Bugzilla ID: Bugzilla Summary:

926029
CFCA (China Financial Certification Authority) root CA
CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must
1) Comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (http://www.mozilla.org
2) Supply all of the information lated in http://www.mozilla.org/CA.Information.checklats
a.Review the Recommended Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA.Problema
b.Review the Potentially Problematic Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA.Problema

	deficial information about the ex-3 associated organization
Column1	Column2
CA Company Name	China Financial Certification Authority (CFCA)
Website URL	http://www.cfca.com.cn/
Organizational type	Established on June 29, 2000, China Financial Certification Authority (CECA) is a national authority of security authoritication approved by the People's Bank of China and state information security administration. CECA is a critical national infrastructure of financial information security and one of the first certification service suppliers granted a certification service license after the release of the Electronic Signature Law of the People's Republic of China.
Primark Market / Customer Base	SSL Certificates can be used in the areas such as online banking, e—commence, e—politic, enterprise informatization and public services and so on. CFCVs customers are throughout People's Republic of China, and it's in the leading position in Chinese CA industry for years in terms of business size, security and technology. There are more than 200 Chinese banks that are using CFCA's certificates to ensure the security of online banking trade.
Impact to Mozilla Users	CFCA is the top one of China's CAs, certificates issued by CFCA has accumulated over 50,000,000 for now, which accounts for more than 50% of the total amount of certificates issued in China. Certificate users of which using firefox requires CFCA's root certificate to be included in Mocilla's products. Furthermore, CFCA has passed Webtrust audit, it meets Mocilla's requirements of root certificate inclusion.
Inclusion in other major browsers	Internet Explorer
CA Contact Information	CA Email Alias: gxthao@cfca.com.cn CA Phone Number 8610-83520031 Title / Department Risk management supervisor/ Business management department

Technical information about each root certificate (GT)

Certificate Name	CFCA GT CA
	CN = CFCA GT CA
	O = China Financial Certification Authority
Certificate Issuer Field	C = CN
Certificate Summary	This root certificate issues Individual Certificate, Organization Certificate, Web Server Certificate and Code Signing Certificate.
Root Cert URL	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=816416
SHA1 Fingerprint	A8:F2:DF:E3:6A:E0:CC:2D:B9:DD:38:34:7D:30:AE:D9:55:1D:D2:5A
Valid From	20120821
Valid To	20420821
Test Website URL	https://www.56zhifu.com
CRL URL	http://crl.cfca.com.cn/gtoca/RSA/crl1.crl
OCSP URL	http://ocsp.cfca.com.cn/ocsp/
	http://gtc.cfca.com.cn/gtoca/gtoca2.cer
	Maximum expiration time of OCSP responses :7 days
Requested Trust Bits	websites, email, code signing
SSL Validation Type	ov
EV Policy OID(s	N/A
Nonsequential serial numbers	CFCA's end-entity certificates now have 8 bits of unpredictable random data in serial number.
and entropy in cert	New end-entity certificates after 2014-2-15 will have 20 bits of unpredictable random data in serial number .
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Technical information about each root certificate (EV)

Certificate Name	CFCA EV ROOT
Certificate Issuer Field	CN = CFCA EV ROOT
	O = China Financial Certification Authority
	C = CN
Certificate Summary	This root certificate issues EV certificates.
Root Cert URL	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8356494
SHA1 Fingerprint	E2:88:29:4B:55:84:AB:6B:58:C2:90:46:6C:AC:3F:88:39:8F:84:83
Valid From	20120808
Valid To	20291231
Test Website URL	https://pub.cebnet.com.cn
CRL URL	http://crl.cfca.com.cn/evoca/RSA/crl1.crl
OCSP URL	http://ocsp.cfca.com.cn/ocsp/
	http://gtc.cfca.com.cn/evoca/evoca.cer
	Maximum expiration time of OCSP responses :7 days
Requested Trust Bits	websites,code signing
SSL Validation Type	EV
EV Policy OID(s	2.16.156.112554.3
Nonsequential serial numbers	
and entropy in cert	20 hits of unpredictable random data will be include in social number of new and entity certificates III

