W TO: A/Administrator A/Chairman, NASA Advisory Council Z/Associate Administrator for Policy and Plans FROM: W/Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Administrative Investigations, and Assessments SUBJECT: Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions and International Space Station Operational Readiness Task Forces The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is conducting an inquiry on United States (U.S.) participation in the Phase I Russian Mir Space Station Program (Phase I). As part of that inquiry, we examined the external review teams NASA appointed to identify and analyze issues for the first Shuttle-Mir rendezvous and for subsequent Shuttle-Mir missions (the Stafford Task Forces). Because NASA will continue to rely on the Stafford Task Forces' assessments regarding the final NASA-Mir mission as well as the International Space Station (ISS) program, we are making recommendations to improve the effectiveness of these external reviews. Introduction In May 1994, the Acting Deputy Administrator established the Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions (SR&DM) to assess ISS Phase I Shuttle-Mir missions under the charter of the NASA Advisory Council (NAC). Lt. General Thomas P. Stafford, USAF (Ret.) (General Stafford) was selected as chair for the Task Force based on his expertise regarding on-orbit rendezvous and docking maneuvers, especially between U.S. and Russian space craft. The Task Force initially focused on technical and management aspects of the Shuttle-Mir Program. At the Administrator's request, it expanded that focus to include flight readiness. In November 1996, the Administrator established the Task Force for ISS Operations Readiness (IOR) to conduct reviews and assessments and issue recommendations to the NAC regarding the operational readiness of the ISS. General Stafford also chairs the IOR Task Force. General Stafford's knowledge and experience with U.S. and Russian space programs and his familiarity with Russian political and social environments has been credited with being instrumental in increasing Russian cooperation and communication on the ISS program. This may be one of the most important benefits NASA derives from the continued work of the Stafford Task Forces. [Note 1] The Role of the Task Forces The SR&DM Task Force was initially established "to review Phase 1 (Shuttle-Mir) planning, training, operations, rendezvous and docking, and management and to provide interim reports containing specific recommendations to the Advisory Council." [Note 2] After the fourth formal report of the SR&DM Task Force, the Stafford Task Force began issuing letters of flight readiness and focusing on Shuttle-Mir safety assessments (See Appendix A for a list of report and letter dates). The SR&DM Task Force addressed the first five reports to the NAC Chairman. It addressed the letters of flight readiness to the NASA Administrator and presented results of its assessments at quarterly NAC meetings. The Task Forces are largely volunteer organizations and the period between Shuttle-Mir missions is relatively short. For these reasons, the Task Forces rely on mission-related presentations made to them by NASA as a primary source of information for making their assessments. In addition, the Task Forces form small teams (working groups and "Red Teams") which, among other activities, visit Russia to gather additional information to assist in making their assessments. Individual members also contact NASA employees or others with expertise in specific areas. General Stafford communicates with his counterpart Academician Utkin (Utkin) either in person or by telephone on specific issues. [Note 3] Many of the issues General Stafford addresses to Utkin have been discussed earlier by the Phase I staff and their mission counterparts in Russia. [Note 4] Nevertheless, the dialogue in which General Stafford engages with Utkin is important as part of the contextual negotiations between the Russians and Americans. [Note 5] The Administrator increasingly relies on the Stafford Task Force to provide safety assessments of Shuttle-Mir missions, and on July 15, 1997, the Agency described the Task Force to Congress as "the third part of a three-fold safety assessment process" (See Appendix B). [Note 6] A. NASA Should Reevaluate The Role Of The Task Forces For Future Missions The ISS assembly schedule of more than 40 combined U.S. and Russian launches over a 6-year time frame will be very aggressive (much more so than Shuttle-Mir missions with 4 to 6 months between mission launches). As presently staffed, the time constraints and demands on the largely volunteer Task Force members precludes members from providing immediate safety and mission assessments of every ISS mission. [Note 8] NASA has alternative methods to perform safety assessments. There are external advisory groups that either focus on safety, such as the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), or look at safety-related issues (e.g., the National Research Council has conducted studies on orbital debris and the NAC Advisory Council on the ISS, headed by A. Thomas Young, also examines some safety-related issues). The Stafford Task Forces could better serve NASA by focusing on specific areas of review for the remainder of the Phase I mission and for ISS Phases II and III. For instance, topics could include crew training, crew compatibility, habitation, procedural documentation, and