Japanese Government Public Key Infrastructure (GPKI)

Application Certification Authority2(Sub) Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

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Government Information Systems

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1. Introduction

This CP/CPS defines the operation policy related to certification services of the Application Certification Authority2(Sub) (hereinafter referred to as "Application CA2(Sub)") which issues server certificates, code signing certificates and document signing certificates.

These certificates enable implementation of encrypted communications between business servers of organizations including offices and ministries and signature on software and documents.

Application CA2 (Sub) complies with guidelines of the latest version of AICPA/CICA, WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities and CA/Browser Forum, Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly.

The requirement for the guidelines are given priority more than this CP/CPS when the disagreement is caused in the requirement for this CP/CPS and these guidelines.

This Application CA2 CP/CPS is consistent with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (IETF PKIX) RFC 3647, Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework.

1.1 Overview

The Application CA2(Sub) issues server certificates, code signing certificates and document signing certificates to organizations including offices and ministries.

The Application CA2(Sub) does not assume the CP (Certificate Policy) and the CPS (Certification Practices Statement) to be independent but defines this CP/CPS as the operation policy related to the certification services of the Application CA2(Sub).

1.2 Document name and identification

The certificate policy of the Application CA2(Sub) covers the certificate policy for the server certificate, the certificate policy for the code signing certificate and the certificate policy for the document signing certificate of the Application CA2(Sub). The identifiers of the policies are as follows:

- Server certificate policy: 0.2.440.100145.8.4.1.11.110
- Code signing certificate policy: 0.2.440.100145.8.4.1.1.120
- Document signing certificate policy: 0.2.440.100145.8.4.1.1.160

1.3 PKI participants




Figure 1-1 Organization chart

1.3.1 Certification authorities

The Inter-Ministerial Council of Government Information Systems makes the decision concerning operations of the Application CA2(Sub).

The role of the Governing Council in relation to Application CA2(Sub) operations shall be as follows:

- Decision concerning the CP/CPS of the Application CA2(Sub)
- Decision concerning action to CA private key compromise state
- Decision concerning action to emergencies such as occurrence of disasters
- Decision concerning establishment and abolishment of the Local Registration Authority (LRA)
- Decision concerning other important matters pertaining to operation of the Application CA2(Sub)

1.3.2 Issuing Authority (IA) and Registration Authority (RA)

Application CA2(Sub) director, IA key administrator, Reception personnel, and reviewer perform operation services such as administration of the CA private key and establishment and abolishment of the LRA. The general manager of the Information System Administration of the Government Information Systems Planning Division, Administrative Management Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is Application CA2 director.

Application CA2 administrator, assistant Application CA2 administrator, senior IA operators, general IA operators, and audit log inspector perform operation services such as system operation, system maintenance and administration, and issuance, re-key, and revocation of certificates. The tasks of these personnel are defined in "5.2 Procedural Controls".

1.3.3 Local Registration Authority (LRA)

This organization is approved by the sterling committee and established for each office and ministry in principle. This organization accepts and review applications, form subscriber, related to issuance, re-key and revocation of certificates.

In this organization, LRA administrators, LRA operators, LRA reception personnel, and LRA reviewer are staffed. The tasks of these personnel are defined in "5.2 Procedural Controls".

1.3.4 Subscriber

The subscriber administers certificates issued from the Application CA2(Sub), and uses the certificates in accordance with this CP/CPS.

1.3.5 Relying parties

The relying party who verifies a certificate checks the validity of the server certificates, code signing certificates and document signing certificates using the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or OCSP responder issued by the Application CA2(Sub).

1.3.6 Other participants involved No stipulation

1.4 Certificate usage

1.4.1 Appropriate certificate uses

Server certificates are used for existence certification of servers used by offices and ministries and for encrypted communications. Server certificates shall remain valid for three years from the date on which they take effect. Code signing certificates are used for signatures in software distributed to citizens and enterprises from offices and ministries. Code signing certificates shall remain valid for three years from the date on which they take effect

Document signing certificates are used for signatures in digital documents such as PDF files distributed safely. Document signing certificates shall remain valid for three years from the date on which they take effect.

1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses

Certificates issued from the Application CA2(Sub) shall not be used other than purposes described in "1.4.1 Appropriate certificate uses".

1.5 Policy Administration

1.5.1 Organization administering the document

The Government Information Systems Planning Division, Administrative Management Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications perform services related to change, update, and so on of this CP/CPS.

1.5.2 Contact person

The Contact Officer about this CP/CPS shall be an official of the Government Information Systems Planning Division, Administrative Management Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is Application CA2 director.

Then URL of the contact side is as follows:

URL: http://www.gpki.go.jp/

1.5.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

The Inter-ministerial Council of Government Information Systems decides the suitability of the CP/CPS of the Application CA2(Sub).

1.5.4 CPS approval procedures

The Application CA2(Sub)' s CP/CPS for the Application CA2(Sub) shall be validated by a decision of the Inter-ministerial Council of Government Information Systems.

1.6 Definitions and acronyms

- CA (Certification Authority)

An agency that issues, re-keys or revokes certificates, generates and protects private

keys for CAs, etc., and registers subscribers. If referred to simply as a "CA", certificate issuance and registration operations are included.

- CA certificate

A CA certificate of the Application CA2(Sub) is the subordinate CA certificate issued that is signed by Application CA2(Root) for the public key of the Application CA2(Sub).

- CP/CPS (Certificate Policy/Certification Practices Statement)

- CP: A document stipulating the operating policy to be applied when a CA issues certificates
- CPS: A document stipulating matters relating to CA operations, certificate policies, key generation and management, and liabilities, etc. It shall externally demonstrate the reliability and security of the CA. While the Certificate Policy indicates which policy shall be applied, the Certification Practices Statement indicates how the specific policy shall be applied.

- CRL (Certificate Revocation List)

A list of server certificates, code signing certificates and document signing certificates that have been revoked prematurely for such reasons as the CA private key compromise. The signatures of the CAs that issued the revoked certificates are attached to this list.

- FIPS 140-1 (2) (Federal Information Processing Standard)

Federal Information Processing Standards compiled by NIST (the National Institute of Standards and Technology) of the United States, which stipulate security requirements pertaining to encryption technology. These cover general requirements relating to encryption technology for cryptographic modules used in computers and communication systems. There are four security levels, from lowest to highest.

- Level 1: The lowest security level defined in the FIPS. Applied to cryptographic modules used in ordinary PCs.
- Level 2: At this level, cryptographic modules are equipped to retain evidence of intrusion in the event of unauthorized access.
- Level 3: At this level, cryptographic modules are equipped to retain evidence of intrusion in the event of unauthorized access. Compared with Level 2, a more stringent tracing capability is provided. Special hardware is used to delete data in the event of an intrusion.
- Level 4: The highest security level defined in the FIPS. It also provides for the

detection of environmental changes, such as temperature and current fluctuations.

- GPKI (Government Public Key Infrastructure)

Organization or infrastructure that confirms mutually that electronic documents, created by computerized processes, such as applications and notifications between citizens and governmental organization, and electronic documents, created by computerized processes, between governmental organizations or within the same organization were created by the proper nominal persons and that the contents were not modified. Specifically, it is a certification system of national governments using signatures by the public key cryptosystem, consisting of the Bridge CA (hereinafter referred to as "BCA") and governmental organization side CA.

- HSM (Hardware Security Module)

Hardware devices used to store private keys.

- IA (Issuing Authority)

An agency that carries out those aspects of CA operations that relate to certificate issuance. A "general IA operator" is a person whose main task is the issuance of certificates. Within the Application CA2(Sub), these people are classified on the basis of the authority into "senior IA operators" and "general IA operators".

- IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force)

The main mission of this technical task force is to develop and standardize protocol technology for the Internet. A specification created by this group is called a "Request for Comments".

- ISO (International Standardization Organization)

The mission of this organization is to set international standards in all technical fields except electrical engineering.

- ITU (International Telecommunication Union)

A specialist agency of the United Nations dedicated to the improvement and rational utilization of telecommunications.

- ITU-T (International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication

Standardization Sector)

A division of the ITU dedicated to telecommunication standardization.

- LRA (Local Registration Authority)

A Registration Authority with responsibility for a local community. This organization is established in the unit of office and ministry. This organization accepts and reviews applications for issuance, re-key and revocation of certificates from subscribers.

- OID (Object Identification)

Identifiers registered with registration agencies (ISO, ITU) with values that are unique in the world. Registered object identifiers are used for such items as the PKI algorithms used, and the subject types (country names and other attributes) stored in certificates.

- OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol)

A name of protocol which is on-line base checking the validity of corresponding certificates.

An OCSP responder is a server which verifies the validity of a certificate specified by a relying party and returns the result for the verification of the certificate to the relying party.

The Application CA2(Sub) provides the OCSP responder which is in accordance with RFC5019 and RFC6960.

- PKCS (Public Key Cryptography Standards) #10

PKCS are technical standards used to implement the public key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security of the United States. PKCS #10 specifies the certification request syntax standard for CSRs to CAs.

- PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)

The infrastructure required to use public key certificates that warrant the validity of public keys.

- PKIX (Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509))

An IETF task force that works on security issues. Its objective is to establish certificate, CRL profiles, CP and CPS frameworks.

- RA (Registration Authority)

An agency that handles CA operations pertaining to registration. The main tasks are identity checking for parties to which certificates are issued, the registration of information required for the issuance of certificates, and CSR to CAs.

- RFC3647 (Request For Comments3647)

RFC is the generic term for standard documents related to the Internet. RFC3647, one of the documents, provides frameworks and guidelines for creating a CPs or CPSs.

- RSA

One of the encryption algorithms used in public key cryptography. Proper security levels are ensured because it is almost impossible to apply prime factor analysis to an integer produced by multiplying two sufficiently large, different prime numbers.

- SSL/TLS (Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security)

Protocol that performs cryptography and certification of communications between server and client to send and receive data safely.

- X.500 Identifier (DN: Distinguished Name)

X.500 is a directory standard developed by the ITU to provide a wide spectrum of services, ranging from name and address surveys to attribute-based searches. X.500 identifiers are used in X.509 issuer names and subject names.

- X.509

A certificate and CRL format established by the ITU-T. X.509v3 (Version 3) has extended fields to hold optional information. Within GPKI, X.509v3 is used for certificates and X.509v2 for CRLs.

- archive

To retain certificate issuance histories, revocation histories and other information on a long-term basis.

- access control

Control functions that prevent unauthorized access to computers and other information resources. These functions allow the identity of the person seeking access to be checked so that the person can perform only those operations (reading, writing, etc.) which have previously been authorized.

