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This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
Remarks of J. Brian Atwood Ford Hall Forum "The Lessons of Bosnia"
May 14, 1998
Boston, Massachusetts
It is nice to be here. I am always happy to have a chance to return to my native Massachusetts. I would like to thank the Ford Hall Forum and the people who put so much hard work into organizing this event. Today, I would like to discuss the current situation in Bosnia as well as some of the most important lessons that I think the United States, and the entire international community, need to carry away from the tragedy that befell the Balkans.
The international news of today is typically shocking: India conducts two more nuclear tests risking an arms race on the subcontinent; Indonesian demonstrators confront the military as the economy disintegrates; the Secretary of State tries again to revive the Middle East peace process; fighting continues in Kosovo, though, in a diplomatic breakthrough, American negotiators convince the two sides to talk.
We live in a world of fast-moving events. A world of conflict and crisis and a world of transition from conflict. It is this transition from conflict--that period of fragile peace, of uneasy truce--that I would like to explore with you this evening.
These transitions receive a lot of attention at the beginning because a diplomatic agreement to end a conflict is hot news. Few of us will forget the dramatic announcement of a Camp David accord between Begin and Sadat. Or, Rabin and Arafat shaking hands on the White House lawn. Or, the announcement of a peace agreement on Bosnia in Dayton, Ohio.
But the process of building a peace is more obscure. It involves reviving a war-torn economy, encouraging mortal enemies to work together, demobilizing soldiers and putting them to work, holding elections and legitimizing governments and generally helping people return to a normal lifestyle. None of this can match the excitement of getting adversaries to agree to abandon war, but this transition work is the absolutely essential counterpart to the diplomatic breakthrough.
It is the peacemakers--the Carters, the Kissingers, the Clintons, the Holbrookes and the Albrights--who will receive the accolades, the Nobel Peace Prizes, and this attention is well deserved. Negotiating a peace between committed adversaries is the
highest form of diplomacy and worthy of the highest praise. But history is more patient. It will always wait to see if the paper of peace becomes the reality of peace.
Except for the occasional reference in a story about Kosovo, one doesn't hear much today about Bosnia. We are no longer confronted with daily stories, pictures of death and destruction in Sarajevo, or Banja Luka, or Tuzla. The fears of widespread U.S. casualties among peacekeepers have largely subsided. Yet today in those places the structure of peace is being built, block by block.
The jury of historians is still out on the Dayton Peace Accords. We are at the stage of "no peace, no war," but we are making progress and the outlines of success are beginning to take shape.
By looking back just a few years, we are reminded of how far we have come in Bosnia. The first half of 1995 was the low point.
The international community seemed weak and ineffectual. UN observers became hostages as "safe havens" became killing fields. Humanitarian assistance was blocked with impunity and ethnic cleansing and genocide were once again in the news from Europe.
Bosnia's civilians fell victim to people who have today been accused of crimes against humanity--war criminals. We witnessed killings of civilians, concentration camps, the use of rape as a weapon of war and the forced displacement of millions of people in the largest flow of refugees in Europe since World War II. Four years after the war began, more than 250,000 Bosnians had been killed.
There were people in our country back then who argued that this civil war was none of our business. It was Europe’s problem. They were not all wrong--it was Europe’s problem. But how quickly we seemed prepared to abandon the investment we had made in Europe after World War II to secure the place.
Was American isolationism once again going to lead to the destabilization of Europe, to the loss of Eastern Europe to extreme ideologies, to the loss of a democratic, stable and prosperous Western Europe?
The conflict in Bosnia was spilling beyond that country's borders. In European capitals, there was a growing right-wing backlash against the influx of refugees from Bosnia. The stridency and extreme nationalism of politicians like Le Pen in France and the violence of anti-immigrant skinheads in Germany threatened years of commitment to an integrated Europe. The NATO alliance itself was beginning to look like a paper tiger. And our efforts to introduce the free market system in Eastern, Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union were seriously set back.
In July of 1995, Serbian forces captured the U.N.-declared safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa and massacred thousands of civilians. The collapse of the U.N. mission and the ineffectiveness of the international community cried out for a response. It was at this juncture that American engagement seemed both essential and highly dangerous. Contrary to American public opinion at the time, the Clinton Administration and NATO launched major military and diplomatic initiatives.
