Title

  Test IKEv2.EN.R.1.1.6.6: Receiving Multiple Proposals for CHILD_SA
  Part C: Multiple Extended Sequecnce Numbers (BASIC)


Purpose

  To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles IKE_AUTH request with multiple proposals.


References

  * [RFC 4306] - Sections 2.7, 3.4 and 3.10.1
  * [RFC 4718] - Sections 2.1 and 2.2


Test Setup

  * Network Topology
      Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
  * Configuration
      In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
  * Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
      IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.


Procedure

   NUT                  TN1
(End-Node)           (End-Node)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
    |                    | (Packet #1)
    |------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
    |                    | (Judgement #1)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Packet #2)
    |------------------->| IKE_AUTH response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #2)
    |                    |
    V                    V
N: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
Packet #1 See Common Packet #1
Packet #2 See below

TN1 transmits an IKE_AUTH request including a SA payload which contains the two proposals as follows:
IKE_AUTH exchanges Algorithms
Proposals Protocol ID Encryption Integrity ESN
Part C Proposal #1 ESP ENCR_3DES AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 ESN
Proposal #2 ESP ENCR_3DES AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 NoESN


* Packet #2: IKE_AUTH request
IPv6 Header Same as the Common Packet #3
UDP Header Same as the Common Packet #3
IKEv2 Header Same as the Common Packet #3
E Payload Same as the Common Packet #3
IDi Payload Same as the Common Packet #3
AUTH Payload Same as the Common Packet #3
N Payload Same as the Common Packet #3
SA Payload Other fields are same as the common packet #3
SA Proposals See below
TSi Payload Same as the Common Packet #3
TSr Payload Same as the common packet #3


Proposal #1 SA Proposal Next Payload 2 (more)
Reserved 0
Proposal Length 40
Proposal # 1
Proposal ID 3 (ESP)
SPI Size 4
# of Transforms 4
SPI Any
SA Transform Next Payload 3 (more)
Reserved 0
Transform Length 8
Transform Type According to above configuration
Reserved 0
Transform ID According to above configuration
SA Transform Next Payload 3 (more)
Reserved 0
Transform Length 8
Transform Type According to above configuration
Reserved 0
Transform ID According to above configuration
SA Transform Next Payload 0 (last)
Reserved 0
Transform Length 8
Transform Type According to above configuration
Reserved 0
Transform ID According to above configuration
Proposal #2 SA Proposal Next Payload 0 (last)
Reserved 0
Proposal Length 40
Proposal # 2
Proposal ID 3 (ESP)
SPI Size 4
# of Transforms 4
SPI Any
SA Transform Next Payload 3 (more)
Reserved 0
Transform Length 8
Transform Type 1 (ENCR)
Reserved 0
Transform ID 3 (3DES)
SA Transform Next Payload 3 (more)
Reserved 0
Transform Length 8
Transform Type 3 (INTEG)
Reserved 0
Transform ID 2 (HMAC_SHA1_96)
SA Transform Next Payload 0 (last)
Reserved 0
Transform Length 8
Transform Type 5 (ESN)
Reserved 0
Transform ID 0 (No ESN)
  Part C: Multiple Extended Sequecnce Numbers (BASIC)
       9. TN1 starts to negotiate with NUT by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
      10. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
      11. After reception of IKE_SA_INIT response from the NUT, TN1 transmits an IKE_AUTH
          request including a SA payload as described above to the NUT.
      12. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.


Observable Result

  Part C
    Step 10: Judgment #1
      The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT response including "ENCR_3DES",
      "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as accepted
      algorithms.
  
    Step 12: Judgment #2
      The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH response including a SA Proposal with "ENCR_3DES",
      "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as accepted algorithms.


Possible Problems

  * None.