 

 

When selecting locations for utilities, be aware 
of possible conflicts and spacing requirements 
both horizontally and vertically. In addition 
there can be demand for underground zones for 




planting beds and foundations for hardened 
street furniture. 

Unit IX-B-48 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-48The following considerations can impact the site and 
layout design:
•Overall size and number of structures placed on site•Massing and placement of structures•Access/egress points, such as visitor entries, staff 
entries, and loading docksCampus/University 


 

Campus / University 

 

A campus or university style complex in an 
urban environment takes on many of the 
concerns of the suburban site. 


• Placement of the structures on the site – how 
many, how large, what level of risk, and 
how integrated for their daily functions 

• Access to the site for pedestrians and 
vehicles, and then access to the buildings, 
with circulation patterns from roadways to 
sidewalks to buildings 

Unit IX-B-49 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-49First Layer of Defense (Uncontrolled)
..Personnel Access Control
..Vehicle Access Control & Inspection
..Vehicle Stand-offHigh Security BuildingThird, Second, and First Layers of Defense 
(Controlled)
..Personnel Access Control
..Vehicle Access Control
..HardeningSecond Layer of Defense (Controlled)
..Personnel Access Control
..Vehicle Access Control
..Vehicle Stand-offCampus/UniversityConfirm Reference? 


 

 

The same concepts for layers of defense in the 
urban environment have expanded options in 
the campus / university environment, just like 
the suburban situation. 

 

Access control at the first layer to maximize 
stand-off for larger threats is the goal. 

 

Add access control and stand-off barriers at 
each additional layer of defense to provide 
stand-off that results in minimal hardening of 
the building being required. 



 

Campus / University 


 

Unit IX-B-50 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-50Access Points
..Reject vehicles 
beforefinal 
barrier
..Inspection area 
blast effects
..Pressure
..Fragments
..Reaction time 
to activate 
barriersFEMA 426, Figure 2-15: Combined Multi-User Gate, p. 2-37Campus/University 


 

Location selection for vehicular access and 
entry control for a building starts with an 
evaluation of the anticipated demand for 
access to the controlled site. An analysis of 
traffic origin and destination, and an analysis 
of the capability of the surrounding 
connecting road network, including its 
capacity to handle additional traffic, should 
then be performed. Expansion capacity 
should also be considered. The analysis 
should be coordinated with the state and local 
departments of transportation. 

 

Two security measures that are overlooked 
are: First, allowing the vehicle to enter the 
site so that it can turn around and leave. A 
proper entry control point would never allow 
the vehicle to enter the site if it were not 
authorized. Second, there are multiple 
reaction times that must be added – guard 
recognition that vehicle is avoiding security, 
guard reaction to activate final barriers, and 
activation time from closed to open for the 
final barriers. The time delay from 
recognition to deployment must be less than 
the speed of the vehicle between the 
recognition point and the final barrier. 

 

Campus / University -- Access Points 


 

It is advisable to design circulation to separate 
different types of traffic and provide separate 
routes for staff, for visitors, and for deliveries. 
With the separation of vehicle types, security 
can more easily address differing needs for 
screening, observation, and potential threat 
mitigation. 

 

Roadway network design that uses straight-line 
approaches to buildings may give approaching 
vehicles the opportunity to gather the necessary 
speed to ram protective barriers and crash into 
buildings. Possible solution: design 
approaches to be parallel to the façade, with 
berms, high curbs, trees, and other measures 
used to prevent vehicles from departing the 
roadway. 

 

The existing terrain can have a significant 
impact on the suitability of a potential entry 
control point site. Flat terrain with no thick 
vegetation is generally preferred. A gentle rise 
in elevation up to the entry control guard 
building allows for a clear view of arriving 
vehicles. Consider how existing natural 
features such as bodies of water or dense tree 
stands may enhance perimeter security and 
vehicle containment, without restricting 
observation capability or allowing easier 
surveillance of the building by potential threat 
elements. Entry control spatial requirements 
vary, depending on the type, the traffic 
demand, and the necessary security measures. 

 



Gatehouses, lobbies, and guard posts should be 
provided with clear views of approaching 
traffic -- pedestrian and vehicular. Screening 
areas and entries may be located to offer more 
privacy and protection. 



 

Unit IX-B-51 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-51FEMA 426, Figure 2-2: Clustered versus Dispersed Site Layouts, p. 2-8Campus/University 


 

Campus / University – Clustered versus 
Dispersed Facilities 

 

Depending on the site characteristics, the 
occupancy requirements, and other factors, 
buildings may be clustered tightly in one area, 
or dispersed across the site. Both patterns have 
compelling strengths and weaknesses. 

 

Concentrating people, property, and operations 
in one place creates a target-rich environment, 
and the mere proximity of any one building to 
any other may increase the risk of collateral 
impacts. Additionally, the potential exists for 
the establishment of more single-point 
vulnerabilities in a clustered design than would 
exist in a more dispersed pattern. However, 
grouping high risk activities, concentrations of 
personnel, and critical functions into a cluster 
can help maximize stand-off from the 
perimeter and create a “defensible space.” 

Unit IX-B-52 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-52•Significant impact on making 
building visible or hidden to 
aggressors•Enhance surveillance 
opportunities of approaches 
and parking•Minimize views into building•Reduce blast effectsOrientationFEMA 426, Figure 2-3: Clustering to Enhance Surveillance Opportunities 
While Minimizing Views into Buildings, p. 2-8Campus/University 


 

Campus / University -- Orientation 

 

Orientation is the building’s spatial relationship 
to the site, its orientation relative to the sun, 
and its vertical or horizontal aspect relative to 
the ground. 

