

**THE COMMISSION ON  
THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES**

**HEARING ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO  
THE NATIONAL GUARD**

**DECEMBER 13-14, 2006**

**PANEL 3 – DECEMBER 14, 2006, 2:00 PM**

**WITNESSES:**

**MG RAYMOND F. REES, ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
STATE OF OREGON**

**MG R. MARTIN UMBARGER, ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
STATE OF INDIANA  
AND CHAIRMAN,  
NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES**

**MAJOR GENERAL ROGER P. LEMPKE, ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
STATE OF NEBRASKA  
AND PRESIDENT,  
ADJUTANTS GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES  
AS PRESENTED BY**

**MAJOR GENERAL FRANK VAVALA, ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
AND VICE PRESIDENT,  
ADJUTANTS GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES**

*Transcript by:  
Federal News Service  
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ARNOLD PUNARO: The commission will come to order. This afternoon the commission concludes our initial several days of hearings on S-2658 and HR-5200, the proposed National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006. As I've noticed previously in the previous panels, this legislation evoked strong feelings from supporters and opponents alike, and the commission is seeking testimony from witnesses on all sides of the issue in order to get as full an understanding as possible of the legislation and its implications.

Yesterday morning we heard primarily from departmental witnesses – first Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, David Chu, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Tom Hall testifying on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is scheduled, and has indicated to me that he will be testifying before the commission in the January timeframe. He is overseas visiting the troops during this upcoming holiday season, as we speak.

Our second witness yesterday was Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary for Preparedness George Foresman, who provided his department's assessment of the impact of the legislation with particular focus on the provisions which would enhance the role of the chief of the National Guard Bureau in identifying gaps in homeland security/civil support capabilities of the National Guard and securing the resources necessary to provide the required military assistance to civil authorities contemplated in local, state and federal emergency response plans. And I will tell our three witnesses that we questioned them pretty directly on this issue of requirements and who is supposed to establish the requirements, and then after hearing his answers, we suggested to him that perhaps the Department of Homeland Security is not doing as good a job as they need to be doing in basically getting to the Department of Defense the kind of requirements they believe they have as they profess to be in charge of the federal emergency response plan.

And I believe, after a lot of kind of talking around the problem, he sort of rogered up that, yeah, he probably could do a better job of that. I will tell you that he's a very seasoned – as you all know him – professional first responder with a lot of experience, and we're lucky to have a guy at DHS who's got his eye on the ball like that. But he's admitted that on the requirement side of the house, they need to do a much better job of getting to the Department of Defense the basis upon which we can do some resourcing decisions.

Finally, our senior Army and Air Force witnesses this morning provided their services perspectives on the impact of S-2658 and HR-5200 on the relationship between the Army and Air National Guard and their parent services. We heard from the chief of staff of the Army, General Schoomaker. We heard from the secretary of the Air Force, Mike Wynne, chief of staff of the Air Force, General Buzz Moseley. And the secretary of the Army, Fran Harvey will be testifying in January as well along with General Pace.

Our final panel in this initial several days of hearings will be the proponents of the legislation. We went to the congressional sponsors to seek their guidance, who would

best represent their position on this legislation. They came back and urged us to hear from this distinguished group that we have before us this afternoon, so I want to welcome Major General Frank Vavala, the vice president of the Adjutants General Association of the United States and adjutant general of the state of Delaware, and he will be delivering testimony this afternoon on behalf of Major General Roger Lempke, the president of the Adjutants General and the Nebraska TAG. General Lempke unfortunately is fogged in – weathered in in Nebraska. He’s testified before the commission before. He’s a very expert and viable witness, and I’m sure we’ll be able to engage with him in continuous dialogue, but I know he’s ably represented here today.

Major General Martin Umbarger, the chairman of the National Guard Association of the U.S. and adjutant general of the state of Indiana, and Major General Raymond Fred Rees, adjutant general of the state of Oregon, who is extremely well known to many of us here on the commission. We’ve served together off and on in many capacities, and probably no more knowledgeable, at least in this one commission’s humble experience – knowledgeable and experienced individual on all these matters than Fred, who served in the Guard Bureau, as the head of the Guard Bureau, on RFPB and TAG two or three times, and just about every other job. So he’s been around all these issues for years and he knows the ins and outs, and I suspect that’s a reason why the proponents felt so strongly about having him testify this afternoon.

Major General Timothy Lowenberg, the adjutant general of the state of Washington, was also invited, but he had a long-standing scheduling conflict. That was our hit, not his, because of the timing of the way we scheduled the hearing, and could not attend.

I should mention we also asked General Blum to testify in this series – in this initial series – but again, he’s traveling and he will be coming in January as well.

I welcome back from the morning session the chief of the Army National Guard, General Vaughn, who is ably assisting the chief of staff of the Army today. And I know that the adjutant general know that he’s not there watching over your shoulders; he’s there to provide whatever reinforcing fires may be necessary, if any. So he also still owes us some testimony because he was not able to make the San Antonio hearing when the other chiefs testified, and we look forward to getting him before the commission with his valuable insights.

So we look forward this afternoon to your candid analysis of the background in the specific provisions of this legislative proposal, what you and the congressional sponsors believe what was accomplished.

I pointed out at every panel we’ve had the last two days that people need to understand that the proponents of these legislation, that congressional sponsors, Senators Bond and Leahy in the Senate, and many other co-sponsors; Congressman Gene Taylor and Congressman Tom Davis in the House and many other co-sponsors, these are not jump on a bandwagon, Johnny-come-lately friends of the National Defense or the Guard

and Reserve. They've consistently supported a strong national defense day in and day out for decades, and much of the equipment that we have in the Guard and Reserve today, that we're using in wartime probably wouldn't be there if it wasn't for proponents like that of the Guard and Reserve. So these are not critics of the Pentagon that are proposing this legislation.

I've also reminded some of our departmental witnesses that I recall very well the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in 1986, which also made significant changes in the relationships in the Department of Defense, was not supported by one single person in the Department of Defense at the time that the Congress was proposing that legislation either.

So we welcome you again this afternoon. I hope you'll be able to – one of the things we've challenged all our witnesses to do is we'd like to get a clear understanding of what are the problems that are we trying to fix and what are the requirements that generate those problems? We'll have, as I said, a second hearing on this proposed legislation in January with the additional witnesses as indicated.

So with that, I will turn it over to our witnesses. And I don't know if you all have self-organized yourselves and in what order you would like to testify, but I'm going to leave that to you all. So however you want to proceed is fine with the commission.

**MAJOR GENERAL R. MARTIN UMBARGER:** Well, Chairman Punaro, members of the commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am Major General Marty Umbarger, the chairman of the board of the National Guard Association of the United States and the adjutant general of the state of Indiana. I have served in the Indiana National Guard for over 37 years and I'm proud to say 34 years of which I served as a citizen soldier – an M-day soldier.

The National Guard Association of the United States has spoken on behalf of the members of the National Guard for over 128 years, and it seems fitting that we would offer our perspective on any discussions of empowerment of the National Guard and of its leadership. Our mission remains the same today as it has from the birth of our organization: united representation before Congress. The National Guard Association of the United States applauds the determination of this commission as they take on the challenge of defining the future of the reserve components in the years ahead.

We embrace our comrades in the federal reserve and the active force. Together we have accomplished much in these most demanding times. Each of these components celebrates its individuality, but we all share certain common principles. Having said that, it is important to note that the constitutionality mandated dual-mission status of the National Guard clearly sets us apart.

My purpose today is to convince this congressionally charged commission that the time has come to create new relationships between the National Guard and the Department of Defense to offer a solution to assist in the direction and administration of this most valuable defense asset. In April of this year, bold and innovative members of

the Senate and House introduced Senate Bill 2658 and its companion Bill 5200 – Senate Bill 2658 and the House Bill 5200, the National Guard Defense Enhancement and The National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006. This legislation offers potential relief for the frictions between the guard and the active component.

We appear before this commission today because the Congress has referred to you – your attention to the concept raised in the Empowerment Act. While our association was confident that the creative and commonsense approach contained in this legislation would easily carry today in the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress, it was not to be. You now have the opportunity to embrace these solutions with a favorable report to the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress in March of 2007.

The National Guard Association of the United States sees the timing of your deliberations as an opportunity to leverage both the new leadership in the Department of Defense with the selection of Dr. Robert Gates as our new secretary, and the possibility of a strong, fresh, and energetic Congress. We believe the conditions are right for making a new beginning.

At the Air National Guard Senior Leader Conference in Baltimore earlier this week, Dr. Michael Hammer, noted author and expert in process re-engineering, spoke to the senior officer and enlisted force of the Air National Guard about the way ahead. Dr. Hammer's impressive clients list includes the United States Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, but he pulls no punches in arguing the concept of the business process. I quote Dr. Hammer. He said, "The way DOD operates simply doesn't make it anymore. Organizations that do not adapt or change go by the way of the dinosaur. The status quo just doesn't work anymore."

We truly believe an empowerment legislation to be the way ahead. The introduction in the Empowerment Act was met by the Department of Defense with a blanket rejection of all its sections on the grounds that neither the chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the secretary of the Defense believed change was necessarily warranted. It is our understanding that this continues to be their position. Unfortunately, this Pentagon position is extremely disappointing to us in the Guard and is the very reason that empowerment legislation is needed.

Pentagon officials have said that the Guard has been and is at the table, that except for a few isolated instances, their inputs are regularly factored into strategic decision-making. And as a general, let me give you some personal observations about the Guard's seat at the table and the decision-making process.

In a January 2006 budget decision, the Army endeavored to reduce the Army National Guard force structure by 18,000 soldiers, expurgate combat teams, two division headquarters, and one combat aviation brigade. In a simultaneous budget action, the Air Force announced its plan to reduce and lower the Air National Guard Force structure by 14,000 airmen.

On February 2, 2006, 75 members of the U.S. Senate sent a letter of protest to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. On February the 3<sup>rd</sup> of 2006, 51 governors signed a letter of protest to the president. The governors ultimately prevailed and budget support for the existing force structure was restored. It does not need to be this difficult. All of us know the stress that exists on our armed forces today. We are a nation at war. No one disputes the Guard's value and the contribution to winning on a war on terrorism. Let's be clear. The National Guard Association understands that the competition for scarce resources puts tremendous pressure on the services to do more with less. In these times, to seriously consider a reduction in the National Guard or any reserve component, absolutely makes no sense and it's definitely not a good business decision.

Empowerment is not just about creating a four-star general. It's not just about adding another seat at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. More importantly, it is about recognizing the unique nature of the National Guard and providing for the security and the well-being of the citizens of the several states, as well as prosecuting the nation's war overseas and all our commitments.

The chiefs of the National Guard Bureau have provided the commission with a detailed assessment of each of the provisions of the Empowerment Act of 2006. The National Guard Association of the United States agrees with the bureau chief that while the Joint Chiefs speak with informed authority on Title 10 prosecution of the nation boards and provision of advice to the president and the secretary of Defense, there is no question that the chief of the National Guard Bureau is a subject matter expert with regard to the defense and the security of our homeland.

I would remind this commission that the national defense strategy articulated in the 1421 model identifies the most important of our defense commitments as the defense of the homeland. The Army and Air National Guard are forward deployed in more than 3,000 communities across this nation as America's first line of defense. We know the nation's first responders by name – the police chiefs, the sheriffs, the fire chiefs – the incident commanders.

The chief has said, "The grade of the chief of the National Guard Bureau should be determined by the level of work performed in a scope and effect of the action taken." We agree that the officer charged with the responsibility of over 450,000-plus soldiers and airmen – we are larger than all the strengths of the other reserve components combined – merits a four-star rank.

Let me also suggest that more recent service decisions on sweeping resistance to post-mobilization training suggestions have failed to recognize the unique nature of the National Guard, and now the Army has raised this latest concern about the unfettered accessibility to the Guard.

The Army National Guard has not refused – the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard has not refused to accept any single mission and it has met every call. I believe the American people simply will not swallow the myth that the Guard is not

accessible. If Guard leadership recommendations on shortening the length of post-mobilization training for the Guard had been followed from the earliest days of the war on terror, the Army would not find itself as severely constrained for manpower. This is not an accessibility problem; it is a management problem.

Logic suggests that the National Guard has perspective that merits senior leadership participation and more than in the ordinary way. Empowerment legislation is a bold step to codify in law what has heretofore been left to policy interpretation by the Defense Department. The Army and the Air Force – each of these provisions of the 2006 Empowerment Act sought to speak, to identify a weakness in their current process. The leadership of the Guard does not seek confirmation or espouse disloyalty. They want a professional, collegial relationship with their parent services and the Department of Defense. Adjutants general bring a wealth of experience found nowhere else in the defense establishment.