lessons learned. These focused reviews are more germane to the original charters of the Task Forces and the framework of the NAC. Safety assessments should be limited to habitation-related issues or specific safety or technical concerns and should be coordinated with other external advisory groups such as the ASAP. [Note 9] Recommendation: The Agency should follow its original charter for the Stafford Task Forces to perform studies on specific areas rather than having them provide immediate safety assessments prior to launches. B. NASA Should Reevaluate The Composition Of The Task Forces The members and support staff of the Stafford Task Forces include special Government employees (SGE's), [Note 10] NASA civil servants, and three contractor employees hired under a task on a Johnson Space Center (JSC) contract. The current SR&DM Task Force consists of the Chairman (General Stafford); 14 voting members; 2 technical advisors, one of whom is an "ex officio" member; [Note 11] and an Executive Secretary. A part-time contractor administrative assistant provides administrative support to the Task Forces. The composition of the SR&DM Task Force has remained relatively constant since it was created in May 1994. The IOR Task Force's composition is similar to that of the SR&DM Task Force. Several members serve on both the SR&DM and the IOR Task Force (See Appendix E). Most members of the Task Forces (SR&DM and IOR) are current or former NASA employees and contractors, or are affiliated with the aerospace industry or NASA by contract. Some members have backgrounds in engineering and operations management, some are former astronauts, and three members are physicians. Task Force members who are current NASA civil servant employees are involved in the Agency's Space Shuttle, Shuttle-Mir, ISS, science, microgravity, and safety programs. The SGE Task Force members are appointed federal experts and consultants and are subject to the identical ethical requirements (e.g., conflict of interest constraints) imposed on civil servant employees pursuant to the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch. [Note 12] As part of their appointment process, SGE’s must submit Confidential Financial Disclosure Reports (OGE/SF Form 450) which are reviewed by the Office of General Counsel. As with civil servant employees, the SGE's must annually resubmit an OGE/SF Form 450. The SGE's serve voluntarily and receive no compensation for their services beyond reimbursement for travel expenses (including per diem). Unlike the SGE's and civil servants, the three contractor employees are not subject to the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch. Moreover, the contractor employees are not volunteers but are paid employees of private companies. Our examination of the composition of the Stafford Task Forces indicates the following: 1. The Presence Of NASA Civil Servants As Voting Members Negates The Appearance Of An Objective, External Advisory Task Force NASA characterizes the Task Forces as being "independent" and "objective." [Note 13] Yet, NASA civil servant employees serve as voting members of the Stafford Task Forces. As NASA employees responsible for mission and program success, they are in conflict (or potential conflict) with their role as voting members of independent Task Forces. The perception of the integrity, independence, and objectivity of the Task Forces is diminished by the employees' dual roles. For example, the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Deputy Associate Administrator is a voting member of the Task Forces. The perception of independent safety reviews may be negated by a voting Task Force member who is not independent from and external to the NASA safety process. Likewise, members of the Task Force who are currently astronauts may impact the perception of independence and objectivity as they vote on issues directly affecting their programs. [Note 14] Another example is the Associate Administrator for Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications who serves both as a voting member of the Task Forces and also provides oversight of the Mir and ISS science programs for which his office is responsible. Information in these areas is vital to the success of the Task Forces, but representation should be limited to technical advice, assistance, or information. Recommendation: Current NASA civil servant members of the Task Forces whose positions are directly related to specific issues being assessed should serve only in a non-voting advisory role. 2. The Presence Of SGE Members Whose Professional Livelihoods Are Closely Aligned With NASA’s Shuttle-Mir And ISS Programs Negates The Appearance Of An Objective, External Advisory Task Force Some SGE members of the Task Forces are contractors closely linked to NASA contracts and NASA programs dealing with the Space Shuttle, Shuttle-Mir, and ISS. Some SGE's are so closely aligned with NASA programs and contracts or hold significant financial interests in NASA contractors that they may have to recuse or disqualify themselves from any discussions regarding the operations of the contracts vis-a-vis Shuttle-Mir or ISS programs. [Note 15] Having SGE members closely aligned with related Russian and NASA programs, contracts, and grants may create the perception of a bias or lack of impartiality. [Note 16] For example, an SGE who is a former astronaut is also the Chief Operations Officer for the United Space Alliance (USA) contract. Under the Space Flight Operations Contract, USA provides operations and processing services for the Space Shuttle. The success of the Space Shuttle program is directly related to the Shuttle manifests (supported by USA) for construction of the ISS. This close relationship with the Space Shuttle program may create a perception of bias and may diminish the perception of independence and objectivity. One SGE, a retired Rockwell executive, is also Vice President and Deputy Program Manager of Kistler Aerospace Corporation (Kistler). Kistler has contracted with Aerojet to purchase a total of 76 Russian engines to power Kistler’s future K-1 reusable launch vehicles. This SGE has served on Stafford Task Force Red Teams and has traveled with the Stafford Task Force to Russia. The position held by this SGE at Kistler and the financial dealings Kistler has with the Russian aerospace industry may negatively impact the perception of independence and objectivity. [Note 17] Another SGE and former astronaut is President and Chief Executive Officer of ANSER Corporation. [Note 18] ANSER, once a small Air Force Federal Contract Research Center, is now a multimillion dollar organization with a large foreign customer base that includes joint working agreements with Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. ANSER not only fosters opportunities for international cooperation by providing analysis of current Eastern European technologies and space activities but also contracted with NASA to produce a report assessing NASA science performed on Mir. [Note 19] The position held by this SGE coupled with the related activities of his organization with Russian and NASA aerospace and science organizations may weaken the perception of the Task Forces' independence and objectivity. Recommendation: The Task Force Executive Secretary should closely review with an ethics counselor the Confidential Financial Disclosure Reports of all SGE members to evaluate potential disqualifying interests. Where the perception of bias exists, but the technical expertise of the individual is vital to the mission of the Task Forces, the SGE member should serve solely in a non-voting advisory role. 3. The Task Forces Can Better Function As An External Objective Group By Diversifying Its Professional Membership The composition of the SR&DM Task Force has remained relatively unchanged since its creation in 1994 (See Appendix E). However, the focus of the SR&DM Task Force has changed from producing topic-specific, detailed reports for the NAC to primarily assessing safety and flight readiness of Shuttle-Mir missions for the Administrator. [Note 20] As stated earlier, the Task Force is generally comprised of current or former NASA employees, or with individuals who are affiliated with the aerospace industry or with NASA by contract. For the Task Forces to achieve maximum effectiveness, a membership balance should be maintained between individuals with in-depth NASA knowledge and those with relevant outside perspectives. General Stafford (with input from Task Force members) currently recommends individuals for appointment to the Task Forces. However, a revised selection procedure could yield a more diverse Task Force membership with the appropriate expertise to address emerging issues and also reduce the potential for a selection bias that tends to perpetuate a professionally homogenous group. This professional homogeneity fosters the perception of a lack of objectivity. Although astronauts and other professionals closely associated with NASA generally have a high degree of objectivity, the Task Forces must weigh all external perceptions. [Note 21] The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requires the membership of advisory committees (including task forces) to be "fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented." [Note 22] The Act also requires that precautions be taken to ensure that the advice and recommendations of the committees "will not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest, but will instead be the result of the advisory committee's independent judgment." [Note 23] Advisory committees and task forces not only provide ideas and advice to the Government, but they can also bestow political legitimacy on that advice. Because of the value that can be placed on advisory committee and task force recommendations, care must be taken to assure objectivity. Even though not covered under FACA, when the National Research Council (NRC) selects experts to work on various studies, the possible perception of a lack of objectivity is avoided by employing a committee to screen potential members. The screening includes discussions of bias and appearance issues. The committee balances the composition of the group to embrace members with divergent views. To increase openness, the NRC posts the names of the recommended study group members on a webpage for public comment prior to making the final selection. In this way, additional rigor is placed on the selection process to maximize the opportunity to include individuals with diverse viewpoints as committee members. Members and advisors with long-term experience and in-depth knowledge of NASA and Russian programs and technical areas are essential elements of the Stafford Task Forces. However, to be most effective, the Task Forces should be routinely infused with the perspectives of highly qualified, new, and diverse members while maintaining the continuity