• How many times have you seen aluminum 
foil on windows because the afternoon 
summer sun overcomes the air-conditioning 
capacity along that side of a building? 

 
The physical positioning of a building relative 
to its surroundings may seem subtle, but can be 
a greater determinant of security. 
Good site design, orientation, and building 
placement should allow building occupants to 
look out of the facility while minimizing views 
into the building. 


The proximity of a vulnerable façade to a 
parking area, street, adjacent site, or other area 



 

 



that is accessible to vehicles and/or difficult to 
observe can greatly contribute to its 
vulnerability. 

 

Unit IX-B-53 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-53Blocking Sight LinesSiting and View RelationshipsCampus/UniversityFEMA 426, Figure 2-5: Blocking of Site Lines, p. 2-20 


 

Campus / University -- Siting and View 
Relationships 

 

Landscape and urban design inherently define 
the “line of sight” in a space. Operational 
security is not a traditional element of master 
planning, but managing the threat of hostile 
surveillance is a significant consideration in 
protecting people, property, and operations. 
With careful selection, placement, and 
maintenance, landscape elements can provide 
visual screening that protects sensitive 
operations, gathering areas, and other activities 
from surveillance without creating concealment 
for covert activity. 

 

These techniques seek to deny aggressors a 
“line of sight” to a potential target, either from 
on or off site. This increases the protection of 
sensitive information and inhibits operation of 
stand-off weapons. In addition to the use of 
various screening options, anti-surveillance 
measures (e.g., building orientation, 
landscaping, screening, and landforms) can 
also be used to block sight lines. 

 

The design should maximize opportunities for 
internal surveillance of site perimeters and 
screening of internal areas from external 
observation. Topography, relative elevation, 
walls, and fences are design elements that can 
open and close views. Vegetation can open, 
close, or block views, not only for security 
purposes but also to provide beauty and to 
support wayfinding. As a rule of thumb, 
vegetation should be very high or very low, to 
keep views open. Vegetation at the base of 
buildings and structures should be designed 
and maintained to prevent explosives from 
being hidden from view – easily see a briefcase 




or a backpack. 

 

Landforms can have a direct bearing on the 
security of a facility. They can be either 
beneficial (e.g., an elevated site that may 
enhance the surveillance of the surrounding 
area), or detrimental to anti-surveillance. 
Generally speaking: 
• For security purposes, buildings should not 
be sited immediately adjacent to higher 
surrounding terrain or buildings if at all 
possible. 


 

Unit IX-B-54 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-54Parking
..Restrict parking from 
the interior of a group 
of buildings and away 
from restricted area
..Locate parking within 
view of occupied 
buildings
..If possible, design the 
parking lot with one-
way circulation 
Campus/University 


 

Campus / University -- Parking 

 

Building placement on the site must balance 
stand-off distances; relationship to adjacent 
streets and buildings; siting of utilities, parking 
areas, and driveways; as well as access to 
parking and loading areas. 



 

 

There are three primary types of parking 
facilities, all of which present security trade-
offs. 

• Surface lots can be designed to keep 
vehicles away from buildings, but they 
consume large amounts of land and, if 
constructed of impervious materials, can 
contribute greatly to stormwater runoff 
volume. They can also be hazardous for 
pedestrians if dedicated pedestrian pathways 
are not provided. 

• In contrast, non-street parking is often 
convenient for users and a source of revenue 
for local governments, but this type of 
parking may provide little or no setback. 

• Finally, garage structures provide revenue 
and can be convenient for users, but they 
may require structural measures to ensure 
blast resistance as well as crime prevention 
measures to prevent street crime. 

Although the cost of land suggests that the 
construction of a garage below a building 


(either underground or aboveground) may be 
the most economically viable approach for 
many developments, they can be highly 
vulnerable to vehicle-borne weapons, 
endangering the building above. If garages 
must be used, human security procedures (e.g., 
vehicle searches) and electronic systems (e.g., 
closed circuit television) may be necessary. 

 

Parking structures open to the public should be 
sited and evaluated with concern for stand-off 
from other buildings, screening from critical 
operations and sensitive areas that might be 
observed from within the parking structure, and 
as a point of access or staging for use of 
weapons or explosives. Progressive collapse 
can become a concern in parking structures. 

 

If stand-off distance is needed between a 
building and a First Layer controlled perimeter, 
placing parking in this area is an excellent use 
of the available space, as shown in this graphic. 

 

Unit IX-B-55 

 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-55Minimize exterior 
signage or other 
indications of asset 
locationsLocate trash bins 
as far from facility 
as possible 
Eliminate potential hiding places near 
facility, provide an unobstructed view 
around facilityEliminate lines of 
approach perpendicular 
to the buildingMinimize 
vehicle 
access 
pointsLocate facility 
away from 
natural or man-
made vantage 
pointsEliminate parking 
beneath facilitiesLocate parking to obtain 
stand-off from facilityIlluminate building exteriors or 
sites where exposed assets are 
locatedSecure access 
to power/heat 
plants, gas 
mains, water 
supplies, and 
electrical 
serviceBest PracticesFrom US Air Force, Installation Force Protection Guide, 1997 


 

Page 2-52 of FEMA 426 provides a 
comprehensive list of security/protection 
measures that can be taken – increasing in 
protection, cost, and level of effort – that 
complements this graphic on Site Mitigation 
Measures. 

Best Practices 

 

To summarize: 

 


• A broad spectrum of mitigation actions can 
be taken – with a wide range of cost, 
protection provided, and level of effort 
required by the asset owner. 

