An alien convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation regardless of the date of the conviction when the alien is placed in deportation proceedings on or after March 1, 1991, and the crime falls within the aggravated felony definition.
(1) Where an alien who did not receive oral warnings of the
consequences of failing to appear at a deportation hearing pursuant
to section 242B(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252b(a) (1994), moves to reopen deportation proceedings held in
absentia under section 242B(c) of the Act in order to apply for a
form of relief that was unavailable at the time of the hearing, the
rescission requirements prescribed by section 242B(c)(3) of the Act
are not applicable. Instead, the motion to reopen is subject to
the regulatory requirements set forth at 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2(c) and
3.23(b)(3) (1998).
(2) Where deportation proceedings held in absentia are reopened to
allow for an application for new relief, the Immigration Judge must
determine in each individual case the weight to be accorded to the
alien’s explanation for failing to appear at the hearing and
whether such explanation is a favorable or adverse factor with
respect to the ultimate discretionary determination.
(1) Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1998), where an asylum
applicant has shown that he has been persecuted in the past on
account of a statutorily-protected ground, and the record reflects
that country conditions have changed to such an extent that the
asylum applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution
from his original persecutors, the applicant bears the burden of
demonstrating that he has a well-founded fear of persecution from
any new source.
(2) An asylum applicant who no longer has a well-founded fear of
persecution due to changed country conditions may still be eligible
for a discretionary grant of asylum under 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1)(ii) only if he establishes, as a threshold matter,
compelling reasons for being unwilling to return to his country of
nationality or last habitual residence arising out of the severity
of the past persecution.
(3) The applicant failed to establish compelling reasons arising out
of the severity of the past persecution for being unwilling to
return to Afghanistan where he suffered beatings during a month-long
detention and the disappearance and likely death of his
father.
Where counsel’s insistence on corroborating evidence discouraged the respondents from seeking asylum, but was reasonable in light of case precedent, there is no showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(1) A decision by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to
institute removal or other proceedings, or to cancel a Notice to
Appear or other charging document before jurisdiction vests with
the Immigration Judge, involves the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion and is not a decision that the Immigration Judge or this
Board may review.
(2) Once the charging document is filed with the Immigration Court
and jurisdiction is vested in the Immigration Judge, the Service
may move to terminate the proceedings, but it may not simply cancel
the charging document. The Immigration Judge is not required to
terminate proceedings upon the Service’s invocation of
prosecutorial discretion but rather must adjudicate the motion on
the merits according to the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 239.2 (1998).
(3) The Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals lack
jurisdiction to review a decision of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to reinstate a prior order of removal
pursuant to section 241(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5) (Supp. II 1996).
The Board of Immigration Appeals lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim for relief from deportation pursuant to Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as there has been no specific legislation to implement the provisions of Article 3, no regulations have been promulgated with respect to Article 3, and the United States Senate has declared that Article 3 is a non-self-executing treaty provision.
(1) The third prong of the standard for determining whether a
conviction exists with regard to deferred adjudications has been
eliminated pursuant to section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (Supp. II 1996). Matter
of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), superseded.
(2) A deferred adjudication under article 42.12, § 5 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure is a conviction for immigration
purposes.
(1) An alien seeking immigrant classification as an alien of
exceptional ability or as a member of the professions holding an
advanced degree cannot meet the threshold for a national interest
waiver of the job offer requirement simply by establishing a
certain level of training or education which could be articulated
on an application for a labor certification.
(2) General arguments regarding the importance of a given field of
endeavor, or the urgency of an issue facing the United States,
cannot by themselves establish that an individual alien benefits
the national interest by virtue of engaging in the field or seeking
an as yet undiscovered solution to the problematic issue.
(3) A shortage of qualified workers in a given field, regardless of
the nature of the occupation, does not constitute grounds for a
national interest waiver. Given that the labor certification
process was designed to address the issue of worker shortages, a
shortage of qualified workers is an argument for obtaining rather
than waiving a labor certification.
(1) Merely establishing and capitalizing a new commercial enterprise
and signing a commercial lease are not sufficient to show that an
immigrant-investor petitioner has placed his capital at risk. The
petitioner must present, instead, evidence that he has actually
undertaken meaningful concrete business activity.
(2) The petitioner must establish that he has placed his own capital
at risk, that is to say, he must show that he was the legal owner
of the invested capital. Bank statements and other financial
documents do not meet this requirement if the documents show
someone else as the legal owner of the capital.
(3) The petitioner must also establish that he acquired the legal
ownership of the invested capital through lawful means. Mere
assertions about the petitioner's financial situation or work
history, without supporting documentary evidence, are not
sufficient to meet this requirement.
(4) To establish that qualifying employment positions have been
created, INS Forms I-9 presented by a petitioner must be
accompanied by other evidence to show that these employees have
commenced work activities and have been hired in permanent, full-time
positions.