of core membership. [Note 24] This action would not only provide consistency and familiarity to their Russian counterparts but would also prepare the next generation of NASA employees or SGE’s to interface with the Russians. The Stafford Task Forces should seek divergent views from individuals possessing relevant expertise who are not associated with NASA. For example, adding non-NASA personnel from the NRC; the Federal Aviation Administration; the Department of Defense; or the National Transportation Safety Board, would increase the Task Force's credibility and enhance its capabilities. Recommendations from prestigious bodies outside NASA carry great weight with Congress and the public and would help focus attention on specific issues. Recommendation: NASA should increase the professional diversity of the Task Forces by rotating membership and appointing highly qualified individuals from various backgrounds as members or advisors. The Agency should seek recommendations for qualified Task Force members from outside sources. The expertise and skills of those recommended for membership should relate directly to ISS issues. [Note 25] C. More Economical And Efficient Use Of Support Contractors In addition to SGE's and civil servants, the Stafford Task Forces rely on contractors to provide technical and administrative support. These services are contracted under a JSC contract, NAS9-18800, with Johnson Engineering Corporation (JEC). [Note 26] Technical and administrative support for the Stafford Task Forces is provided through a task order under WBS A.1.4 of the JEC contract valued at $1,574,000 with a period of performance ending April 30, 1998. Additional technical support is provided by a sole source subcontractor, Engle Technologies, Inc. (ETI), under JEC task order WBS A.1.4. The ETI firm, fixed price subcontract (JE-9019-SN3043), consisting of one employee, is valued at $725,091 with a 30 month period of performance ending April 30, 1998. [Note 27] Our review of the support contractors services includes: 1. Administrative Support Services The administrative support for the Task Forces is provided through task order WBS A.1.4 of the JEC contract. The administrative tasks provided to the Stafford Task Forces include, but are not limited to: taking notes and supplying minutes of meetings, scheduling conferences, arranging travel and lodging, coordinating and completing paper work for travel reimbursements and Confidential Financial Disclosure Reports for some SGE's. Provisions for administrative support, however, are not included in the task descriptions or task requirements for this task order. According to the Office of Policy and Plans, other NAC committees or task forces rely on civil servants or use the Jorge Scientific Corporation contract (NAS5-32459) [Note 28] available through the Technical Information Services Branch at the Goddard Space Flight Center for most of their administrative support. NASA Headquarters management advocates the Jorge Scientific Corporation contract for providing consolidated administrative support to NAC committees, task forces, and other Headquarters offices. This is consistent with support service contract consolidations efforts throughout Headquarters and the Agency (See Appendix H). The Stafford Task Forces could also obtain additional administrative support from civil servant support staff at Headquarters. [Note 29] Headquarters downsizing has created a small surplus of support personnel that could be made available for administrative support of the Stafford Task Forces. Also, the Office of Headquarters Operations is evaluating civil service support staff balances to determine the feasibility of consolidating civil servant administrative support to assist the NAC. Finally, having JSC administer a contract to provide administrative support for a NAC task force rather than using the Jorge Scientific Contract only serves to reinforce the perception that the Stafford Task Forces are closely aligned with JSC. Recommendation: In keeping with the NAC's general reliance on and the Agency's encouragement to use the Jorge Scientific Corporation contract or civil servant support staff for administrative support, the Executive Secretary of the Stafford Task Forces should follow this same procedure for obtaining administrative support for the Task Forces. The current study by the Office of Headquarters Operations should include the specific needs of the Stafford Task Forces to determine if Headquarters civil servants are available to support the Task Forces. 2. Technical Support Services Technical support for the Stafford Task Forces is provided by JEC under task order WBS A.1.4 using JEC employees and the sole source subcontractor ETI. The JEC contract provides the "ex officio" member who serves in a technical support capacity. [Note 30] The ETI sole source subcontract provides a technical advisor [Note 31] for the Stafford Task Force. According to the Office of Policy and Plans no other NAC committees or task forces rely on continuing contractor supplied technical support. a. Technical Support Provided By JEC The "ex officio" technical support provided by the JEC task order under WBS A.1.4 is very broad. This support not only covers assisting in the Stafford Task Forces' external reviews, but also includes working on "JSC internal technical tasks" of Space Shuttle, Shuttle-Mir, ISS, and other advanced programs (See Appendix K). In addition to technical