• The nominal ranking of mitigation measures 
on Page 2-52 provides a framework for the 
identification of short-term and long-term 
measures that can be taken. 

• This is a great summary slide and can be 
found in FEMA 426 and the Air Force 
Installation Force Protection Guide on your 
Student Reference CD. 

 



Unit IX-B-56 


 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITYUnit IX-B-57Unit IX Case Study ActivitySite and Layout Design GuidanceBackgroundFEMA 426, Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist: 
screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability 
assessmentRequirements: Vulnerability Rating ApproachAssign sections of the checklist to qualified group membersRefer to Case Study and answer worksheet questionsReview results to identify site and layout vulnerabilities and 
possible mitigation measures 


 

Refer participants to FEMA 426, the Unit IX 
Case Study activity in the Student Manual. 

 

Members of the instructor staff should be 
available to answer questions and assist 
groups as needed. 

 

There are 42 questions to answer by the team 
and then confer. With an average of 7 team 
members this means each member answers 
about 6 questions or about 5 minutes per 
question during their 30 minutes of research. 

 

The Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for preliminary design or 
existing building vulnerabilityassessment. The 
checklist includes questions that determine if 
critical systems will continue to function to 
enhanc e deterrence, detection, denial, and 
damage limitation, and if emergency systems 
will function during a threat or hazard 
situation. 

Activity Requirements 

 

• Continue working in small groups. 

• Assign sections of the checklist to the 
group member who is most knowledgeable 
and qualified to perform an assessment of 
the assigned area. 

• Refer to the Case Study to determine 
answers to the worksheet questions. 

• Then review results to identify 
vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures. 

 

Take 45 minutes to complete this activity 
broken down as 30 minutes of research and 15 
minutes of group interaction to compare 
information and discuss mitigation measures. 
Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group, 
taking about 15 minutes to ensure no group is 
drastically off track. 

 

 

Transition 

 

Unit X will cover Building Design Guidance. 

 

 



Student Activity 

 


 

UNIT IX-B -- CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 

(Urban Version) 

 

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 (Table 1-22, pages 1-46 to 
1-93) can be used as a screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment of the site 
where the building is located and the layout of the building on that site. It can also be used for 
assessment of an existing building and its site. The checklist includes questions that determine if 
critical and emergency systems will continue to function to enhance deterrence, detection, denial, 
and damage limitation during and after a threat or hazard situation. 

 

Requirements 

 

Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most knowledgeable and qualified 
to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the Appendix B Case Study to determine 
answers to the questions. Then review results as a team to identify vulnerabilities and possible 
mitigation measures. 

 

OPTIONAL for On-Site Courses depending upon venue and course attendees: [This 
indented portion is not included in the standard student manual SM Unit IX-B and 
should be included if this venue occurs] 

 

(1) Combine the student activity time for Unit IX, Site and Layout Design Guidance 
with Unit X, Building Design Guidance, after Unit X using the time not used for 
Course Exam and Course Exam Review. 

 

(2) In the student activity time slot after Unit IX (at the end of Day 2) have a Plenary 
Group/Roundtable/Interactive Discussion with students providing experiences, legal 
restrictions, lessons learned, success stories, design impediments, common 
vulnerabilities, and other items of interest applicable to the course that is happening in 
their communities. The instructor(s) will capture the main points on an easel 
pad/white board for review at the end of the session and for recording to incorporate 
into the Urban Case Study as appropriate. 

 

1. Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
(FEMA 426, Table 1-22, pages 1-46 to 1-93), which address site and layout. 

 

Note: There are 42 questions below (18 in Section 1, 4 in Section 2, and 20 in 
Section 5), so it is recommended that the team split up the questions among 
themselves taking 5-7 questions each and review the Appendix B Case Study for 
answers. Apportion the available time for gathering the answers and then provide 
each other the answers while performing the two actions below. 

 

2. Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the vulnerability ratings 
determined in the Unit IV Case Study Activity and, based on this more detailed analysis, 




decide if any vulnerability rating needs adjustment. Adjust the Risk Matrix poster 
accordingly for vulnerability rating and risk rating. 

 

3. Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from the site and 
layout perspective. 

 

4. Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs (as adjusted in step 2 above) 
based on the recommended mitigation measures. 

 

 

Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

1 

Site 

1.1 

What major structures 
surround the facility 
(site or building(s))? 

What critical 
infrastructure, 
government, military, or 
recreation facilities are 
in the local area that 
impact transportation, 
utilities, and collateral 
damage (attack at this 
facility impacting the 
other major structures or 
attack on the major 
structures impacting this 
facility)? 

 

Critical infrastructure to 
consider includes: 

Telecommunications 
infrastructure 

Facilities for broadcast TV, cable 
TV; cellular networks; newspaper 
offices, production, and 
distribution; radio stations; 
satellite base stations; telephone 
trunking and switching stations, 
including critical cable routes and 
major rights-of-way 

Electric power systems 

Power plants, especially nuclear 
facilities; transmission and 
distribution system components; 
fuel distribution, delivery, and 
storage 

Gas and oil facilities 

Hazardous material facilities, 
oil/gas pipelines, and storage 
facilities 

Financial institutions (banks, 
credit unions) and the business 
district; note schedule 
business/financial district may 
follow; armored car services 

Transportation networks 

Airports: carriers, flight paths, 
and airport layout; location of air 
traffic control towers, runways, 
passenger terminals, and parking 
areas 

Bus Stations 

Pipelines: oil; gas 

Trains/Subways: rails and lines, 
railheads/rail yards, interchanges, 

The HazardCorp Building is 
located in the downtown 
business district of a major 
urban city. There are several 
commercial iconic properties, 
several government offices, and 
various high-density attractions 
within a 5-mile radius of the 
building. In the immediate 
vicinity of HazardCorp Building 
are two residential 
condominiums, four office 
buildings, and a hotel. There 
are additional office buildings, 
hotels, and parking structures 
within easy walking distance. 