(5) In order to demonstrate that the new commercial enterprise will
create not fewer than 10 full-time positions, the petitioner must
either provide evidence that the new commercial enterprise has
created such positions or furnish a comprehensive, detailed, and
credible business plan demonstrating the need for the positions and
the schedule for hiring the employees.
(1) A promissory note secured by assets owned by a petitioner can
constitute capital under 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) if: the assets are
specifically identified as securing the note; the security
interests in the note are perfected in the jurisdiction in which
the assets are located; and the assets are fully amenable to
seizure by a U.S. note holder.
(2) When determining the fair market value of a promissory note
being used as capital under 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e), factors such as
the fair market value of the assets securing the note, the extent
to which the assets are amenable to seizure, and the present value
of the note should be considered.
(3) Whether a petitioner uses a promissory note as capital under
8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) or as evidence of a commitment to invest cash,
he must show that he has placed his assets at risk. In
establishing that a sufficient amount of his assets are at risk,
a petitioner must demonstrate, among other things, that the assets
securing the note are his, that the security interests are
perfected, that the assets are amenable to seizure, and that the
assets have an adequate fair market value.
(4) A petitioner engaging in the reorganization or restructuring of
a pre-existing business may not cause a net loss of employment.
(1) Regardless of its location, a new commercial enterprise that is
engaged directly or indirectly in lending money to job-creating
businesses may only lend money to businesses located within
targeted areas in order for a petitioner to be eligible for the
reduced minimum capital requirement.
(2) Under the Immigrant Investor Pilot Program, if a new commercial
enterprise is engaged directly or indirectly in lending money to
job-creating businesses, such job-creating businesses must all be
located within the geographic limits of the regional center. The
location of the new commercial enterprise is not controlling.
(3) A petitioner may not make material changes to his petition in an
effort to make a deficient petition conform to Service
requirements.
(4) If the new commercial enterprise is a holding company, the full
requisite amount of capital must be made available to the
business(es) most closely responsible for creating the employment
on which the petition is based.
(5) An alien may not receive guaranteed payments from a new
commercial enterprise while he owes money to the new commercial
enterprise.
(6) An alien may not enter into a redemption agreement with the
new commercial enterprise at any time prior to completing all of
his cash payments under a promissory note. In no event may the
alien enter into a redemption agreement prior to the end of the
two-year period of conditional residence.
(7) A redemption agreement between an alien investor and the new
commercial enterprise constitutes a debt arrangement and is
prohibited under 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e).
(8) Reserve funds that are not made available for purposes of job
creation cannot be considered capital placed at risk for the
purpose of generating a return on the capital being placed at risk.
(9) The Service does not pre-adjudicate immigrant-investor
petitions; each petition must be adjudicated on its own merits.
(10) Under 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e), all capital must be valued at fair
market value in United States dollars, including promissory notes
used as capital. In determining the fair market value of a
promissory note, it is necessary to consider, among other things,
present value.
(11) Under certain circumstances, a promissory note that does not
itself constitute capital may constitute evidence that the alien
is "in the process of investing" other capital, such as cash. In
such a case, the petitioner must substantially complete payments
on the promissory note prior to the end of the two-year conditional
period.
(12) Whether the promissory note constitutes capital or is simply
evidence that the alien is in the process of investing other
capital, nearly all of the money due under the promissory note must
be payable within two years, without provisions for extensions.
(13) In order for a petitioner to be considered to have established
an original business, he must have had a hand in its actual
creation.
(1) A petitioner under § 203(b)(5) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act cannot establish the requisite investment of
capital if he lends the money to his new commercial enterprise.
(2) Loans obtained by a corporation, secured by assets of the
corporation, do not constitute capital invested by a petitioner.
Not only is such a loan prohibited by 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e), but the
petitioner and the corporation are not the same legal entity.
(3) A petitioner's personal guarantee on a business's debt does not
transform the business's debt into the petitioner's personal debt.
(4) A petitioner must present clear documentary evidence of the
source of the funds that he invests. He must show that the funds
are his own and that they were obtained through lawful means.
(5) A petitioner who acquires a pre-existing business must show that
the investment has created, or at least has a reasonable prospect
of creating, 10 full-time positions, in addition to those existing
before acquisition. The petitioner must, therefore, present
evidence concerning the pre-acquisition level of employment.
Simply maintaining the pre-acquisition level of employment is not
sufficient, unless the petitioner shows that the pre-existing
business qualifies as a "troubled business."
In order to commence proceedings against an alien for purposes of sections 204(g) and 245(e)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(g) and 1255(e)(2) (1994), an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) that was issued on or after June 20, 1991, must be filed with the Immigration Court. Matter of Fuentes, 20 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 1991), superseded.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute an exception to the 180-day statutory limit for the filing of a motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order of deportation under section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(A) (1994), on the basis of exceptional circumstances.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute an exception to the 180-day statutory limit for the filing of a motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order of deportation under section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(A) (1994), on the basis of exceptional circumstances.