assessments, the contractor also appears to provide some administrative support services that are outside any task descriptions or task requirements as provided under this task order. Deliverables for this task order are monthly reports which are, in actuality, nothing more than ETI monthly invoices and listings of meetings attended by ETI. Furthermore, the "ex-officio" member of the Task Forces is apparently in a position to justify the technical and cost reasonableness of the ETI subcontract proposal. This relationship increases the perception of partiality which in turn lessens the appearance of independence and objectivity (See Appendix L). b. ETI Sole Source Contract We have two main concerns with the Stafford Task Forces’ use of the ETI sole source subcontract. First, the initial basis for the ETI sole source subcontract to JEC is no longer apparent. The basis used to justify the current sole source subcontract to ETI is that only one responsible source can satisfy Agency requirements. [Note 32] However, it is no longer clear as to how this technical advisor is uniquely qualified to perform this work. Given the number of Shuttle-Mir rendezvous and docking missions that have occurred since this sole source was established, other qualified sources are probably available to perform the technical aspects of this effort (e.g., several Shuttle astronauts now have firsthand knowledge with Shuttle-Mir rendezvous and dockings). The technical expertise provided by ETI may now be available from sources within the civil service staff, the astronaut corps of the Agency, or other the private sector entities. [Note 33] These sources could serve as non-voting members of the Task Forces (if they are current civil servants) or as SGE’s. Moreover, using other qualified individuals as technical advisors in no way precludes the Stafford Task Forces from using the ETI advisor as an SGE. Our second concern is that a contractor employee affiliated with the Stafford Task Forces may be serving or acting in positions that are inherently Governmental in nature. [Note 34] For example, a contractor employee has led working groups made up of civil servants and SGE's, to include leading working groups or various activities on visits to Russia. This activity is not only contrary to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 guidance but could also give the perception that a contractor employee is directing Federal employees and/or conducting foreign relations. [Note 35] As in the JEC task description, the ETI Statement of Work also directs the contractor to "maintain communication and relations with the Russian Space Agency Advisory Expert Council" (See Appendixes J and K). This specific tasking may place the contractor in a position to conduct foreign relations or to give the perception of conducting foreign relations. This function should be performed by General Stafford, other SGE's, or civil servant employees who can appropriately provide continuity and long-term relationships with the Russians. Various Stafford Task Force documents have identified the ETI contractor employee as serving as deputy to General Stafford or as the deputy of independent reviews. This again places the contractor in a potential position of directing Federal employees (including SGE's), conducting foreign relations (in the stead of the Task Force Chairman) and strengthens the perception that a contractor employee is directing Federal employees and/or conducting foreign relations. The Agency should consider structuring and staffing the Task Forces to perform taskings without using support contractors. Scientific and engineering technical support can be provided a number of different ways including an expansion of SGE appointments, civil servant detailees within NASA or from other Federal departments or agencies, term or temporary civil service appointments, or the use of "NASA excepted" appointments. [Note 36] If expertise provided by current technical support is essential to the success of the Task Forces, then such support can also be provided through any of the aforementioned methods. Recommendation: The Agency and the Stafford Task Forces should review current sources of technical support and explore using alternatives. NASA should reevaluate the use of and justification for support service and sole source contracts to provide technical support for the Stafford Task Forces, especially since the JEC task order and ETI subcontract periods of performance end on April 30, 1998. [Note 39] The Agency should also examine and correct all situations found to be contrary to OMB Circular A-76 policy. Summary of NASA Management's Response NASA's response states the activities of the Stafford Task Forces are within the discretion of NASA management and are within the approved terms of reference. NASA also states the composition of advisory committees in the "absence of legal constraints" is left to the discretion of management. In balancing members' expertise and independence, expertise may legitimately outweigh total independence. The Agency asserts members of NASA advisory groups are selected based on technical expertise and the ability to "contribute to deliberations." NASA also states membership in advisory groups is balanced to represent various points of view. In addition, the Agency cited no FACA, OMB Circular A-76, or conflict of interest (18 U.S.C., section 208) violations by the Stafford Task Forces. NASA states that some recommendations