- application CA2(Sub) repository

This is used to store certificates and CRL issued by the Application CA2(Sub). (See "Repository".)

- algorithm

A procedure or method for computation or problem solving.

- cryptography module

Product including hardware, firmware, and software that install cryptography functions such as encryption, decryption, digital signature, certification technology, and random number generation.

- tampering

Changing the content of data.

- key size (key length)

One of the factors that determines the degree of encryption. The key size is expressed as a length in bits. The strength of the encryption increases in proportion to key length.

- key pair

A public key and private key pair used in public key cryptography. Since one key cannot be deduced from the other, it is possible to disclose one (the public key) while keeping the other (the private key) confidential.

- activation

Turning on a system or equipment, etc., for use.

- activation data

The data (passwords, etc.) required to activate a system or equipment, etc.

- control key

A key required for HSM operations. It is used to control HSM functions.

- compromise state

A situation in which reliability may have been lost. In the case of a CA, the CA private key compromise undermines the reliability of all certificates issued by that CA.

- public key

One of the pair of keys used in public key cryptography. It is the public key corresponding to a private key.

- public key cryptosystem

A cryptography method that employs two different keys to decrypt messages. RSA cryptography is typical of this approach.

- public key parameter

A value used by both the certificate owner and the relying party when using elliptic curve encryption or other methods. In the case of elliptic curve encryption, it means the curve's parameters on which calculations are based.

- code signing certificate

A public key certificate used for signature in software distributed safely. It can be trusted by the code signing certificate that a distribution origin is not tampered and a program is not altered.

- computer security

Countermeasures used to protect computers and other assets relating to information processing activities from external threats to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and usability of information.

- server certificate

A public key certificate used for encrypted communications between clients and a server and that proved the server can be trusted.

- revocation information

Information published by a CA to indicate that certificates issued by that CA have been revoked prematurely for such reasons as re-key due to changes in the information contained in the certificate, or the CA private key compromise.

- revocation list See "CRL".

- subject name

A name that identifies the subscriber who owns the certificate and the private key corresponding to the public key stored in the certificate.

- certificate (public key certificate)

An electronic document certifying that a public key is owned by the person named in the certificate. The CA checks the content and applies its signature, thereby guaranteeing the validity of the public key.

- relying party

A person who verifies the validation of certificates (including software).

- certificate signing request (CSR)

The data file used as the basis for the issuance of a certificate. The CSR includes the public key of the party requesting the issuance of the certificate, and the certificate is issued by applying the signature of the issuer to that public key. GPKI conforms with PKCS#10.

- subscriber

An object issue for certificates (Web server, administrator and so on)

- signature (digital signature)

A mechanism that guarantees the integrity of a message using private keys under the public key cryptography method. The hash value of the message is encrypted and attached to the message using the private key of the sender. The recipient uses the public key of the signatory to check the identity of the sender and detect any alteration in the message.

- security audit

An audit of important security issues.

- operation key

A key required for HSM operations.

- time stamp

A value that indicates the time when an event recorded in the log, etc., took place. It is based on time data controlled by a reliable time management device.

- Elliptic Curve Cryptography

An encryption method that uses addition and subtraction operations defined by an elliptic curve. It is necessary to maintain the strength of the encryption by changing the parameters.

- integrated repository

A published repository containing the certificates and CRL required to check the validity of certificates, which are part of the information in the BCA repository and Application CA2 repositories. (See "Repository".)

- document signing certificate

A public key certificate used for signature in digital documents such as PDF files distributed safely. It can be trusted by the document signing certificate that a distribution origin is not tampered and a document is not altered.

- issuer name

A name that identifies the CA that issued a certificate and applied its signature.

- hash function

A function that prevents the calculation of the same output values from two different input values. It is also impossible to calculate back to the input value from the output value.

- hash value

The output value of the hash function corresponding to a particular value. (See "Hash Function".) .

- deactivation

To render a system or equipment, etc., unusable.

- private key

One of the pair of keys used in public key cryptography. This key, which corresponds to the public key, is used only by the party concerned.

- private key escrow

Entrusting the private key used in signatures, which only the legitimate owner can hold, to a third party.

- finger print

The hash value corresponding to any message. Under GPKI, this indicates the hash value of the public key. It is called a "fingerprint" because of the ability of the hash function to assign a unique value. (See "Hash Function".)

- profile

A definition of the data included in certificates and CRL. Certificate and CRL profiles are defined in RFC5280.

- restore

To restore data from a backup.

- repository

A published database containing certificates and CRL. Under GPKI, a directory server is used.

- log

A file recording operations and processes carried out on a computer.

2. Publication and repository responsibilities

2.1 Repository

Information pertaining to the Application CA2(Sub) is published in the integrated repository and on web site.

2.2 Publication of certification information

(1) The publication in the integrated repository

The Application CA2(Sub) registers the following information held in the Application CA2(Sub) repository in the integrated repository and publishes them:

- CA certificate of the Application CA2(Sub)
- CRL
- (2) The publication in web site

The Application CA2(Sub) publishes the following information on web site:

- CA certificate of the Application CA2(Sub) and its finger print
- Information about the CA private key compromises
- The CP/CPS and their revision history
- (3) The publication in OCSP responder

The Application CA2(Sub) provides the OCSP responder to verify the status of the certificate for the relying party by on-line.

2.3 Time or frequency of publication

Published information shall be updated at the following intervals.

- Whenever a CA certificate and CRL are issued or re-keyed
- Whenever this CP/CPS is amended

2.4 Access controls on repositories

Access control is not performed for information registered in the integrated repository from the Application CA2(Sub) repository and published on web site.

3. Identification and authentication

3.1 Naming

3.1.1 Types of Names

The issuer name and subject name of a certificates issued by the Application CA2(Sub) shall be determined according to the format of the X.500 Distinguished Name (DN).

3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

(1) Server certificate

A name used in a Server certificate is a server name. An absolute domain name (FQDN: Fully Qualified Domain Name) is set.

(2) Code signing certificate

A name used in a code signing certificate is the name of an organization distributing an application.

(3) Document signing certificate

A name used in a document signing certificate is the name of an organization distributing a document such as a PDF file.

3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

As described in "3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful ".

3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms

The rules for interpreting various types of names shall be determined to the X.500 series distinguished name rules.

3.1.5 Uniqueness of names

Name uniqueness in certificates shall be performed by the Application CA2(Sub).

3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks No stipulation

3.2 Initial identity validation

3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key

As for the application procedure of a server certificate, a code-signing certificate and a document signing certificate, the Application CA2(Sub) shall verify the signatures of the CSRs and confirm that it is signed using the private key that correspond to the public key included in the CSRs.

3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity

As for the application procedure of a server certificate, a code-signing certificate and a document signing certificate, the LRA shall verify the authenticity of the organization to which the subscriber belongs according to comparing with organizations which were written in the application by directory of government officials that the Independent Administrative Agency National Printing Bureau issued.

3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

As for the application procedure of a server certificate, a code-signing certificate and a document signing certificate, the LRA shall verify the authenticity of the subscriber according to comparing with name, contact, etc. which were written in the application by directory of government officials that the Independent Administrative Agency National Printing Bureau issued.

The LRA also check the intention of an application by a telephone or meeting.

3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information

No stipulation

3.2.5 Validation of authority

The appropriateness of authority is confirmed according to the procedures defined in "3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity" and "3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity".

3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation No stipulation

3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key

Identification and authentication for routine re-key of a certificate are performed according to the procedure defined in "3.2 Initial identity validation".

3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation of a certificate are performed according to the procedure defined in "3.2 Initial identity validation".

3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request

Identification and authentication for revocation of a certificate are performed according to the procedures defined in "3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity" and "3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity".

4. Certificate life-cycle operational requirements

4.1 Certificate application

4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application

(1) Server certificate

The server certificate application shall be submitted to the LRA by a subscriber or an authorized representative of the same organization as that of the subscriber.

The LRA shall perform an application of the Server certificate to the Application CA2(Sub).

(2) Code signing certificate

The code signing certificate application shall be submitted to the LRA by a subscriber or an authorized representative of the same organization as that of the subscriber.

The LRA shall perform an application of the code signing certificate to the Application CA2(Sub).

(3) Document signing certificate

The document signing certificate application shall be submitted to the LRA by a subscriber or an authorized representative of the same organization as that of the subscriber.

The LRA shall perform an application of the document signing certificate to the Application CA2(Sub).

4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibilities

(1) Server certificate

The subscriber shall apply accurate information on their certificate applications to the LRA.

The LRA shall confirm that the owner of the domain name written as a name(cn) of a server certificate in the application form belongs to Ministries and Agencies who have jurisdiction over LRA, or its related organization with the thirdparty databases(whois) and apply accurate information to the Application CA2(Sub).

(2) Code signing certificate

The subscriber shall apply accurate information on their certificate applications to the LRA.

The LRA shall confirm that the organization name written as a name (cn) of code signing certificate in application exists and be organization name of Ministries and Agencies with jurisdiction over LRA or highest administrative agency belonging to Ministries and Agencies in accordance with the organization name in public document and then apply accurate information to the Application CA2(Sub).

(3) Document signing certificate

The subscriber shall apply accurate information on their certificate applications to the LRA.

The LRA shall confirm that the organization name written as a name (cn) of document signing certificate in application exists and be organization name of Ministries and Agencies with jurisdiction over LRA or highest administrative agency belonging to Ministries and Agencies in accordance with the organization name in public document and then apply accurate information to the Application CA2(Sub).

4.2 Certificate application processing

(1) Server certificate

The subscriber shall apply to the LRA in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

The LRA shall perform review in accordance with the based on the procedure defined in "3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity "and "3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity ", and registers to the Application CA2(Sub).

The Application CA2(Sub) shall check that the application contents registered by the LRA are appropriate in accordance with the implementation of the procedure defined in "3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key" and the examination in LRA being completed. The Application CA2(Sub) will not verify the CAA(Certificate Authority Authorization) Record.

(2) Code signing certificate

The subscriber shall apply to the LRA in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

The LRA shall perform review in accordance with the based on the procedure defined in "3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity "and "3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity ", and registers to the Application CA2(Sub).

The Application CA2(Sub) shall check that the application contents registered by the LRA are appropriate in accordance with the implementation of the procedure defined in "3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key" and the examination in LRA being completed.

