Congressman Mark Steven Kirk
[Contact][District][Links][Press Releases][Services][Students][Visiting]

 * Home Page

 * Biography
 * Census 2000
 * Mark Kirk on the Issues

 108th Legislation:
  * Sponsored
  * Cosponsored

 107th Legislation:
  * Sponsored
  * Cosponsored

 Thomas - Legislative Information on the Internet
 Search CURRENT
 CONGRESS for Text
 of Bills:
 By Bill Number
 
 By Word/Phrase
 
 

Statement by Congressman Mark Kirk
On Consideration of H. Res. 114
Authorization for Use of Force Against Iraq
October 8, 2002

Mr. Speaker, 140 years ago, a gentleman from Illinois wrote the following passage -- one that applies to the question now before this House:

"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves and we shall save our country.

Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.

We say we are for Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We -- even we here -- hold the power and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free -- honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve.

We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just -- a way which if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless."

Abraham Lincoln wrote those words on the eve of his most important decision of the Civil War. The occasion before us here is also drenched in historical significance.

I am often asked if I am a "Dove" or "Hawk" on the question of Iraq. I prefer to be an "Owl" -- one who approaches this with a steady, firm judgment.

I believe that we must deal with the enforcement of the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq to disarm as part of an international coalition. Diplomatic efforts must be our primary effort, with a use of armed force only as a last resort. Along well-settled principles of Constitutional and International Law, the United States may declare war only with the formal approval of the Congress and should try to endeavor to operate with the approval of the UN Security Council.

As a veteran myself, I believe that making the decision between war and peace to be the most sacred duty of the Congress. Many people who never saw war are quick to urge military action. Veterans can report with first-hand experience that waging war is a cruel and blunt instrument to be used only by a free people as their last choice. In my own experience, war taught me to be the best friend of our State Department -- a place where diplomacy is always the preferred course of action. I used to work in the State Department and I applaud Secretary of State Colin Powell in his efforts to build a large coalition of like-minded nations to enforce the will of the Security Council.

With regard to military force, our founding fathers debated the proper place for the power to make war at the Constitutional Convention and feared it most in a new democracy. They specifically rejected proposals to give such a power to the President and directed that only the elected representatives of the American people in our Congress could declare war. For most of our history, Presidents followed the restrictions of the Constitution when going to war. In the 1950s and 1960s, we deviated from the clear requirements of the Constitution to our profound detriment. I believe that it is far worse to send our uniformed men and women into a conflict the American people do not support than to never send them at all.

In recent years, Presidents Bush and Clinton returned to our historic, constitutional practice of Congress voting before sending uniformed Americans into harm's way. Congress voted on U.S. military actions in Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo prior to deployment. As a military officer involved in each of these campaigns, I can report that the long congressional debate and formal approval of our missions made a difference improving our morale and clarity of purpose. The Administration should follow these precedents and obtain congressional sanction to engage in military action against Iraq. Congress must approve any military action against Iraq before it happens. Without such formal approval, no action should be taken.

When the United States and our allies emerged victorious after the Second World War, we remade the ineffective League of Nations into a more effective United Nations. Under the charter of the UN, all member states are required by international law to abide by the decisions of the UN's Security Council. By the terms of the UN Charter, permanent members of the Security Council – the United States, China, Russia, France and Britain – retain the power to veto any proposed action by the Council. While the Council has not always been able to take decisive action, it has moved on many occasions to enforce the will of the international community in Korea, Kuwait, Bosnia and Kosovo.

President Bush's decision to seek approval by the UN Security Council to enforce its previously-passed resolutions underscores a fundamental political and military requirement for the United States military to build allied support and to isolate any potential opponent of the international community. By acting under a UN resolution, U.S. armed forces could join as part of a broad coalition opposing an enemy that has little to no international support. For this key reason, the resolution clearly outlines that the United States should try to act with approval of the UN in dealing with Iraq.