CA Hierarchy information for each root certificate (GT)

CA Hierarchy	CFCA GT CA has two internally—operated subordinate CAs:
	CFCA OCA2 - issues SSL, Code Signing, Email, VPN, and Device certificates.
	CFCA GT OCA21 - Issues pregenerated certificates, individual certificates.
Externally Operated SubCAs	CFCA GT CA has no Externally Operated subCA.
CrossSigning	N/A
Technical Constraints on	N/A
Thirdparty Issuers	

CA Hierarchy information for each root certificate (EV)

CA Hierarchy	CFCA EV root
Externally Operated SubCAs	CFCA EV root has no Externally Operated subCA.
CrossSigning	N/A
Technical Constraints on	N/A
Thirdparty Issuers	

		Verification Policies and Practices (GT)
Policy	Documentation	https://bug926029.bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=816212
Audit		Audit Type: WebTrust for CA
		Auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers
		Audit Report: https://cert.webtrust.org/ViewSeal?id=1606

Baseline Requirements (SSL)	CFCA conforms to the Baseline_Requirements_V1_1_6 of the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for Issuance and
	Management of Extended Validation Certificates published at http://www.cabforum.org. In the event of any
	inconsistency between this document and those Guidelines, those Guidelines take precedence over this
	document.
Organization Verification	CPS section 3.2.2.2
SSL Verification Procedures	CPS section 3.2.2.3-6
Email Address Verification	
Procedures	CPS section 3.2.2.5
Code Signing Subscriber Verification	
Procedures	
	CPS section 3.2.2.3
Multifactor Authentication	For each account that can access the certificate issuance system, we use usbkey model SJK1232 in the procedure of authorization, this measure is apply to all
	accounts that can cause the approval and/or issuance of end-entity certificates
Network Security	
•	CFCA maintain network security controls that meet the Network and Certificate System Security Requirements published at http://www.cabforum.org
	Verification Policies and Practices (EV)
Policy Documentation	https://bug926029.bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=816212
Audit	Audit Type: WebTrust EV for CA
	Auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers
	Audit Report: https://cert.webtrust.org/ViewSeal?id=1607
Baseline Requirements (SSL)	CFCA conforms to the EV SSL Certificate Guidelines Version 1.4.3 of the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for Issuance and
	Management of Extended Validation Certificates published at http://www.cabforum.org. In the event of any
	inconsistency between this document and those Guidelines, those Guidelines take precedence over this
	document.
Organization Verification	CPS section 3.2.2.2
SSL Verification Procedures	CPS section 3.2.2.3-6
Email Address Verification	CPS section 3.2.2.5
Procedures	
Code Signing Subscriber Verification	CPS section 3.2.2.4
Procedures	
Multifactor Authentication	For each account that can access the certificate issuance system, we use usbkey model SJK1232 in the procedure of authorization this measure is apply to all
	accounts that can cause the approval and/or issuance of end-entity certificates
Network Security	CFCA maintain network security controls that meet the Network and Certificate System Security Requirements published at http://www.cabforum.org