(3) Document signing certificate

The subscriber shall apply to the LRA in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

The LRA shall perform review in accordance with the based on the procedure defined in "3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity "and "3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity ", and registers to the Application CA2(Sub).

The Application CA2(Sub) shall check that the application contents registered by the LRA are appropriate in accordance with the implementation of the procedure defined in "3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key" and the examination in LRA being completed.

4.3 Certificate issuance

(1) Server certificate

The Application CA2(Sub) signs to the public key registered with the CA private key, issue a server certificate.

The Application CA2(Sub) distributes the issued Server certificate to the LRA in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

The LRA distributes the server certificate to the subscriber or certificate applicant in accordance with the secure communications. The issuance is notified by distribution of the server certificate.

(2) Code signing certificate

The Application CA2(Sub) signs to the public key registered with the CA private key, issue a code signing certificate .

The Application CA2(Sub) distributes the issued code signing certificate to the LRA in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

The LRA distributes the code signing certificate to the subscriber or certificate applicant in accordance with the secure communications. The issuance is notified by distribution of the code signing certificate.

(3) Document signing certificate

The Application CA2(Sub) signs to the public key registered with the CA private key, issue a document signing certificate .

The Application CA2(Sub) distributes the issued document signing certificate to the LRA in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

The LRA distributes the document signing certificate to the subscriber or certificate applicant in accordance with the secure communications. The issuance is notified by distribution of the document signing certificate.

4.4 Certificate acceptance

(1) Server certificate

The subscriber shall check the contents of the certificate without delay. If the subscriber detects any problems, the subscriber shall notify the problem to the LRA.

The LRA assumes acceptance of the server certificate to be completed if the subscriber don't notify the LRA about the problem.

(2) Code signing certificate

The subscriber shall check the contents of the certificate without delay. If the subscriber detects any problems, the subscriber shall notify the problem to the LRA.

The LRA assumes acceptance of the code signing certificate to be completed if the subscriber don't notify the LRA about the problem.

(3) Document signing certificate

The subscriber shall check the contents of the certificate without delay. If the subscriber detects any problems, the subscriber shall notify the problem to the LRA.

The LRA assumes acceptance of the document signing certificate to be completed if the subscriber don't notify the LRA about the problem.

4.5 Key pair and certificate usage

4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage

When using private keys and certificates, the subscriber is obliged to:

- Use the server certificate, the code signing certificate and the document signing certificate in accordance with this CP/CPS.
- Administer the server certificate, the code signing certificate, the document signing certificate and these private keys corresponding to the certificates safely.
- Inform the LRA of the compromise state of the private keys as soon as the state occurs.

4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage

When trusting and using public keys and certificates, the relying party of the server certificate, the code signing certificate and the document signing certificate is obliged to:

- Check the use purpose of the server certificate, the code signing certificate and the document signing certificate.
- Check that the server certificate, the code signing certificate and the document signing certificate are not tampered.
- Verify the validation of the server certificate, the code signing certificate and the document signing certificate.
 - 4.6 Certificate Renewal
- (1) Server certificate

No stipulation

- (2) Code signing certificateNo stipulation
- (3) Document signing certificateNo stipulation

4.7 Certificate re-key

(1) Server certificate

When the cases that the expiration date of the server certificate, in which re-Keying of the server certificate, the corresponding private key shall be generated newly according to the procedures stipulated in "4.2 Certificate application processing" and "4.3 Certificate issuance ".

(2) Code signing certificate

When the cases that the expiration date of the code signing certificate, in which re-Keying of the code signing certificate, the corresponding private key shall be generated newly according to the procedures stipulated in "4.2 Certificate application processing" and "4.3 Certificate issuance ".

(3) Document signing certificate

When the cases that the expiration date of the document signing certificate, in which re-Keying of the document signing certificate, the corresponding private key shall be generated newly according to the procedures stipulated in "4.2 Certificate application processing" and "4.3 Certificate issuance ".

4.8 Certificate modification

(1) Server certificate

When the cases that certificate information are modified, the certificate shall be issued according to the procedures stipulated in "4.2 Certificate application processing" and "4.3 Certificate issuance". When the certificate is revoked due to modification, the procedure in "4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request" is performed.

(2) Code signing certificate

When the cases that the certificate information are modified, the certificate shall be issued according to the procedures stipulated in "4.2 Certificate application processing" and "4.3 Certificate issuance". When the certificate is revoked due to modification, the procedure in "4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request" is performed.

(3) Document signing certificate

When the cases that the certificate information are modified, the certificate shall be

issued according to the procedures stipulated in "4.2 Certificate application processing" and "4.3 Certificate issuance". When the certificate is revoked due to modification, the procedure in "4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request" is performed.

4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1 Conditions for revocation

(1) Server certificate

The Application CA2(Sub) revokes a server certificate when the following certificate revocation reasons occur:

- In case of compromise of private key of the server certificate due to theft, loss, leakage, and illegal use, etc. or there is fear of making dangerous to be compromised.
- In case of re-issuance of the certificate.
- In case of contents of the certificate and the purpose of use are not correct.
- In case of modification of contents described in the certificate.
- In case of the CA private key is lost, compromise or acquire evidence that the certificate is used illegally by any other reasons.
- In case of use of the certificate is stopped.
- In case of end of authentication business.
- The Inter-ministerial Council of Government Information Systems decides that the certificate should be revoked due to the case in which the subscriber or LRA violates the obligations defined by this CP/CPS and Term of service.
- In case of realization that indicated situation of use of FQDN or IP address in the certificate is no longer legitimately permitted.
- In case of inaccuracy or there is fear of making dangerous to be misunderstood of contents described in the certificate.
- Application CA2(Sub) director decides the revocation according to a request from the LRA.
- Application CA2(Sub) administrator decides the revocation because of even such as erroneous issuance of the certificate due to any reason chargeable to the Application CA2(Sub).
- (2) Code signing certificate

The Application CA2(Sub) revokes a code signing certificate when the following certificate revocation reasons occur:

- In case of compromise of private key of the code signing certificate due to theft,

loss, leakage, and illegal use, etc. or there is fear of making dangerous to be compromised.

- In case of re-issuance of the certificate.
- In case of contents of the certificate and the purpose of use are not correct.
- In case of modification of contents described in the certificate.
- In case of the CA private key is lost, compromise or acquire evidence that the certificate is used illegally by any other reasons.
- In case of use of the certificate is stopped.
- In case of end of authentication business.
- The Inter-ministerial Council of Government Information Systems decides that the certificate should be revoked due to the case in which the subscriber or LRA violates the obligations defined by this CP/CPS and Term of service.
- In case of inaccuracy or there is fear of making dangerous to be misunderstood of contents described in the certificate.
- Application CA2(Sub) director decides the revocation according to a request from the LRA.
- Application CA2(Sub) administrator decides the revocation because of even such as erroneous issuance of the certificate due to any reason chargeable to the Application CA2(Sub).
- (3) Document signing certificate

The Application CA2(Sub) revokes a document signing certificate when the following certificate revocation reasons occur:

- -
- In case of compromise of private key of the document signing certificate due to theft, loss, leakage, and illegal use, etc. or there is fear of making dangerous to be compromised.
- In case of re-issuance of the certificate.
- In case of contents of the certificate and the purpose of use are not correct.
- In case of modification of contents described in the certificate.
- In case of the CA private key is lost, compromise or acquire evidence that the certificate is used illegally by any other reasons.
- In case of use of the certificate is stopped.
- In case of end of authentication business.
- The Inter-ministerial Council of Government Information Systems decides that the certificate should be revoked due to the case in which the subscriber or LRA violates the obligations defined by this CP/CPS and Term of service.

- In case of inaccuracy or there is fear of making dangerous to be misunderstood of contents described in the certificate.
- Application CA2(Sub) director decides the revocation according to a request from the LRA.
- Application CA2(Sub) administrator decides the revocation because of even such as erroneous issuance of the certificate due to any reason chargeable to the Application CA2(Sub).

4.9.2 Who can request revocation

(1) Server certificate

The server certificate revocation application shall be submitted to the LRA by a subscriber or an authorized representative of the same organization as that of the subscriber.

The LRA shall perform the revocation application of the server certificate to the Application CA2(Sub).

(2) Code signing certificate

The code signing certificate revocation application shall be submitted to the LRA by a subscriber or an authorized representative of the same organization as that of the subscriber.

The LRA shall perform the revocation application of the code signing certificate to the Application CA2(Sub).

(3) Document signing certificate

The document signing certificate revocation application shall be submitted to the LRA by a subscriber or an authorized representative of the same organization as that of the subscriber.

The LRA shall perform the revocation application of the document signing certificate to the Application CA2(Sub).

4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request

(1) Server certificate

The certificate applicant shall perform an application for server certificate revocation to the LRA in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

The LRA shall perform review in accordance with the name (cn) written in the application checks that it is the same as that of the name (cn) written in the application at the time of an issue application and registers the server certificate revocation application to the Application CA2(Sub). The Application CA2(Sub) shall perform

revocation processing of the server certificate according to the revocation application from the LRA and register the CRL in the integrated repository.

The LRA shall check the completion of server certificate revocation and informs the subscriber or the applicant of it.

(2) Code signing certificate

The certificate applicant shall perform an application for revocation of code signing certificate to the LRA in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

The LRA shall perform review in accordance with the name (cn) written in the application checks that it is the same as that of the name (cn) written in the application at the time of an issue application and registers the code signing certificate revocation application to the Application CA2(Sub).

The Application CA2(Sub) shall perform revocation processing of the code signing certificate according to the revocation application from the LRA and register the CRL in the integrated repository.

The LRA shall check the completion of code signing certificate revocation and informs the subscriber or the applicant of it.

(3) Document signing certificate

The certificate applicant shall perform an application for revocation of document signing certificate to the LRA in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

The LRA shall perform review in accordance with the name (cn) written in the application checks that it is the same as that of the name (cn) written in the application at the time of an issue application and registers the document signing certificate revocation application to the Application CA2(Sub).

The Application CA2(Sub) shall perform revocation processing of the document signing certificate according to the revocation application from the LRA and register the CRL in the integrated repository.

The LRA shall check the completion of document signing certificate revocation and informs the subscriber or the applicant of it.

4.9.4 Revocation request grace period

In case of event needing revocation, subscriber shall perform the revocation application immediately.

4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request

The Application CA2(Sub) shall perform revocation immediately after the revocation application procedure terminates.

When an already-issued certificate is revoked, its revocation processing is not cancelled. When the certificate is issued again to the subscriber for the revoked certificate, the issue procedure is performed newly.