The decision to go to war is the most important decision that I can make as a representative in Congress. As a veteran, I see any potential military action first through the eyes of the young men and women who volunteered to wear the uniform and would carry out such a mission. We must use the opportunities we have to take non-military action through the UN to determine if unrestricted inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction can take place. If these inspections succeed, we will have accomplished our objectives without loss of life. If they fail, it will rally international support against an isolated foe, making any more decisive action quicker and much more likely to succeed.

When we look at the situation in Iraq, we should not take military action until two basic questions are answered:

1. Does Iraq Present a Clear and Present Danger to the United States and Our Allies?
2. Will Non-military Action by the International Community Achieve Our Objectives?

So, does Iraq present a clear and present danger?

With regard to Iraq, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 686 in March of 1991 requiring Iraq to release all prisoners of war, return Kuwaiti property and pay damages. To date, the UN reports that Iraq failed to return 609 prisoners from 14 UN member states, including one American pilot. Iraq also holds over 5,000 Iranian POWs. In total, the respected human rights group Amnesty International reports that Iraq failed to account for 16,000 people held in its custody. The UN staff reported to the Security Council on this issue that "no progress [has been] made on return..." Iraq also failed to return Kuwaiti military equipment and items from its state archives.

In April of 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 687. The resolution required Iraq to "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" all "chemical and biological weapons." The resolution also required Iraq to "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons usable material" or construct "any research, development or manufacturing facilities." Finally, the resolution also required Iraq to "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km and related major parts and repair and production facilities."

Despite the requirement not to possess chemical and biological weapons, UN staff reported that Iraq lied to the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in 1995 after Saddam Hussein's son-in-law defected to Jordan and told of the dictator's still-thriving biological and chemical weapons programs. Iraq then admitted it produced thousands of liters of anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin for use with Scud missile warheads, aerial bombs and artillery. UNSCOM reported to the Security Council that Iraq concealed its biological weapons program and failed to account for three tons of growth material for biological agents. The UN also reported that Iraq failed to account for 15,000 artillery rockets filled with nerve gas and 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas.

In January 2001, our Defense Department reported that Iraq converted Czech L-29 jets into chemical and biological delivery vehicles. Iraq also modified a second jet for use as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to spray chemical and biological weapons. We have evidence that Iraq has built a third unmanned aerial vehicle that is much smaller than the larger jets. There are reports that this smaller UAV is the intended final vehicle for use delivering chemical and biological weapons in a way that would not be detected on radar. There is compelling further evidence on this program which remains classified.

Reporting on the violation of commitments on ballistic missiles, UNSCOM disclosed that, contrary to UN resolutions, Iraq had retained a number of Scud missiles. Iraq also began work on two new missiles, a liquid-fueled missile (the al-Samoud) and solid-fueled missile (the Ababil), both capable of flying far beyond the 150 km limit imposed by the UN Security Council. Such missiles could deliver a weapon of mass destruction against Israel in under 250 seconds. Iraq also rebuilt the al-Mamoun missile test facility that had been dismantled by the UN to prevent the construction of long-range missiles. Work is underway to test a much larger missile engine to support even longer-range missiles.

Despite promises not to acquire or test nuclear components, Iraq has a large nuclear weapons complex. Saddam Hussein regularly makes reference to his "nuclear mujahadeen" and UNSCOM reports over 40,000 Iraqis work on the nuclear weapons program. British intelligence services report that Iraq stepped up purchases of nuclear weapons material over the last 14 months. The New York Times recently reported Iraqi agents attempted to purchase 114,000 parts of a nuclear centrifuge to refine fissile material for a nuclear bomb. In September, the British International Institute for Strategic Studies reported that absent the Gulf War, Iraq would have had nuclear weapons by 1993 and could now possess a weapon within months of obtaining fissile material.

Last year, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri1, an Iraqi defector, reported that he visited 20 secret facilities dedicated to producing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. He supported his report with copies of Iraqi government contracts and technical specifications. It is clear that Iraq is advancing program to develop weapons of mass destruction in violation of its commitments imposed by the UN Security Council.