While the concept of jointness is now common parlance, it has been a way of life in our Guard for over 60 years. The National Guard Association of the United States believes it is unconscionable not to harness this power in a predictable way. An integral part of implementing empowerment should be the utilization of Guard general officers, including adjutants general, into the appropriate Army and Air Force billets where they have the requisite skills.

Mr. Chairman, the National Guard Association of the United States will continue to work with you on perfecting appropriate empowerment legislation, and I would be happy to respond to questions from you and other members of the commission.

REP. PUNARO: Thank you, General, for that excellent statement.

General.

MAJOR GENERAL FRANK VAVALA: Chairman Punaro and members of the commission, thank you for allowing me to testify on behalf of the Adjutants General Association of the United States. I'm Major General Frank Vavala, the adjutant general of Delaware and vice president of the Adjutants General Association of the United States, and, like General Umbarger, was a traditional member of the National Guard for 31 years and have almost 40 years of total service.

Our president, General Lempke, sends his regrets. I spoke to him while walking up to this hearing and I thanked him profusely for allowing me this opportunity to excel. (Laughter.) General Lempke, if he had been here, would be wearing blue, which certainly underscores the joint nature of our service in the National Guard.

The Adjutants Association of the United States membership consists of the adjutant generals of 50 states, the three territories, and the District of Columbia. I'll offer a perspective on legislation known as the National Defense Enhancement and National

Guard Empowerment Act of 2006, contained in two identical bills, HR 5200 and S 2658, will I'll refer to as the Guard Empowerment or just "the act" in my testimony.

Our views on national defense changed dramatically after the brutal terrorist attack against Americans, in America, on September 11, 2001. The entire focus of our Title 10 organization and planning was on defeating enemies away from our homeland. The last legislation to dramatically change how the Defense Department organizes the fight was the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. Most notable was the establishment of combatant commands, which served the nation well in Desert Storm, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Were it not for 9/11, we would probably not be here today. But clearly times have changed again and our defense organizations must keep up.

In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina uncovered weaknesses in local and federal government preparedness, organization, and responsiveness to large natural disasters. Even though the Department of Defense is not generally the lead federal agency in responding to natural disasters, the immensity of resources needed to save lives and restore order in Louisiana and Mississippi significantly tasked military resources, specifically the National Guard in Title 32 rather than Title 10 status.

The Guard Empowerment Act seeks to close gaps in the Department of Defense organization and operations that link with state active duty and Title 32 operations and hinder the nation's ability to bring critical resources to bear on external and internal threats. It does not seek to create a pseudo-separate service, as some have claimed. Let me be loud and clear about this point. The adjutants general in no uncertain terms want to be different or separate from the Army or Air Force. We've spent nearly 30 years working to operate the same as the active component. We simply desire that the full spectrum of missions assigned to the National Guard be fully represented in planning, training, and resource allocation.

The Guard Empowerment Act seeks to shape Title 10 practices in moderate ways to better cope with the emergence of Title 32 operations in homeland defense and homeland security missions. Today I'll address major provisions of the act using effects based on rationale and logic.

The chief of the National Guard Bureau serves as the principal advisor to the Army and Air Force leadership on matters pertaining to the National Guard. Certainly the current chief, Lieutenant General Steve Blum, has served masterfully in this role. However, current roles and responsibilities place the chief in a position having to wait until his advice is sought. Clearly the National Guard is being used under Title 32 in innovative ways never imagined in decades prior – ways such as airport security, the G-8 Summit, responsibility for security operations at the Winter Olympics, the Hurricane Katrina response, and most recently, enhanced border security known as Operation Jumpstart.

For the secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the services to be fully aware of how the National Guard can be used in innovative ways,



the chief needs regular involvement in senior leadership activities instead of waiting to be asked. The Guard Empowerment Act contains two provisions for enhancing the chief's ability to participate upfront in homeland defense and homeland security discussions in DOD. Number one, it assigns the chief of the National Guard Bureau to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Number two, it makes the National Guard Bureau a joint activity under the secretary of Defense and the chief principal advisor to the secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters.

We believe that these actions will place the chief in a position to participate in policy and planning discussions that will lead to decisions that will better prepare the National Guard for its spectrum of missions.

The next effect sought is to ensure the National Guard is appropriately represented in the combatant command for which it will be the primary force provider in most situations, namely Northern Command. Reserving the deputy commander position for a qualified National Guard officer accomplishes this objective while respecting the Title 10 makeup of this command.

While some have contended that this will restrict the NORTHCOM commander's ability to select officers for the deputy position, I point out that the longstanding practice of specifying a senior Canadian officer for deputy commander position of NORAD does not seem to have hurt the effectiveness of that organization.

The National Guard officer in the deputy commander position will ensure NORTHCOM understands and fully embraces all National Guard capabilities under Title 32 and Title 10 while also providing a means to achieve closer working relationships with the National Guard Joint Force Headquarters in the several states and territories.

The next effect desired is to better leverage the joint experience and the special knowledge National Guard officers bring to fighting against terrorism at home and responding to natural disasters. The provision in the act that requires consideration of National Guard officers for positions through lieutenant general achieves this. Current DOD policies and practices restrict National Guard officers from competing for certain general officer positions.

The last effect desired is to enhance ability to obtain the resources to support state, federal, homeland defense and homeland security missions. In the prior decade, resources for the Army National Guard – that's personnel, equipment, training, and facilities – were determined based on assumptions of units having less than full capabilities. With the Army and Air National Guard engaged in full spectrum of missions involving state active duty, the Title 10 service, this model is no longer feasible. But current and projective funding for the Department of Defense is not expected to grow.

Spending more is not an option. Spending smarter is necessary. Increasing the grade of the chief from lieutenant general to general will accomplish two things. First, it will place the chief at a grade level commiserate with managing a \$21.8 billion budget

and over 450,000 Army and Air Guard personnel in Title 32 operations and also training them for Title 10 operations, and serving as the communication links to the 50 states, the three territories, and the District of Columbia, and also, the Department of Defense on National Guard matters.

Second, the four-star grade is the proper level of the primary advocate for homeland security resources. No one else in the Department of Defense directly champions National Guard needs for the home front, as does the chief of the National Guard Bureau. Unfortunately, the National Guard has often not received resources specified by Congress concerned about citizens' protection and safety.

Separate budgets for training and equipping the National Guard for homeland security missions is another feature of the act that will ensure the Guard is ready for its full mission spectrum. The purpose of this change is not to acquire new and different equipment; just the opposite is true. The Guard cannot effectively operate across its mission spectrum with different equipment for different missions. The purpose is to simply assure that congressional expectations regarding training and equipping are met.

Finally, the National Guard Charter needs updating to reflect the full spectrum of missions we are involved in and the range of government organizations with whom we deal. There are sections of the act the adjutant generals did not support that may require improved language. First is the elimination of the National Guard advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This position is vital for working daily issues that are National Guard specific just as other staff members work issues specific to their expertise. This position is a staff rather than an executive level position.

Second, we would like to see legislation that will require DOD to establish policies that would credit National Guard officers for joint-duty credit for work performed for the homeland joint environment, including the state joint force headquarters for NORTHCOM, combatant commands, and for the office of the Secretary of Defense.

I have one final point. I was told that earlier testimony by Department of Defense representatives highlighted the fact that the chief of the National Guard Bureau does not technically, I suppose, have command and control of National Guard assets and forces. Lieutenant General Blum exerted superior management and leadership in the face of stodgy, bureaucratic impediments to get over 50,000 National Guard members and supporting resources to New Orleans over a week's time. A timely and massive movement of resources reminiscent of the Berlin airlift. Later he would organize and move 6,000 National Guard members to the southwest border and engage in border patrol support in less than 60 days. We view the question here as one of expertise, not command and control.

The fight against terrorism began with the National Guard responding in state active duty and Title 32. In the five years following 2001, no subsistent policy or process changes for the role of the National Guard have been made to adapt to the different style

of warfare or the nation's increased concerns about homeland security and the role of the National Guard.

Your final report is not due out until early 2008 and then will likely be followed by a lengthy period of legislative actions before real reform begins. Meanwhile, the enemies overseas continue to fight. Threats to our homeland remain as great as ever and natural disasters of even greater magnitude than Hurricane Katrina are possible.

My sense is that the American people want to see changes that will improve the ability of the National Guard to protect our homeland and our citizens. The Guard Empowerment Act presents an opportunity to make very logical adjustments the Department of Defense operations that will enhance the nation's ability to fight terrorism overseas while protecting our homeland. Thank you, again, for allowing me to testify today. I look forward to your questions and the opportunity to work with the commission in other areas.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you, General. And as persuasive as Roger Lempke always is when he testifies and speaks, you can report back to him he was more than ably represented by your presence here today for sharing the opening statement, and I know equally as well in the Q's and A's.

GEN. VAVALA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: General Rees.

MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND F. REES: Chairman Punaro and members of the commission, I thank you for this opportunity to testify. Pardon me; I'm going to offer up my testimony as I presented for the written record. If you permit me, I'll try to abbreviate this in the interest of time.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you very much, and without objection, all the testimony will be included in the record.

GEN. REES: All right. Thank you. When you made introductions earlier, you alluded to the various positions that I've held in the past. And certainly, I think I'm somewhat unique, serving at all the various levels. One of the things that's not in my written testimony is that I am also – in my current position as adjutant general of Oregon, I'm also appointed as the governor's homeland security advisor and have operational control of our Office of Emergency Management in Oregon.

So in this abbreviated context of what I'm going to try to present to you here, I want to just get this message across to you: The people of America deserve the highest level of security which our government is able to deliver. In order to ensure that our integrated state and federal, civil and military capabilities can deliver that security, reform of the National Guard is absolutely essential. That reform, regardless of exactly

how it happens, must address two critical elements: relationships and resourcing. And certainly General Umbarger and General Vavala have talked to that.

In my written testimony, I talk about two analogies that I suggest that you look at. One is the Coast Guard and how it operates, how it works with the Navy, works with DHS, with DOD to see to it that the full spectrum of responsibilities, whether it's as its own separate entity it fulfills its responsibilities to DHS, or as reserve of the Navy it fulfills its responsibilities to the Department of Defense.

More importantly, perhaps, is the analogy to the Special Operations Command because I believe that the way that this legislation that you are reviewing here and that you are questioning all these witnesses about is specifically about the business or relationship that's similar to the Special Operations Command and how they establish requirements, how they articulate whatever the shortfalls may be that the services are not particularly covering, and how they can get that accomplished. And I believe this legislation somewhat gives the same capability to the National Guard Bureau, to the chief of the National Guard, and I strongly endorse it as it is written.

There's also a comment in my written testimony about the role of the deputy commander at Northern Command. It is somewhat the same as General Vavala just described, and I strongly endorse that from my own personal experience out there, that the deputy commander of Northern Command could be and should be a National Guardsman that would effectively help communicate with the 50 states and territories and the District of Columbia in using the National Guard in a very seamless and effective fashion.

So in summary, I say that, again, I support strongly the legislation. I think there are a couple of revisions that General Vavala has suggested here in pertaining to the National Guard advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and policy for joint credit for National Guard and Reserve officers that need to be addressed or modified within this. I encourage and urge the commission to endorse the proposals of House Bill 5200, or as an alternative, to put forward other viable reforms, which will effectively address this business of relationships and resourcing to get at these unmet requirements.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you.

Our first questioner this afternoon will be Commissioner Les Brownlee.

LES BROWNLEE: Well, first of all, let me thank all of you for your service to the nation as –

MR. PUNARO: Press that microphone –

MR. BROWNLEE: Oh, I'm sorry.

As leaders of our citizen soldiers and citizen soldiers yourself, we thank you for your service. We really appreciate your testimony here. I know that we've had some very intense discussions here on this commission regarding these issues and we've been asked by the members of Congress to look at it.

One of the things – you are all here clearly representing your views based on your experience in the National Guard. Do you believe, based on what you know, that similar legislation should be advanced for the reserves? General Umbarger?

GEN. UMBARGER: Well, I can't speak for the Army Reserve not having ever served in that.

MR. BROWNLEE: Well, any of the reserves, then.

GEN. UMBARGER: I think we are unique in the fact that while we have similar roles, if you go back to the Army and Air Force and our capacity, the Air Force Reserve and the Army Reserve, but it's the homeland security, that state mission that we have – it's in the Constitution; each state shall have a militia. (We're all ?) to the citizens of their state where I think we differ tremendously.

MR. BROWNLEE: Okay.

General Vavala, do you have view?

GEN. VAVALA: Mr. Commissioner, General Umbarger underscored the key aspect of this. It's all about the role of the Guard. It's the uniqueness of the Guard. It's the constitutionally uniqueness of what we do. We are unlike any other reserve component because of our dual federal and our state missions. And as such, this kind of legislation needs to apply to us as a service rather than the reserve components. They are different; we are different. We're very proud of that fact that, again, it was constitutionally based. I feel the founding fathers had it right, that we needed a force that was able to take care of the federal mission but also back here at home to support the state.