 

As with many major cities, there 
is significant water access to 
various locations within 5-mile 
radius of the building and the 
river is within 0.05 miles of the 
building. Because of the water, 
ground access is constrained by 
bridges, tunnels, and ferries. 

 

While two major airports are 
over 5 miles from the building, 
what is not shown are 8 
heliports and two skyports 
inside the 5-mile radius. A 
metropolitan subway also 
serves the business district and 
the nearest station is two blocks 
from the building. 

 



 

Banking and finance 
institutions 

There is significant shipping 
serving the various ports 
carrying all types of materials 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

tunnels, and cargo/passenger 
terminals; note hazardous 
material transported 

Traffic: interstate 
highways/roads/tunnels/ bridges 
carrying large volumes; points of 
congestion; note time of day and 
day of week 

Trucking: hazardous materials 
cargo loading/unloading 
facilities; truck terminals, weigh 
stations, and rest areas 

Waterways: dams; levees; berths 
and ports for cruise ships, ferries, 
roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and 
container ships; international 
(foreign) flagged vessels (and 
cargo) 

Water supply systems 

Pipelines and process/treatment 
facilities, dams for water 
collection; wastewater treatment 

Government services 

Federal/state/local government 
offices – post offices, law 
enforcement stations, fire/rescue, 
town/city hall, local 
mayor’s/governor’s residences, 
judicial offices and courts, 
military installations (include 
type-active, Reserves, National 
Guard) 

Emergency services 

Backup facilities, 
communications centers, 
Emergency Operations Centers 
(EOCs), fire/Emergency Medical 
Service (EMS) facilities, 
Emergency Medical Centers 
(EMCs), law enforcement 
facilities 

 

The following are not critical 
infrastructure, but have 
collateral damage potential to 
consider: 

Agricultural facilities: chemical 
distribution, storage, and 
application sites; crop spraying 
services; farms and ranches; food 
processing, storage, and 
distribution facilities 

 

There are extensive tank farms 
east and west of HazardCorp 
Building on the other side of the 
river in the respective 
directions. 

 

There is also a high 
concentration of police in the 
area due to multiple 
jurisdictions having authority. 

 

A fire station is within 1/4 mile 
of the building and seven 
hospitals are within 3 miles. 

 



for use in Hazard City and 
transshipment to other 
locations. In conjunction with 
the ports and the transshipment 
of goods, there is extensive 
railroad trackage, some as 
close as within 1-1/2 miles of 
the building. The area around 
Hazard City is the No. 4 
intermodal port in the Western 
Hemisphere. Intermodal means 
the ability to move freight from 
train to truck and back again. 
An intermodal port ties together 
ship, rail, and truck freight 
transfers. 

 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

Commercial/manufacturing/ind-ustrial facilities: apartment 
buildings; business/corporate 
centers; chemical plants 
(especially those with Section 
302 Extremely Hazardous 
Substances); factories; fuel 
production, distribution, and 
storage facilities; hotels and 
convention centers; industrial 
plants; raw material production, 
distribution, and storage facilities; 
research facilities and 
laboratories; shipping, 
warehousing, transfer, and 
logistical centers 

Events and attractions: festivals 
and celebrations; open-air 
markets; parades; rallies, 
demonstrations, and marches; 
religious services; scenic tours; 
theme parks 

Health care system 
components: family planning 
clinics; health department offices; 
hospitals; radiological material 
and medical waste transportation, 
storage, and disposal; research 
facilities and laboratories, walk-in 
clinics 

Political or symbolically 
significant sites: embassies, 
consulates, landmarks, 
monuments, political party and 
special interest groups offices, 
religious sites 

Public/private institutions: 
academic institutions, cultural 
centers, libraries, museums, 
research facilities and 
laboratories, schools 

Recreation facilities: 
auditoriums, casinos, concert 
halls and pavilions, parks, 
restaurants and clubs (frequented 
by potential target populations), 
sports arenas, stadiums, theaters, 
malls, and special interest group 
facilities; note congestion dates 
and times for shopping centers 

 

References: FEMA 386-7, FEMA 



 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

SLG 101, DOJ NCJ181200 

 

1.2 

Does the terrain place 
the building in a 
depression or low area? 

 

Depressions or low areas can trap 
heavy vapors, inhibit natural 
decontamination by prevailing 
winds, and reduce the 
effectiveness of in-place 
sheltering. 

 

Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 

 

The building is not in a 
depression or low area, but on 
flat terrain in an urban canyon 
where wind flow is constrained 
by the numerous high-rise 
buildings. Thus, the urban 
landscape can have the same 
effect as a depression or low 
area. 

 

1.3 

In dense, urban areas, 
does curb lane parking 
place uncontrolled 
parked vehicles 
unacceptably close to a 
building in public 
rights-of-way? 

