UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., APPELLANTS V. MADISON D. LOCKE, ET AL. No. 83-1394 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1984 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Reply Brief for the Appellants Appellees and their amici devote considerable space in their briefs to descriptions of various approaches Congress might have adopted in establishing filing requirements applicable to mining claims located on federal lands. For the most part, they advocate systems under which federal land managers would assume the burden of advising claimants, on a case-by-case basis, whenever they failed to comply with a statutory requirement and providing them with various opportunities to establish that they intended to retain their claims, despite the default. In the view of appellees and their amici, such alternatives would be preferable to the scheme Congress chose to enact in Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. 1744, under which retention of a mining claim is conditioned on compliance with statutory requirements for initial and annual filings. But, of course, the issue in this case is not whether Conqress has made the best possible policy choice in imposing on claimants the burdens of compliance with the filing requirements. Rather, the question is whether Congress was constitutionally barred from providing that failure to comply with those requirements results in loss of a mining claim. On that point, appellees and their amici have failed to rebut our arguments that Section 314(c) of the statute Congress enacted satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 1. Appellees and their amici contend that conditioning retention of a mining claim on compliance with statutory filing deadlines, as Congress has done in Section 314(c), violates procedural due process. We showed in our opening brief (at 23-35) that application of the principles articulated by this Court in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982), requires the conclusion that Section 314(c) is fully consistent with procedural due process. Appellees and their amici suggest, however, that the Court's decisions in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), provide a more appropriate analytical framework. See Appellees' Br. 24-27; Mobil Am. Br. 18; Alaska Miners Ass'n Am. Br. 13-16; Colorado Mining Ass'n Br. 3. But it is clear that the procedures available to claimants in connection with the operation of Section 314(c) are fully consistent with the principles of the Court applied in Mathews and Morrissey. Under Section 314(c), the question that must be resolved is whether or not a claimant has complied with the filing requirements of Section 314(a) and (b). As we explained in our opening brief (at 28-29), appellees and other claimants receive the full procedural protections of individualized notice and opportunity for a hearing in connection with resolution of that question. For example, a claimant who apparently has failed to comply with the requirements for annual filings under Section 314(a) receives a letter from the Bureau of Land Management notifying him that his claim is being declared void because of that default. See, e.g., J.S. App. 22a-24a (letter from BLM to Madison D. Locke). /1/ Before the declaration of invalidity becomes final, the claimant is given an opportunity to present evidence that he in fact has complied with the filing requirements. /2/ In this case appellees were advised of their right to appeal the declaration to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (id. at 22a-23a). In many cases, all evidence relevant to the issue of compliance with Section 314 will appear in the written record, so that the IBLA will be able to make an accurate determination of the facts without holding an evidentiary hearing. However, if a claimant should allege additional facts that, if proved true, would establish his compliance with Section 314, he would be entitled to a hearing. See J.S. App. 20a. Here the IBLA determined (J.S. App. 20a) that no evidentiary hearing was necessary, because appellees themselves informed the Board that they had hand delivered their affidavits of assessment work to BLM on December 31, 1980, rather than "prior to December 31," as the statute requires. In view of appellees' admission, there was no possibility that the IBLA would reach an erroneous conclusion concerning their compliance with Section 314, and thus, the validity of their claims. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 343-347; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 484. Such procedures are clearly consistent with the requirements of procedural due process. /3/ 2. Most of the contentions put forward by appellees and their amici appear to relate to substantive due process, rather than procedural due process. Appellees and their amici take the position that Congress acted irrationally in conditioning retention of mining claims on compliance with the Section 314 filing requirements, rather than on intent to retain, or active development of, those claims. See Appellees' Br. 23; Alaska Miners Ass'n Am. Br. 16-17; Mobil Am. Br. 50; Mountain States Legal Foundation Am. Br. 2, 7. Appellees and their amici suggest further that in enacting Section 314(c) Congress acted