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Gun-Free School Zones:
Looking to a Landmark Case to Deal with the Present
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
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Facts and Case Summary
| FACTS |
The Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990 was enacted by Congress in order to prevent the possession of firearms near a school. The Act forbade any individual to "knowingly ... possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has a reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone," 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(1)(A). Any individual found in violation of this Act would be guilty of committing a federal crime and could face imprisonment.
An anonymous tipster informed school officials at Edison High School (located in Texas) that one of their students, twelfth grader Alfonso Lopez, brought a gun to school. Lopez was placed under arrest after a search by school officials found a .38 caliber handgun and five bullets in his possession. Although Lopez was originally charged with violating a Texas law prohibiting firearms on school property, his case was removed to federal court where a grand jury indicted him of violating the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990.
Lopez sought to quash his indictment on Constitutional grounds. He argued that, although Congress looked to its authority to regulate interstate commerce to justify this Act, the Act had nothing to do with commerce. In essence, Lopez argued that Congress usurped the power of the states by passing an ordinary criminal Act under the guise of its authority to regulate commerce. |
| ISSUE |
Whether the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 is authorized by the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. |
| RULING |
No. (5-4) |
| REASONING |
Majority Opinion
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority of the Court, including Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, held that the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 was not supported by the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8. After reviewing the history of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court stated that Congress does not have the authority to regulate everything that remotely touches upon interstate commerce. The Court held that the constitutional test for whether or not Congress can regulate an economic activity under the Commerce Clause is determined by whether the action has a "substantial effect" upon interstate commerce. Although the Court recognized that great deference should be given to Congress in determining what affects interstate commerce, it could not ignore the fact that the connection between guns in school and interstate commerce was so remote that its effect was nowhere near substantial. For these reasons, the Court exercised an independent review of Congress' findings and held that the Act was unconstitutional because the Act exceeded the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause. |
| CONCURRENCE 1 |
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice Anthony Kennedy reiterated the importance of deferring to Congress' findings regarding what activities have an impact on interstate commerce. Yet, she held that independent judicial review is sometimes appropriate. When, as in this case, there appears to be no reasonable connection between a regulation and interstate commerce, the Court must strike down the law. |
| CONCURRENCE 2 |
In a separate concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Court should reexamine its Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In particular, he argued that interstate commerce has a very specific definition. This definition does not necessarily permit Congress to regulate activities, such as manufacturing that, although substantially affecting interstate commerce, occur completely intrastate. |
| DISSENT 1 |
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented arguing that the majority's holding in Lopez was a retreat from recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Moreover, he argued that the Court should not substitute its personal feelings about what affects interstate commerce for the findings of the people's elected representatives. |
| DISSENT 2 |
Justice David Souter dissented arguing that as long as Congress made a rational argument, even if it was not the best one, that gun violence in schools could affect interstate commerce, the Court should defer to its findings. Souter found Congress' justifications rational and so argued for deference to them. |
| DISSENT 3 |
Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and John Paul Stevens, dissented arguing that gun violence in schools has a demonstrable impact on interstate commerce. For example, he argued that gun violence increases insurance premiums and affects where people want to live. Moreover, he argued that such violence in schools impairs the education process. Since an educated populace is necessary for the U.S. economy to function, he stated that Congress could rationally conclude that gun violence has an adverse impact on interstate commerce. Congress chose to address this issue with the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, and the Court should defer to its judgment. |
| Please Note: After the decision in Lopez, Congress amended the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 to permit prosecutions of individuals who possess a firearm on/near school property if the firearm was involved in interstate commerce. Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this matter, the amended statute was held to be constitutional by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. See United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); United States of America v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999). |
| Please Note: Concurring opinions support the conclusion of the Court's decision but may offer different reasoning for that conclusion. |
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