 

Where distance from the building 
to the nearest curb provides 
insufficient setback, restrict 
parking in the curb lane. For 
typical city streets, this may 
require negotiating to close the 
curb lane. Setback is common 
terminology for the distance 
between a building and its 
associated roadway or parking. It 
is analogous to stand-off between 
a vehicle bomb and the building. 
The benefit per foot of increased 
stand-off between a potential 
vehicle bomb and a building is 
very high when close to a 
building and decreases rapidly as 
the distance increases. Note that 
the July 1, 1994, Americans with 
Disabilities Act Standards for 
Accessible Design states that 
required handicapped parking 
shall be located on the shortest 
accessible route of travel from 
adjacent parking to an accessible 
entrance. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

Yes, there is limited 
uncontrolled curb lane parking 
around the building. 

 

The HazardCorp Building is 
bounded by city streets with 
high traffic volumes. 

 

On the east side of the plaza is a 
drop off zone where no parking 
is allowed and building stand-
off is 80 feet. On the north and 
west sides of the building for 
the whole building block, 
parking is restricted to 
government vehicles only with 
designated parking spaces. 
Double parking next to the 
government vehicles provides 
15 feet of stand-off on the north 
side and 10 feet of stand-off on 
the west. Commercial parking 
is allowed on the south side in 
support of the loading dock and 
stand-off is 10 feet. 

 

1.4 

Is a perimeter fence or 
other types of barrier 
controls in place? 

 

The intent is to channel 
pedestrian traffic onto a site with 
multiple buildings through known 
access control points. For a single 
building, the intent is to have a 
single visitor entrance. 

 

 

There is no fence or other 
barrier controls for pedestrians 
around the building. There are 
nine entrances into the building 
(three main door entrances, four 
entrances to retail spaces, the 
loading dock, and two entrances 
into underground parking) 
Under the building there are 
stairs and elevators with access 
controls that allow entrance into 
the building. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

 

1.5 

What are the site access 
points to the site or 
building? 

 

The goal is to have at least two 
access points – one for passenger 
vehicles and one for delivery 
trucks due to the different 
procedures needed for each. 
Having two access points also 
helps if one of the access points 
becomes unusable, then traffic 
can be routed through the other 
access point. 

 

Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 

 

 

Passenger vehicles have two 
entrances to the underground 
parking – one on the west side 
and one on the south. This is a 
good arrangement in case a 
problem occurs at one of the 
entrances. 

 

1.7 

Is there vehicle and 
pedestrian access 
control at the perimeter 
of the site? 

 

Vehicle and pedestrian access 
control and inspection should 
occur as far from facilities as 
possible (preferably at the site 
perimeter) with the ability to 
regulate the flow of people and 
vehicles one at a time. 

 

 

Reference: FEMA 386-7 

 

Entrances to the building that 
do not go past the current 
security desk have access 
control. Designated elevators, 
including one service elevator, 
have card readers and PIN 
(Personal Identification 
Number) keypads for 
movement to and from access 
controlled floors. To get the 
elevator to move to a specific 
floor you have to press the floor 
key, read your card, and enter 
your PIN. In addition, there is a 
Duress PIN that alerts building 
and floor security that an 
authorized person is moving to 
a controlled floor with a 
security problem. 

 

Two of the designated building 
elevators with access controls 
serve the underground parking 
levels. The elevators will not 
move upward with someone in 
the car unless proper access is 
accepted. The elevators reset to 
the lobby automatically when 
there is no additional weight 
sensed in the elevator car. 

 

The elevators serving the 
underground parking that is not 
under the building have no 
access control equipment 
installed. 

 

The underground parking 



Deliveries are limited to the 
loading dock which is under the 
control of building security. 

Control on-site parking with 
identification checks, security 
personnel, and access control 
systems. 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

entrances and exits have 
automated controls with 
lightweight drop arms to issue 
tickets upon entrance and to 
take payment upon exit. There 
are no other access controls. 

 

1.8 

Is there space for 
inspection at the curb 
line or outside the 
protected perimeter? 

 

What is the minimum 
distance from the 
inspection location to 
the building? 

 

Design features for the vehicular 
inspection point include: vehicle 
arrest devices that prevent 
vehicles from leaving the 
vehicular inspection area and 
prevent tailgating. 

 

If screening space cannot be 
provided, consider other design 
features such as: hardening and 
alternative location for vehicle 
search/ inspection. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

 

The street on the west side 
could have a direction change – 
to the north, to allow more 
space to inspect tenant vehicles 
that want to park underneath the 
building. This is not ideal 
because of limited stand-off (10 
feet). 

 

Vehicles approaching the 
loading dock can be inspected 
on the east end of the south-side 
street in the curb lane. This 
would provide more stand-off 
(60 feet), but may not be 
sufficient based upon the 
weapon yield that can be carried 
in a delivery truck. 

 

One approach would be to use 
the triangular landscaped street 
traffic control space northwest 
of the building as an inspection 
point, with the concurrence of 
neighbors and local authorities. 
Stand-off would be 220 feet 
from the HazardCorp Building, 
but only 60 feet from Office 
Building G. 

 

1.10 

 

Are these devices at the 
property boundary or at 
the building? 

 

Passive barriers include bollards, 
walls, hardened fences (steel 
cable interlaced), trenches, 
ponds/basins, concrete planters, 
street furniture, plantings, trees, 
sculptures, and fountains. Active 
barriers include pop-up bollards, 
swing arm gates, and rotating 
plates and drums, etc. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

There are no vehicle anti-ram 
devices for the site or the 
building. 

 



There is no ideal space for 
inspection of vehicles coming 
to this building. 

What are the existing 
types of vehicle anti-ram 
devices for the site or 
building? 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

1.13 

Does site circulation 
prevent high-speed 
approaches by vehicles? 