in our report will be addressed at the time the IOR Task Force is renewed. These recommendations include evaluating membership, assessing the status of NASA members and technical advisors, and adhering to the correct application of "ex officio" status. The Agency will also evaluate sources for administrative and technical support. Finally, NASA will also designate a deputy chair for the IOR Task Force from among the SGE membership and will assure that working groups are led by Government employees. NASA's complete response to our draft report dated January 12, 1998, is provided in Appendix P. Evaluation of Management Response In his cover memo to NASA's response, the Administrator states, ". . . [Y]ou raise a serious issue regarding the perception of bias in our activities. We share this concern and plan to exercise appropriate review and management judgment as we proceed with NASA Advisory Council activities." We believe our recommendations will improve the Task Forces' credibility, effectiveness, and balance in points of view and lessen the perception of selection bias. We will continue to review and monitor the operation of the Stafford Task Forces and NASA's actions in response to our recommendations. Conclusion NASA characterizes the independent assessments of the Stafford Task Forces as vital for the safety and flight readiness of Shuttle-Mir and ISS missions. The credibility, independence, objectivity, and value of the Task Forces’ recommendations are therefore essential to the mission success of the remaining Shuttle-Mir and future ISS missions. We feel our recommendations will increase the credibility and effectiveness of the Stafford Task Forces. [original signed by] David M. Cushing 16 Enclosures cc: Distribution Distribution National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Officials-In-Charge AD/Acting Deputy Administrator AT/Associate Deputy Administrator (Technical) C/Associate Administrator for Headquarters Operations F/Associate Administrator for Human Resources and Education G/General Counsel H/Associate Administrator for Procurement I/Associate Administrator for External Relations J/Acting Associate Administrator for Management Systems and Facilities L/Acting Associate Administrator for Legislative Affairs M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight P/Associate Administrator for Public Affairs Q/Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance U/Associate Administrator for Life & Microgravity Sciences & Applications NASA Advisory Officials Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Chairman, Advisory Committee on the International Space Station Chairman, Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions and ISS Operational Readiness Task Force Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of each of the following Congressional Committees and Subcommittees: Senate Committee on Appropriations Senate Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space Senate Committee on Government Affairs House Committee on Appropriations House Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice House Committee on Science House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics For copies of Appendices A to P, please contact Dana Mellerio. REPORT END NOTES: Note 1. Other contributions of the Task Forces include the recommendation to establish the Phase I Program Office and Program Manager position and to reorganize the Moscow Technical Liaison Office. Note 2. Introduction to the second, third, and fourth reports of the SR&DM Task Force, dated July 29, 1994, November 2, 1994, and March 1, 1995, respectively. Note 3. For example, while in Russia, General Stafford personally spoke with Utkin about the June 25, 1997, Progress collision with the Mir. He spoke with Utkin via telephone about last minute computer problems days before the STS-86 launch. Note 4. Prior to General Stafford's discussions with Utkin, the Phase I Program Manager, Frank Culbertson (Culbertson), and his team were in contact with both NASA's Moscow teams and their Russian counterparts discussing how to avoid future Progress collisions with the Mir and establishing U.S./Russian communication and mission protocols on automatic (KURS) and manual (TORU) dockings. Likewise, U.S./Russian discussions on the computer problems just prior to the STS-86 launch occurred at the Team 0 meetings at Kennedy Space Center on September 20, 1997, before General Stafford was notified and before he called Utkin. Note 5. In his Manual for Negotiating with Russians prepared for Johnson Space Center, Steven D. Jones points out the importance of having someone of recognized stature build and maintain trusting, long-term relationships with the Russians. In addition, Jones also notes the importance of strengthening relationships through social interactions. The formal signing of contracts or protocols are a ceremonial result of many social meetings where the actual agreements have been reached. Note 6. The Agency has since corrected its depiction of the Stafford Task Force’s relationship with the formal NASA safety assessment process. The Task Force, however, remains one of three checks the Administrator reviews for Shuttle-Mir safety. See also the OIG report, Timing of Independent Team Meetings and Communications for Shuttle-Mir and International Space Station (ISS) Missions, dated November 20, 1997. Note 7. The launch of STS-86 bringing David Wolf (Wolf) to Mir and the future