4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

The relying party shall check the validity of a trusting and using certificate. The Application CA2(Sub) publishes the CRL in the integrated repository and provides the OCSP responder so that the validity can be checked.

4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency

The CRL of 48-hour validity period is issued at intervals of 24 hours. However, if an event such as occurrence of a CA private key compromise state, the CRL is issued immediately.

4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs

The Application CA2(Sub) reflects the issued CRL on the integrated repository promptly.

4.9.9 On-line revocation/ status checking availability

The BCA maintains and administers the integrated repository and the OCSP responder. And the OCSP responder provides verification means for a certificate status by on-line.

4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements

The validity of a certificate shall be checked either by the CRL which is published in the integrated repository or the OCSP responder which provides the status of the certificate.

4.9.11 Other forms of available revocation information No stipulation

4.9.12 Special requirements related to key compromise

When the private key of a subscriber enters a compromise state, the subscriber shall inform the LRA about the state quickly. The LRA shall perform the revocation application procedure quickly. The Application CA2(Sub) shall perform revocation processing quickly according to the revocation application from the LRA.

4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension

The Application CA2(Sub) does not terminate the certificates temporarily.

4.9.14 Who can request suspension No stipulation

4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request No stipulation

4.9.16 Limits on suspension period No stipulation

4.10 Certificate status services

4.10.1 Feature in operation

The status of a certificate can be checked using the CRL or the OCSP responder.

4.10.2 Service availability

The integrated repository and the OCSP responder are operated 24x7. Operation may be temporarily stopped by maintenance, etc.

4.10.3 Operational specification No stipulation

4.11 End of subscription No stipulation

4.12 Key escrow and recovery

The CA private key is not escrowed.

5. Administration of Facilities and Operations

5.1 Physical controls

5.1.1 Site location and construction

The Application CA2(Sub) facilities shall be located at a site where it will not be affected by flooding, earthquakes, fire and other disasters. Structural countermeasures shall also be used to protect the building from earthquakes, fire and illegal intrusion. The equipment used shall be installed in safe locations that provide protection from disasters and illegal intrusion.

5.1.2 Physical access

Rooms within the Application CA2(Sub) facilities shall be subject to strict entry/exit control at multiple security levels, depending on the importance of the authentication operations carried out in those rooms. Authentication shall be provided using IC cards or biometric identification systems that allow the identification of authorized operators.

Authorization to entry/exit rooms shall be granted by the Application CA2(Sub) director as stipulated in "5.2 Procedural controls".

Security guards shall be stationed in the Application CA2(Sub) facilities, and it shall also be monitored 24x7 by surveillance systems.

5.1.3 Power and air conditioning

The Application CA2(Sub) shall secure adequate power supply capacity for its equipment, etc., and implement countermeasures against power interruptions, power failure and fluctuations in voltage or frequency. If commercial power becomes unavailable, the facility shall switch to generator power within a specified time.

Air conditioning equipment shall be installed to maintain an appropriate operating environment for equipment and working environment for personnel.

5.1.4 Water exposures

Rooms in the building in which the Application CA2(Sub) facilities is located shall be equipped with water leakage detectors, and steps shall be taken to make floors or ceilings water-proof.

5.1.5 Protect against earthquake-damaged

The building in which the Application CA2(Sub) facilities is located shall have an earthquake-resistant structure, and steps shall be taken to prevent equipment and machinery from toppling or falling.

5.1.6 Fire prevention and protection

The building in which the Application CA2(Sub) facilities is located shall have a fire-resistant structure. Rooms shall be protected with firewalls, and fire extinguishers shall be provided.

5.1.7 Media storage

The Application CA2(Sub) shall store memory devices that include archive and backup data in a lockable storage facility located in a room to which there is appropriate entry/exit control. Media shall be taken into or out of storage in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

5.1.8 Waste disposal

The Application CA2(Sub) shall dispose documents and memory devices that contain confidential information of in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

5.1.9 Offsite backup

When the Application CA2(Sub) stores media of important data at an off-site location separate from the Application CA2(Sub) facilities, the Application CA2(Sub) shall assure security of a transport route, also device a security countermeasure, commensurate to that of the Application CA2(Sub) facilities, to the facility in which the media are retained.

5.2 Procedural control

5.2.1 Trusted roles

(1) Application CA2 director

Application CA2 director is responsible for operation of the Application CA2(Sub) and performs:

- Establishment of Application CA2 management policies
- Coordination of authentication operations
- Coordination of actions in emergencies, such as the CA private key compromise or

- disasters
- Coordination of other aspects of Application CA2(Sub) management

(2) IA key administrator

The IA key administrator is responsible for services using the CA private key and shall perform the following task:

Multiple IA key administrators perform the operations.

- Retention and management of keys used to control HSM functions (hereinafter referred to as "control keys")
- Retention and management of backup memory devices for the CA private key
- Attendance at HSM key operations for the generation of the CA private key
- Attendance at HSM key operations for the re-key of the CA private key
- CA private key backups and HSM key operations for restoration from backups, as well as setting up of backup media for the CA private key

(3) Reception personnel

Reception personnel accept applications related to participation and withdrawal from the LRA, adjusts communication with applicants, and administers application documents.

(4) Reviewer

Reviewer shall perform reviews of applications related to participation and withdrawal from the LRA.

(5) Application CA2 administrator

Application CA2 administrator is responsible for operations of the Application CA2(Sub) and shall perform the following task:

- Provision of work instructions to senior IA operators and general IA operators, and
- confirmation of results
- Instruction concerning initial actions in response to emergencies, such as CA private key compromise and disasters
- Operations control of the Application CA2(Sub)
- Control of a key required for HSM operations (hereafter referred to as "operation key")

(6) Assistant application CA2 administrator

The assistant application CA2 administrator is acting Application CA2 administrator, and shall perform the following task in place of Application CA2 administrator:

- Provision of work instructions to senior IA operators and general IA operators, and
- confirmation of results
- Operations control of the Application CA2(Sub)
- Control of the operation key required for HSM operations

(7) Senior IA operator

Senior IA operators perform the following task related to the Application CA2(Sub) system. The operations shall be performed by multiple senior IA operators.

- Generating CA private key, and operation of the operation
- Operation of the operation key required for HSM operations at re-key of a CA private key
- Activation and deactivation of a CA private key
- Application CA2(Sub) system start and stop
- Application CA2(Sub) repository start and stop
- Administration of the Application CA2(Sub) system reconfiguration
- Administration of system reconfiguration relating to database backups, restoration and archive operations for the Application CA2(Sub) system

(8) General IA operator

General IA operators perform the following task related to certificates issued from the Application CA2(Sub) system. The operations shall be performed by multiple general IA operators.

- Registration and modification of the certificate policy
- Revocation of server certificates, code signing certificates and document signing certificates
- Processing of issues, re-keys and revocations for operator certificates
- Issues, re-keys and revocations of OCSP server certificates to OCSP responder.
- Administration of Application CA2(Sub) repository settings

(9) Audit log inspector

The audit log inspector performs the following task related to the log recording important events related to security for the Application CA2(Sub) system and Application CA2(Sub) repository (hereafter referred to as "audit log"):

- Audit log inspect
- Deletion of unnecessary audit log

(10)LRA administrator

The LRA administrator is responsible for LRA management and shall perform the following task:

- Designation of LRA personnel and cancellation of designation
- Work planning and work instruction to LRA personnel
- Final approval of review result of requesting issuance, re-key and revocation of server, code signing and document signing certificates
- Control of review request for issuance, re-key and revocation of server, code signing and document signing certificates
- Controls of application documents
- Operation of internal review of the LRA
- Reporting of internal review result to Application CA2 director

(11)LRA operator

According to instructions of LRA administrator, LRA operators register requests for issuance, re-key and revocation of server, code signing and document signing certificates in the Application CA2(Sub).

(12)LRA Reception personnel

LRA Reception personnel accepts applications for issuance, re-key, and revocation of server, code signing and document signing certificates, and perform associated paperwork and liaison services.

(13)LRA Reviewer

LRA Reviewer reviews applications for issuance, re-key and revocation of server, code signing and document signing certificates.

5.2.2 Number of persons required per task

In the Application CA2(Sub), two or more persons shall perform important services such as CA private key generating.

5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role

Identification and authentication shall be carried out to ensure that only authorized

operators operate the systems.

5.2.4 Role requiring separation of duties

Important services are instructed to Application CA2 administrator from Application CA2 director.

Application CA2 administrator instructs task to each personnel. When the important services are performed, authorities of personnel are separated for mutual checks and balances. An LRA administrator instructs LRA services to each LRA personnel.

5.3 Personnel controls

Matters pertaining to Application CA2(Sub) personnel, including review of qualifications, education and transfers, shall be governed by the National Public Service Law and other laws relating to personnel affairs. All personnel shall receive education and training so that they can acquire the knowledge and skills required for Application CA2(Sub) administration. When services are consigned partly, appropriate contracts, related to consigned services, including responsibility for maintaining confidentiality shall be placed with the consignee.

5.4 Audit logging procedures

Audit log inspector collate audit log with service execution records and perform security audit for checking abnormal events such as invalid operation.

5.4.1 Types of events recorded

Important events relating to the security in the Application CA2(Sub) system and the Application CA2(Sub) repository are recorded in the audit logs including the access log and operations log.

The following information shall be included in the audit log. The following information shall be included in the audit log.

- Type of event
- Date and time of event
- Processing result
- Information to identify source of event (operator name, system name, etc.)

5.4.2 Frequency of processing log

Audit log reviewers collate audit log with job execution records or the like every week.

5.4.3 Retention period for audit log

The audit log shall be retained for seven years.

5.4.4 Protection of audit log

Access to audit log shall be controlled and action to enable tampering to be detected shall be taken.

Audit log is backed up every week in external storage media and retained in a lockable archive in a room of which entering and leaving are administered appropriately.

Audit log is browsed and deleted by audit log reviewers.

5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures

The audit log shall be backed up every day and is collected in external storage media every week.

5.4.6 Audit collection system

The audit log collection function shall be one of in the Application CA2(Sub) system functions. The function collects important events related to security as audit log from when the system starts.

5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject

Audit log shall be is checked without notification to persons causing events.

5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments

Operational and system-related vulnerability shall be assessed by means of audit log inspections.

5.5 Records archival

5.5.1 Types of records archived

Archive data types are:

- Certificate issuing history
- CRL issuing history
- Start and stop log
- Operation log

5.5.2 Retention period for archive

Archive data is retained for 10 years after the validity period of the certificate expires.