inconsistently with its underlying objectives. In the view of appellees and their amici, Congress was concerned primarily with elimination of stale claims -- a concern that is addressed by the initial filing requirement of Section 314(b); they suggest that Congress had no real interest in providing for forfeiture in the case of a claimant's failure to make a timely annual filing, at least when the claim continues to be actively developed. See Appellees' Br. 23 n.12, 26; Mobil Am. Br. 27-33; Colorado Mining Ass'n Am. Br. 9-11; Alaska Miners Ass'n Am. Br. 16. The suggestion that Section 314(c) serves no rational purpose as it applies to annual filings is inaccurate. Of course, Congress clearly provided in Section 314(c) that claimants who failed to comply with the annual filing requirements of Section 314(a) would automatically lose their claims. /4/ Thus, it should be presumed that Congress itself perceived that provision as one that would advance the objectives of the statute. But it is also apparent that the mining industry joined in the judgment that such a provision would serve legitimate purposes. The provision of Section 314(c) for forfeiture of mining claims upon failure to comply with an annual filing requirement is quite similar to a proposal made by the American Mining Congress to the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) in 1968. In its statement the American Mining Congress recommended expressly "that the mining laws be amended to provide that a mining claim is conclusively presumed abandoned if some notice or other instrument is not filed in the appropriate county office by or in behalf of the owner of the mining claim at least once every three years." Public Land Committee of the American Mining Congress, The Mining Industry and the Public Lands: A Statement on Behalf of the American Mining Congress Before the Public Land Law Review Commission 22 (1968) (hereinafter The Mining Industry and the Public Lands). /5/ The American Mining Congress pointed out in its recommendation (ibid.) that the conclusive presumption would make it unnecessary to conduct expensive contest proceedings to clear the record. /6/ In 1975, the American Mining Congress specifically endoresed the provision that became Section 314. Indeed, the organization stated that its support for enactment of a recordation requirement for mining claims was predicated on retention of the language of the House bill (which was identical in all significant respects to the language enacted as Section 314), as opposed to the Senate version of the bill (which combined a recording provision with the requirement that an application for patent for mining claims be filed within a certain number of years). Public Land Policy and Management Act of 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on H.R. 5224 and H.R. 5622, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 381-382 (1975) (statement of Howard L. Edwards of the Anaconda Company on behalf of the American Mining Congress); id. at 164-166 (relevant provision of House subcommittee draft legislation). As we explained in our opening brief (at 17-20), the provision that claimants who fail to make a timely annual filing automatically lose their claims furthers the statutory objective of establishing an efficient and effective system for the management of federal lands. /7/ Section 314(c) provides a convenient self-executing mechanism that ensures that federal land managers will be able to assemble a centralized, up-to-date bank of information concerning the status of the massive number of mining claims located on federal lands; that in turn allows them to take actions affecting those lands on the basis of complete information about the rights of mining claimants. /8/ By placing the burden of notification on the claimant (who is in the best position to know whether he wishes to retain the claim), the statute largely frees federal land managers from the cumbersome procedure of identifying claims of doubtful status and determining on a case-by-case basis whether individuals wish to retain those claims -- the benefit the American Mining Congress mentioned expressly in its presentation to the PLLRC. Section 314(c) serves as a particularly effective enforcement mechanism by providing a strong incentive for claimants to comply with the filing requirements. Appellees and their amici stress that both the PLLRC and the Senate committee described filing requirements as providing a solution to the problem of stale claims. They deduce from those statements that Congress could not have meant to provide for forfeiture of claims that are not stale merely because a claimant has failed to comply with the Section 314 filing requirements. See Appellees' Br. 15; Nevada Am. Br. 8-11; Alaska Miners Ass'n Am. Br. 11-12, 16; Colorado Mining Ass'n Am. Br. 9-11; Mobil Am. Br. 28-29. /9/ But the statements cited by appellees and their amici refer to provisions that ultimately were not enacted. The PLLRC did not adopt the precise approach urged by the American Mining Congress (see pages 6-7 & note 5, supra). Instead, the Commission recommended that failure to file notice of existing claims within a reasonable time should constitute conclusive evidence of abandonment and that holders of existing claims should have an option to perfect their claims under new location procedures, including issuance of permits and payment of rentals and royalties. See Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's Land: A Report to the President and to the Congress 130 (1970); id. at 126. The Senate committee in 1975 adopted a provision similar to the PLLRC recommendation, under which retention of an existing mining claim would be conditioned on initial recordation within two years of enactment of the statute and an application for patent within ten years thereafter. S. Rep. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975). The House committee however, favored the approach the American Mining Congress urged (see pages 6, 8, supra), under which retention of a claim would be conditioned on compliance with both initial recordation and annual filing requirements, but not on an application for patent. H.R. Rep. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976). The conference committee voted to adopt the House version, which became Section 314. H.R. Rep. 94-1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30, 62 (1976). Appellees and their amici do acknowledge that in enacting Section 314 Congress intended not only to eliminate stale claims, but also to provide for periodic notification to federal land managers concerning the status of mining claims. See Appellees' Br. 15; Nevada Am. Br. 11; Colorado Mining Ass'n Am. Br. 10-11; Mobil Am. Br. 8-9, 23. They do not dispute that the automatic invalidation provision serves as a particularly effective way to ensure that claimants will provide such notification; indeed, they do not explain what incentive there would be for claimants to make the required filings in a timely manner if there were no provision for automatic invalidation of claims for failure to comply with the statutory requirements. Appellees and their amici suggest, however, that federal land managers could adopt various procedures for notifying claimants of their failure to comply with the filing requirements and for giving them opportunities to demonstrate that they nevertheless intend to retain their claims. See Appellees' Br. 26-27; Nevada Am. Br. 25-26: Colorado Mining Ass'n Am. Br. 17-19; Alaska Miners Ass'n Am. Br. 15. But such procedures would amount essentially to a return to the cumbersome and unsatisfactory system of case-by-case contest proceedings that existed prior to the enactment of FLPMA. See Gov't Br. 3-4, 40. Appelles and their amici appear to take the position that due process requires that the federal government, rather than claimants themselves, bear the administrative burden of ensuring that federal land managers receive standardized, up-to-date information on the status of mining claims. In addition, they apparently contend that Congress can never condition retention of a mining claim on compliance with a particular filing deadline, so long as federal land managers have some way to contact dilatory claimants and to attempt to extract the relevant information from them on a case-by-case basis. That position is simply untenable. In the context of a massive system involving close to two million mining claims located on vast areas of federal lands, /10/ it is surely reasonable for Congress to conclude that, in the interests of administrative manageability, it is claimants who should bear the minimal burden of making timely filings in order to preserve their property interests. /11/ 3. Many of the contentions advanced by appellees and their amici appear ultimately to amount to a claim that Section 314(c) is "unfair" and that claimants should be given a second chance of some sort before their failure to comply with the filing requirements results in loss of a claim. /12/ Of course, the fact that operation of a statute may produce apparently harsh results in certain cases does not mean that the statute itself violates due process. /13/ Moreover, viewed in a broader context, Section 314(c) is hardly as "unfair" as appellees and their amici suggest. As appellees themselves acknowledge (Br. 9 n.6), the vast majority of claimants manage to comply with the Section 314 filing requirements and thereby retain their claims. That is not surprising, since compliance with the filing requirements is neither burdensome or difficult. In addition, there are several ways in which claimants can ensure that they will meet the statutory filing deadlines. Most obviously, they can obtain and read a copy of the statute (which provides that claimants must make their annual filings "prior to December 31") or the regulation, 43 C.F.R. 3833.2-1(b)(1) (which states that claimants must file "on or before December 30"). If claimants are uncertain about the precise deadline, they can file earlier in the year, thereby avoiding any confusion about whether the annual filing is due on December 30 or December 31. They can hand deliver their filings or check to make sure any filing they mail has reached the appropriate BLM office. And, of course, it has always been within the power of claimants to escape any regulatory requirements associated with unpatented mining claims by proceeding to patent and obtaining full ownership of the land on which a claim has been located. See, e.g., Best v. Humboldt Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963) (noting risk