Test IKEv2.EN.R.1.2.5.1: Close the replaced CHILD_SA Part A: (BASIC)
To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchanges to rekey CHILD_SA and INFORMATIONAL Excahnges to delete old CHILD_SAs.
* [RFC 4306] - Sections 2.8
* Network Topology Connect the devices according to the Common Topology. * Configuration In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration. * Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.
NUT TN1 (End-Node) (End-Node) | | |<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni) | | (Packet #1) |------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr) | | (Judgement #1) | | |<-------------------| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N+, SAi2, TSi, TSr}) | | (Packet #2) |------------------->| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N+, SAr2, TSi, TSr}) | | (Judgement #2) | | |<-------------------| IPsec {Echo Request} | | (Packet #3) |------------------->| IPsec {Echo Reply} | | (Judgement #3) | | |<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Ni, TSi, TSr}) | | (Packet #4) |------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA response (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Nr, TSi, TSr}) | | (Judgement #4) | | |<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {D}) | | (Packet #5) |------------------->| INFORMATIONAL response (HDR, SK {D}) | | (Judgement #5) | | V V
N: REKEY_SA N+: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
Packet #1 See Common Packet #1 Packet #2 See Common Packet #3 Packet #3 See Common Packet #19 Packet #4 See Common Packet #13 Packet #5 See below
Packet #5: INFORMATIONAL request
IPv6 Header Same as the Common Packet #17 UDP Header Same as the Common Packet #17 IKEv2 Header Same as the Common Packet #17 E Payload Other fields are same as the Common Packet #17 Next Payload 42 (Delete) Delete Payload Next Payload 0 (last) Critical 0 Reserved 0 Payload Length 12 Procotol ID 3 (ESP) SPI Size 4 # of SPIs 1 Security Parameter Index(es) (SPI) SPI negotiated by Initial Exchange
Part A: (BASIC) 1. TN1 starts to negotiate with NUT by sending IKE_SA_INIT request. 2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A. 3. After reception of IKE_SA_INIT response from the NUT, TN1 transmits an IKE_AUTH request to the NUT. 4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A. 5. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms to NUT. 6. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A. 7. TN1 transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request including a Notify Payload of type REKEY_SA and rekeyed CHILD_SA's SPI value in the SPI field to the NUT. 8. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A. 9. TN1 transmits an INFORMATIONAL request including a Delete payload with the old CHILD_SA's SPI value to the NUT. 10. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
Part A Step 2: Judgment #1 The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT response including "ENCR_3DES", "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as accepted algorithms.
Step 4: Judgment #2 The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH response including "ENCR_3DES", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as accepted algorithms.
Step 6: Judgment #3 The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms.
Step 8: Judgment #4 The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA response including "ENCR_3DES", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
Step 10: Judgment #5 The NUT transmits an INFORMATIONAL response including a Delete payload with the old CHILD_SA's SPI value to the TN1.
* None.