5.5.3 Protection of archive

Access to archive data shall be controlled and action to enable tampering to be detected shall be taken.

5.5.4 Archive backup procedures

Archive data shall be backed up every day and copied external memory devices every month.

5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records

A time stamp is assigned to archive data in the unit of record.

5.5.6 Archive collection system No stipulation

5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information

The external memory devices on which the archive is stored shall be checked for readability on an annual basis.

5.6 Key changeover

CA key pairs shall be re-keyed within every 7years.

The distribution method of the new CA public key is the same as that in "6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties".

5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery

5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures

The Application CA2(Sub) will plan procedures to restore services immediately, against with an accident or a compromise as follows.

- Crash of hardware resources, software, and/or data
- CA private key is compromised.
- Disasters such as fire and earthquake

5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and/ or data are corrupted

If hardware resources, software and/or data are crashed, restoration is performed quickly by using backup hardware resources, software and/or data. Software and/or data necessary for restoration are collected periodically or whenever circumstances required it.

5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures

If a CA private key is compromised, certification services are stopped in accordance with predetermined procedures and the following procedures are performed:

- Publication of information related to the compromise state
- Revocation of server, code signing and document signing certificates
- Discarding and re-generating of the CA private key
- Reissuing of server, code signing and document signing certificates

If a subscriber's private key is compromise, the certificate is revoked in accordance with the procedure defined in "4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension ".

5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster

If the Application CA2(Sub) facilities are damaged by disasters, operation is performed in a backup site by using backup data. The backup site is set in a location separated from the main site by appropriate distance. The service policy at a disaster is defined as follows:

- CRL publication by the integrated repository is given the highest priority. The publication is restarted within 48 hours after the publication is stopped.
- Urgent issuance and revocation of certificates are restarted within 96 hours after the services stopped.
- Ordinary services are restarted after complete restoration of the Application CA2(Sub) facilities and security at the main site is confirmed.

5.8 CA or RA termination

If the Inter-ministerial Council of Government Information Systems decides to terminate the certification services of the Application CA2(Sub), the Application CA2(Sub) shall notify the LRA, subscribers, and relying party about the storage organization and the disclosure method and the Application CA2(Sub)'s backup and archive data, no later than 90 days before the termination of operations. Then the Application CA2(Sub) performs prescribed service termination procedures.

6. Technical security controls

6.1 Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1 Key pair generation

(1) CA keys

CA key pairs shall be generated by multiple senior IA operators by using the HSM certificated to FIPS140-2 level 3, with attendance of multiple IA key administrators.

(2) Server certificate key

Server certificate key pairs shall be generated by a subscriber.

(3) Code signing certificate key

Code signing certificate key pairs shall be generated by a subscriber.

(4) Document signing certificate key

Document signing certificate key pairs shall be generated by a subscriber.

6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber

The Application CA2(Sub) does not deliver a private key to the subscriber.

6.1.3 Public key delivery to the certificate issuer

A subscriber sends the public key of the user to the LRA by a secure method, and the LRA sends the key to the Application CA2(Sub) by a secure method.

6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties

The Application CA2(Sub) shall publish CA certificates in the integrated repository and on web site and publish the finger prints on web site. The CA certificates and finger prints shall be published on web site by a secure method.

6.1.5 Key sizes

(1) CA key

RSA 2048-bit key shall be used.

(2) Server certificate key

RSA 2048-bit key shall be used.

(3) Code signing certificate key

RSA 2048-bit key shall be used.

(4) Document signing certificate key

RSA 2048-bit key shall be used.

6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking No stipulation

6.1.7 Key usage purposes

The keys shall be used only for the following use purposes:

(1) CA key

CA private key shall be used for signatures.

(2) Server certificate key

Server certificate key shall be used for existence certification of the server and the encrypted communications.

(3) Code signing certificate key

Code signing certificate key shall be used for a signature of software such as programs.

(4) Document signing certificate key

Document signing certificate key shall be used for a signature of document such as PDF files.

6.2 Private key protection and cryptographic module engineering controls

- 6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls
- (1) CA key

CA private key shall be protected using the HSM certified to FIPS140-2 level 3.

(2) Server certificate key

No stipulation

(3) Code signing certificate key

No stipulation

(4) Document signing certificate key

No stipulation

6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

Operations related to CA private key administration shall be performed by multiple IA key administrators and multiple senior IA operators.

6.2.3 Private key escrow

CA private keys shall not be escrowed.

6.2.4 Private key backup

CA private key backups shall be carried out by multiple IA key administrators and multiple senior IA operators.

CA private key backed up from an HSM shall be retained securely by multiple IA key administrators.

6.2.5 Private key archival

CA private keys shall not be archived.

6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module No stipulation

6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module

(1) CA key

Multiple IA key administrators and multiple senior IA operators shall generate and store the CA private key within an HSM.

(2) Server certificate key

No stipulation

(3) Code signing certificate key

No stipulation

(4) Document signing certificate key

No stipulation

6.2.8 Method of activating private key

(1) CA key

CA private keys shall be activated by multiple senior IA operators, using the operation key and password.

(2) Server certificate key

No stipulation

(3) Code signing certificate key

No stipulation

(4) Document signing certificate key No stipulation 6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key

(1) CA key

CA private keys shall be deactivated by multiple senior IA operators, using the password.

(2) Server certificate key

No stipulation

(3) Code signing certificate key

No stipulation

(4) Document signing certificate key

No stipulation

6.2.10 Method of destroying private key

(1) CA key

CA private keys in the HSM shall be erased by multiple IA key administrators and multiple senior IA operators, using the HSM function. Also, the medium shall be treated by the same method when the backup media of the CA private key shall be destroyed.

(2) Server certificate key

No stipulation

(3) Code signing certificate key

No stipulation

(4) Document signing certificate key

No stipulation

6.2.11 Cryptographic module Rating

This shall be as stipulated in "6.1.1 Key pair generation" and "6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls ".

6.3 Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1 Public key archival

Public keys shall be included in certificate archives. They shall be retained for the period stipulated in "5.5.2 Retention period for archive ".

6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

(1) CA key

The public and private keys of the Application CA2(Sub) shall be valid for 10 years from the date they were validated. They shall be re-keyed within seven years.

If encryption security levels are judged to be low, keys shall be updated at that time.

(2) Server certificate key

The public and private keys of the server certificate shall be valid for three years from the date they were validated.

If encryption security levels are judged to be low, keys shall be updated at that time.

(3) Code signing certificate key

The public and private keys of the code signing certificate shall be valid for three years from the date they were validated.

If encryption security levels are judged to be low, keys shall be updated at that time.

(4) Document signing certificate key

The public and private keys of the document signing certificate shall be valid for three years from the date they were validated.

If encryption security levels are judged to be low, keys shall be updated at that time.

6.4 Activation data

6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation

(1) CA key

The operation key and password required to activate the HSM in which the CA private key is stored shall be generated and registered by multiple IA key administrators and multiple senior IA operators.

(2) Server certificate key

The activation data of the private key of a server certificate shall be generated and registered by the subscriber.

(3) Code signing certificate key

The activation data of the private key of a code signing certificate shall be generated and registered by the subscriber.

(4) Document signing certificate key

The activation data of the private key of a document signing certificate shall be generated and registered by the subscriber.

6.4.2 Activation data protection

(1) CA key

The operation key and password required to activate the HSM in which the CA private key is stored shall be retained safely by the Application CA2(Sub).

(2) Server certificate key

The activation data of the private key of a server certificate shall be retained safely by the subscriber.

(3) Code signing certificate key

The activation data of the private key of a code signing certificate shall be retained safely by the subscriber.

(4) Document signing certificate key

The activation data of the private key of a document signing certificate shall be retained safely by the subscriber.

6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data No stipulation

6.5 Computer security controls

6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements

The Application CA2(Sub) system shall be equipped with various functions, including the access control, operator identification and authentication, encryption for database security, audit log and archive data collection, and CA key and system recovery.

6.5.2 Computer security rating No stipulation

6.6 Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1 System development controls

The development, adjustment, and modification of the Application CA2(Sub) system shall be carried out by a reliable organization in a reliable environment in accordance with the prescribed procedures. The developed, adjusted or modified system is verified in a test environment and approved by Application CA2 director. Then the system shall be introduced. The system specifications and verification reports shall be documented and retained.

6.6.2 Security management controls

The Application CA2(Sub) system maintenance and management shall include periodic security checks of the operating system and software. The verification results shall be documented and retained. The computer virus countermeasure and the malicious program countermeasure shall be performed appropriately.

6.6.3 Life cycle security controls

The Application CA2(Sub) shall check development, operation, and maintenance of the system evaluated timely through audit. They shall improve if necessary.

6.7 Network security controls

The information that is published in information stored in the Application CA2(Sub) repository shall be copied in the BCA integrated repository through a firewall. As communications with the LRA, only the encrypted communications through a leased line are used. Proper security control measures shall be implemented to prevent unauthorized access or retrieval.

6.8 Time-stamping

The Application CA2(Sub) shall carry out time synchronization of the system by using a reliable time source and assign time-stamp to important information recorded in the system in the unit of record.