taken by locator who chooses not to carry his claim to patent); Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 163 U.S. 445, 450 (1896) ("The interest in a mining claim, prior to the payment of any money for the granting of a patent for the land, is nothing more than a right to the exclusive possession of the land based upon conditions subsequent, a failure to fulfil which forfeits the locator's interest in the claim."). It is true that appellees have suffered a significant loss as a result of their failure to comply with the filing deadlines of Section 314. /14/ On the other hand, appellees could have avoided that loss by taking some relatively simple steps. /15/ It does not seem particularly "unfair" for Congress to have concluded that appellees and other claimants should be responsible for taking such steps in order to preserve their claims. If Congress should conclude that unacceptable numbers of persons are forfeiting active claims because of insubstantial defaults, it may wish to amend FLPMA to provide for some sort of more flexible filing system or for relief of other sorts. /16/ But neither constitutional principles nor any generalized concept of "fairness" require that this Court invalidate Section 314(c). /17/ For the foregoing reasons and those stated in our opening brief, the judgment of the district court should be reversed. Respectfully submitted. REX E. LEE Solicitor General OCTOBER 1984 /1/ In addition to the letter to Madison D. Locke reprinted in the appendix to the jurisdictional statement, letters were sent to appellees Rosalie E. Locke, Sam Buccambuso, and Tony Buccambuso, co-owners of the claims at issue in this case. /2/ See 43 C.F.R. 4.21 (timely filing of notice of appeal normally suspends the effect of the decision appealed from pending the decision on appeal); 43 C.F.R. 4.415 (request for hearings on appeal involving questions of fact); 43 C.F.R. 4.420 et seq. (hearings procedures). /3/ Appellees and amicus Alaska Miners Association point to the fact that Mathews and Morrissey require a balancing of interests as part of the determination of what process is due in a particular situation. They urge that the strong interest of claimants in retaining their claims requires that there be notice and a hearing on the issue of whether a claimant who has failed to comply with Section 314 in fact intended to abandon his claim. See Appellees' Br. 26-27; Alaska Miners Ass'n Am. Br. 14-16. But the Mathews/Morrissey inquiry addresses only what procedures must be afforded in connection with a given determination; it cannot be used to change the nature of the determination that is to be made (e.g., to convert the determination under Section 314(c) from whether a claimant has complied with the statutory filing requirements to whether a claimant intended to abandon his claim). Regardless of the relative strength of the interests of claimants and the federal government, the relevant issue under the statute continues to be compliance with the Section 314 filing requirements -- an issue on which claimants have a full opportunity to be heard prior to a final declaration of invalidity. /4/ Amicus the State of Nevada appears to concede as much when it criticizes us for "arbitrary reliance" on the "literal words" of the statute. See Nevada Am. Br. 20. Appellees suggest (Br. 27-28) that Section 314(c) could be read to require forfeiture only in cases in which a claimant has failed to make any filing of a document required by Section 314, not when a claimant has filed such a document after the time specified by the statute. That interpretation, apparently advanced for the first time in this court, would be inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. Section 314(c) provides that a claim will be lost upon "(t)he failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and (b) of this section." The very first requirement described in subsection (a) is the date by which the relevant instruments "shall" be filed. The term "as required" surely encompasses a reference to this explicit and prominent time deadline. Moreover, there would be little sense in appellees' interpretation, since it would mean that no one could ever be sure whether a claim had become invalid as a result of failure to file a required document, since the claimant could always avoid such a loss by filing the document belatedly. Appellees and several of their amici also contend that Congress must have meant that a claim would not be lost if a claimant has "substantially complied" with the Section 314 requirements. See Appellees' Br. 28-29; Nevada Am. Br. 8-21; Alaska Miners Ass'n Am. Br. 19-21. We discussed the issue of substantial compliance in our opening brief (at 42-29), and we will not repeat that discussion here. We note, however, that none of the briefs submitted in support of appellees provides a plausible explanation of how a filing made on December 31 can be said to comply substantially with a statutory requirement that such a filing be made "prior to December 31." Nor do the briefs explain how a system based on substantial compliance could be administered as a practical matter in connection with a massive data-gathering program of the type at issue here. Cf., e.g., Alaska Miners Ass'n Am. Br. 20 (suggesting simply that any "reasonably 'late' filing" should