Following the deployment of UNSCOM to Iraq, Saddam Hussein barred international inspectors access to key individuals, sites and equipment necessary to verify compliance with international law. The UN condemned Iraq for failing to comply with UN Security Council resolutions on August 15, 1991. The UN Security Council subsequently passed 12 more resolutions between 1991 and 1999 condemning Iraq and attempting to enforce the will of the international community2. The President of the Council also made 30 statements condemning Iraq's non-compliance.

Beyond commitments to return prisoners and to disarm weapons of mass destruction, the UN Security Council also passed Resolution 688 requiring Iraq to end repression of the Iraqi people "the consequences of which threaten international peace and security." The UN Commission on Human Rights and UN General Assembly reported on "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights" citing an "all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror." The Iraqi government blocked all visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights from 1992 to the present.

Amnesty International reported that in October 2000, Iraq executed dozens of women on charges of prostitution. Amnesty also reported the decapitation of numerous women accused of crimes with victims heads displayed in front of homes for several days. They further reported that the female relatives of prisoners are often raped as part of their torture. The UN Special Rapporteur, Max Van der Stoel, reported that hundreds of Iraqi Kurds were used as subjects in Iraq's testing of new chemical and biological weapons. Van der Stoel also reported at least 1,500 executions of political opponents. Sometime between September of 1998 and December of 1999, the town of Albu ‘Aysh was destroyed with extensive civilian casualties. UNSCOM also reported on a special prison for the children of adult prisoners. The Human Rights Alliance also reported that over 500 journalists and intellectuals have been executed.

Under Resolution 688, the United States, France and Britain were directed to operate no-fly zones over southern Iraq to protect the Shia minority (Iraq's governing elite is exclusively Sunni) and northern Iraq to protect five million Kurdish citizens of Iraq. The Iraqis of these communities strongly support the no-fly zones and believe that it is the key to safety for their families. I am a veteran of Operation Northern Watch and was proud to serve my country to protect helpless minorities. On September 16th, Iraq offered the UN Secretary General the opportunity to return UNSCOM to Iraq for "unrestricted" inspections. On September 17th, Iraqi armed forces fired on UN aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone. They did so again the following day. To date, the Iraqis have fired on UN aircraft over 60 times since their offer of "unrestricted" inspections.

Iraq is also prohibited from carrying out terrorist acts under the terms of the UN Security Council's Resolution 687. Despite this requirement, agents of the Iraqi Intelligence Service attempted to use a car bomb in 1993 to assassinate former President George Bush. Iraq harbors the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO) that killed several Americans. It also housed the Palestine Liberation Front, best known for killing American Leon Klinghoffer and many attacks against Israel. Iraq also sheltered the Abu Nidal organization and now pays $10,000 to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. Defectors report that Iraq operates an international terrorist training camp at Salman Pak, open to Arab and non-Arabs alike. While there is no clear link between the Iraqi government and the September 11th attacks, Iraq now harbors several members of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization.

Much of this activity by Iraq costs money. Iraq must operate under a UN embargo that allows it to sell oil with proceeds going into an account controlled by the UN. Despite protests from average Iraqis, the government of Iraq regularly applies for the use of the UN oil-for-food money to purchase luxury cars, electronic equipment and elite infant diet formula. Much of the funding under the UN program was used by Iraq to construct several "presidential palaces" detailed in a well-covered speech by then Secretary of State Madeline Albright. In order to generate funding for its weapons of mass destruction program and missile development, Iraq exports thousands of barrels of oil on the black market in violation of the UN program, with proceeds controlled by Saddam's two sons, Uday and Qusai. Total proceeds exceed several billion dollars – more than enough to fund a large weapons of mass destruction program.