7. Certificate and CRL profiles

7.1 Server certificate

Table 7-1	Server	certificate
-----------	--------	-------------

Area name	Critical flag	Value	Description
version (version number)		2	v3 integer
serial Number (serial number) signature algorithm ID (signature algorithm)		Example: 23	Certificate serial number, integer Application CA2(Sub) signature algorithm
algorithm identifier (algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
issuer name (issuer name)		cn=ApplicationCA2 Sub, ou=GPKI, o=Japanese Government, c=JP	Application CA2(Sub) distinguished name(DN) in English PrintableString
validity period (certificate validity period)			Validity period of certificate
notBefore (issue date)		Example: 010401000000Z	Start date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
notAfter (termination date)		Example: 040401000000Z	Termination date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
subject name (subject name)		Example: cn=xxx.yyy.go.jp, ou=Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, o= Japanese Government, c=JP	Distinguished name of the subject(DN) in English (DN consists of 4RDN), cn: server FQDN PrintableString

subject public key info			
(subject public key			Public key algorithm
information)			
algorithm identifier		1.2.840.113549.1.1.1	Server public key algorithm
(algorithm identifier)		1.2.040.113349.1.1.1	identifier, RSA Encryption
parameter			No value for RSA
(parameter)		NULL	NO VAIUE IOF RSA
public key			Server public key, BIT
(public key)		BIT STRING	String
extensions		1	
(certificate extention area)			
authorityKeyIdentifier			
(CA key identifier)			CA key identifier
	FALSE		Application CA2(Sub)key
keyldentifier		OCTET STRING	identifier
subjectKeyIdentifier			
(subject key identifier)	FALSE	OCTET STRING	Subject key identifier
keyUsage			A key usage purpose is
(key usage)	TRUE		specified
digitalSignature		1	[0]
keyEncipherment		1	[2]
extendedKeyUsage			An extended key usage
(extended key usage)	FALSE		purpose is specified
KeyDurneeeld	TALGE	id kn converAuth	Server authentication by
KeyPurposeId		id-kp-serverAuth	TLS or SSL
subjectAltName			
(subject alt name)	FALSE		
dNSName		Example: xxx.yyy.go.jp	Server FQDN, IA5 String
certificatePolicies			
(certificate policies)			
policyldentifier	FALSE		OID
		0.2.440.100145.8.4.1.11.11	Server certificate policy OID
certPolicyId		0	id-apca-cp-tls.server110
		, v	

policyQualifiers			Policy qualifiers (pointer to CPS or user notification information)
policyQualifierId		id-qt-cps	CPS
qualifier		http://www.gpki.go.jp/apca2/ cpcps/index.html	Application CA2(Sub)CPS URI, IA5 String
issuerAltName (issuer alt name)	FALSE	cn=アプリケーション CA2 Sub, ou=政府認証基盤, o= 日本国政府, c=JP	Application CA2(Sub) distinguished name (DN) in Japanese, UTF8 String
cRLDistributionPoints (CRL distribution points)			
distributionPoint			Distribution point
fullName (non abbreviated name)	FALSE	http://dir2.gpki.go.jp/Applic ationCA2Sub.crl	A CRL distribution point is specified by URI. IA5 String
distributionPoint			Distribution Point Name
fullName (non abbreviated name)		http://dir2.gpki.hq.admix.g o.jp/ApplicationCA2Sub.crl	A CRL distribution point is specified by URI. IA5 String
issuer's signature (issuer's signature)			Digital signature of Application CA2(Sub)
algorithm identifier (algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
	ENCRYPT	ED (signature value)	

7.2 Server certificate (OCSP)

Area name	Critical flag	Value	Description
version (version number)		2	v3 integer
serial Number (serial number) signature algorithm ID (signature algorithm)		Example: 23	Certificate serial number, integer Application CA2(Sub) signature algorithm
algorithm identifier (algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
issuer name (issuer name)		cn=ApplicationCA2 Sub, ou=GPKI, o=Japanese Government, c=JP	Application CA2(Sub) distinguished name(DN) in English PrintableString
validity period (certificate validity period)			Validity period of certificate
notBefore (issue date)		Example: 141201000000Z	Start date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
notAfter (termination date)		Example: 171201000000Z	Termination date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
subject name (subject name)		Example: cn=xxx.yyy.go.jp, ou=Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, o= Japanese Government, I=Chiyoda-ku, st=Tokyo, c=JP	Distinguished name of the subject(DN) in English (DN consists of 6RDN), cn: server FQDN PrintableString

Table 7-2 Server certificate (OCSP)

subject public key info (subject public key			
(SUDJECT DUDJIC KEV)			
			Public key algorithm
information)			
algorithm identifier		1.2.840.113549.1.1.1	Server public key algorithm
(algorithm identifier)			identifier, RSA Encryption
parameter		NULL	No value for RSA
(parameter)			
public key		BIT STRING	Server public key, BIT
(public key)			String
extensions			
(certificate extention area)			
authorityKeyIdentifier			
(CA key identifier)			CA key identifier
	FALSE		Application CA2(Sub)key
keyldentifier		OCTET STRING	identifier
subjectKeyIdentifier			
(subject key identifier)	FALSE	OCTET STRING	Subject key identifier
keyUsage			A key usage purpose is
(key usage)			specified
digitalSignature	TRUE	1	[0]
keyEncipherment		1	[2]
extendedKeyUsage		·	An extended key usage
(extended key usage)			purpose is specified
(extended key usage)	FALSE		
KeyPurposeId		id-kp-serverAuth	Server authentication by
			TLS or SSL
subjectAltName			
(subject alt name)	FALSE		
dNSName		Example: xxx.yyy.go.jp	Server FQDN, IA5 String
certificatePolicies			
(certificate policies)			
policyldentifier	FALSE		OID
aart Dalia: da		0.2.440.100145.8.4.1.11.11	Server certificate policy OID
certPolicyId		0	id-apca-cp-tls.server110

policyQualifiers			Policy qualifiers (pointer to CPS or user notification information)
policyQualifierId		id-qt-cps	CPS
au alifiar		http://www.gpki.go.jp/apca2/	Application CA2(Sub)CPS
qualifier		cpcps/index.html	URI, IA5 String
issuerAltName		cn=アプリケーション CA2	Application CA2(Sub)
(issuer alt name)	FALSE	Sub, ou=政府認証基盤, o=	distinguished name (DN) in
		日本国政府, c=JP	Japanese, UTF8 String
cRLDistributionPoints			
(CRL distribution points)			
distributionPoint			Distribution point
fullName		http://dirQ.apl/i.ap.ip/Applip	A CRL distribution point is
(non abbreviated	FALSE	http://dir2.gpki.go.jp/Applic	specified by URI. IA5
name)	FALSE	E ationCA2Sub.crl	String
distributionPoint			Distribution Point Name
fullName		http://dirQ.god/i.h.g.odpriv.g	A CRL distribution point is
(non abbreviated		http://dir2.gpki.hq.admix.g	specified by URI. IA5
name)		o.jp/ApplicationCA2Sub.crl	String
authorityInfoAccess			
(authority info access)			
accessMethod	FALSE	id-ad-ocsp	OCSP
		http:// open outh anticipation	OCSP responder is
accessLocation		http:// ocsp-sub.gpki.go.jp	specified by URI, IA5string
issuer's signature			Digital signature of
(issuer's signature)			Application CA2(Sub)
algorithm identifier			
(algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
	ENCRYPT	ED (signature value)	

7.3 Code signing certificate

Area name	Critical flag	Value	Description
version		2	v3 integer
(version number)			
serial Number			Certificate serial number,
(serial number)		Example: 23	integer
signature algorithm ID			Application CA2(Sub)
(signature algorithm)			signature algorithm
algorithm identifier (algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
		cn=ApplicationCA2 Sub,	Application CA2(Sub)
issuer name		ou=GPKI,	distinguished name(DN) in
(issuer name)		o=Japanese Government,	English
		c=JP	PrintableString
validity period (certificate validity period)			Validity period of certificate
notBefore (issue date)		Example: 010401000000Z	Start date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
notAfter (termination date)		Example: 040401000000Z	Termination date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
		Example: cn= Ministry of Internal Affairs and	
		Communications,	Distinguished name of the
subject name		ou=Ministry of Internal	subject(DN) in English (DN
(subject name)		Affairs and	consists of 4RDN)
		Communications,	PrintableString
		o= Japanese Government,	
		c=JP	

Table 7-3 Code signing certificate

a that a the table	-		
subject public key info			
(subject public key			Public key algorithm
information)			
algorithm identifier			Code signing public key
(algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.1	algorithm identifier, RSA
			Encryption
parameter		NULL	No value for RSA
(parameter)		NOLL	
public key			Code signing public key,
(public key)		BIT STRING	BIT String
extensions		•	•
(certificate extention area)			
authorityKeyIdentifier			
(CA key identifier)			CA key identifier
	FALSE		Application CA2(Sub) key
keyldentifier		OCTET STRING	identifier
subjectKeyIdentifier			
(subject key identifier)	FALSE	OCTET STRING	Subject key identifier
keyUsage			A key usage purpose is
(key usage)	TRUE		specified
digitalSignature		1	[0]
extendedKeyUsage			An extended key usage
(extended key usage)	FALSE		purpose is specified
KeyPurposeld		id-kp-codeSigning	Code signing
certificatePolicies			
(certificate policies)			
policyIdentifier			OID
policyldertiller			
			Code signing certificate
certPolicyId	FALSE	0.2.440.100145.8.4.1.1.120	policy OID
			id- apca-cp-ds.class120
			Policy qualifiers (pointer to
policyQualifiers			CPS or user notification
			information)
policyQualifierId		id-qt-cps	CPS

	-		
qualifier		http://www.gpki.go.jp/apca2/ cpcps/index.html	Application CA2(Sub)CPS URI, IA5 String
issuerAltName		cn=アプリケーション CA2	Application CA2(Sub)
(issuer alt name)	FALSE	Sub, ou=政府認証基盤, o= 日本国政府, c=JP	distinguished name(DN) in Japanese, UTF8 String
cRLDistributionPoints (CRL distribution points)			
distributionPoint			Distribution point
fullName (non abbreviated name)	FALSE	http://dir2.gpki.go.jp/Applic ationCA2Sub.crl	A CRL distribution point is specified by URI. IA5 String
distributionPoint			Distribution Point Name
fullName (non abbreviated name)		http://dir2.gpki.hq.admix.g o.jp/ApplicationCA2Sub.crl	A CRL distribution point is specified by URI. IA5 String
issuer's signature (issuer's signature)			Digital signature of Application CA2(Sub)
algorithm identifier (algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
	ENCRYPTED (signature value)		

7.4 Code signing certificate (OCSP)

Area name	Critical flag	Value	Description
version		2	v3 integer
(version number)			
serial Number			Certificate serial number,
(serial number)		Example: 23	integer
signature algorithm ID			Application CA2(Sub)
(signature algorithm)			signature algorithm
algorithm identifier (algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
		cn=ApplicationCA2 Sub,	Application CA2(Sub)
issuer name		ou=GPKI,	distinguished name(DN) in
(issuer name)		o=Japanese Government,	English
		c=JP	PrintableString
validity period (certificate validity period)			Validity period of certificate
n et Defense			Start date of certificate
notBefore		Example: 150801000000Z	validity period
(issue date)			YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
a ot A ft o r			Termination date of
notAfter		Example: 180801000000Z	certificate validity period
(termination date)			YYMMDDHHMMSSZ

