Title

  Test IKEv2.EN.R.1.2.6.7: Changing PRFs when rekeying the IKE_SA
  Part A: (BASIC)


Purpose

  To verify an IKEv2 device properly uses new IKE_SA.


References

  * [RFC 4306] - Sections 2.8
  * [RFC 4718] - Sections 5.5


Test Setup

  * Network Topology
      Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
  * Configuration
      In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
      Configure the devices according to the Common Configuration except for Italic
      parameters.
IKE_SA Rekeying Algorithms
Encryption PRF Integrity D-H Group
Part A ENCR_3DES PRF_HMAC_SHA1 AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 Group 14
  * Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
      IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.


Procedure

   NUT                  TN1
(End-Node)           (End-Node)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
    |                    | (Packet #1)
    |------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
    |                    | (Judgement #1)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Packet #2)
    |------------------->| IKE_AUTH response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #2)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {SA, Ni})
    |                    | (Packet #3)
    |------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA response (HDR, SK {SA, Nr})
    |                    | (Judgement #3)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {})
    |                    | (Packet #4)
    |------------------->| INFORMATIONAL response (HDR, SK {})
    |                    | (Judgement #4)
    |                    |
    V                    V

N: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
Packet #1 See Common Packet #1
Packet #2 See Common Packet #3
Packet #3 See below
Packet #4 See Common Packet #17

Packet #3: CREATE_CHILD_SA request Packet #3 is same as Common Packet #11 except SA Transform proposed in each test.

Part A:
SA Transform of Tranform Type D-H is replaced by the following SA
Transfrom.
SA Transform Next Payload 0 (last)
Reserved 0
Transform Length 8
Transform Type 4 (D-H)
Reserved 0
Transform ID 14 (2048 MODP Group)
  Part A: (BASIC)
     1. TN1 starts to negotiate with NUT by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
     2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     3. After reception of IKE_SA_INIT response from the NUT, TN1 transmits an IKE_AUTH
         request to the NUT.
     4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     5. TN1 transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request to the NUT.
     6. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     7. TN1 transmits an INFORMATIONAL request with no payloads protected by the new
         IKE_SA and the Message ID field in the IKE header is zero.
     8. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.


Observable Result

  Part A
       Step 2: Judgment #1
       The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT response including "ENCR_3DES",
       "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as accepted
       algorithms.
       Step 4: Judgment #2
       The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH response including "ENCR_3DES",
       "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as accepted algorithms.
       Step 6: Judgment #3
       The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA response including "ENCR_3DES",
       "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 14" as proposed
       algorithms. And the proposal in the SA payload Response includes 1 (IKE) in the Protocol ID
       field, 8 in the SPI size field and rekeyed IKE_SA's responder's SPI value in the SPI field.
       Step 8: Judgment #4
       The NUT responds with an INFORMATIONAL response with no payloads protected by the
       new IKE_SA and the Message ID field in the IKE header is zero.


Possible Problems

  * None.