MR. BROWNLEE: I totally agree with that.

GEN. REES: Sir, I think that, again, as his argument stated, this legislation speaks to the business of how the Guard and its role out there, in a unique fashion, serving the governors in response as a first military responder to domestic emergencies is a – we have 200 years of history here as far as the Constitution statute and custom in what people expect the National Guard be able to do on behalf of governors.

On the other hand, I think we're also looking for some seamlessness. And I think there's been a lot of discussion – I don't think it's addressed directly in this bill – about how we can have better use of our emergency preparedness liaison officers that are out in

every state that are coming from all the reserve components representing their services, better relationships with the defense coordinating elements that are in each FEMA region.

So all of those things could be looked at, certainly could be dealt with, but I think what we're really talking about here is the business of how can the National Guard communicate and reduce whatever gap there may be between what's going on in the states and at the national level?

MR. BROWNLEE: The National Guard and Reserve, especially in the Army, has become increasingly involved in our combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. And you all know that we've discussed on this panel here the transition from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve force, and that clearly has some changes which we're considering and you're addressing here today.

Some of the problems that I'm personally aware of that came up when we started getting some of the National Guard brigades ready to go to combat were manning. Some of the units were not fully manned and had been, as this chairman pointed out, volunteers stripped out of them, and they had manning unit integrity problems. They were not properly equipped. Some of them required additional training to get them up to that standard. What do you consider, each of you – I'd like for you to address this – to be the most critical areas we ought to address here with respect to these things? And what changes in both legislation, legal, the law, and policies would you recommend?

GEN. UMBARGER: Sir, I would say that, you know, being a – citizen soldiers have always come at the sound of the gun after 9/11, or submitting when the president said he needed us at the airports or whether he needed us on the borders. He used the Guard critical infrastructure throughout this nation. I heard this testimony this morning. Really a lot of our volunteers were out of some our high-speed units, young men and women, volunteers in droves, to try to protect our nation. That was probably a mistake if we look back on it. We probably should have housed them. We probably should have kept some of our combat forces a little more ready for the long fight.

I will tell you that the AFORGEN model, the Army Force Generation Model, brings to me personally what my experience is, a great predictability for our young men and women. Me, as the adjutant general, to know that I've got a brigade combat team – which I have one in Indiana; I was fortunate to command it – they're going off to war as a brigade combat team, just like those in the Army, that I've got the opportunity to not cross level right at the time they get to MOB station. I can do that earlier enough, at two or three years, to get them fully manned. And hopefully we get the right equipment so we can train in our pre-MOB set.

MR. BROWNLEE: Yes.

GEN. UMBARGER: Get those individual skills done by the leadership we're going to go to war with. We have that done so when they come to the MOB station, all their SRP is done. They're individually ready to go and they can do their collective final

validation there at the MOB station and go over as a full combat organization. And they've trained together – see, we do training not just at the MOB station. We have – our weekend assemblies and our annual trainings are very intense anymore. And if we had that team put together, that model gives us the predictability to do that, so we go as a fighting unit, whether it be a detachment, a company, a battalion, or a full-up brigade combat team.

MR. BROWNLEE: Thank you.

General Vavala:

GEN. VAVALA: Sir, I'd follow on to what General Umbarger said, that obviously predictability is vital to our ability to man and equip our force. And we probably, if we had it to do over again, as he said, would probably approach this thing in a different fashion.

We feel that we can certainly meet the needs of the nation and, from a manning and equipping standpoint, our service components are taking steps to be able to provide what's necessary. Cross leveling is a way of life for us, but it's also a way of life for the active component as well. If you could go in there and look at the analysis in order to provide manned and ready units that are deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, there's a cross leveling that takes place. But from our perspective, it's that predictability to be able to tell that soldier, airman and woman that this when you're going and this is what the expectation is and to be able to meet that expectation.

MR. BROWNLEE: Yes, very good. You might be interested to know this morning during testimony by General Schoomaker, he mentioned that same thing and said they were certainly moving to address that and I know he shares your concern about that.

GEN. REES: Sir –

MR. BROWNLEE: He also said it was kind of like building an aircraft in flight. You know – (chuckles) – they're at war at the same time we're trying to fix the problem.

I'm sorry – General Rees?

GEN. REES: Sir, I think from my – again, my unique perspective in the three times I've served as an adjutant general, first of all, when I started in this business the Cold War was still going on.

MR. BROWNLEE: Yes.

GEN. REES: The second time I went back was after Desert Storm, and now I've come back and got into this business again, where we are in the post-nine-one (sic) era. And I will tell you that in each case, the National Guard was responding, doing what was

asked of it. And what I'm seeing now is a veteran force, a veteran organization. This war has gone on longer than World War II. We're seeing a lot of competence, confidence in what they're doing. People at every level are very focused at, I think, getting the job done.

And I think that what General Umbarger and General Vavala have just talked about, this business about training unit call-ups is a very important aspect of this. I think we need to shorten the times that people are actually mobilized so that we don't spend so much time at mobilization stations –

MR. BROWNLEE: Yes.

GEN. REES: – that we use the mobilization time for actually deployments – get on with it, get over there, and get home. And I think the other sub-element to this that needs to be addressed is that in those two previous episodes when I served as an adjutant general, there was always this understanding that we were going to cascaded older equipment or we wouldn't have the right kind of equipment. It would come later on. And I think that's got to be addressed. Fortunately, I understand from General Vaughn and others that have communicated to us that there is going to be fenced money in the POM to see to it that our Title 10 go-to-war equipment is going to be there.

But if we're going to have an enhanced role in homeland security and homeland defense, we can't have this roller coaster business. We've got to have some kind of baseline capability in there to establish, what are those requirements? How can we get the job done and have that equipment there? We don't have this sign wave of readiness that it is a steadier state than it is now.

MR. BROWNLEE: Yes. Thank you.

Last question, Mr. Chairman, if I could. Right now Title 10 says that the secretaries of the military departments are responsible, along with the chiefs. The chiefs actually assist the secretary in the carrying out of his responsibilities, but that the secretaries are responsible for organizing, equipping, and training. They're not actually in a chain of command anywhere. They're responsible for organizing, equipping and training.

General Vavala, you said in your statement that the chief would have responsibilities for management and training under this legislation. Would you propose legislation that would then change the responsibilities of the secretaries of the military departments with respect to their organizing, equipping and training responsibilities?

There's none that I've seen that does that, but I don't think you could ignore that if you were going to give the proposal of the enhanced role of the chief of the National Guard bureau here these responsibilities.



GEN. VAVALA: Well, Mr. Secretary, first of all, you talk about organizing, equipping and training, and that is the role of the secretaries of the various service components. I would not recommend changing that. And again, that organizes, equips and trains for our federal mission. I think I said that in the testimony, that obviously we need that kind of equipping and organization and training to meet both of our federal and our state roles. As far as the chief's role in that, we're not looking at a command and control thing with the chief, we're looking at an oversight in management and a channel of communication for the service secretaries. And that's what I meant in it.

MR. BROWNLEE: Where does he fit, in your view – and others of you I'd like for you to comment also – with respect to the secretary and the chief?

GEN. VAVALA: Well, again, the recommendation is that we would be viewed as a joint entity, and the chief of the bureau would be an advisor to the secretary of the Army, secretary of the Air Force.

MR. BROWNLEE: General Rees?

GEN. REES: As I understand what's this legislation's on, we're not trying to do harm to the relationship –

MR. BROWNLEE: No, no, I understand. I'm just trying to sort out these responsibilities here. We don't want to make things more confusing than what they might have been in the past.

GEN. REES: Yes, sir. I think that for the better part of 30 years, the total force concept, as articulated by Melvin Laird –

MR. BROWNLEE: Sure.

GEN. REES: – and Creighton Abrams is that everybody endorses this. This has proven to be a wonderful tool, and for the Title 10 war fight, I think that we're doing a very good job of trying to fulfill all those requirements. What we're seeing here, or what we're proposing, I think, in this legislation is the idea that when we get to the business of what happens in the states, what happens in the domestic arena – and my analogy, again, going back to Special Operations Command – if you went back historically and you looked at when budget decisions were made, requirements were established, et cetera for Special Operations Command, and it had to go into the services to compete against, say, conventional forces, so that last dollar was decided on; it typically went to conventional forces, it didn't go to Special Operations. So legislation was created to make sure that those requirements could be established and there was a way to track the money and make sure that, yes, it did end up with Special Operations.

And what we're suggesting here and through this legislation is an opportunity to address that in the context of what goes on in the domestic arena and those areas where perhaps the war fight capabilities are not going to be able to address all of the issues that

are incumbent in the domestic arena. Examples of that would be planning, training, and exercising. That there's no operations money for that. Some of these things that General Blum has advocated to the JROC appear to be having some success are things like what they call the CERFP. It's an enhanced capability to take existing organizations out there and give them special tools to do urban search and rescue, these kinds of things that typically aren't in the repertoire of your Title 10 go-to-war mission.

All of those elements would be in this legislation if we could get this passed so not to do violence or harm our relationship with the secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, but to articulate this special niche requirement.

GEN. REES: I think the relationship has to be there continued with the service chiefs, but I think, again, it's how the Guard is being used in a joint manner. We all remember as – I was an Army guy, always have been an infantry guy. We talked about combined arms before we really started doing it. We talked about jointness before we really started doing it. I'll tell you, the Guard today is truly a joint organization. You sit and you think about the state partnership program that started in 1994. I can think about – it has nothing to do with the services, but where we went and we embraced each Guard state, got a sister organization of the old Warsaw Pact countries that the chief of the National Guard Bureau has directed. It's worked tremendously. We've got a great relationships with all those countries, has brought them into democracy. I will tell you, I have Slovakia from Indiana and I've had the chief of their armed forces in my home, as well I in his.

And I'll tell you, when we went over to Iraq, you look at those countries; those are the countries that backed us. Those are the countries that sent forces in with us. Some of our more traditional allies, as you well know, has not been there with us. So we have a great relationship there. The G-8 Summit, the Winter Olympics – I can't tell you what I've learned in my state that – I have a fighter wing. Now, you think of fighter wing, you've got aircraft and you've got maintainers. I'm surprised at the amount of capability for the homeland that I've got in my Air Guard, my civil engineering units, and my medical unit is all part of that wing.

So it's all part of that capability that, I think, the chief would be able to work directly with the Department of Defense and let them know what we're capable of doing on all these unique missions that he's asked of us.

MR. BROWNLEE: Well, thank you.

Let me just, in closing, say how very much I admire the members of the National Guard throughout this nation and the great service they provide. And I have a first cousin who retired last year as the command sergeant major of the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division of the Texas National Guard. And I have such great admiration for him and what he's done over the years, and all those soldiers out there, and we appreciate their service very, very much. Thank you. And that of their families as well. They put up with a lot.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you Commissioner Brownlee.

Commissioner McKinnon.

DAN MCKINNON: I don't believe there's a single person in this room, on the commissioner or anywhere else, or at the DOD, that doesn't believe in the importance of the National Guard. I mean, we had testimony this morning from the chief of staff of the Army of how important you all are to their mission.

But what we're talking here today is about legislation that's been proposed by the Congress, or to the Congress, to be adopted. And they've asked this commission to look at that legislation and say what should be done about it. Along that line, I'd like to know, maybe, what are the top three issues on that legislation that you all feel are the most important issues?

There's a lot of issues here, and we're hearing from the fellows at DOD that they're not necessary, and they've given us arguments why they're not. And I think from your all's standpoint, we need to hear what you all think of why they are really genuinely necessary to change the law of the way the Department of Defense operates. Why do you need a four-star general? Why do you need to be part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? What's the difference between a joint bureau and a joint activity? Who does Gen. Blum report to? This would be helpful, at least from our standpoint of thinking. Do we have the ammunition to understand why this legislation is necessary?

GEN. UMBARGER: Well, I'll jump on that first, sir, and try my darndest here. I feel the three that I would pick would be – I do feel the Army and Air National Guard – Air National Guard Bureau needs to be a four-star general. I said earlier in my testimony we're over 65 percent of the reserve component force, over 450 soldiers and airmen. We are here. And we talk about the uniqueness and the difference between the Army Reserve and the Air Force Reserve and the Guard – I was just thinking a little bit after that question was asked is, you know, we do mirror both components. We abrogate combat teams just like they have. Our functional brigades – we have 106 brigades in the Army National Guard and we have wings in the Air Force, both mobility wings and tanker wings and F-16s. We are part of the fight overseas. We can go in and do the same as the active component. The reserve component of the other services merely take up a void in which they got most of the combat support and combat service support. So we have that uniqueness about it.