Table 7-4 Code signing certificate(OCSP)

		r	1
		Example: cn= Ministry of	
		Internal Affairs and	
		Communications,	
		ou=Ministry of Internal	Distinguished name of the
subject name		Affairs and	subject(DN) in English (DN
(subject name)		Communications,	consists of 6RDN)
		o= Japanese Government,	PrintableString
		l=Chiyoda-ku,	
		st=Tokyo,	
		c=JP	
subject public key info			
(subject public key			Public key algorithm
information)			
			Code signing public key
algorithm identifier		1.2.840.113549.1.1.1	algorithm identifier, RSA
(algorithm identifier)			Encryption
parameter			
(parameter)		NULL	No value for RSA
public key			Code signing public key,
(public key)		BIT STRING	BIT String
extensions			
(certificate extention area)			
authorityKeyIdentifier			
(CA key identifier)			CA key identifier
	FALSE		Application CA2(Sub) key
keyldentifier		OCTET STRING	identifier
subjectKeyIdentifier			
(subject key identifier)	FALSE	OCTET STRING	Subject key identifier
keyUsage			A key usage purpose is
(key usage)	TRUE		specified
digitalSignature	INCL	1	[0]
extendedKeyUsage			An extended key usage
(extended key usage)	FALSE		purpose is specified
KeyPurposeId		id-kp-codeSigning	Code signing

certificatePolicies			
(certificate policies)			
policyldentifier			OID
policylderitiller			Code signing certificate
certPolicyId		0.2.440.100145.8.4.1.1.120	policy OID
		0.2.110.100110.0.1.1.11120	id- apca-cp-ds.class120
	FALSE		Policy qualifiers (pointer to
policyQualifiers			CPS or user notification
policyQualificito			information)
policyQualifierId		id-qt-cps	CPS
policy additiona		http://www.gpki.go.jp/apca2/	Application CA2(Sub)CPS
qualifier		cpcps/index.html	URI, IA5 String
		cn=アプリケーション CA2	Application CA2(Sub)
issuerAltName	FALSE	Sub, ou=政府認証基盤, o=	distinguished name(DN) in
(issuer alt name)		日本国政府, c=JP	Japanese, UTF8 String
cRLDistributionPoints			
(CRL distribution points)			
distributionPoint			Distribution point
fullName			
(non abbreviated		http://dir2.gpki.go.jp/Applic	A CRL distribution point is
name)	FALSE	ationCA2Sub.crl	specified by URI. IA5 String
distributionPoint			Distribution Point Name
fullName			A CRL distribution point is
(non abbreviated		http://dir2.gpki.hq.admix.g	specified by URI. IA5
name)		o.jp/ApplicationCA2Sub.crl	String
authorityInfoAccess			
(authority info access)			
accessMethod	FALSE	id-ad-ocsp	OCSP
			OCSP responder is
accessLocation		http:// ocsp-sub.gpki.go.jp	specified by URI, IA5string
issuer's signature			Digital signature of
(issuer's signature)			Application CA2(Sub)
algorithm identifier		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
(algorithm identifier)		1.2.040.113049.1.1.11	зна2300011113АЕнстурион

ENCRYPTED (signature value)

7.5 Document signing certificate

Area name	Critical flag	Value	Description
version (version number)		2	v3 integer
serial Number (serial number)		Example: 23	Certificate serial number, integer
signature algorithm ID (signature algorithm)			Application CA2(Sub(signature algorithm
algorithm identifier (algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
issuer name (issuer name)		cn=ApplicationCA2 Sub, ou=GPKI, o=Japanese Government, c=JP	Application CA2(Sub) distinguished name(DN) in English PrintableString
validity period (certificate validity period)			Validity period of certificate
notBefore (issue date)		Example: 010401000000Z	Start date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
notAfter (termination date)		Example: 040401000000Z	Termination date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ

Table 7.5 Document signing certificate

		Example: cn= Ministry of	
		Internal Affairs and	
		Communications,	Distinguished name of the
subject name		ou=Ministry of Internal	subject(DN) in English (DN
(subject name)		Affairs and	consists of 4RDN)
		Communications,	PrintableString
		o= Japanese Government,	
		c=JP	
subject public key info			
(subject public key			Public key algorithm
information)			
algorithm identifier			Document signing public key
algorithm identifier		1.2.840.113549.1.1.1	algorithm identifier, RSA
(algorithm identifier)			Encryption
parameter		NULL	No value for RSA
(parameter)		NULL	No value for KSA
public key			Document signing public
(public key)		BIT STRING	key, BIT String
extensions			
(certificate extention area)			
authorityKeyIdentifier			
(CA key identifier)			CA key identifier
land de stiffer	FALSE		Application CA2(Sub) key
keyldentifier		OCTET STRING	identifier
subjectKeyIdentifier			Outlinet housidentifier
(subject key identifier)	FALSE	OCTET STRING	Subject key identifier
keyUsage			A key usage purpose is
(key usage)	TOUE		specified
digitalSignature	TRUE	1	[0]
nonRepudiation		1	[1]
certificatePolicies			
(certificate policies)	FALSE		
policyIdentifier			OID

		Document signing certificate
	0.2.440.100145.8.4.1.1.160	policy OID
		id- apca-cp-ds.class160
		Policy qualifiers (pointer to
		CPS or user notification
		information)
	id-qt-cps	CPS
	http://www.gpki.go.jp/apca2/	Application CA2(Sub)CPS
	cpcps/index.html	URI, IA5 String
	cn=アプリケーション CA2	Application CA2(Sub)
FALSE	Sub, ou=政府認証基盤, o=	distinguished name (DN) in
	日本国政府, c=JP	Japanese, UTF8 String
		Distribution point
		A CRL distribution point is
FALSE	ationCA2Sub.crl	specified by URI. IA5 String
		Distribution Point Name
		A CRL distribution point is
		specified by URI. IA5
	o.jp/ApplicationCA2Sub.crl	String
		Digital signature of
		Application CA2(Sub)
	1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
ENCRYPT	FED (signature value)	
	FALSE	id-qt-cps http://www.gpki.go.jp/apca2/ cpcps/index.html cn=アプリケーション CA2 Sub, ou=政府認証基盤, o= 日本国政府, c=JP

7.6 Document signing certificate(OCSP)

Area name	Critical flag	Value	Description
version (version number)		2	v3 integer
serial Number (serial number)		Example: 23	Certificate serial number, integer
signature algorithm ID (signature algorithm)			Application CA2(Sub(signature algorithm
algorithm identifier (algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
issuer name (issuer name)		cn=ApplicationCA2 Sub, ou=GPKI, o=Japanese Government, c=JP	Application CA2(Sub) distinguished name(DN) in English PrintableString
validity period (certificate validity period)			Validity period of certificate
notBefore (issue date)		Example: 150801000000Z	Start date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
notAfter (termination date)		Example: 150801000000Z	Termination date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ

Table 7.6 Document signing certificate(OCSP)

			[
		Example: cn= Ministry of	
		Internal Affairs and	
		Communications,	
		ou=Ministry of Internal	Distinguished name of the
subject name		Affairs and	subject(DN) in English (DN
(subject name)		Communications,	consists of 6RDN)
		o= Japanese Government,	PrintableString
		I=Chiyoda-ku,	
		st=Tokyo,	
		c=JP	
subject public key info			
(subject public key			Public key algorithm
information)			
algorithm identifier			Document signing public key
algorithm identifier		1.2.840.113549.1.1.1	algorithm identifier, RSA
(algorithm identifier)			Encryption
parameter			Na usika far DOA
(parameter)		NULL	No value for RSA
public key			Document signing public
(public key)		BIT STRING	key, BIT String
extensions			
(certificate extention area)			
authorityKeyIdentifier			
(CA key identifier)			CA key identifier
keyldentifier	FALSE	OCTET STRING	Application CA2(Sub) key
			identifier
subjectKeyIdentifier	FALSE	OCTET STRING	Subject key identifier
(subject key identifier)			
keyUsage			A key usage purpose is
(key usage)	TRUE		specified
digitalSignature	_	1	[0]
nonRepudiation		1	[1]
certificatePolicies			
(certificate policies)	FALSE		
policyIdentifier			OID

		1	
			Document signing certificate
certPolicyId		0.2.440.100145.8.4.1.1.160	policy OID
			id- apca-cp-ds.class160
			Policy qualifiers (pointer to
policyQualifiers			CPS or user notification
			information)
policyQualifierId		id-qt-cps	CPS
		http://www.gpki.go.jp/apca2/	Application CA2(Sub)CPS
qualifier		cpcps/index.html	URI, IA5 String
		cn=アプリケーション CA2	Application CA2(Sub)
issuerAltName	FALSE	Sub, ou=政府認証基盤, o=	distinguished name (DN) in
(issuer alt name)		日本国政府, c=JP	Japanese, UTF8 String
cRLDistributionPoints			
(CRL distribution points)			
distributionPoint			Distribution point
fullName			
(non abbreviated		http://dir2.gpki.go.jp/Applic	A CRL distribution point is
name)	FALSE	ationCA2Sub.crl	specified by URI. IA5 String
distributionPoint			Distribution Point Name
fullName			A CRL distribution point is
(non abbreviated		http://dir2.gpki.hq.admix.g	specified by URI. IA5
name)		o.jp/ApplicationCA2Sub.crl	String
authorityInfoAccess			
(authority info access)			
accessMethod	FALSE	id-ad-ocsp	OCSP
			OCSP responder is
accessLocation		http:// ocsp-sub.gpki.go.jp	specified by URI, IA5string
issuer's signature			Digital signature of
(issuer's signature)			Application CA2(Sub)
algorithm identifier			
(algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
	ENCRYP	FED (signature value)	
		, , ,	

7.7 OCSP server certificate

Table 7-5 OCSP	server certificate
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Area name	Critical flag	Value	Description
version (version number)		2	v3integer
serial Number (serial number)		Example: 1	Certificate serial number, integer
signature algorithm ID (signature algorithm)			OCSP server certificate signature algorithm
algorithm identifier (algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryption
issuer name (issuer name)		cn=ApplicationCA2 Sub, ou=GPKI, o=Japanese Government, c=JP	Application CA2 (Sub) distinguished name(DN) in English
validity period (certificate validity period)			Validity period of certificate
notBefore (issue date)		Example: 141201000000Z	Start date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
notAfter (termination date)		Example: 150401000000Z	Termination date of certificate validity period YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
subject name (subject name)		Example: cn=ApplicationCA2 Sub OCSP Responder, ou=GPKI, o=Japanese Government, c=JP	OCSP server certificate distinguished name(DN) in English
subject public key info (subject public key information)			Public key algorithm