In cases falling within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, exclusion proceedings are appropriate for aliens returning to the United States under a grant of advance parole, with two exceptions. Those exceptions are aliens with pending registry applications and those not specifically informed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that they risk being placed in exclusion proceedings upon reentry. Matter of Torres, 19 I&N Dec. 371 (BIA 1986), modified.
An applicant for asylum who departed the United States after having been granted an advance authorization for parole, and who, on his return, was paroled into this country under the provisions of section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (Supp. V 1993), was properly placed in exclusion proceedings following the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s denial of his application for asylum and revocation of his parole. Navarro-Aispura v. INS, 53 F.3d 233 (9th Cir. 1995); and Barney v. Rogers, 83 F.3d 318 (9th Cir. 1996), distinguished.
A motion to reopen deportation proceedings conducted in absentia pursuant to section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1994), that demonstrates a lack of notice of the scheduled hearing is excepted from the regulatory time limitations on motions.
Due to a fundamental change in the definition of a “refugee” brought about by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, the Board of Immigration Appeals will allow reopening of proceedings to pursue asylum claims based on coerced population control policies, notwithstanding the time and number limitations on motions specified in 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1997).
In considering the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Young v. Reno, 114 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 1997), the Board of Immigration Appeals reaffirms its holding in Matter of Li, 20 I&N Dec. 700 (BIA 1993), that a petitioner who qualifies as an adopted child under section 101(b)(1)(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(e) (1994), cannot confer immigration benefits on a natural sibling.
An alien failed to establish that a foot injury he suffered on the day before his deportation hearing amounted to exceptional circumstances to excuse his failure to appear within the meaning of section 242B(f)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(f)(2)(1994), where he gave no explanation for neglecting to contact the Immigration Court before the hearing and did not support his claim with medical records or other evidence, such as an affidavit from his employer.
An alien who claimed that his failure to appear at his deportation hearing resulted from an “illegible hearing date” on the Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) failed to establish by sufficient evidence that he received inadequate notice of the hearing under section 242B(c)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(B)(1994), or that his absence was the result of exceptional circumstances under section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Act.
An alien failed to establish that a serious headache he suffered on the day of his deportation hearing amounted to exceptional circumstances to excuse his failure to appear within the meaning of section 242B(f)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(f)(2)(1994), where he gave no explanation for neglecting to contact the Immigration Court on the day of the hearing and did not support his claim with medical records or other evidence, such as affidavits by persons with knowledge regarding the extent and seriousness of the alien’s headache and the remedies he used to treat it.
In order to qualify as a “legitimated” child under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C)(1994), a child residing or domiciled in Peru must have been under the age of 18 at the time the changes in Peruvian law regarding legitimation took effect, and “extramarital filiation” must have been established prior to the child’s 18th birthday, unless he or she was legitimated under the former laws of that country. Matter of Quispe, 16 I&N Dec. 174 (BIA 1977); and Matter of Breninzon, 19 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 1984), modified.
An alien who suffered repeated beatings and received multiple handwritten anti-Semitic threats, whose apartment was vandalized by anti-Semitic nationalists, and whose son was subjected to degradation and intimidation on account of his Jewish nationality established that he has suffered harm which, in the aggregate, rises to the level of persecution as contemplated by the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Precedent decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals which have been certified to the Attorney General for review are binding on the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Immigration Judges and continue to serve as precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues unless or until they are modified or overruled by the Board or the Attorney General.
(1) An alien who arrives in the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole is an “arriving alien,” as that term is defined in the federal regulations. (2) According to the regulations, an Immigration Judge has no authority over the apprehension, custody, and detention of arriving aliens and is therefore without authority to consider the bond request of an alien returning pursuant to a grant of advance parole.
Where the Board of Immigration Appeals dismisses an appeal as untimely, without adjudication on the merits, the Board retains jurisdiction over a motion to reconsider its dismissal of the untimely appeal to the extent that the motion challenges the finding of untimeliness or requests consideration of the reasons for untimeliness. Matter of Mladineo, 14 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 1974), modified.
(1) To be statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal under
section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)), an alien must demonstrate that
he or she has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for
not less than 5 years, has resided in the United States
continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status,
and has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.
(2) In addition to satisfying the three statutory eligibility
requirements, an applicant for relief under section 240A(a) of the
Act must establish that he or she warrants such relief as a matter
of discretion.
(3) The general standards developed in Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec.
581, 584-85 (BIA 1978), for the exercise of discretion under
section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(1994), which was the
predecessor provision to section 240A(a), are applicable to the
exercise of discretion under section 240A(a).
An alien who was convicted of aggravated driving while under the influence and sentenced to 2½ years in prison was convicted of a “crime of violence” within the meaning of section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)), and therefore is deportable under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii)(1994), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.