be considered to be in substantial compliance with Section 314). /5/ The full text of the amendment advocated by the American Mining Congress is as follows (emphasis added): If the owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim shall fail for any period of more than any three (3) successive years commencing after August 31, 1968, to file for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of assessment work performed or a detailed report provided for by Public Law 83-876, such failure shall be conclusively deemed to constitute the abandonment of the mining claim by the owner, but there shall, however, be no abandonment if the instrument is defective or not timely filed for record under other federal or state laws permitting filing or recording thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but not all of the owners of the mining claim. The Mining Industry and the Public Lands, supra, at 22. Much of the language of this proposed amendment is virtually identical to the language of Section 314(a)(1) and (c). In making its proposals, the American Mining Congress purported to speak on behalf of the mining industry. See The Mining Industry and the Public Lands, supra, at 1. We are lodging a copy of the relevant portions of the American Mining Congress statement with the Clerk of the Court and providing copies to counsel for appellees and amici. /6/ The general approach advocated by the American Mining Congress was incorporated into the proposed Mineral Development Act of 1971, H.R. 10640 and S. 2542, introduced in the 92d Congress, but not reported out of committee. The so-called "industry bill" provided that failure to file a location notice or to file affidavits of annual labor by the end of the work year would render a claim void. The industry bill was reintroduced in 1974 as S. 3086 and in 1975 as H.R. 8690. See MacDonnell, Public Policy for Hard-Rock Minerals Access on Federal Lands: A Legal-Economic Analysis, 71 Q. Colo. School of Mines 1, 60-61 (1976). The American Mining Congress continued to support a recordation provision under which failure to make initial and annual filings would render a claim void. See, e.g., Mineral Development on Federal Lands: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 263-264 (1974) (statement of Howard L. Edwards of the Anaconda Company on behalf of the American Mining Congress); see also id. at 78-79, 103-105 (relevant provisions of S. 3086). Several other mining organizations, including amicus Colorado Mining Association, advised the Senate subcommittee considering such legislation that they recognized the need for stringent bright-line tests in connection with any provision addressed to elimination of inactive claims. See id. at 310 (letter from Colorado Mining Ass'n to Sen. Clifford P. Hansen) ("We favor imposition upon claim owners of specific duty to perform specified acts within a stated period of time to indicate continuing active interest at peril of elimination of the claim."); id. at 332 (letter from Southwestern Minerals Exploration Ass'n to Sen. Clifford P. Hansen) ("Requirements to keep a claim active should be specifically spelled out in the statutes. If the requirements are not met within a specified period of time the claim should automatically become inactive."). /7/ FLPMA was intended to be a major step toward modernizing the public land laws and establishing a coherent public land policy. H.R. Re. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1976). It was designed to "consolidate (existing) laws, remove conflicts, and provide missing authority" and to provide the first comprehensive, statutory statement of purposes, goals, and authority for the use and management of about 448 million acres of federally-owned lands administered by (BLM)." S. Rep. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975). The provisions of FLPMA require that the Secretary of the Interior, inter alia, prepare and maintain a comprehensive inventory of all public lands and their resources (43 U.S.C. 1711(a)); develop land use plans for the public lands (43 U.S.C. 1712(a)); execute sales and exchanges of public lands (43 U.S.C. 1713, 1716); make withdrawals of public lands (43 U.S.C. 1714); grant rights of way across federal lands (43 U.S.C. 1761 et seq.); and recommend designation of wilderness areas to the President (43 U.S.C. 1782). /8/ Amicus Mobil Oil Corporation suggests (Br. 27-37, 46) that there is no real need for automatic invalidation of claims under Section 314(c) because BLM could determine the status of mining claims by consulting information it has collected pursuant to various other regulatory requirements, such as those found at 43 C.F.R. Subpt. 3809. But the information collected under these other regulations is different from that mandated by Congress under section 314; it is stored in different forms and in different locations and need not be updated on a regular basis. Some claims (e.g., temporarily inactive claims) are not subject to any of the requirements to which Mobil refers. Cf. Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Public Land Statistics 1983, at 146 (1984) (showing only 1,864 notices and plans of mining operations filed with BLM pursuant to 43 C.F.R. Subpt. 