 

The intent is to use site 
circulation to minimize vehicle 
speeds and eliminate direct 
approaches to structures. 

 

 

The HazardCorp Building has 
streets on each side. The west 
side has the slowest approach 
speed as the street is so close to 
the building and a sharp turn to 
strike the building will require 
slowing down. The north, east, 
and south roads allow higher 
approach speeds. The north and 
south streets allow a vehicle at 
high speed to strike the building 
at a shallow angle with little 
speed reduction. The plaza on 
the east side of the building 
allows high-speed vehicles on 
the north, east, and south streets 
to jump the curb and strike the 
plaza building entrance at high 
speed. 

 

1.14 

Are there offsetting 
vehicle entrances from 
the direction of a 
vehicle’s approach to 
force a reduction of 
speed? 

 

Single or double 90-degree turns 
effectively reduce vehicle 
approach speed. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

There are no offsetting vehicle 
entrances of note. The north 
pedestrian entrance, the west 
vehicle entrance, the loading 
dock, the south pedestrian 
entrance, and the south vehicle 
entrance all require 90 degree 
turns in order to enter the 
structure. 

 

Designated parking already 
identified provides some 
additional protection, especially 
on the north and west sides. 
Commercial vehicles waiting 
for off-load on the south side 
provides some protection 
against high-speed vehicles. 

 

1.15 

 

Adjacent public parking should 
be directed to more distant or 
better-protected areas, segregated 
from employee parking and away 
from the building. Some 
publications use the term setback 
in lieu of the term stand-off. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

Adjacent public parking is that 
parking associated with the next 
building or site that is not under 
the control of the owners of the 
building being assessed. 

 

The stand-off distance varies 
depending upon the side of the 
building being considered, but 
varies from 10 feet to 80 feet 
closer to the building. The 
street width adds stand-off (30 
to 60 feet) to the adjacent 
parking on the other side of the 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

Is there a minimum 
setback distance 
between the building 
and parked vehicles? 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

streets. 

 

Does adjacent surface 
parking on site maintain 
a minimum stand-off 
distance? 

 

The specific stand-off distance 
needed is based upon the design 
basis threat bomb size and the 
building construction. For initial 
screening, consider using 25 
meters (82 feet) as a minimum 
with more distance needed for 
unreinforced masonry or wooden 
walls. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

With parking only providing 
stand-off of 10 to 80 feet, the 
design basis threat must be 
evaluated at these distances to 
determine hardening required to 
limit damage. 

 

Do standalone, 
aboveground parking 
garages provide 
adequate visibility 
across as well as into 
and out of the parking 
garage? 

 

Pedestrian paths should be 
planned to concentrate activity to 
the extent possible. 

 

Limiting vehicular entry/exits to a 
minimum number of locations is 
beneficial. 

 

Stair tower and elevator lobby 
design shall be as open as code 
permits. Stair and/or elevator 
waiting areas should be as open 
to the exterior and/or the parking 
areas as possible and well lighted. 
Impact-resistant, laminated glass 
for stair towers and elevators is a 
way to provide visual openness. 

 

Potential hiding places below 
stairs should be closed off; nooks 
and crannies should be avoided, 
and dead-end parking areas 
should be eliminated. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

There are no aboveground 
parking garages. However, 
many of the concerns apply to 
the underground parking, 
especially observability of stair 
towers and elevator lobbies 
serving the parking levels. 

 

1.18 

Are garage or service 
area entrances for 
employee-permitted 
vehicles protected by 
suitable anti-ram 
devices? 

 

Coordinate this 
protection with other 
anti-ram devices, such 

Control internal building parking, 
underground parking garages, and 
access to service areas and 
loading docks in this manner with 
proper access control, or 
eliminate the parking altogether. 

The anti-ram device must be 
capable of arresting a vehicle of 
the designated threat size at the 
speed attainable at the location. 

 

There are no anti-ram devices 
installed at underground 
parking entrances. 

 

The Administration Office on 
the first floor is pre-notified of 
all deliveries to the Loading 
Dock. During allowed delivery 
hours a Building Management 
representative monitors the 
Loading Dock and commercial 
parking area. 

 



1.16 

1.17 

 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

as on the perimeter or 
property boundary to 
avoid duplication of 
arresting capability. 

 

 

All entries, especially the 
Loading Dock, are covered by 
color CCTV systems with DVR 
(Digital Video Recording). 

 

1.19 

Do site landscaping and 
street furniture provide 
hiding places? 

 

Minimize concealment 
opportunities by keeping 
landscape plantings (hedges, 
shrubbery, and large plants with 
heavy ground cover) and street 
furniture (bus shelters, benches, 
trash receptacles, mailboxes, 
newspaper vending machines) 
away from the building to permit 
observation of intruders and 
prevent hiding of packages. 

 

If mail or express boxes are used, 
the size of the openings should be 
restricted to prohibit the insertion 
of packages. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

No street furniture identified 
around the building or on the 
plaza. 

1.20 

Is the site lighting 
adequate from a security 
perspective in roadway 
access and parking 
areas? 

 

Security protection can be 
successfully addressed through 
adequate lighting. The type and 
design of lighting, including 
illumination levels, is critical. 
Illuminating Engineering Society 
of North America (IESNA) 
guidelines can be used. The site 
lighting should be coordinated 
with the CCTV system. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

Security lighting is coordinated 
with CCTV requirements to 
ensure good quality pictures, 
both on the monitors and on 
recordings. This lighting is 
where CCTV cameras are 
installed at entrances of the 
building and parking. 