In reviewing the reports of the UN, our allies and respected outside human rights groups, it is clear that the Iraqi regime represents a growing present danger to the United States, our allies, and its own people. Given its proximity to Iraq, our allies in Israel probably face the greatest danger. I believe that the disarmament of Iraq is important to the security of the United States but is vital to the security of our allies in Israel. In my judgement, the existence of Israel hangs on the success or failure of the UN effort to disarm Iraq. That is why the government of Israel, like Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, strongly supports this goal. It is clear that steadfast, concentrated action by the international community is needed to reduce the danger to the United States and our key allies.

Will Non-military Action by the International Community Achieve Our Objectives?

Between 1991 and 1997, UNSCOM was able to demilitarize a large number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and missiles. It is clear that UNSCOM was able to delay the expected 1993 date when Iraq was expected to possess a nuclear arsenal. UNSCOM's two chiefs, Ambassador David Kay and Ambassador Richard Butler, emphasize that while inspections yielded results, they had to be supported by strong international action to bolster the authority of the UN. This support waned in 1997 and allowed Iraq to force the withdrawal of UNSCOM in 1998.

There have been no inspections in Iraq for four years and less is known now about the progress Iraq has made on its weapons of mass destruction program. More is known about the resources Iraq spends on this program with indications that Iraq has substantially increased spending on special military projects over the years since UN inspectors were forced to leave. A steady stream of defectors and reports from other UN members indicate that Iraq is accelerating its work on nuclear, biological, chemical and missile programs.

Ambassador Kay testified before the House Armed Services Committee that further inspections would not be effective unless the UN was given a carte blanche to visit any site with no notice, retaining the right to produce any witness at any time. He advised the Committee that he believed Saddam Hussein would never agree to such an inspection policy.

He was wrong.

On September 16th, Saddam Hussein advised the Secretary General of the UN that Iraq would permit the redeployment of UN inspectors in Iraq with no restrictions. Many observers are understandably skeptical that Iraq will actually allow UN inspectors to peacefully disarm Iraq of its most deadly and expensive weapons.

Nevertheless, this is an opportunity that we cannot ignore.

The UN should mount an inspection mission to Iraq with the authority to conduct the most aggressive inspection plan possible. It is possible that non-military action by the international community will achieve our objectives in Iraq.

The history of international arms inspections shows some failures. Eighty years ago, the international community imposed an inspection regime on the government of Germany. The League of Nations created an "Inter-Allied Control Commission" for the "complete execution of delivery, destruction, rendering useless of weapons, ammunition and material carried out at the expense of the German government." Inspectors were granted full freedom of movement, all necessary facilities, documents and designs. 337 inspectors were deployed in 11 districts across the country. The Commission reported the following results:

Cannons Destroyed33,384
Artillery Shells Destroyed37,211,551
Machine Guns Destroyed87,240
Poison Gas Cylinders Destroyed920 tons

In sum, they reported that 97% of Germany's artillery and 98% of her men under arms were rendered ineffective.

The Commission's reports on German violations were very controversial. Andre Tardieu, the leading French diplomat for implementing the inspections, wrote to President Wilson on the controversy of inspector reports:

"The pacifist element in each of the nations of the League will be quite naturally inclined to deny reports disturbing to their peace of mind and more or less consciously espouse the cause of the German government which will deny the said reports. We must recall the opposition of these pacifist elements at the time when Germany armed to the teeth and openly made ready the aggression of 1870 and 1914. To sum up:
-- Germany will deny
-- Their government will discuss
-- Public opinion will be divided, alarmed, [and] nervous. The League, unarmed, will have brought to pass in the world not general peace but general uncertainty which will give birth to a kind of interior and exterior conflict."

In the end, Germany rearmed under the eyes of over 300 international inspectors. As evidence of violations mounted, the international community lost its nerve to impose the will of the League of Nations. This lesson of history is instructive and we should use it to make sure international inspections in Iraq do not suffer the same fate.

The record of inspections in Iraq is uneven. While the UN Special Commission on Iraq reported an impressive amount of Iraqi weaponry destroyed, its lack of cooperation from the government and failure to achieve a complete accounting show that it was not a complete success.