The other side is this 1421 strategy, defending the homeland. Who better to defend it than the National Guard? I think no one knows us better and knows what we need at that level to provide the resources, the training, and the equipping through all the adjutant generals than the chief of the National Guard Bureau, who then could convey that to the secretary of Defense, could convey that to the president about the uniqueness.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay. Well, DOD will argue away at you're part of – let's take the Army's side of the house area. You're part of the Army and you've got the chief of staff of the Army and he's going to make that argument for you.

GEN. UMBARGER: Yes, sir. I've met many great – and I've got great relationships – I'm a senior Army guy. I can't tell you the number of senior Army generals I've met who say, you know, I really don't understand the Guard; I've never worked with the Guard. Now, hopefully that's changing as time comes, but they really – and I really feel the service chiefs, as they should be, are focused totally on the away game, if you will, that Title 10 responsibility.

I heard Secretary Schoomaker say it today. He feels like defending the homeland, you do that by doing the away game. You fight overseas. That's what we have to take care of first. When I go to work every day as an adjutant general, I think mostly, what am I going to do to protect the citizens of Indiana in case something happens? I provide forces to him and the Air Force to go over and do the Title 10 responsibility. I've got the responsibility for taking care of our citizens here at home, and that is our number one mission.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay. So there's one. What would item two and three be maybe?

GEN. VAVALA: Well, to make the National Guard a joint activity under the secretary of Defense. And he's really – would be the chief or principal advisor to the secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. And again, it's the uniqueness, and it's what General Umbarger just underscored, is that state role, the homeland security aspect of what we do. We've got that conduit to the emergency responders in each community and certainly that conduit and connection with the emergency managers in our state, which is so essential. So again, that aspect of what we do as a national guard I think underscores what we're asking for in this act.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay.

General Rees?

GEN. REES: Sir, I'd articulate it slightly differently. I think both General Umbarger and General Vavala have talked to relationships. And I put that number one in my list, all of the elements in here that have to do with relationships. If we get that established the right way, whether it's the four-star, the business of where they sit, who they communicate with, who they have the authority to talk to, et cetera, that would be fundamental. That would be the number one thing. I'd scoop up all of that.

The second thing I would go after is those that – the second priority would be the resourcing piece of this because at the heart of it all, if you can't get the resources to address these special things, whether it's Special Ops, it's the Coast Guard, it's the

business of what we can do in homeland security/homeland defense that is not addressed in the Title 10 mission, that's got to be picked up.

And the third one would be the operational aspect because this is somewhat muddled and confused. I think that the chief of the National Guard Bureau, by what we've done over the years – and I think anybody who would go in and an analysis of the Bureau, they'd find out that, yes, we have somebody who is not in command, but we've got somebody who is an enabler, who gets out and gets things done and helps facilitate things moving from one state to another to be able to address disasters, emergencies, et cetera. And this legislation would help us actually get our hands around that and not see it as just something that happens by happenstance out here but actually is codified.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay. Just as a separate issue here – well, it's the same issue really. What's the difference between a joint bureau and a joint activity? We've been struggling in trying to figure that out. Can anybody – (chuckles)? Maybe you have the same problem we've got; I don't know.

GEN. REES: I think we probably do, sir. Joint bureau is somewhat unique in that it is a term of art that's been in law here since the Air National Guard was established 60 years ago. And because it addresses only the relationship between the Army and the Air Guard and its relationship with the Air Force and the Army and those secretaries of those services, it doesn't really get to this business of all these other activities that were described by General Umbarger earlier that are joint: the business of doing things that are not specific to the services. Because it's an old term, perhaps it needs to be replaced by a new term that has currency in the vernacular within the Department of Defense. A joint activity has a broader meaning.

MR. MCKINNON: Let me just refer to General Schoomaker. This morning he talked about his desire, in essence, to activate, involuntarily, guard units on a more frequent basis than one in six. Do you all feel that's a workable thing? Or where do you reach the point where you start getting a lack of people volunteering to serve in the Guard because they're reactivated so frequently?

GEN. UMBARGER: Well, I would start by saying I wholly endorse the fact that we should mobilize units, not individuals. That's what got us into trouble to begin with. I will say that when the Army came out with their ARFORGEN model and they explained it to us as a strategy, a lot of our soldiers and airmen have come home – (unintelligible) – one in two, I will tell you, the first questions they ask as it comes time to whether they stay with us or not is, when am I going back and how often? What do I tell my family? What do I tell my employer? And everybody's been very supportive.

I will tell you, as one adjutant general, I have showed them this strategy. This is where your Army, this is where your Air Force likes to take you, particularly Army one in six. I've had many, many of our young men and women say, I'll stay with you. I'm a combat veteran; I'll stay with you. I'm willing to do that. If we move that to the left and we bring them out one in four, one in three or something like that, it does, quite frankly,

concern me. I feel like I've violated a little bit some of the trust they put in me as their leader.

Having said that, I said this is a strategy. I would hope we could live with that strategy. And if we can live with that, then they'll be ready to go. Sir, they'll be ready to go. These young men and women, they know that this the long fight. They're not staying in the Guard to not go and serve, but they like to not – and they sure do not want to have to volunteer to go. If it is to go, then it needs to be involuntarily where the whole unit goes, so I don't go to my wife or I got to my employer that supported me and say, hey, I'm going off again with my unit; by the way, I volunteered to go. A lot of young men and women are willing to do that, but it kind of puts them in a little bit of a bad situation, if you understand.

MR. MCKINNON: Yes. Any other –

GEN. VAVALA: Well, following on to General Umbarger's testimony, unit integrity needs to be maintained, and a predictability, as he said. We also have to wrestle with the pre-mobilization training that we go through right now, particularly in the Guard and the Reserve. And the fact that when we talk about a mobilization deployment, we're talking anywhere from 18 to 22 months based on the train-up times to get those units through a mobilization station, and then, when they're actually sent into combat, that year of boots on the ground, so it amounts to anywhere from 18 to 22 months. We feel confident that we can perform the pre-mobilization training and certification in our states and cut down on that deployment time, which would make this more plausible.

GEN. REES: Yes, sir, I feel, as I've indicated earlier, I'm impressed as I visit this veteran force about the sense of confidence, the confidence that they demonstrate. We have a very successful recruiting program going on now thanks to the leadership of the Army National Guard at the national level. And I find that most of these people that are coming in, they clearly know that deployments are in the future for them. They want to be part of it. They were much younger five years ago when 9/11 took place and they want to serve.

So there are these elements that have been talked about here of predictability – what did we promise people, et cetera? But I believe, as do General Umbarger and General Vavala, that these people will respond if they're called upon and things are changed from one in six to whatever is necessary to support the country. I'm not sure they're all going to be happy about it, but I know they will respond.

I would also echo this thing about mobilization. I think that – or the length of mobilization. If I've ever heard any complaint from anybody about serving, it is having to go through a long and lengthy mobilization. In fact, I've heard from many people, if I have to go through another MOB station, I'm going to quit – (laughter) – because – I'll take the deployment, I'll go over seas, I'll do all – I'll go into combat, but the MOB station, after they've done this once, that's enough.

So this is something where I think we need to rely on our veterans to take it on and train these people at IDT, at AT, in the pre-MOB situation – shorten the mobilization from 18 months to 12 months or less and get on with it.

MR. MCKINNON: Appreciate it. If all America doesn't realize the importance of the Guard, they certainly are in these days and times of national emergency, what's going on overseas. Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Thompson.

J. STANTON THOMPSON: Oh, Fred – (unintelligible) – be with you again so you will know that he and I served together at NORTHCOM for a period of time.

I'd like to kind of focus on this rank of general issue, and I want to narrow our focus down just a little bit. We've asked our staff to look at history to see when the last reserve component officer, whether it be a guardsman or a Title 10 reserve, was promoted to the rank of general or admiral. We don't have that data yet, but I think it would at least be four decades or older. So let's look at it as – if Congress agrees that there be a reserve component officer of a four-star rank, let's compare investment of that congressional change maybe in a different light. I'd like to know, if that were not the Guard chief, the chief of the bureau, but rather the commander of the U.S. Northern Command – give me your opinion.

GEN. UMBARGER: I would see no problem with that. I think I understood you correctly.

MR. THOMPSON: If the Congress agreed to authorize one –

GEN. UMBARGER: Oh, I see. I didn't – okay, I understand.

MR. THOMPSON: – one, would you rather have it as the chief of the Guard Bureau or the commander of U.S. Northern Command?

GEN. UMBARGER: That's a very good question, Mr. Thompson, for me to answer. It might be – I will just give you my – this would just be my opinion as an individual. I personally think the chief of the National Guard Bureau, in what we're asking for – to do for us and for the Guard, would be where I think would be most important.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay.

GEN. VAVALA: Certainly, sir; I would agree with that. The chief of the bureau is really a force manager. And those terms were used in the CSIS report and characterized him as a force manager, although as a second option I'd certainly embrace a guard officer in command in NORTHCOM at the four-star level.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. General.

GEN. REES: I think you pose an interesting issue here. Certainly, if we look at this bill and what they're proposing in relationship to Northern Command, it doesn't really address who can or who should be the commander. It just talks about could be the deputy commander. I would counter with this, that if in fact that legislation were to pass and a reserve component officer could or would be chosen to be the head of Northern Command, the companion piece to that would still be that the deputy commander would be a National Guard three-star because regardless of who the commander is, albeit it could be a National Guard officer, that they still need to have a relationship with the National Guard because of its unique circumstances out there and what it does.

MR. THOMPSON: I sense that the rationale of the – and this is just a sense of mine, but the rationale of the folks who drafted the legislation and are sponsoring it seem to feel like that there needs to be a four-star reserve component advocate somewhere in the mix, to better articulate – and you all have said this – some of the uniquenesses of your branch of service. But I also understand that in the uniform command plan, right, General Rees, that a combatant commander has a lot of influence on the services on how this whole thing meshes together.

So again, I'm hearing the votes are – I'm not sure I got your vote. Let me ask it again. If you had one four-star authorized by the Congress from a reserve component – and I'm assuming – I think it actually says – well, it intends it to be a National Guardsman if you look at the legislation – would you rather have it in the bureau or would rather have it – can't have both; I'm not going to let you off the hook – or would you have it at U.S. Northern Command? Yes, no?

GEN. UMBARGER: I would say the bureau.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay.

GEN. VAVALA: Chief of the bureau, sir.

MR. THOMPSON: Chief of the bureau. Okay.

That's what I have.

MR. PUNARO: Okay. Thank you.

Commissioner Stump.

E. GORDON STUMP: Good morning, fellow adjutants general. I had a great time working with you all for years and years.

Just a point of clarification. When we're talking about this joint activity, in some of our discussions one of the problems with it or an area of discussion has been, with that



designation as joint activity and advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, do you anticipate with that comes budget authority for the homeland security mission over and above the budget you get from the Air Force and the Army?

GEN. UMBARGER: What that alludes to is what I think what General Rees talked about, the uniqueness of Special Operations Command where they have unique equipment and unique – and they had to eventually get to the point where they can do that. So that would be – we do not feel like that the budget ought to fall out for the services part of it, but yet for those unique equipment issues, those that it takes to protect the homeland, for a Title 32 responsibility I think that would be important, extremely important, because if there are gaps. We all know they're there.

GEN. VAVALA: Mr. Commissioner, there would have to be a budget associated with that – (inaudible).

GEN. REES: Yes, sir. And as I tried to articulate earlier, I think you have relationships, you have all sorts of responsibilities there, but if you can't get to resourcing in that particular area and have appropriate outcome, it's not going to achieve what you want to achieve.

MR. STUMP: You mentioned gaps – and this is another part of the legislation where the chief of Guard Bureau will identify gaps between the military requirements and the civilian requirements for the homeland security mission. We've had Mr. Foresman in from the Department of Homeland Security, who thought that maybe it should be a responsibility of the Department Homeland Security to identify what those gaps are. What's your opinion on who should be responsible for determining those requirements and gaps in requirements to identify what's required by Homeland Security?

GEN. UMBARGER: I think the Secretary for Homeland Defense, along with the NORTHCOM commander, if we knew the requirements that they felt like they needed to provide the resources to do what needs to be done to protect the homeland, then we could identify those and it might – again, in that 1421 strategy, I will tell you, in my state we all tried to support, and always will, whatever equipment it takes to send our young men and women off to war to have the right equipment. We try to keep as much home as we can for the homeland, but I will tell you in my state – I'm sure the other adjutant generals will say the same – I'm about 40 percent. I could go through those 10 essential we really try to keep, but there's times that I'm critically low. And if we were able to articulate that, that there was a requirement that we could identify, then I think the resources will come to that. After those going off to war, they should be taken care of first.

But I think that should be the next place to where the priority of where the equipment goes should be to fulfill those requirements, and they need to be identified.

MR. STUMP: Yes. Our big question is who identifies those? (Chuckles.)

GEN. VAVALA: I assume that would be the secretary of –

(Cross talk.)