1.21 

Are line-of-sight 
perspectives from 
outside the secured 
boundary to the building 
and on the property 
along pedestrian and 
vehicle routes integrated 
with landscaping and 
green space? 

 

The goal is to prevent the 
observation of critical assets by 
persons outside the secure 
boundary of the site. For 
individual buildings in an urban 
environment, this could mean 
appropriate window treatments or 
no windows for portions of the 
building. 

 

Once on the site, the concern is to 
ensure observation by a general 
workforce aware of any 
pedestrians and vehicles outside 
normal circulation routes or 

There is ample opportunity for 
observation of critical assets 
and functions observable 
though perimeter windows in 
the urban environment around 
the HazardCorp Building. The 
upper floors are at less risk due 
to the nearby buildings being 
about half as tall as the 
HazardCorp Building. 

 



 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

attempting to approach the 
building unobserved. 

 

 

1.23 

Are all existing fire 
hydrants on the site 
accessible? 

 

Just as vehicle access points to 
the site must be able to transit 
emergency vehicles, so too must 
the emergency vehicles have 
access to the buildings and, in the 
case of fire trucks, the fire 
hydrants. Thus, security 
considerations must 
accommodate emergency 
response requirements. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

The building is ringed by 20- to 
24-inch water mains with 
hydrants on all sides of the 
building. There is nothing 
indicated that currently blocks 
access to the hydrants. 
However, future barrier 
considerations should take into 
account hydrant access. 

 

2 

Architectural 

2.1 

Does the site and 
architectural design 
incorporate strategies 
from a Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental 
Design (CPTED) 
perspective? 

 

The focus of CPTED is on 
creating defensible space by 
employing: 

 - Design streets, sidewalks, and 
building entrances to clearly 
indicate public routes and direct 
people away from 
private/restricted areas 

 - Discourage access to private 
areas with structural elements and 
limit access (no cut-through 
streets) 

 - Loading zones should be 
separate from public parking 

2. Natural surveillance: 

 - Design that maximizes 
visibility of people, parking areas, 
and building entrances: doors and 
windows that look out on to 
streets and parking areas 

 - Shrubbery under 2 feet in 
height for visibility 

 - Lower branches of existing 
trees kept at least 10 feet off the 
ground 

 - Pedestrian-friendly sidewalks 
and streets to control pedestrian 
and vehicle circulation 

 - Adequate nighttime lighting, 
especially at exterior doorways 

3. Territorial reinforcement: 

Working 



Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 

 

1. Natural access controls: 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

 - Design that defines property 
lines 

 - “Traffic-calming” devices for 
vehicle speed control 

4. Target hardening: 

 - Prohibit entry or access: 
window locks, dead bolts for 
doors, interior door hinges 

 - Access control (building and 
employee/visitor parking) and 
intrusion detection systems 

5. Closed circuit television 
cameras: 

 - Prevent crime and influence 
positive behavior, while 
enhancing the intended uses of 
space. In other words, design that 
eliminates or reduces criminal 
behavior and at the same time 
encourages people to "keep an 
eye out" for each other. 

 

References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 

2.2 

Is it a mixed-tenant 
building? 

 

Separate high-risk tenants from 
low-risk tenants and from 
publicly accessible areas. Mixed 
uses may be accommodated 
through such means as separating 
entryways, controlling access, 
and hardening shared partitions, 
as well as through special security 
operational countermeasures. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

Working 

2.3 

Are pedestrian paths 
planned to concentrate 
activity to aid in 
detection? 

 

Site planning and landscape 
design can provide natural 
surveillance by concentrating 
pedestrian activity, limiting 
entrances/exits, and eliminating 
concealment opportunities. Also, 

Working 



 - Design that distinguishes 
private/restricted spaces from 
public spaces using separation, 
landscape plantings; pavement 
designs (pathway and roadway 
placement); gateway treatments at 
lobbies, corridors, and door 
placement; walls, barriers, 
signage, lighting, and “CPTED" 
fences 

 

 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

prevent pedestrian access to 
parking areas other than via 
established entrances. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

2.4 

Are there trash 
receptacles and 
mailboxes in close 
proximity to the 
building that can be 
used to hide explosive 
devices? 

The size of the trash receptacles 
and mailbox openings should be 
restricted to prohibit insertion of 
packages. Street furniture, such as 
newspaper vending machines, 
should be kept sufficient distance 
(10 meters or 33 feet) from the 
building, or brought inside to a 
secure area. 

 

References: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide and DoD 
UCF 4-010-01 

 

Working 

5 

Utility Systems 

 

 

What is the source of 
domestic water? 

(utility, municipal, 
wells, lake, river, 
storage tank) 

 

Is there a secure 
alternate drinking water 
supply? 

 

Domestic water is critical for 
continued building operation. 
Although bottled water can 
satisfy requirements for drinking 
water and minimal sanitation, 
domestic water meets many other 
needs – flushing toilets, building 
heating and cooling system 
operation, cooling of emergency 
generators, humidification, etc. 

 

Reference: FEMA 386-7 

Working 

5.2 

Are there multiple entry 
points for the water 
supply? 

 

If the building or site has only 
one source of water entering at 
one location, the entry point 
should be secure. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

Working 

5.3 

 

Ensure that only authorized 
personnel have access to the 
water supply and its components. 

 

Reference: FEMA 386-7 

 

Working 

5.4 

Does the building or site 
have storage capacity 
for domestic water? 

Operational facilities will require 
reliance on adequate domestic 
water supply. Storage capacity 
can meet short-term needs and 
use water trucks to replenish for 

Working 



5.1 

 

Is the incoming water 
supply in a secure 
location? 