As you all know, NATO undertook a major series of airstrikes against Bosnian Serb targets. This was the first step toward getting the parties to the bargaining table in Dayton, Ohio. After months of these negotiations, the leaders of, Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995.
Dayton was a complicated agreement. It created a federation in the Muslim-Croat dominated areas, a Bosnian-Serb Republic, governments in those regions, and a national government as well. It required elections at all levels and governance structures that forced collaboration among former enemies. It called for a substantial peace keeping force, and demilitarized zones of separation and a program of disarmament that sought both to lower weapons levels and to redistribute arsenals to achieve balance and a determent against future war. My purpose tonight is not to bore you with the details of this complicated agreement. You probably recall the controversy that surrounded the Dayton Accords at the time.
Some argued that Dayton was worse than no agreement at all, that it legitimized ethnic cleansing by creating zones dominated by the militaries of the ethnic combatants. Critics believed that elections would further legitimize the most recalcitrant elements of the three major groups. They said it was impossible to imagine these groups collaborating on issues of governance.
Against the backdrop of a devastated country, these criticisms rang even more true. More than two million Bosnians were refugees or were in internal exile. Unemployment hovered around ninety percent. Gross domestic product had declined by about 70 percent, and per capita income was down to about $400. Approximately 40 percent of Bosnia's bridges and roads had been damaged. Over half of Bosnia's secondary schools had been destroyed.
But even more daunting than any of these statistics were the fear, distrust and deep social fissures that had fractured Bosnian society. Rebuilding the physical
landscape of Bosnia seemed far easier than healing the social and psychological rift. The reconstruction process would demand more than just military peacekeepers.
At that point in time Dayton was a highly questionable piece of paper. It was never touted as perfect, only the most we could get. It stopped the war but the real question was whether it could guarantee the peace.
At the beginning of 1996, the post-conflict transition period began. At that point, USAID, the European Commission, the World Bank and the other development agencies of Europe began to rebuild a society and to build a peace.
The reconstruction effort worked under the security umbrella of NATO. We needed the military and the military needed us. The first NATO commander, General Bill Nash, called USAID part of his force protection plan and we described our program in Congress not only as essential to making Dayton work, but also as the best possible exit strategy for American forces.
It was clear that the benefits of peace had to be tangible, and that for peace to hold, Bosnians who embraced the principles of Dayton would need to quickly see improvements in their own lives. That is why I am so proud that USAID moved out so quickly, ahead of the other donors. Our shelter repair program helped thousands of Bosnian families repair one or two rooms in their houses so they could move out of refugee encampments and into their. We repaired electricity lines, restored water system, rebuilt bridges, roads, railroads and communication systems. We also gave out loans so that businesses could start up and put people to work.
While the importance of these measures may sound self-evident, it is important to remember the deep doubts that existed when we began to implement these programs. Take our support for elections and democracy for example.
Some argued that elections would only give nationalist thugs from the three ethnic groups the cachet of elected office. Some argued that elections would only spur more violence. Those were, and are, legitimate concerns.
But some degree of pluralism and more moderate leadership have resulted from the series of elections in Bosnia over the last two years. Perhaps the most dramatic breakthrough occurred when Mallard Deduce, a supporter of a multi-ethnic Bosnia, was chosen Prime Minister of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. Parties that opposed ethnic purity won as much as 30% in last year's municipal elections and the parties that were elected to prepare for the next war have begun to lose their influence.
Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Serb forces during the war, has lost so much influence he is more worried about being captured than he is about party politics. All three of the major parties are showing signs of internal tension as they are pressured by outside parties and by the new realities of normalization. People in Bosnia today are beginning to care more about jobs and education and healthcare than they are about the next war.
We have seen real progress in opening up political "space." One of the key efforts of our assistance programs in Bosnia has been to break the stranglehold of state-dominated media. In many respects, the war itself had been made possible by state-controlled radio and television that blanketed the population with relentless propaganda that played effectively on people's fears and fostered ethnic hatred.
The existence of an alternative media, which was mostly started with assistance from USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, allowed President Plavsic in the Republic of Srpska to make public the corruption of Karadic and his allies in Pale. Newspapers and magazines in Sarajevo are beginning to challenge corruption and incompetence in government. These outlets are reflecting the sentiments of people who want a better life.