MR. STUMP: Homeland Security?

GEN. VAVALA: Homeland Security.

GEN. REES: I think maybe that's kind of at the heart of what we've got here is that you have Title 10 responsibilities – the NORTHCOM commander looks out there out there at this business – my perception of this, having served there two years – and is going to utilize the resources of the Title 10 services of your component commanders and so on of Northern Command to bring to bear on whatever the issue may be. What I think this legislation is trying to deal with is the business of what are those requirements that get us at the lower end of this spectrum, those things that are in the Title 32 force, in the National Guard that are going out there and being utilized from just the basic – that we're going to do a search and rescue thing at Hurricane Katrina, all across that business.

And what I think we've seen and what I think General Blum has tried to articulate repeatedly, is there are areas such as these CERFPs that we've mentioned before, other things that he's put before the JROC. I would say there's also some things that have to do with standardization and training people in the National Guard and the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, all of these things that are not addressed in the world of Title 10 that are just not going to come out of Northern Command until you get away from the idea it's a combatant command and it's focused internally on the domestic arena.

So that may be somewhat of a cynical statement, but I think it's kind of a fact of life. I think that you have to have – the chief of the bureau has got to be able to articulate this and help communicate this appropriately to the Department of Defense.

MR. STUMP: Anything to add?

GEN. VAVALA: Talking about recommendations as it relates to our National Guard forces, the state, and local responders is recommendations need to come from the National Guard itself.

MR. STUMP: Okay.

GEN. REES: I think there's one other thing that was alluded to earlier here today about Mr. Foresman's testimony and the Department of Homeland Security. Clearly there is a good relationship between DOD and DHS, and we see how effective that relationship is in particular, say, the use of the Coast Guard. Admiral Thompson had his relationship out there and there were a number of Coast Guard officers at Northern Command who were very effective in helping communicate and establish the right path ahead for any operational need.

But what we don't see is that same kind of relationship when it comes to the National Guard, is how is that communicated? Do we go through the services? Do we go through Northern Command? It's muddy, and I think that this legislation would help us move down that direction of cleaning that up and fixing responsibility.

MR. STUMP: Great. Thank you.

One of the highest profile proposals in the Empowerment Act is the proposal to make the chief a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And as a response to the commission, General Blum stated that – and I quote, “The fact that my position is not on the Joint Chiefs of Staff has in no way hindered me from responding to the president or to the secretary Defense request for advice.” He also stated in his response that the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force aptly represent the federal Title 10 war fight interests of the Army and Air National Guard on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “What they lack is deep experience in working with civilian authorities on domestic operations.” The chief of the National Guard Bureau goes on to state that his position is the Department of Defense's foremost military officers with experience in deployment of the National Guard of several states, inter-governmental and state interagency use of the Guard forces and state active duty, and Title 32 as well, in matters as pertaining to domestic response and support operations generally. The chief to the bureau suggests that he should have such an advisory role to the Joint Chiefs that falls short of actual membership. That was in his letter to us.

Would an advisory role such as this give the National Guard Bureau a stronger voice? I would also tell you that General Moseley just testified that he felt that the two advisors to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs were very important and that there to advise the Joint Chiefs and he would not see those people go away. He also said that he, in fact, represents the Air National Guard and the support civil authorities as the chief – as a member of the Joint Chiefs, and General Schoomaker does likewise.

So that's their opinion. So I guess we have three ways to look at it: one, he becomes a member of the Joint Chiefs; two, he becomes an advisor to the Joint Chiefs; or three, we let the chairman of the representative services represent the National Guard interest in Title 32 missions. So why don't you respond on which way you think we ought to go with that one.

GEN. REES: Want to start right to left or anything? (Laughter.)

I think clearly the strongest position would be have a seat. But on the other side of the coin, you've got this business of how do you get a relationship established? Just going through the services I think is inadequate because of this unique nature of the National Guard. And again, and I sound like a broken record here, but I think the evidence would tell us that it's just like what's happened with Special Operations Command decades ago. The same kinds of things go on here. We need to have that

voice at the table. And it would be the strongest if it were a seat at the table, but if that's not possible, then clearly an advisor role but not through the services.

GEN. VAVALA: General Rees articulated it well. The primary thrust needs to be that we get a seat at the table so that we're involved in all of the high-level decisions that are being made, that we have a voice for the 450,000 members of the National Guard.

MR. STUMP: Marty?

GEN. UMBARGER: Well, I think the service chiefs on the Joint Chiefs are the subject matter experts for their services and they lend tremendous advice, and I think from the homeland, the National Guard Bureau chief is our subject matter expert that can handle that most important mission that we've got. And all I know, I just kind of look back in history – I don't know. I just remember for years the Marine Corps, the commandant was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I'm sure that the secretary of the Navy felt like – or the chief to the Navy operations felt like he could adequately articulate for the Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps has been a big part of the Joint Chiefs, as you all know, in the role that they play. And I think the bureau position would be equally important.

MR. STUMP: I'll direct this to General Rees since he spent two years up at Northern Command.

Of course, we're all aware that one of the provisions would be to dictate that the deputy for NORTHCOM be a National Guard officer. Now, the answer that we've heard back from DOD and the services – well, they want to pick the best qualified officer but we are doing research and I don't believe we have found any Guard or Reserve officer who has been promoted to lieutenant general in the Guard or Reserve. And so there appears to be a barrier for Guard and Reserve officers getting promoted above the rank of major general.

So do you think that this might be a solution, and, in fact, will it really help if that officer reports to Title 10 four-star, meaning as soon as he takes a position he'll still take those positions, or what would be the advantages to doing this?

GEN. REES: Well, as already been offered in testimony here, one of the other things about NORTHCOM that you get to observe every day is that right in the same hallway is the NORAD representation there and the deputy to NORAD is always a Canadian officer. So you have a situation, yes, that's unique. Maybe we're talking apples and oranges but it's very instructive because I think it shows us that when it comes down to, you know, two major relationships that in a bi-national sense it was clear that they established this. It's worked and it's very effective.

So when we get down to that there are 450,000 National Guardsmen out there and you're going to try to promote a better operational relationship, a better articulation of

requirements, a better understanding about how we can communicate with 50 governors of states and territories, et cetera, I think the long-term effect of having a deputy be a National Guard officer would be immense.

MR. STUMP: Great. I think we only have, I don't know, 8 percent or so that are Guard representatives at NORTHCOM. Do you think we're adequately represented now and should have more?

GEN. REES: I think there's a significant presence of National Guard and Reserve officers and enlisted personnel at Northern Command. I don't think it's a matter of the quantity, necessarily, as being in the right positions and being able to be in those places of influence.

MR. STUMP: Do you feel that there's any type of changes that we could recommend to improve the relationship between the National Guard and NORTHCOM?

GEN. REES: I would get off in the direction – I don't think this is something that has to do with legislation. It has to do more with organization. This is strictly a personal opinion. It's been established as a combatant command, which has much wider responsibilities than just homeland security, even though everything should supposedly focus on homeland security. As a result, I think there are some sub-elements of the organization that should be restructured to reach out to things such as the adjutant general of the National Guard, to reach out to the defense coordinating elements at the various FEMA regions. The way they're structured now, many of these relationships are subordinated out through – layered down below 5<sup>th</sup> Army as opposed to having a direct relationship with Northern Command.

MR. STUMP: Okay. Thank you much. Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Okay. Commissioner Lewis.

PATRICIA LEWIS: Thank you for being here this afternoon and thank you for your service.

As the chief of staff of the Army reminded us earlier today, our force structure has diminished in size considerably in our recent history. Also, our responsibilities in homeland security and homeland defense, as evidenced by the events of 9/11 and Katrina, have put tremendously more pressure on the reserve components and the National Guard. So I think some of that pressure is creating real challenges for the Guard. I acknowledge that right up front. I also want to say that the Guard has done a tremendous job in responding to that and so it's a bit challenging sometimes to help you articulate what we're trying to accomplish by this Empowerment Act. But my experience in the defense arena has taught me that resources are what solve the problem, and I think we've gotten to that point of the discussion this afternoon.

So my first question to you is, are you comfortable that you are appropriately represented and have an adequate role and voice in your resourcing for your Title 10 responsibilities under the current structure? And I don't care where we start.

GEN. UMBARGER: I would say we're much better articulated on the Title 10 resources. It may not be to the timeliness of which we would like to get the equipment. We heard it today that the (eight to 13 ?) POM, that's a long while. And, you know, just because it's in the POM doesn't mean things change. So we're kind of betting on the Kumawat (ph). But on the Title 32 side for our missions in the homeland, I feel that's where we're lacking the most.

MS. LEWIS: Okay.

GEN. VAVALA: Commissioner, we've made great strides in equipping the force for our overseas mission, our Title 10 federal mission. But, again, upon the return of these forces and the fact that these forces need to be available for federal 32, state, homeland security missions, that equipment is not there. And we're scraping to try to resource and equip those forces who return from the war site. We've made tremendous progress in the war fight aspect of it, but not the full spectrum operation that, again, underscores our uniqueness.

MS. LEWIS: General Rees?

GEN. REES: I would echo the same comments that both General Umbarger; General Vavala have made here. I think there were some shocking things that took place in the BRAC and in the presidential budget memoranda that came out earlier this year that have already been testified to that would indicate there wasn't good communication with the Guard and the Reserve component. And I believe that many efforts have been made to correct that, but it would be helpful to have a stronger voice and a – the word I'm looking for is continuity in the effort as opposed what appears to be episodic relationship.

MS. LEWIS: I thought that may be the answer, and my personal view is if there some responsible entity for requirements development and those were resourced for your other responsibilities, you would be in a much more comfortable position. In that regard, in your view, who is responsible for developing those requirements for that Title 32 mission? Who were the players and who is the responsible oversight entity? And what funds from the various agencies flow to meet those requirements? And let's do it backwards this time, gentlemen.

GEN. REES: I believe that's at the heart in the legislation. I think it's fairly muddy. If you go historically and you look at it, Title 32 was a training status and it was always there to fulfill our requirements to be able to be mobilized and go into Title 10 status.

So you could probably go back to about 1968 or '69 when we had riots and there was a clear concern about how do we reach down and see to it that there's training and

standards and so on at that time? There was directives – and this actually came out of the secretary of the Army’s office because at that time the secretary of the Army was an executive agent for military assistance to civil authorities, directing that the National Guard would use Title 32 funds to train their people up for riot response.

Now, as we’ve gone along, that’s expanded. We see the Guard doing Title 32 counter-drug operations, a wide variety of things. We did the airport security business in Title 32, and in fact this got to be so far removed from training that we sought legislation to get that corrected. What’s not caught up is the business of establishing what are the requirements? How do we get this done? And certainly many of these things are being done are in joint status, not in service-specific status. And again, I believe it begs for the chief to the National Guard Bureau in a joint sense to articulate this and be able to take it to the right authority.

MS. LEWIS: I understand that, but I am a little confused and uncertain as to whether the items that are before us for consideration would actually accomplish that. And if it remains muddy, you are at a larger disadvantage, I feel, to be removed from your service sponsorship in a way that you would be or to supporting your other responsibilities. If you can help us with any ideas to clearly define how that requirements process on an interagency basis could occur and how that funding could be requested and flow, I think it would much improve your position. If you have any ideas, please share them with us.

GEN. REES: Other than the general statements that I’ve made previously about both the Special Operations and the Coast Guard relationship, to get down in the weeds and so on, what I would offer is to come back with some written testimony or whatever you would like to have with some A BC types of things –

MR. PUNARO: That would be extremely helpful because this is – I don’t think we’ve heard yet from either the Department of Defense or the Department of Homeland Security, and I certainly haven’t heard it here this afternoon: Who is responsible for developing that requirement? Who establishes the requirement in this area? And if somebody could produce – maybe the Guard Association could produce a flow chart and show us and get us a copy of the requirement document that General Blum or General Vaughn or the Adjutant Generals have produced that they’ve turned in to the budget deliberation process upon which somebody could make a decision. And it’s not just a Guard issue; it’s a DHS issue because they’re supposed to assess the broad gaps in the federal response plan. They haven’t produced such a document, so I don’t believe we’re ever going to solve this problem if somebody doesn’t take ownership of the requirements process.

MS. LEWIS: Exactly, and if I may, I don’t want you to think I’ve in any way taken a position on any of these recommendations. There may be tremendous merit in them, but I have yet to see how it’s going to help you out of the box that you’re in, and I’m afraid if we further empower you without giving you the full tools to accomplish

your mission, you're going to be at a significant disadvantage. I didn't mean to interrupt you; I just wanted to make that clarifying point.