 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

How many gallons of 
storage capacity are 
available and how long 
will it allow operations 
to continue? 

 

extended outages. 

 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities. 

 

5.5 

What is the source of 
water for the fire 
suppression system? 

 

Are there alternate water 
supplies for fire 
suppression? 

 

The fire suppression system water 
may be supplied from the 
domestic water or it may have a 
separate source, separate storage, 
or nonpotable alternate sources. 

 

For a site with multiple buildings, 
the concern is that the supply 
should be adequate to fight the 
worst case situation according to 
the fire codes. Recent major 
construction may change that 
requirement. 

 

Reference: FEMA 386-7 

Working 

5.6 

Is the fire suppression 
system adequate, code-
compliant, and protected 
(secure location)? 

 

Standpipes, water supply control 
valves, and other system 
components should be secure or 
supervised. 

 

Reference: FEMA 386-7 

 

Working 

5.7 

Do the 
sprinkler/standpipe 
interior controls (risers) 
have fire- and blast-
resistant separation? 

 

 

Are there fire hydrant 
and water supply 
connections near the 
sprinkler/standpipe 
connections? 

 

The incoming fire protection 
water line should be encased, 
buried, or located 50 feet from 
high risk areas. The interior 
mains should be looped and 
sectionalized. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

Working 



(local utility company 
lines, storage tanks with 
utility company backup, 
lake, or river) 

 

Are the sprinkler and 
standpipe connections 
adequate and redundant? 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

5.8 

Are there redundant fire 
water pumps (e.g., one 
electric, one diesel)? 

 

Are the pumps located 
apart from each other? 

Collocating fire water pumps puts 
them at risk for a single incident 
to disable the fire suppression 
system. 

 

References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 

 

Working 

Are sewer systems 
accessible? 

 

Are they protected or 
secured? 

 

Sanitary and stormwater sewers 
should be protected from 
unauthorized access. The main 
concerns are backup or flooding 
into the building, causing a health 
risk, shorting out electrical 
equipment, and loss of building 
use. 

 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

 

Working 

What fuel supplies do 
the building rely upon 
for critical operation? 

 

Typically, natural gas, propane, 
or fuel oil are required for 
continued operation. 

 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

 

Working 

How much fuel is stored 
on the site or at the 
building and how long 
can this quantity support 
critical operations? 

 

How is it stored? 

 

How is it secured? 

 

Fuel storage protection is 
essential for continued operation. 

 

Main fuel storage should be 
located away from loading docks, 
entrances, and parking. Access 
should be restricted and protected 
(e.g., locks on caps and seals). 

 

References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 

 

Working 

What is the normal 
source of electrical 
service for the site or 
building? 

 

Utilities are the general source 
unless co-generation or a private 
energy provider is available. 

 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

 

Working 



5.9 

5.10 

5.11 

5.14 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 

Is there a redundant 
electrical service 
source? 

 

Can the site or buildings 
be fed from more than 
one utility substation? 

 

The utility may have only one 
source of power from a single 
substation. There may be only 
single feeders from the main 
substation. 

 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

 

5.16 

How many service entry 
points does the site or 
building have for 
electricity? 

 

Electrical supply at one location 
creates a vulnerable situation 
unless an alternate source is 
available. 

 

Ensure disconnecting 
requirements according to NFPA 
70 (National Fire Protection 
Association, National Electric 
Code) are met for multiple 
service entrances. 

 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

 

Working 

5.17 

 

Typically, the service entrance is 
a locked room, inaccessible to the 
public. 

 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

 

Working 

5.18 



5.15 

Working 

Is the incoming electric 
service to the building 
secure? 

What provisions for 
emergency power exist? 
What systems receive 
emergency power and 
have capacity 
requirements been 
tested? 

 

Is the emergency power 
collocated with the 
commercial electric 
service? 

 

Is there an exterior 
connection for 

Besides installed generators to 
supply emergency power, 
portable generators or rental 
generators available under 
emergency contract can be 
quickly connected to a building 
with an exterior quick disconnect 
already installed. 

 

Testing under actual loading and 
operational conditions ensures the 
critical systems requiring 
emergency power receive it with 
a high assurance of reliability. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

 

Working 


Section 

Vulnerability Question 

Guidance 

Observations 



emergency power? 

 

5.19 

By what means do the 
main telephone and data 
communications 
interface the site or 
building? 

 

Typically communication ducts 
or other conduits are available. 
Overhead service is more 
identifiable and vulnerable. 

 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

 

Working 

5.20 

Are there multiple or 
redundant locations for 
the telephone and 
communications 
service? 

 

Secure locations of 
communications wiring entry to 
the site or building are required. 

 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

 

Working 

5.21 

Does the fire alarm 
system require 
communication with 
external sources? 

 

By what method is the 
alarm signal sent to the 
responding agency: 
telephone, radio, etc.? 

 

Is there an intermediary 
alarm monitoring 
center? 

 

Typically, the local fire 
department responds to an alarm 
that sounds at the station or is 
transmitted over phone lines by 
an auto dialer. 

 

An intermediary control center 
for fire, security, and/or building 
system alarms may receive the 
initial notification at an on-site or 
off-site location. This center may 
then determine the necessary 
response and inform the 
responding agency. 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

 

Working 

5.22 

Are utility lifelines 
aboveground, 
underground, or direct 
buried? 

 

Utility lifelines (water, power, 
communications, etc.) can be 
protected by concealing, burying, 
or encasing. 

 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 

 

Working