The challenges in moving toward a democratic Bosnia remain formidable. But the progress is obvious. Those elections required by Dayton that some feared would legitimize the thugs are now seen as a vehicle for change, the only way people can make a choice.
People are beginning to feel they have a stake in peace. The economy is rebounding dramatically. Jobs have been created, vital infrastructure has been repaired. Those mayors who support the Dayton process have seen their towns benefit. Those who stand in the way of progress will deny their people the right to a better life--and they, in turn, will vote for leaders who will produce jobs, education, and running water.
Recovery of the economy has been dramatic, especially in the Federation, where commitment to Dayton principles had heretofore resulted in greater donor investment than in the Republic of Srpska.
The World Bank estimates GDP growth at 62 percent in the Federation for 1996 and 35 percent in 1997. By the year 2000 the Federation's GDP per capita could reach 80 percent of its prewar level, ahead of the original predictions for recovery. Two recent studies indicate USAID programs have been tied to about 25 percent of this improvement in growth rates.
The improvements in security and everyday life is encouraging, we are seeing increasing numbers of refugee returns. Since Dayton, the U.N. has reported a total of 425,000 registered returns. An unknown number of unregistered returns have also taken place. By helping create the necessary conditions at the community level, our assistance programs are serving as a magnet for people to return home.
We have a long way to go in Bosnia before we pass the point of no return--no return to war, that is. We will experience more crises that will require the good offices of Ambassador Bob Gelbard, the Secretary of State's superb envoy.
But as each week passes, more people in Bosnia gain a stake in peace. More people are engaged in commercial transactions across ethnic lines. More people are moving across the internal borders. By July when common license plates will be required, even more will venture forth. More people are earning wages and sending their children to repaired schools. More people are living normally on what used to be battlefields.
The development challenge Bosnia represents is immense. This is not only a county emerging from civil war, it is a country emerging from over forty years of communism. The central planners in Belgrade decided where the industries would be placed. They decided prices, wages, and social services. Today we are left not only with a war-torn economy we are left with a void where financial, fiscal and regulatory systems need to be. We are left with steel plants that will never again be viable and publicly owned companies of all sorts that can not compete and are a drain on tax dollars.
So we are seeking not only to reconstruct a war-torn society, we are also seeking to transform it. And we are making progress here as well. Private companies are springing up. Banks are beginning to operate. Government control is beginning to loosen and market forces are taking over.
The tragedy of ethnic conflict will take at least a generation to heal. When one looks back on genocide and ethnic cleansing, the first impulse is to doubt the positive instincts of human nature. Are we destined to fall prey one day to our basest instincts?
I was recently with President Clinton in Rwanda. We had just met with the families of genocide victims. The President was so moved by that experience that he wondered out loud why the dark side of human nature periodically emerges in tragedy. But, like the families with whom he had just met, he expressed confidence that people of goodwill can overcome their worst instincts. He went on to say:
"There is only one crucial division among the peoples of the Earth. And believe me, after over five years of dealing with these problems I know it is not the divisions between Hutu and Tutsi, or Serb or Croat and Muslim, or Arab and Jew, or Catholic and Protestant in Ireland, or black and white. It is really the line between those who embrace the common humanity we all share and those who reject it."
I am sure everyone in this room embraces a concept of a common humanity. It helps to live in an open society where diversity is respected and citizens rights are protected. Our constitution tells us we should respect our fellow citizens whatever their race, creed, or ethnic group, and our religions tell us to love thy neighbor. And yet we still hear of hate crimes and discrimination in the United States.
People need open systems and legal systems that protect their individual interest and defend the general interest. They also need a stake. They need a roof over their heads, a job and at least the prospect of a better life for their children. That is what we are attempting to help the people of Bosnia do for themselves.
Development is the essential counterpart to diplomacy. Bosnia demonstrates that clearly. Let us hope that long after Bosnia recedes from the headlines, we will have the patience and the vision to see this challenge through. For if we celebrate the breakthrough of Dayton and fail to relate its provisions to conditions on the ground, we will fail the test of history. That is why we need Congressional support for resources. That is why we need continuing high level attention within the executive branch. And that is why on the question of Bosnia, USAID is as important to Dayton’s success as is the U.S. military. Thank you.
This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
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Last Updated on: July 18, 2001 |