GEN. REES: No, I fully agree with you and – one of the things about this business about the – whether it's homeland security or homeland defense; everybody keeps interchanging these things. And yet I know Admiral Thompson, in our previous life together in Northern Command, which people are trying to put a bright line down there that there's homeland defense and there's homeland security. Well, some of these places are very gray, and if we're going to have seamlessness between state and federal interjurisdictional relationships and so on, you've got to have somebody step up and help enable this. And I think one of the great things about the National Guard, is it is in all of these jurisdictions out here, and it could very much help standardization, help training and exercising, help break down some of these barriers.

MS. LEWIS: I agree.

MR. PUNARO: Okay?

MS. LEWIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Thompson has an alibi question. Then we're going to go to Commissioner Brownlee.

MR. THOMPSON: I love these vote kind of questions, so stand by. (Laughter.) When the chief of staff of the Air Force was talking to us after our visit together – our formal visit – he reaffirmed to me that an Air National Guardsman in an airplane can take off in state status, shift to 32 status, shift to 10 status, get back to state status without ever landing the airplane. Okay now, where I'm coming from is if we can figure out how to eliminate the frictions between state status, 32 status and 10 status, doesn't it seem logical that we could also combine the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard into one Reserve component for the Air Force, and likewise for the Army? And I'd like to say, could that – if we could, figure out a way of taking care of those frictions both in line with the Constitution and all the things we have to do there. Would that be a logical step? Yes or no?

General?

GEN. UMBARGER: That's a pretty tough one – (laughter) – just thrown right there, Mr. Thompson. I've got a great, great bunch of runs – (chuckles) – on the Army Reserve and the Air Force Reserve. I do think they play a totally – a little bit different role with the type of missions that they do have in support of the active Army and active Air Force. So, I would say that I'm not going to render an opinion on that one. (Laughter.)

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. General?



GEN. VAVALA: Commissioner, I'd say no. Again, it's because of the dual missionality of the Guard that state mission under Title 32 in state active duty, it's under the command and control of the governor of that respective state. Now as far as the total Air Force is concerned, we're already fully integrated in there. The Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve.

MR. THOMPSON: What if the manpower of the Air Force Reserve became a part of the Air National Guard?

GEN. VAVALA: We could accept that. (Laughter.)

MR. THOMPSON: Fred?

GEN. REES: Well, that's obviously a very loaded question, and I believe that there are ways that we can cooperate between the Reserve and the Guard. Examples of this exist in the New York military department. Their Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve are available through some legal mechanism to actually support domestic emergencies to work under the Adjutant General. So there are ways this could be done for response. As far as bringing the two organizations together, getting rid of one organization versus the other one, I think it gets right down to what is the functionality of each of the Reserve components. And I would say that Title 10 components have a lot of responsibilities in argumenting and assisting Title 10 active duty force that are perhaps much broader, but have their own unique responsibilities that the National Guard does not.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Brownlee?

MR. BROWNLEE: I just have one. General Rees, I went back and read your statement very carefully. I think you make some interesting suggestions here when you compare the National Guard Bureau to the Coast Guard and to the Special Operations Command. And of course SOCOM is a command, so maybe your analogy with the Coast Guard is more appropriate, but I note that you did put in your statement that the Coast Guard is a part of the Department of Homeland Security, but in order to perform its dual role as relationships and resourcing through DOD. If we should adopt these proposals within this legislation regarding the four-star general and the membership of the Joint Staff, which some of us still haven't made our minds up on, should we also consider making the National Guard a part of the Department of Homeland Security except during times of war, as the Coast Guard is? Would that take care of your Title 32 more immediate responsibilities and missions, and then make it clear when you came under Department of Defense more clear?

GEN. REES: I'm sure that's – it could be read that way, but what I'm really an advocate of is if they want to make major reform, which this legislation does not do, I would be an advocate of what I call a mirror image relationship. In other words, the National Guard has such an enormous role to play in the Department of Defense and with the Army and the Air Force. And has already been articulated here several times, we do

not want to do harm to that. But if there is a reform necessary – if DHS is the one who’s going to articulate requirements, perhaps there needs to be some kind of a conduit and relationship so that DHS can reach to the Guard to articulate those that work with the Department of Defense to see that their requirements are stated, funding is provided, et cetera, et cetera. But I would not be an advocate – I am not an advocate of removing the National Guard and its relationship with the Department of Defense.

MR. BROWNLEE: And I’m not proposing that, I’m just asking since you made that analogy if that would make it more clear and resolve some of these other issues.

GEN. REES: I think that’s a distinct possibility, but I think it’s a huge leap, and I think it’s much more reasonable to expect that people could see this SOCOM model, even though it’s not a command – because it’s within DOD you don’t have to deal with other agencies. Other than a coordination fashion, it could all be handled in house. And in going specifically back to this thing about it’s not a command, I guess I’d like to point out to a lot of folks that many of the federal-state relationships that are out there deal with this business of the power of the purse. And so whether it’s the transportation department trying to get highways built, they don’t go out and build the highways, they go to the state and say, here’s the standard. We want it so many feet wide and a certain layer of asphalt put out there, and here’s the money to do it if you build it to our standard. And I think that’s somewhat analogous here to what the Chief of the Bureau does. He’s got enormous influence on what goes on in these states because of his ability to shift the resources where they need to go for structure and everything else.

So he may not be a commander in the sense of having uniform code of military justice authority, but he does wield a huge stick.

MR. BROWNLEE: Well, neither do the chiefs of the military services, for that matter. They’re not commanders. They’re advisors to the Secretary, really. They assist the Secretary in the performance of their duty.

Would you all like to comment on that? No? Okay.

MR. PUNARO: Before I get to my questions, I want to see if any of the other commissioners have any additional questions. Anybody else?

Let me ask a few questions as we close out this panel. One thing I’d like to address is – just so we’re clear on the record – the timing of our various reports here from the Commission. Our final report is due 1 January 2008 by statute. But, the provisions that the Congress statutorily have asked us to comment on that relate to the National Guard Empowerment Act and other provisions, of which the total was 15 – that report is due on March 1, 2007. And I can assure everyone that we will meet that deadline without question. However, I would note as one of the sponsors of the legislation has noted in a speech on the Senate floor that Congress certainly is not precluded from taking action on this legislation at any point that they will.

I'm not suggesting that someone has suggested that we're slowing this process down. I certainly would say we certainly are not. The Congress can act as quickly or as slowly as they want on just about any issue. Furthermore, I would say that despite some things I've read in the press, the Commission was not involved in the conference at all. In fact, we stayed as far away from that as possible, and I can tell you as the Chairman of the Commission, nothing would have pleased me more than for the members of the conference committee on this bill to have solved all these problems and passed whatever legislation the Congress deemed appropriate – certainly that was way above our pay grade – and not send us additional 15 provisions to look at.

And furthermore, we didn't get involved in that, and so the bottom line is there's nothing precluding the Congress from taking action on this legislation at any point that they wish to. Certainly they're not in session right now. They've adjourned sine die, but they come back in January. They get sworn in on January 2<sup>nd</sup>, they could pass this on January 3<sup>rd</sup> if they like. We're not holding them up.

But we will meet our statutory deadline, and we will make judgments and recommendations on all these provisions as the law requires us to do. So that's on the timing.

On the accessibility issue – I want to make sure I'm clear on that – because what I heard the Chief say this morning was that – I'm not sure, and General Vavala, I want to make sure I understood your testimony correctly. To me, it came across as you were saying there was split between the Guard and the active Army on this issue of accessibility and the way people were called up. My read of it is, the Army as a total force – it was the active Army, the Army Guard and the Army Reserve – that went forward to the Secretary of Defense and recommended to get some of these policies of request for forces, the approval of people as individual status, the things that resulted in the cross-leveling – it wasn't a dispute between – dispute is probably too strong a word – it wasn't a disagreement of opinion between the Guard and the active Army that you all have been joined at the hip in opposing. Because General Schoomaker said he recommended again and again and again that these policies be changed so that they have greater access to the Guard and Reserve.

But again, I don't want to put words in your mouth, so why don't you tell me what the issue is?

GEN. VAVALA: Now, let me clarify, Mr. Chairman. We definitely are accessible. In fact the Guard has never failed to answer the call. The issue at stake there is, you know, the announced ARFORGEN model and the mobilizations as they – the mobilization times as they exist today.

MR. PUNARO: I'm looking at that part in your testimony. You're saying that the 18 months was a policy established by the Department of the Army, not the Department of Defense?

GEN. VAVALA: Yes. It was the Department of the Army –

(Cross talk.)

MR. PUNARO: Okay, so what is causing then the cross-leveling in the Guard units right now that – I mean, we visited that brigade at Fort Hood – 40 states to put that unit together. What's causing the cross-leveling of the Guard units then?

GEN. VAVALA: The requirement that they go as a C-1 unit, that they have to be fully up to C-1 in order to mobilize. So that requires again –

(Cross talk.)

MR. PUNARO: That's a requirement for active units, too. I don't think we want any unit going to war that isn't fully C-1.

GEN. VAVALA: Yes, sir. And we said that the cross-filling of those units is happening in the active component and in the National Guard.

MR. PUNARO: Correct. But, I mean, as I understand it, that's more tied to because the Department of Defense established a policy that once they deployed, we couldn't use them for two years and we couldn't call them up again for x number of years. And that's the policy that General Schoomaker was addressing this morning. And I'm trying to find out, is there a dispute between General Schoomaker and the Guard about that policy?

GEN. UMBARGER: No. No, we don't want to involuntarily – we don't want to have our soldiers go deployment voluntarily. We want to take by units, not by individuals.

MR. PUNARO: Correct.

GEN. UMBARGER: And I will make a comment about the aviation. When you went to visit the 36<sup>th</sup> Aviation Brigade, is that the unit at Fort Hood – is the unit you're talking about?

MR. PUNARO: I personally wasn't on the visit, but a couple of the commissioners were.

GEN. UMBARGER: Wasn't that what it was, the aviation brigade? One thing is that is a unique anomaly, if you will. Aviation assets are such to where for a homeland security mission, our aviation units are spread all over much more than our normal units are. So, the fact there was a lot of units – a lot of states were involved with that, that is a little bit particular.

MR. PUNARO: Understand. I mean, I'm not going to go back over these statistics of what we're doing to cross-level that has nothing to do with what you just talked about. In other words, we're putting companies together that we have to go to dozens and dozens of states to get enough people. It's because we can't use the people that are in the unit right now because they've already done one mobilization. Short of the two years, but they've done at least one year.

I thought that's what General Schoomaker was – I'm just trying to find out – is there – I'm kind of looking out of my eye to General Vaughn. I want to make – because I think it's really important to make sure we understand whether there's a disagreement between the active Army and the Army Guard on this. Yes?

GEN. VAUGHN: Sir, if I could, I don't think there's any disagreement.

MR. PUNARO: Okay. I didn't think there was, I just want to –

(Cross talk.)

GEN. VAUGHN: The story about how we got into cross-leveling needs to really be told.

MR. PUNARO: Right.

GEN. VAUGHN: And some of – (inaudible) – have already started this. You know, we did things for a lot of folks that we probably wouldn't do again –

MR. PUNARO: Right.

GEN. VAUGHN: – if we had a crystal ball. We broke forces all over.

MR. PUNARO: Right.

GEN. VAUGHN: We also didn't have an ARFORGEN model, so we didn't know who to take next.

MR. PUNARO: Correct.

GEN. VAUGHN: So we took the wrong people next, and so we had to continue to piecemeal in and cross-level all these forces. Now all we need to do is stop all that. Reset this force, and get that mobilization period down to one year. And that's exactly General Schoomaker said.

MR. PUNARO: That's what I thought, and so basically now to do that – and I agree completely, and it was done not just in the Guard Reserve, it was done in the Marine Corps, it was done on the active side. And as you point out, I didn't have those

statistics, but I suspect cross-leveling in certain active duty units could be just as bad as it is in some of the Guard and Reserve units.

But this was addressing this issue – they basically have said that – the G-3 of the Army has said, we're out of slits when it comes to the Army Reserve and the Army Guard because when you go through all the buckets of who's left to go and you take out the 187,000 that they can't use again even though they've still got a year left on the two years under the law, the law is not precluding them; it's the OSD policy.

He says we've got to re-set the force. And so what he wants to do to help reset that is I heard his testimony this morning. He says, there's three things you can do. You can reduce demand. We don't control that. That's controlled by the external threat. That's not logical. We can increase the size of the active duty Army. My impression is he's in favor of that. There are a lot of people who are in favor of that, but we all know that that's not something you can do overnight. And depending on how many you can get in any given year, it takes a long time to build a new brigade combat team, so it was not my impression he thought that was a near-term solution, either.

So the third, and it sounded to me like the practical option he was looking at, was going back to OSD to try to get this policy reversed so he could have accessibility to the Guard Reserve, which means – and that was the question you got earlier – we're looking at a more frequent call-up of some of these Guard brigades than the quote one in six, or one in five. And I know OSD's position because I hammered Dr. Chu the day before. He said, well wait a minute. We made a commitment to these kids and to their families. We gave them a certain expectation, and the reason we don't want to change that is we don't want to break faith.