3809 during fiscal year 1983). Thus, the approach Mobil urges would not yield the centralized bank of standardized information that is made possible by Section 314 filings. Moreover, Congress presumably did not anticipate that other sources of information could substitute for Section 314 filings, since it enacted Section 314 in addition to the other FLPMA provisions that serve as authority for the regulatory scheme on which Mobil primarily relies, 43 C.F.R. Subpt. 3809. See 43 C.F.R. 3809.0-3. /9/ Appellees and several amici suggest that Congress's use of the term "abandonment" signifies that Section 314(c) should be read to mean that a claim cannot be lost unless it in fact has been abandoned, as that term was used at common law. See Appellees' Br. 17-18; Mobil Am. Br. 23-27; Alaska Miners Ass'n Am. Br. 12 & n.2. But Section 314(c), read as a whole, clearly indicates that failure to comply with the filing requirements results in loss of a claim. The word "abandonment" therefore must be read to refer only to the common law consequences of abandonment (i.e., forfeiture of a claim, see Farrell v. Lockhart, 210 U.S. 142, 147-148 (1908)), not to the sort of evidence needed under common law to show that abandonment had occurred. In this connection, we note that the suggestion (see Appellees' Br. 15-17; Colorado Mining Ass'n Am. Br. 4) that Congress, in enacting Section 314, did not intend to affect in any way the rights of claimants as they existed under the general mining laws is incorrect. Congress expressly stated in Section 302(b) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 1732(b) (emphasis added): "Except as provided in (Section 314) * * * , no provision of this section or any other section of this Act shall in any way amend the Mining Law of 1872 or impair the rights of any locators or claims under that Act * * * ." /10/ From October 21, 1976, through the end of fiscal year 1983, BLM accepted a total of 1,792,861 claims for recording. Public Land Statistics 1983, supra, at 145. /11/ Of course, it would be preferable if all claimants who intended to retain their claims would comply with the filing requirements, so that there would be no loss of active claims. However, Congress presumably considered the possibility that some claimants might lose active claims because they failed to comply with the statute and weighed it against the need for a system that would be administratively manageable. The proposals advanced by appellees and their amici demonstrate well that the goals of administrative manageability and preservation of every active claim are not easy to reconcile. /12/ Several amici cite numerous cases in which individuals or corporations have lost claims because of failure to comply with some aspect of the Section 314 filing requirements. See Mountain States Legal Foundation Am. Br. 3-7 & App.; Alaska Miners Ass'n Am. Br. 5, 15 & Exhs. A-D. Of course, it is impossible for us to respond on a case-by-case basis in this brief, or even to describe the background facts of each case cited by amici. We note, however, that some of the instances cited appear to involve defects that are now considered "curable," i.e., failures to comply with nonstatutory requirements that may be corrected within a given period of time (e.g., failure to submit a $5 service fee with an initial filing may be cured by submission of the fee within 30 days of notification to claimants, see 43 C.F.R. 3833.1-3). A few instances could involve BLM determinations that were simply incorrect and that would have been reversed on administrative or judicial review. Of course, errors in application of Section 314 would not require that the provision itself be held unconstitutional. We note that loss of active claims is likely to become less frequent as time goes on. BLM has made efforts to clarify and otherwise improve the regulations relating to the filing requirements. See 47 Fed. Reg. 56300 (1982); 44 Fed. Reg. 9720 (1979). Moreover, as we explained in our opening brief (at 31-32 n.22), BLM in 1980 initiated the practice of mailing reminder notices to claimants several months before each annual filing deadline. Appellees correctly note (Br. 5-6 n.5) that they could not have received such a reminder notice in 1980 because the information from their initial filing was not fed into the central BLM computer until March 1981, presumably because of the large backlog that resulted from the massive number of initial filings in 1979 and other start-up problems. However, this type of problem presumably will become far less common now that the system has been in place for several years. /13/ As we noted in our opening brief (at 29-30, n.21), there are many situations in which failure to comply with a statutory deadline can lead to harsh results. Thus, a litigant whose counsel has misread the relevant statute, and therefore has missed a jurisdictional deadline for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari, may not obtain review by this Court; and, under U.C.C. Section 9-403(2) (1971), a secured creditor who fails to file a continuation statement every five years loses his secured interest. See also Gov't Br. 44 n.33 (describing 30 U.S.C. 188(b), which provides that certain oil and gas leases will terminate automatically upon the lessee's failure to make annual rental payments on or before the anniversary date of the lease). /14/ Appellees' loss may not be so significant as it first appears. As we noted in our opening brief (at 7 n.6), appellees may not relocate their claims because common varieties of sand and gravel have been withdrawn from the coverage of the general mining laws. However, appellees might be able to enter into a contractual arrangement that would permit them to continue their mining operations on the same property, under the terms of the Materials Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. 