			0000
algorithm identifier			OCSP server certificate
(algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.1	public key algorithm
,			identifier, RSA Encryption
parameter		NULL	No value for RSA
(parameter)			
public key		BIT STRING	OCSP server certificate
(public key)			public key, bit string
extensions			
(certificate extension			
area)			
authorityKeyIdentifier			Contification outbouits how
(certification authority key			Certification authority key
identifier)	FALSE		identifier
			Application CA2(Sub) key
keyldentifier		OCTET STRING	identifier
subjectKeyIdentifier			
(subject key identifier)	FALSE	OCTET STRING	Subject key identifier
keyUsage			A key usage purpose is
(key usage)	TRUE		specified.
digitalSignature		1	[0]
extendedKeyUsage			
KeyPurposeId	FALSE	id-kp-ocspsigning	OCSPsigning
certificatePolicies			
(certificate policies)			
policyIdentifier			OID
		0.2.440.100145.8.4.1.102.1 42	OCSP server certificate
certPolicyId			Policy OID
			id-apca-cp-ocsp.class142
	FALSE		Policy qualifiers (pointer to
policyQualifiers			CPS or user notification
policy@daillers	_		information)
naliovQualificate		id at one	,
policyQualifierId		id-qt-cps	CPS
qualifier		http://www.gpki.go.jp/apca2/	Application CA2(Sub)CPS
		cpcps/index.html	URI、IA5string

id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck	FALSE		No need to verify OCSP certificate
issuer's signature (issuer's signature)			ApplicationCA2(Sub) digitalsignature
algorithm identifier (algorithm identifier)		1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	sha256WithRSAEncryptio n
	ENCRYPT	ED (signature value)	

7.8 CRL profile

Area name	Critical flag	Value	Description
version		1	v2 CRL integer
(version number)		1	
signature			Signature algorithm
(signature algorithm)			
			Algorithm identifier and
algorithmIdentifier			signature algorithm area
			(signatureAlgorithm) are
			made equal.
algorithm		1.2.840.113549.1.1.1	sha256WithRSAEncryption
(algorithm identifier)		1	······································
		cn=Application CA2	Application CA2(Sub)
issuer		Sub, ou=GPKI,	distinguished name (DN) in
(issuer)		o=Japanese	English
		Government, c=JP	Printable string
thisUpdate		Example:	Update date and time of
(update date of this time)		01050100000Z	this time
			YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
nextUpdate		Example:	Update date and time of
(update date of the next time)		01050300000Z	the next time
			YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
revokedCertificates			Revoked certificate entry
(revoked certificate)			(list of the following set)
userCertificate		Example: 10002	A revoked certificate is
			specified by an integer.
revocationDate		Example:	Revocation date and time
		01050100000Z	YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
crlEntryExtensions			(extension area for each
(revoked certificate entry	FALSE		revoked certificate)
extension)			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Table 7.6 Certificate Revocation List profile

reasonCode			Reason code		
unspecified			[0] undefined		
keyCompromise			[1] Key compromise state		
cACompromise			[2]CA key compromise state		
affiliationChanged			[3] Change of position		
superseded			[4] Overwrite		
cessationOfOperation		Example: 1	[5] Service stop		
certificateHold			[6] Certificate hold		
\downarrow					
Next revoked certificate					

Extension area						
crlExtensions						
(certificate revocation list extension)						
authorityKeyIdentifier (CA key identifier)			CA key identifier. Should be the same as certificate			
	FALSE		extension			
keyldentifier		OCTET STRING	Application CA2(Sub) key identifier			
cRLNumber (CRL number)	FALSE	Example: 32	Sequence number, integer			
	ENCRYPTED (signature value)					

8. Compliance audit and other assessments

The Application CA2(Sub) shall have a compliance audit mechanisms in place to ensure that the requirements of this Application CA2(Sub) are being implemented and enforced as defined in "8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment" and "8.6 Communication of results". Any LRA shall be assessed for operations and managements by the Application CA2(Sub).

8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment

The Application CA2(Sub) shall have audits carried out annually by an auditor. If necessary, the Application CA2(Sub) shall conduct other audits in addition to the regular audits.

8.2 Identity/ qualifications of assessor

The Application CA2(Sub) audits shall be conducted by a person who is fully versed in audit and authentication operations.

8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

A person who has no relationship with the Application CA2(Sub) shall be selected as the auditor for the Application CA2(Sub).

8.4 Topics covered by assessment

Audit shall be carried out primarily to ascertain of the Application CA2(Sub) whether authentication operations are being conducted in accordance with this CP/CPS and the operations manual.

8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency

If any serious deficiencies or matters requiring urgent action are identified through an audit, the Application CA2(Sub) shall take immediate action as determined by the Governing Council. If there is a report concerning the alleged compromise of the CA private key, it shall be treated as an emergency situation, and appropriate procedures shall be implemented accordingly.

The Governing Council shall decide whether or not to suspend the Application CA2(Sub) operations until remedial action has been taken with regard to such serious deficiencies or matters requiring urgent action that have been identified through an audit.

The Governing Council shall confirm that the Application CA2(Sub) has taken actions in response to the deficiencies.

8.6 Communication of results

The results of the Application CA2(Sub) audits shall be submitted by the auditor as reports to the Application CA2 director, which shall, in turn, report audit results to the Governing Council.

Audit reports shall be retained for a period of five years.

9. Other business and legal matters

9.1 Fees

No stipulation

9.2 Financial responsibility No stipulation

9.3 Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1 Scope of confidential information

The Application CA2(Sub) shall treat information as confidential if its disclosure could harm the credibility and integrity of the authentication operations of the Application CA2(Sub).

9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information

Of the information held by the Application CA2(Sub), items that are expressly intended for disclosure, such as certificates, revocation information and this CP/CPS and so on, are not considered confidential.

9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information

Confidential information, including documents and storage media saving confidential information, shall be administered safely by appointing an information manager according to "Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs", "Order for the enforcement of the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs" and so on.

The Application CA2(Sub) shall disclose subscriber's confidential information when a law-enforcement organization formally requests information disclosure according to legal bases, when a request based on wheels of justice or administrative procedure is made, or when a subscriber requests disclosure of information the subscriber presented to the Application CA2(Sub).

9.4 Privacy of personal information

Personal information shall be protected appropriately according to "Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs", " Order for the enforcement of the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs " and so on.

9.5 Intellectual Property Right

The intellectual property rights of the CA key pair, server certificate, code signing certificate, document signing certificate, CRL and this CP/CPS belong to the Application CA2(Sub).

However, it is not always true for the intellectual property rights of the key pairs and the subject names in server certificate, code signing certificate and document signing certificate.

9.6 Representation and warranties

9.6.1 Representations and warranties of IA and RA

The Application CA2(Sub) shall have following representations and warranties related to CA operations:

- Issuance, re-key, and revocation of server certificates, and code signing certificates and document signing certificates in accordance with this CP/CPS.
- Publication of information defined in "2.2 Publication of certification information"
- Every 24 hours it shall update the CRL that is to remain valid for 48-hours.
- The Application CA2(Sub) shall control the CA private key securely.
- If it shall be occurred the CA private key compromise, the Application CA2(Sub) shall quickly publish information of the compromise event.
- The Application CA2(Sub) shall store audit logs and archive data concerning certificate issues, re-keys and revocation, for the required period.
- The Application CA2(Sub) shall monitor system operations.
- The Application CA2(Sub) shall appropriately review LRA information shall be submitted.
- The Application CA2(Sub) shall confirm authenticity of the LRA when issuance, re-key, and revocation request of certificates be accepted.
- The Application CA2(Sub) shall define standards and procedures of LRA operation, included the following:
 - Standard and procedures related to LRA operations for certificate requests
 - Standard and procedures related to LRA security measures should be conducted
 - Standard and procedures related to LRA operation logs should be collected

- The Application CA2(Sub) shall take hold on circumstances of compliance above standards and procedures

9.6.2 LRA representations and warranties

The LRA shall have following represents and warranties related to LRA operations:

- The LRA shall certainly confirm authenticity of acceptance and subscribers, and submitted requests, when subscribers submit request for issuance, re-key and revocation of certificates.
- The LRA shall securely operate issuance, re-key and revocation of certificates to the Application CA2(Sub) with the use of the LRA system.
- The LRA shall notify subscribers of completions of issuance and revocation.
- The LRA shall store securely subscriber information during each request operations of certificate.
- The LRA shall observe the rule of standards and procedures defined by the Application CA2(Sub).
- The LRA shall report to the Application CA2(Sub) circumstances of compliance with the above standards and procedures.

9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties

The subscriber shall have representations and warranties compliance defined in "4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage" and the following rules:

- The subscriber shall request to LRA with correct information for issuance and revocation of certificates.
- The subscriber shall confirm certificates whether or not correct, in receipt of certificates from the LRA.
- The subscriber shall quickly request to the LRA, in case of the certificate information described shall be changed.

9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties

The relying party shall have represents and warranties compliance defined in "4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage".

9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants No stipulation

9.7 Disclaimers of warranties

No stipulation

9.8 Limitations of liability

The responsibility causing from the authentication business that lays this CP/CPS is based on the law in Japan.

9.9 Indemnities

No stipulation

9.10 Term and termination

9.10.1 Term

This CP/CPS shall be valid by approval of the Governing Council.

This CP/CPS shall be not invalid before the terminate conditions defined in "9.10.2 Termination".

9.10.2 Termination

When the Application CA2(Sub) is terminated, this CP/CPS shall be invalid, excluding the conditions defined in "9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival".

9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival

Even when a subscriber terminates certificate usage or when the Application CA2(Sub) operation are terminated, the provisions in "9.3 Confidentiality of business information", "9.4 Privacy of personal information ", "9.5 Intellectual Property Right", and "9.14 Governing Law" shall be applied to the subscriber, relying party, and Application CA2(Sub) regardless of any reasons of termination.

9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants

The point of contact concerning notifications, requests, demands, asks, and other communications is the Government Information Systems Planning Division, Administrative Management Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, this CP/CPS requires and allows. The point of contact is stipulated in "1.5.2 Contact person".

9.12 Amendments

9.12.1 Procedure for amendment

If necessary, this CP/CPS shall be changed by approval of the Sterling committee.

9.12.2 Notification method and period

In case of this CP/CPS changed by approval of the Sterling committee, it shall be published quickly the changed CP/CPS. The CP/CPS publication shall be assumed as notification to subscribers and relying parties.

9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed No stipulation

9.13 Dispute resolution provisions No stipulation

9.14 Governing law

Japanese law shall apply to any disputes arising from authentication services under this CP/CPS.

9.15 Compliance with applicable law No stipulation

9.16 Miscellaneous provisions No stipulation

9.17 Other provisions No stipulation