So you're in a very, very difficult situation. You're in the dilemma of do you break faith with an alleged commitment about the times you deploy. General Schoomaker – others have told me they don't understand whether that commit was real or not. Or, do you break the force? Meaning, do you send combat – do you send units that are less than combat-ready because of cross-leveling? I haven't found one commander that has testified before our commission yet that believes that it's sound military policy to cross-level. In fact, General Schoomaker was very emphatic in his testimony. The Army Guard battalion commander that testified in San Diego, the Army Reserve battalion commander that testified in San Diego, the Marine Reserve battalion commander that testified in San Diego, and these are the guys that are fighting these battalions – not any of the generals sitting around this table.

The Marine battalion commander said cross-leveling is evil because of the fact that it breaks unit cohesion and it makes – and it puts our troops at greater risk. So you've got an issue between breaking the commitment and breaking the force. And I think that's the dilemma. And the Chiefs seem to come down squarely on the side of we are not going to break the force. We want to send cohesive units, and that's what I heard here today. So it sounds to me like the Guard and the active Army are on the same sheet. Is that right, General Vaughn?

GEN. VAUGHN: Sir, we have rebuilt that airplane all the time.

MR. PANURO: Right.

GEN. VAUGHN: (Inaudible) – the success we’ve had within – we are getting ready to go through 350, and, you know, based on last year, the senior leadership said that they would pay with whatever we could recruit, so look out. Look out because we’re growing.

Now, our force structure in-strength adjustment has done something it has never done in our entire history. We’ve gone down to zero. It was at 350-350, and then –

MR. PANURO: Spaces and faces are equal now, is what you’re saying.

GEN. VAUGHN: Spaces and faces are now equal all the way across the United States.

MR. PANURO: That’s not necessarily a good thing.

GEN. VAUGHN: Well, it is –

(Cross talk.)

MR. PANURO: Oh, it is a good thing. All right. (Chuckles.)

GEN. VAUGHN: It enables you – once you take the ARFORGEN model to produce 100 percent use. Now, what we did for over two and a half years was mobilize 100,000 Army Guard soldiers in a big plateau. And if you take our operating force of 312,000 and divide that up, say, to five years, we can put 60,000 in the fight with a surge to 70,000. We can do now the five – (inaudible) – plus whatever it is, and this force will be reset completely in ’09. And that’s what we were asked to do. And by the way, when we come out in the big fight with the Eight Brigade and the division headquarters, over 50 percent of the combat force in at one time – that’s what we’ve been asked to do.

What the Army has to do, and what was really historical about what General Schoomaker said earlier today – one year for Guard and Reserve. That is a turning point. That is immense. That is the Army’s process and training piece. Now, the piece on policy about how we got into this mess, you know, on individuals and cross-leveling, that’s over on the OSD side in trying to guard the coffers and trying to do something else. But we all hoped this thing would get out and get done earlier than it did. It didn’t get done earlier. Now we’re out of units, and now we got to change every – we’ve got to change the very hardest thing which is the MOB –

MR. PANURO: How much time, boots on the ground, Iraq and Afghanistan, would you have under this new process with your units?

GEN. VAUGHN: Nine months.

MR. PUNARO: Nine months?

GEN. VAUGHN: You want me to answer it?

MR. PUNARO: Yeah.

GEN. VAUGHN: It would be whatever the force com and the – (inaudible) – in this instance first Army – comes up with that they can squeeze over on the left side of mobilization for the training –

MR. PUNARO: Right.

GEN. VAUGHN: – just like they talk about. Now, there's some other pieces to this. And General Schoomaker says, you know, the 30 days for leave, I've got to ask you, do you go back and you recommend to Congress that 30 days for leave shouldn't be counted against the Army or the Army Guard or Army units. But it makes sense. I mean, some people are going to take the money rather than the leave. What I'm saying is you may get 10 months, you may get nine months, but it's how efficient what you –

MR. PUNARO: You certainly ought to get more than seven months, which is what the Marine battalions do.

GEN. VAUGHN. Absolutely.

MR. PUNARO: But then what I heard y'all saying was a lot of that – to be able to that in one year, then they've got to be doing their proper training, wherein they're in their regular reserve status. I mean – here's what I came away with today listening to General Schoomaker of the Air Force. The reason the Air Guard and the Air Reserve work so well is they keep those forces resourced at a hundred percent C-1 status every day of the week. Because, as General Moseley said, he doesn't know who's going to be flying a mission. He doesn't have to worry about what status they're in because he knows he's got a resourced force. They've got the equipment, they got the training. They're C-1, they're ready to go.

GEN. VAUGHN: Let me answer the question because we worked that question. These folks – (inaudible) – have worked that question – (inaudible). So what do we do?

MR. PUNARO: Pull your chair up to the mike there, General Vaughn. This still ain't going to count as your testimony. You're still going to have to come back.  
(Laughter.)

GEN. VAUGHN: But we can start counting.



I think, without going back to the – and I haven't gone to the adjutant generals yet. We've certainly talked this –

MR. PUNARO: You've got them right there. They are going to sign up on the spot. (Laughter.) They represent both of the biggest associations the Guard has.

GEN. VAUGHN: Yeah. Fifty-four is a really sporty bunch of people. (Laughter.)

MR. PUNARO: We're going to get the deal right here.

GEN. VAUGHN: What is really going to be key is the ARFORGEN model, and the identification of what year everybody is expected to go in, whether it's BCTs or Maneuver Enhancement Brigades, or engineers, or chemical – whatever it is. Everybody's racked and stacked all the way across. And then something different that we need to do, we need to give an alert for training one year out. One year out. And we need to move monies from the supplemental side that's now only spent –

MR. : One year out.

GEN. VAUGHN: – after mobilization over to the states for them to validate and fix dental, medical – do all your range firing, all the things that you know as a soldier. Give all your net training, your CCT task, all those kinds of things. And we do as much of that as we can do on the left side of mobilization.

Now, I think this is what forces command and the Army's working through right now.

MR. PUNARO: Well, I'm going to get you to make me a hero with my sister-in-law because my nephew called her a couple weeks ago, and she called me immediately. And 30<sup>th</sup> Brigade North Carolina – they read a speech by General Blum that said, hey, the Guard brigades are going to have to go back. Those that got back the firstest are going to go back the firstest. And that brigade was one of them. But the unit says to the kids, oh no, we're not going anywhere; don't you worry about that. Yet at their last drill, what do they start doing? They don't do their regular training; they're getting their dental checks.

Now, you think these kids are stupid? (Laughter.) No way. They know when they start doing dental readiness – so you just said we ought to give them a one year warning order. So, the kids, as you said, they're going to go back. Somebody ought to tell them. So make me a – 30<sup>th</sup> Brigade, I'd like to know – tell those kids what's going to happen in that unit. They have a right to know. You just said you ought to give them a one year notice. I don't know whether they're going or not. General Blum said on the record they are. Their unit commanders tell they aren't. They're doing their dental checks. So –

MR. VAUGHN: I've said that's way above us, this racking and stacking of where those years are and when they start. I know what I think the 30<sup>th</sup> is, and I've talked to the adjutant general, and he likes what we've told him. Now, what's the needs of this country –

MR. PUNARO: But to me it's a lot more important, not what you know or what the two star knows; it's what that sergeant knows and what that sergeant's family knows and what that sergeant's employer knows.

MR. VAUGHN: Well, that's right. Until we get all this straight, we can't go back there and alert them. And what we're pushing for is to give them that one year deal.

MR. PUNARO: All right, so let's say we get this – are the adjutant generals prepared in this interim period because what our General Schoomaker said, he's coming back to the Guard. And you said the Guard always answers to the sounds of the guns. It sounds to me like he's going to want more guard brigades in a shorter timeframe, more frequently as they get this thing reset over the next couple years. Is that what you heard today General Vaughn?

MR. VAUGHN: Well, sure I heard some of that. And I can tell you that some of these brigades and some of these units we're talking about, and you got to distinguish were you're talking about one to five, or one in five, or one to four, or one in four. If you went one year, and no one's gone one year because they've been gone 18 months – so work out the ratio. I mean any ratio –

MR. PUNARO: That was a policy decision by the Army.

MR. VAUGHN: Well, that was a process in training decision, on the 18 months.

MR. PUNARO: Yeah. And as Patty points out, Commissioner Lewis, that as you said, we visited – MOB stations in the Marine Corps. It's the same thing. The kids, they're furious because they're doing in the MOB station the exact same thing they did at their home training station. And you know why, it's because of the people running the MOB station don't trust the unit commanders to basically – yeah, you said you'd have them all ready, and you said you'd do all this, but we don't trust you, so we going to make you do every bit of it again.

MR. VAUGHN: But these are the folks right here that you got to trust to get that done.

MR. PUNARO: That's my point. I agree with you.

MR. VAUGHN: You talked about the one in four or one in five, and I would say this: When we set up – one in six was what you heard them talk about for the Guard. And that was based on BCTs at one time, which are the easiest thing to manage because you can put 34 patches. At that time it was 34 up. And divide that into a number of

years and come up with something like that. The real hard part is you have hundreds and hundreds of other units out there that don't fit into this –

MR. PUNARO: Right.

MR. VAUGHN: – BCT model timeframe. And they're also much in demand for the war fight. So if it was one year, and you had four years back, and so you went one year out of five, that would mean that as we get into this AFGM model and we do the things I just told you we're getting ready to execute, then you wouldn't have to re-MOB anybody for 10 years. Now then, we recruit more than anybody else except the active component Army and the Army National Guard. We recruited 69,000 some odd folks last year. We've got a recruiting machine second to nobody. That means if you do the math, we turn over a huge number of folks – 18 percent is our objective every year to turn over. That's a healthy objective, by the way. That means in five years, 90 percent of the force, you know, if you flat-lined it, should be new, whether or not, because it doesn't work out exactly like that. But you see what we're saying?

Once we get in – once we do the things that the Army has worked very closely with us to do. And that thing that General Schoomaker said was historical today. Once we get that in place for the nation, we're going to be able to turn this thing and keep turning –

MR. PUNARO: Here's my point though. That steady state that we all desire, it's not going to come this year, and it may not come next year. So there going to be some guard brigades – what General Schoomaker was saying is, under the law, it's two years. By OSD fiat and policy, they've limited it to this one year, and they won't let you re-MOB unless there are volunteers, and that's why we're into this cross leveling.

So my question is, are the adjutant generals going to sign up to sending these units back – and they want them to go as units; they don't want them cross level – on a shorter timeframe than they otherwise were planning for, because that's what I heard General Schoomaker talking about today. So that's my – and y'all have said – that's my question.

GEN. REES: I think the – as has already been testified to, whenever they've called the, the Guard responds.

MR. PUNARO: Right.

GEN. REES: As long as it's under the law and statutorily legal, our people will respond.

GEN. UMBARGER: I would say if they're going to do it, we need to know it now –

MR. PUNARO: Right.

GEN. UMBARGER: – because we made the same mistake –

MR. PUNARO: Amen to that.

GEN. UMBARGER: – the first time around. The soldiers need – I would say in that AFORGEN model we'd love to know four years out, quite frankly. That's when we can reduce all this turbulence we're talking about. So if we do it just one year out right now, it would cause turbulence. Wherever those combat teams are, it would be pretty tough on the soldiers' families and the employers. To me it should be at least two years out, before we'd have to go back to BCT.

MR. PUNARO: General?

MR. VAVALA: But saying all that, we will answer the call, but we require some degree of predictability.

MR. PUNARO: Okay.

Yeah, Commissioner Thompson.

MR. THOMPSON: It's not often that we have three state adjutant generals in front of us that are different that we've had before, so I'm going to ask the question on behalf of Commissioner McKinnon. Kind of – we're divided as a commission into working groups, and he kind of heads up the equipment, training, and readiness part. I'd ask all three of you, based upon your state emergency response responsibilities within your given state, have you got enough equipment today to take care of the catastrophic event that you're planning for within your state?

GEN. UMBARGER: Absolutely not.

MR. THOMPSON: Absolutely not, because I think we heard something like 50 or 60 percent of the equipment that's been reset for you guys that went over to Iraq and Afghanistan. But you're saying no –

MR. VAVALA: I think it varies state to state. I do have it, yes.

MR. THOMPSON: You do have it.

GEN. REES: We do not, but this is a moving train. We've got, as you've heard testimony previously about there's a fenced \$21 billion. There are things in the pipeline that are being reset, et cetera. So it's improving. A year ago, I was astounded when I was first was reappointed as adjutant general, went around to these various places: the motor-pool's empty, no weapon's in the vaults, no night vision devices, no anything. And it's steadily been coming up, but we're still, I think in Oregon, in the 30 to 35 percent range right now.