· ·	Response to Mozilla's CA Recommended Practices (GT)
Publicly Available CP and CPS	https://bug926029.bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=816212
CA Hierarchy	CFCA GT CA has two internallyoperated subordinate CAs:
	CFCA OCA2 - issues SSL, Code Signing, Email, VPN, and Device certificates.
	CFCA GT OCA21 - Issues pregenerated certificates, individual certificates.
Audit Criteria	WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities 2.0 From http://www.webtrust.org/
	https://cert.webtrust.org/ViewSeal?id=1606
Document Handling of IDNs in	
CP/CPS	N/A
Revocation of Compromised	CPS section 4.8, CFCA will revoke certificates with private keys that are known to be compromised, or for which verification of subscriber information is known
· ·	to be invalid.
Verifying Domain Name Ownership	CPS section 3.2.2.3-6
Verifying Email Address Control	CPS section 3.2.2.5
Verifying Identity of Code Signing	
Certificate	
Subscriber	
	CPS section 3.2.2.3
DNS names go in SAN	For Multi-domain certificate each domain will containing the Fully-Qualified Domain Name or an iPAddress containing the IP address of a
_	server, meet the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements.
Domain owned by a Natural Person	CFCA's follow this pattern
•	O = name of the person in the form as displayed in its ID
	OU = the string "natural person"
OCSP	http://ocsp.cfca.com.cn/ocsp/
	http://gtc.cfca.com.cn/gtoca/gtoca2.cer
Network Security Controls	CFCA maintain network security controls that meet the Network and Certificate System Security Requirements published
	at http://www.cabforum.org

	Response to Mozilla's CA Recommended Practices (EV)	
Publicly Available CP and CPS	https://bug926029.bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=816212	
CA Hierarchy	CFCA EV root	
Audit Criteria	WebTrust for Certification Authorities - Extended Validation Audit Criteria Version 1.4 From http://www.webtrust.org/	
	https://cert.webtrust.org/ViewSeal?id=1607	
Document Handling of IDNs in	N/A	
CP/CPS		
Revocation of Compromised	CPS section 4.8, CFCA will revoke certificates with private keys that are known to be compromised, or for which verification of subscriber information is known	
	to be invalid.	
Verifying Domain Name Ownership	CPS section 3.2.2.3-6	
Verifying Email Address Control	CPS section 3.2.2.5	
Verifying Identity of Code Signing	CPS section 3.2.2.4	
Certificate		
Subscriber		
DNS names go in SAN	For Multi-domain certificate each domain will containing the Fully-Qualified Domain Name or an iPAddress containing the IP address of a	
	server, meet the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements.	
Domain owned by a Natural Person	EV can be bought only by organisation	
OCSP	http://ocsp.cfca.com.cn/ocsp/	
	http://gtc.cfca.com.cn/gtoca/gtoca2.cer	
Network Security Controls	CFCA maintain network security controls that meet the Network and Certificate System Security Requirements published	
	at http://www.cabforum.org	
Response to Mozilla's list of Potentially Problematic Practices		
Longlived DV certificates	CFCA doesn't issue DV certs., issues OV and EV certs.	
Wildcard DV SSL certificates	CFCA doesn't issue DV certs., issues OV and EV certs.	
Email Address Prefixes for DV Certs	CFCA doesn't issue DV certs., issues OV and EV certs.	
Delegation of Domain / Email	Domain and Email validation will be incorporated into the issuing CAs procedures . Delegation of domain/email validation to third parties can't be done	
validation to	without CFCA	
third parties		

Issuing end entity certificates directly from roots	CFCA issuing certificates using internally—operated subordinate CAs
Allowing external entities to operate subordinate CAs	CFCA do not allow external entities to operate subordinate CAs
Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files	CFCA will not generate the key pairs for their subscriber or any signer or SSL certificates.
Certificates referencing hostnames or private IP addresses	See CPS section 3.2.2.3, 3.2.2.4, certificate hostname not resolvable through the public DNS will not pass our verification. And CFCA will not accept private IP addresses. (DV accept public IP, EV don't accept IP)
Issuing SSL Certificates for Internal	See CPS section 3.2.2.3 , 3.2.2.4 , CFCA will not issue SSL Certificates for Internal Domains.
OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root	CFCA's GCSP responses conform to RFC 2560, And passed BVT test using Firefox 26 CFCA's GSCP sign cert is under same root.
CRL with critical CIDP Extension	CFCA issues full CRLs, but not partitioned CRLs, and never put critical CIDP extensions into full CRLs.
Generic names for CAs	Our CA name include "CFCA"
Lack of Communication With End Users	CFCA has 7*24 hour hotline(8610-4008809888) for end users.

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