While some may say that inspections against a government determined to conceal are certain to fail, I disagree. Unlike the inspectors of Germany or even Iraq, a new Security Council resolution could lay out clear rules granting free, unescorted and unannouced access by inspectors to the Iraq programs. In my work on this issue, I joined with Rep. Robert Andrews of New Jersey -- a representative of the opposite party -- to form an "Iraq Working Group" here in the House. We have convened many meetings with UN Inspectors, Iraqis and Administration officials to learn more about this issue.

Our meetings with UN Inspectors have been some of the most fruitful. Dr. David Kay, the United Nations Chief Weapons Inspector, reported that if he was to return to Iraq, he would need a new Security Council Resolution with two major changes to foster success:

1. Complete access to all sites, including "Presidential sites" and Northern Iraq, which were denied to previous UN inspectors, and

2. The power to grant permanent asylum to any scientist and their families who could be taken out of Iraq and debriefed on the weapons of mass destruction program that employed them.

Kay reported that President Bush Sr. and President Clinton had denied him the authority to force access to key sites and failed to grant him the power to bring any Iraqi and their family members out of Iraq. He reported to our working group that with these two changes -- granted by a new Security Council resolution -- he would be willing to return to Iraq to carry out the will of the United Nations to disarm the government.

I have had several conversations with our National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, and members of our United Nations mission in New York who report that without a credible threat of force, Secretary of State Powell has little chance for passing the kind of Security Council resolution that Dr. Kay outlined would be needed to peacefully disarm Iraq.

They report that two key permanent members of the Council, Russia and France, have clear interests in this question. Russia is owed over $8 billion by the government of Iraq. She sees a possible war as interfering with debt repayments and -- as a good banker -- therefore is inclined against it. If the U.S. leads an international coalition to replace the government of Iraq and Russia opposed this move, then Russia would see its debt repudiated. Russia cannot allow that to happen and therefore would have to back an international effort once it forms. France's position is similar. France's number one goal in the region is access to the Iraqi export market. But if a new government is installed and France opposed this action, France would suffer a loss of a key export market. Therefore, if international pressure is formed, France cannot afford to be left out. Diplomats reported to me that this is similar to the situation facing the Council in September of 1990. Most members did not want to rescue Kuwait and preferred to let Iraq administer this former UN member as a new "19th province of Iraq." Once US action was imminent, the Council and many Arab nations supported the United States because they could not afford to offend the newly rescued Kuwaiti government. In similar fashion, if action is inevitable against Iraq, then the support of such nations will come because they cannot afford to be excluded from a new Iraq.

It is for these reasons, I support the action of this resolution. I am encouraged that the resolution has the support of the Senior Democratic and Republican leaders of this House. It underscores that the consideration of this issue should be without partisan rancor or advantage. We should not consider this measure as partisans but as Americans. This resolution offers the best hope for a UN Security Council resolution to rewrite the rules of inspection to make them effective. Secretary Powell has asked for this resolution to pass the Congress to give him the tools he needs to win UN support. I will vote to support him and this effort.

As a veteran, I see any potential military action first through the eyes of the young men and women who volunteered to wear the uniform and would carry out such a mission. As I have detailed here, I believe this resolution unlocks the door to more effective inspections. We must use the opportunities we have to take non-military action through the UN to determine if unrestricted inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction can take place. If these inspections succeed, we will have accomplished out objectives without loss of life. If they fail, it will rally international support against an isolated Iraq, making any more decisive action quicker and much more likely to succeed.



1 He later returned to Iraq and was executed.
2 UNSCR 715 (October 11, 1991), UNSCR 949 (October 15, 1994), UNSCR 1051 (March 27, 1996), UNSCR 1060 (June 12, 1996), UNSCR 1115 (June 21, 1997), UNSCR 1134 (October 23, 1997), UNSCR 1137 (November 12, 1997), UNSCR 1154 (March 2, 1998), UNSCR 1194 (September 9, 1998), UNSCR 1205 (November 5, 1998), and UNSCR 1284 (December 17, 1999).