launch of STS-89 exchanging Wolf for Andrew Thomas, demonstrate the constraints on the Stafford group. They originally planned a visit to Russia around the K.F. Tsiolkovsky 140th Anniversary Conference. The Task Force had scheduled a meeting with experts on ISS topics but because of the heightened attention on Mir safety issues, the Task Force requested the Russians to schedule additional briefings on Mir issues, even if some ISS issues were not addressed (See Appendix C). As requested by the Administrator, the Stafford Task Force has formed another Red Team led by General Ralph Jacobson, USAF (Ret.) (Jacobson), to assess safety issues for the STS-89 Shuttle-Mir mission now scheduled to launch in late January. However, because of personal schedules, Jacobson is not available for the first 2 weeks of January. The Task Force's open meeting to discuss the results of their assessments is scheduled for January 14, 1998. Note 8. See ASAP Charter, Appendix D. Note 9. Obviously, if the Task Force perceives critical issues impacting safety and mission assurance, they should report these issues immediately to the Phase I Program Office, the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the Administrator, and other relevant officials. Moreover, nothing precludes the Task Force from conducting their own "reality check" on the Agency's efforts by contacting experts on safety issues they believe require examination. Note 10. 18 U.S.C., Section 202(a) defines an SGE as: ". . . an officer or employee. . . who is retained, designated, appointed, or employed to perform, with or without compensation, for not to exceed one hundred and thirty days during any period of three hundred and sixty-five days, . . . temporary duties either on a full-time or intermittent basis. . . ." Note 11. The "ex officio" member of the Stafford Task Force provides technical assistance and some administrative support and is a support contractor. The prior "ex officio" member supplied the same type of support and was also a support contractor. It appears that the Task Force is using the term "ex officio" to mean "unofficial." Note 12. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, Part 2635, Subpart A, General Provisions, 2635.102, Definitions, specifies: (h) Employee means any officer or employee of an agency, including a special Government employee. Note 13. For example, in response the OIG report Timing of Independent Team Meetings and Communications for Shuttle-Mir and International Space Station (ISS) Missions, the Agency describes the Task Forces "operating parallel to but independent of NASA activities." In responding to the same report, General Stafford also characterizes the Task Forces' role as providing "independent assessments." Note 14. Also, with limited space flight opportunities, astronauts may not be inclined to raise issues that could jeopardize future flight selections. This does not mean that astronauts would sacrifice the safety of their colleagues, but raises a concern that flight selection may weigh in the decision making process of the astronauts. Note 15. See Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, Part 2635, Subpart D, Conflicting Financial Interests, 2635.402, Disqualifying financial interests. Note 16. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, Part 2635, Subpart A, General Provisions, 2635.101, Basic obligations of public service, states: (8) Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual. . . . (14) Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical standards set forth in this part. Whether particular circumstances create an appearance that the law or these standards have been violated shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts. Note 17. Kistler Aerospace Corporation is a privately funded, U.S. company. Kistler's Board of Directors and Technical Team is comprised of many former top level NASA and private aerospace corporation officials. Kistler recently (January 5, 1998) awarded a $145 million contract to Northrop Grumman Corporation to design, develop, and manufacture structures for the K-1 two stage reusable launch vehicle program (See http://www.newspace.com/industry/Kistler). Note 18. ANSER is a not-for-profit public service research institute providing analytic and technical support to Federal agencies, as well as some U.S. and foreign corporations, in the areas of aerospace systems, aerospace science and technology, foreign technology analysis, and information systems services. ANSER created the Center for International Aerospace Cooperation (CIAC) to enhance development and cooperation on international aerospace projects. CIAC has joint cooperative working agreements with over two dozen Russian, Ukrainian, and Kazakhstani agencies and institutions, including the Russian Space Agency. In its 1996 Annual Report, ANSER describes the CIAC as having "earned the trust of the Russian scientific community." ANSER claims "[t]his trust defined the basis for cooperative missions to the Russian orbiting laboratory Mir and for eventual co-construction of the International Space Station." A member of the CIAC Board of Advisors serves as a consultant in support of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation which has led the development of U.S./Russian agreements. In this capacity, the CIAC board member serves as a consultant to an activity whose mission is U.S./Russian cooperation. (See ANSER homepage at http://www.anser.org). Note 