601 et seq., and regulations thereunder, 43 C.F.R. Pt. 3600. While such a contractual arrangement might not be as lucrative as a claimant's right to mine without any obligation to make payments to the federal government (see Gov't Br. 2), appellees clearly would not be deprived of the means to earn a livelihood. /15/ Amicus Sierra Club notes (Br. 62-64 n.46) that appellees have contended that a BLM employee erroneously advised the Lockes' daughter that the deadline for their annual filing was December 31 (see Appellees' Br. 5) and suggests that BLM therefore might have been equitably estopped from determining that appellees' claims were invalid. However, the district court found it unnecessary to decide whether any BLM employee in fact had rendered such erroneous advice. See J.S. App. 2a. Nor did the district court determine whether the Lockes relied on such advice, whether reliance would have been reasonable in the circumstances of this case, whether appellees Sam Buccambuso and Tony Buccambuso, co-owners of the claims, had actual knowledge of the correct filing date, and other issues relevant to the issue of estoppel of a private party. We doubt very much that BLM could have been equitably estopped on the facts of this case. As this Court has recently noted, "it is well-settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant." Heckler v. Community Health Services, No. 83-56 (May 21, 1984), slip op. 8. In view of "the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law" (ibid.), there is a heavy burden on any party that urges an exception to the general rule that the government may not be estopped (id. at 9). That is particularly so in cases involving public lands. See, e.g., California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 276 n.4 (1982); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39-40 (1947). Moreover, the Court in Community Health Services suggested specifically (slip op. 13) that receipt of oral advice from government agents could not form the basis for estoppel of the government. /16/ As we noted in our opening brief (at 44), Congress has provided some relief for claimants who forfeited oil and gas placer claims through failure to meet the Section 314 deadlines. See 30 U.S.C. 188(f). /17/ If the Court should conclude, contrary to our submission, that Section 314(c) violates due process, certain aspects of that provision might nevertheless be valid. See Section 707 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 1701 note (severability clause). For example, Section 314(c) might be constitutional as applied to those persons who located their claims following the passage of Section 314, since they clearly took those claims subject to the condition that they comply with the filing requirements. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. at 542 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, Section 314(c) might be valid as to those claimants who failed to comply with the requirements for initial filings under Section 314(b), because it would have been virtually impossible for federal land managers to identify and provide individual notice for each of the estimated six million claims that had been located prior to the passage of FLPMA in 1976. See Gov't Br. 3; J.S. App. 9a. Even if the Court should conclude that Section 314(c) could not survive in any application, it might wish to consider making its holding prospective only, in view of the fact that BLM and various private parties in some cases may have acted in reliance on declarations of invalidity based on Section 314(c) (see J.S. 10-11 & n.12). See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per curiam). Invalidation of Section 314(c) on constitutional grounds presumably would not require invalidation of Section 314(a) and (b), the filing requirements themselves. (Of course, as we have noted previously (Gov't Br. 19-20 & n.14), it might be quite difficult for federal land managers to enforce the filing requirements in the absence of Section 314(c).) In addition, it arguably would be possible for the Court to conclude that, while a conclusive presumption of abandonment would violate due process, a rebuttable presumption of abandonment would be permissible. See Mountain States Am. Br. 8 n.5. However, the need to provide appropriate procedures for such a rebuttable presumption would create grave administrative difficulties. See pages 11-12, supra; Gov't Br. 40-41. We doubt, therefore, that Congress would have chosen to enact Section 314(c) with a rebuttable, as opposed to a conclusive, presumption of abandonment; thus, mere severance of the word "conclusively" from Section 314(c) would not be appropriate. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-109 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).