MR. THOMPSON: Oh, okay. So it does – we heard from General Blum that he had sort of – he was able to get the capabilities to the states by, I guess, realigning some of the equipment things to meet those known catastrophic emergencies. But you're saying that at least in two of the three states, if it happens, your response time would be slower until that equipment got there. Am I hearing –

GEN. UMBARGER: Yes, sir.

MR. THOMPSON: – hearing you right? Okay.

GEN. REES: Are you going back to, like, the hurricane season? (Cross talk.) There were some very deliberate efforts to see to it that hurricane states got equipment.

MR. THOMPSON: Well, no. In some earlier conversations we had with General Blum, afterward – was it the Army's – (inaudible) – that kind of racks and stacks all your Army's equipment? Am I correct with that? And is charged with the resetting of equipment?

MAJ. GEN UMBARGER: Oh, the materiel command – Army materiel command?

MR. THOMPSON: Okay, that was it. Army materiel command. And one of the things that we were hearing that you're in state equipment was down at that 25 to 30 percent level, and we couldn't figure out how in the world you could meet your state obligations with that little bit of equipment. Then we go to this command, and they don't show us a very bright picture of the reset in terms of it's going to be in the next year or two – it kind of was out there a long time away. So in your judgement then – I'm looking at your state mission. I'm not looking at the Title 10 mission. The one thing that General Blum said was that he wasn't too concerned because he could bring that equipment that your state was missing in from other states in order to back fill you to half what you would need for your event. That dictates time to me.

GEN. UMBARGER: No, that's the EMAC (sp) agreements that we've got with our sister states, that's all around us. And we talk all the time. And that's that 10 essential skill sets that we need and we try to assure that we got enough of that there, but I would tell you in my state – I happen to be in a large state. We have a lot of equipment, so we have a lot of units that have been deployed, so we have a lot of night vision goggles, communication equipment, all our cruiser (sp) weapons, almost, they're off to the war fight. So I will tell you in mine, we have to reallocate through our quick reaction force, our ready reaction force that will be there first and so it makes me a little bit lean than some of my other units.

MR. THOMPSON: Another thing that Secretary Foresman said to us yesterday that he had – they had done – the Department of Homeland Security has done an assessment of state emergency plans, contingency plans and he described to us a grant program that the Department of Homeland Security has to kind of help bolster a state's

ability to react. We ask him if the National Guard of that state had access to those grant funds, and he didn't know. So could you tell me if your states are receiving or have access to any of those Department of Homeland Security funds?

GEN. REES: If I might start on this. I think it is very much a state to state issue. This goes back to previous testimony that I provided here today – where there really is no programmatic way to see to it that every state is achieving a certain standard in their National Guard or a common vision, as far as these homeland security requirements. So number one, each state playing obviously is different. Each state addresses their National Guard differently. Some states, they don't address it at all. Some states it's a very significant part of their plan. And then again, it's not programmatic it's based on grants. So it's a dramatically different approach to getting things done than what those of us associated with the Department of Defense are used to or would expect.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, Commissioner Brownlee. Then I've got one last question back on requirements.

MR. BROWNLEE: General Vaughn, could you slide up there for just a minute? I just want to clarify a point that – (laughter) – now I'm trying to recall –

MR. PUNARO: Yeah, just stay up there because my question is going to go to you to.

MR. BROWNLEE: If you could help in recollection of what General Schoomaker said this morning, just to clarify. My recollection was that he said that the need to cross level, which was caused in large part by the over structure of the reserve component so that you might have 100 percent structure, but 80 percent manning. Then you had a lot of people that are volunteered. So you had to pull people from a lot of different units to have a 100 percent manned unit. That contributed in a large part to the Army's decision to have more lengthy pre-deployment training, which reduced the longer mobilization period. Is that what – that's what I understood him to say.

GEN. VAUGHN: Sir, the same pre-deployment training, I would tell you that if you're a guardsman sitting here at the table, is the same pre-deployment training we've been looking at for as long as been in the Guard, which is 37 years. Folks here will tell you the same thing. It is a Cold War throwback. There hasn't been any change to that.

Now, we were over structured, and we were already moving out of over-structure as soon as this was thing started. We could read the tea leaves on this one. That's why – and you know what we did with the end strength piece. Okay, when you're over-structured in a company, you may be down eight folks. You may be down eight people. Cross the Guard that's a lot of people, all told, but it's not a lot in that one unit. But when you started the volunteer piece and filling up these other units, it really compounded that. And the other piece that we talked about, and he was right on the mark. And that was the AFGM piece. If you don't know where you're taking them from – if you look back, and we just had them racked and stacked and even been over-structured, and we hadn't done

the volunteer piece of it, you would have been taken from the bottom and fill in your units on the top. Every state would have not had a problem.

And I'll tell you the other thing about that process that we were in: The Guard was always told, and the Reserve was always told something. You would go to the MOB station as you were, and you were expected to be C-3, because that's the only training we got. And we give you all the training on the other side of mobilization, because remember we were looking at a strategic force and something for a long war fight. Not a continuous campaign like we're doing where we turn this rotations. But when you come to the MOB station, don't worry you're going to get filled with soldiers from the IRR (ph) and training base, and all of that. When these folks looked around, just like the Army Reserve, the Marine Reserve, all away across, what they found was, they were the only ones that were going to furnish the other people. To furnish these full, 100 percent, C-1 units. So, what he said – I don't think he said much any different than what I just said then. That's the way it happened. We know that. He's got that down his face. And he's taken great means and steps to help us improve this.

MR. BROWNLEE: One of the things that we clearly have now, is probably the most combat experience, combat ready, Guard reserve forces we've ever had or exist throughout the world.

GEN. VAUGHN: Sir, that's true.

MR. PUNARO: And we don't want to lose that experience and capability.

Let me close out on this requirements issue again, because we've been in this business a long time, and we all know you don't get any money if you don't have something that basically starts from a requirements document. And I've got a search party out with search lights and rescue people looking for who it is that's generating these requirements. And one of the reasons why we haven't found it yet – maybe somebody will find it – is, you know, we always argued, and our senior leadership argued, if we're ready for the big one, we're ready for the lesser included. And they would argue, hey we got homeland defense covered. We got civil, military support the civil, because we can do the big one.

For the first time, I read an Army active duty lieutenant general saying, well maybe we got that wrong. Because we certainly didn't help us much with these insurgents. We've always argued that as we know, mission essential task lists. What are these soldiers, sailors, airmen to do? Put it in the medals, and that's what they train and get resource to. And you can't just say because you could beat the – whip the Soviet Unions in the big war, that you're ready to deal with some of these lesser included in homeland defense, or some of the non-federal type missions.

And so what would be helpful – because maybe it's out there somewhere, and maybe there's a process, and maybe the staff will find it. Or maybe somebody will roger up in the Pentagon and show us what it is. But I swear we've been looking for and we've

been asking questions. I believe – and I don't have – I'll have the adjutant generals association think about this and get back to us. Don't make the decision on the spot. But if y'all could take on the – how would you develop, or what would make sense from a requirements generation process for these nine federal missions as it relates to the responsibilities of the Department of Defense and particularly the National Guard? So how would we determine those requirements, and then how would we get them into the PPBS process?

And I don't – I think it ought to come from the adjutant generals because that is an official status. NOGIS (ph), great outfit, but it's got a lobbying side to it, whereas the tags are representing the governors. And if you all aren't appropriate, or you think it would be improper for you to give a – we're going to write one because we've got to have one. And maybe we'll find the one the department has, or maybe we'll find the one DHS has. And if so, we can say what it is, and how we think it ought to be changed, because clearly it's not working if they got it. I don't think we're ever going to find it, because I don't believe it exists. We could sure use your all's help, and get something to us. But if that's not appropriate, maybe we could come up with a straw man, and y'all could check it out for us. And so that's what I think is going to solve this resourcing issue, we're going to have to drive it from a requirements process.

General Vaughn.

MR. VAUGHN: Just an absolutely great discussion. You know when we started down this track on requirements for the Title 32 mission, you got to remember Title 32, U.S. code is out there to train the reserve force for the federal mission. And during the time all of us have been in this business, there's nothing been out there for the homeland that sees anything to do with that mission in the homeland being a federal mission. You heard earlier about the lesson included. Now, as we stood up NORTHCOM, you have to ask yourself, you know, in the same manner that General Schoomaker talked about the influence of the combatant commanders out there, you know, what is NORTHCOM's role in coming with the requirements?

(Cross talk.)

MR. PUNARO: – their integrated priority lists on if they don't do it on that?

MR. VAUGHN: Right, somebody has to come up with the requirements.

Now, we've come back several times and said, you know, if they don't want to come with the side of it, you know, because it will impact on the Title 10 – exactly what you said – maybe these folks need to do that. That's where we got the list for 342 pieces of equipment by the way. They came out of the Army National Guard and the Army.

MR. PUNARO: I'm not looking for the answer; I'm looking for the process. So maybe you'll be a double hero with me because if you basically tell me that it's not out there, I won't make the staff look for it between the Christmas and New Year's holiday.



MR. VAUGHN: I don't know enough to tell you it's not out there. I'm just telling you what I think. You know, as I ran through this process a second ago, I don't believe it exists.

GEN. REES: Yeah. Sir, I just submit one thought, is that again, going back to Admiral Thompson's previous life where we worked together out there. People keep trying to find a bright line between DOD and DHS. Part of what we've got is an interagency issue about how do you resolve that. So there's almost got to be a directed interagency relationship to resolve it.

MR. PUNARO: I don't see how we can make recommendations on this legislation without dealing with this issue. If we want to make responsible recommendations, we got to admit the emperor has no close and deal with it. And what I need, if y'all are willing, and if it's appropriate. Now y'all need to think it through because – we're going to have to draw something up because I'm pretty sure, as General Vaughn validated, it doesn't exist. Y'all have a tenth – a gazillion times more expertise, even than our hard charging staff, and we look forward to getting whatever input. Again, this is how should we generate requirements for the nine federal missions that we know exist, that the Department of Defense has said is the number one priority – homeland defense.

The whole reason we created NORTHCOM. You know, don't know what their J8 is doing out there if they're not working on this. And yet we can't get into the resourcing because all they do is look at the Title 10 requirements. No wonder people are frustrated that they aren't getting the right answer, and so we need to deal with it. People may just totally say forget it, but at least we need to give people the option to take a serious look at it. I believe the adjutant generals could be immensely helpful. Y'all really are the subject matter experts on this. And if people hear you're doing it, it may wake up "Sleepy Holler" over at DHS, and it may wake up the J8 and the joint staff, and a few of those other folks.

So I put that to you as an official request, and let me know if you want to do that or not.

GEN. UMBARGER: Mr. Chairman, can I –

MR. PUNARO: Yeah.

GEN. UMBARGER: We didn't come here to address this today, but listening to you talk about requirements and talk about what we need to do to be ready to go on cross leveling, I just can't leave here without bringing up the number one issue we've had for readiness for years. It has been full-time manning of the Army Guard.

MR. PUNARO: Yeah.

GEN. UMBARGER: We're 53 – the validated requirements of the Army, we're still at 53 percent. And we wonder – so we've got our full-time manning such to where it almost begs, but we're still at the C-3 training –

MR. PUNARO: Right. That's a resourcing issue.

GEN. UMBARGER: It's a resourcing issue, and we validated that. We know what it is, and even this year, this is where we talked about this – having somebody at the table fighting for us. It was left out of the budget. Now, the secretary of the Army, we brought up to the RFAC (ph) and they're putting it back in the budget. But I can't – that would be in itself a tremendously forward on improving our readiness, so when we do get ready to go, it takes less time to –

MR. PUNARO: I appreciate that. That's a very good point.

Now, I should actually make an alibi like Commissioner Thompson because the staff is going to jump all over me for saying DHS was a “sleepy holler,” and didn't know what the J8 was doing. (Laughter.) Let me state for the record – I mean George Foresman is about as knowledgeable as expert on homeland security as we have in government. And they seriously want to do the right thing, and of course we know our joint staff, and we know the J8 at NORTHCOM works night and day, seven days a week, 24/7. So we appreciate all their great service and we appreciate y'all's testimony here today. Look forward to staying in close touch.

These are difficult issues, as you well know. What we want to do is make sure we fully understand the problem set that we're trying to solve. Make sure we fully understand what the requirements are. Look forward to hearing from Joe Vaughn officially. We'll be hearing from General Pace and General Blum and others in the January – Secretary Harvey – timeframe. We are going to meet our deadline on March 1 on this legislation. If the Congress passes the legislation and solves it before March 1, super. That will save us some paper work.

But again, thank you again for your great service. But particularly thank the men and women of the National Guard and their families for everything they do for this country overseas and here at home, and have been doing for – Happy birthday, National Guard, 370 years old yesterday.

The hearing is adjourned.

(END)