19. On September 30, 1997, ANSER's CIAC produced a final report, Assessment of the NASA-Mir Science Program in Life and Microgravity Sciences: Benefits to Date and Expectations for the Future, under a firm, fixed-price Headquarters contract NASW-97007 valued at $4.1 million, which includes 4 option years. Note 20. Although the composition of the IOR Task Force is very similar to the SR&DM Task Force, some changes in membership have been made as they relate to ISS-specific issues. Note 21. Most current and former Task Force members have long term direct or indirect ties with current and former astronauts (or are current astronauts), JSC, and/or the JSC Director (See Appendix E). Also, many current and former Task Force members have or had a subordinate relationship to the JSC Director or relationships based on the JSC Director's previous positions (e.g., Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Flight; Deputy for Operation for the Synthesis Group; Director, JSC Flight Crew Operations; and Director, JSC Flight Operations). Note 22. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Section 5(b)(2). See also Appendix F for an explanation of FACA Amendments of 1997 placing FACA-like requirements on committees created by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Public Administration and the use of advice from these committees. Note 23. Ibid., 5(b)(3). Note 24. Several weeks ago, the Inspector General spoke with General Stafford about the composition of the Task Forces and its potential for perceived bias. General Stafford expressed his receptiveness to expanding the expertise and professional diversity of the Task Forces. Likewise, General Stafford was receptive to other ideas such as increasing communications with the astronaut corps on issues impacting Phase I and ISS missions and concerns the astronauts may have about open communications and Stafford Task Force independence. Since that discussion, General Stafford has met with the astronaut corps at JSC. Note 25. For example, the Stafford Task Forces should consider adding expertise in the specific area of human (psychological) factors. Human factor specialists can provide insights into many areas vital to the success of the ISS due to larger and multinational crews and long-duration missions. Note 26. This contract vehicle is a Cost Plus Award Fee task order contract with an estimated value of $157 million. Note 27. The ETI subcontract value of $725,091 is included in the JEC WBS A.1.4 value of $1,574,000. The ETI subcontract value includes a travel allowance not to exceed $95,000 which may not be completely exhausted by the end of the period of performance. Note 28. The Jorge Scientific Corporation contract makes travel and lodging arrangements and provides conference logistics support, along with taking notes and providing minutes of technical meetings (See Appendix G for specific services provided by the contract). Note 29. For example, the Space Science Advisory Committee (SScAC) uses the Jorge Scientific Corporation contract for administrative support. It uses the Headquarters Printing and Design Branch for publication support. The SScAC webpage (http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oss/advisory.htm) is maintained by Code S civil servants and Headquarters Information Technology support staff and contains meeting dates, charter, membership listings, subcommittee listings, and minutes. Note 30. This position (as currently staffed) provides general engineering and analysis as well as some administrative support. Note 31. The responsibilities of the technical advisor appear to include handling the day-to-day workings of the Task Forces, interfacing with NASA personnel, leading work groups, and occasionally serving as the deputy to General Stafford (See Appendix I). The ETI technical advisor supports the Office of the Administrator, the Office of Space Flight, the JSC Center Director, and the NAC for reviews of Shuttle, Shuttle-Mir, and ISS programs. The ETI Statement of Work was modified on October 29, 1996, to require the contractor to support the JSC Center Director (See Appendix J). Note 32. Source: Justification for Other Than Full and Open Competition document dated September 20, 1995. Note 33. As far back as October 1994, the Agency was cautioned by the Internal Review Team (commissioned by the Acting Deputy Administrator to review the validity and need for Headquarters support contracts) to ensure that the ETI effort be "closely monitored to insure that the services involve expertise that is not available within NASA. . . ." (See Appendix M). Note 34. OMB Circular A-76 (Performance of Commercial Activities) defines inherently Governmental functions as "being so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance only by Federal employees." Governmental functions include, but are not limited to, directing Federal employees and conducting foreign relations (See Appendix N). Note 35. Ibid. Note 36. Section 203(c) of the Space Act of 1958 (as amended) authorizes the NASA Administrator to: "appoint not more than four hundred and twenty-five. . . scientific, engineering, and administrative personnel. . . and. . . fix the compensation of such personnel not in excess of the highest rate of grade 18 of the General Schedule. . ." (See Appendix O). Note 37. We are forwarding to management under separate cover additional concerns we have with NASA management's use of the JEC and ETI contracts.