Bugzilla ID: 851435

Bugzilla Summary: WoSign two root certificate inclusion application

CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must

- 1) Comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/)
- 2) Supply all of the information listed in http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist.
 - a. Review the Recommended Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended_Practices
 - b. Review the Potentially Problematic Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices

General information about the CA's associated organization

CA Company Name	WoSign CA Limited
Website URL	http://www.wosign.com/
Organizational type	Private corporation
Primark Market /	Types of customers: General public
Customer Base	Vertical market segments: No. Applicable to all market segments.
	Geographic region? Starting in China market, with plans to expand into Japan and Korea.
Impact to Mozilla Users	WoSign is a private-owned CA in China which issues certificates to the general public. WoSign started their CA business in 2006 as a SubCA of Comodo. WoSign setup its own root CA in 2009 and started to issue certificates in 2011 under this root CA that cross signed with a Startcom CA. WoSign has issued thousands of certificates to China customers, WoSign SSL certificates are deployed in top 10 eCommerce websites in China; for bank, telecom, enterprise etc., and most software developers in China choose WoSign certificate since it supports Chinese. Currently, there are 3 state-owned CAs in China that joined this Program. We think the market needs a commercial CA to provide best products and best service; WoSign is a private owned company that has engaged in CA business for 8 years. We have the PKI technology mastered R&D team, identity authentication team with rich experience and excellent technical support and customer service team. We are sure we will be one of the leaders in China, and we are planning to expand to Japan and Korea market that also have the strong request to issue local language certificates that we support like Japanese and Korean.
Inclusion in other browsers	Applying with Mozilla, Microsoft, Apple at the same time.
CA Contact Information	CA Email Alias: ca@wosign.com
	CA Phone Number: +86-755-26027858, 86008688
	Title / Department: Mr. Richard Wang, CTO

Technical information about each root certificate

Cert Name	Certification Authority of WoSign	CA WoSign
Certificate	CN = Certification Authority of WoSign	CN = CA WoSign
Issuer Field	O = WoSign CA Limited	O = WoSign CA Limited
	C = CN	C = US
Certificate	This root has internally-operated intermediate certificates that	This root has internally-operated intermediate certificates that
Summary	issue SSL, Code Signing, and Client certificates for individuals and	issue SSL, Code Signing, and Client certificates for individuals
	organizations.	and organizations.

		I
Root Cert URL	http://www.wosign.com/Root/WS_CA1_NEW.crt	http://www.wosign.com/Root/ws_ca2_new.crt
SHA1	50:E7:E3:F6:5D:E3:1B:CC:5D:A4:0D:EB:23:14:41:B1:82:22:66:20	15:EA:EE:0D:6E:72:3C:3A:BF:59:65:92:3B:81:5E:4E:07:04:73:26
Fingerprint		
Valid From	2009-08-08 (GMT)	2009-08-08 (GMT)
Valid To	2039-08-08 (GMT)	2039-08-08 (GMT)
Cert Version	3	3
Cert Signature	PKCS #1 SHA-1 With RSA Encryption	PKCS #1 SHA-256 With RSA Encryption
Algorithm		
Signing key	4096	4096
parameters		
Test Website	https://root1evtest.wosign.com	https://root2evtest.wosign.com
CRL URL	http://crls1.wosign.com/ca1.crl	http://crls2.wosign.com/ca2.crl
	http://crls1.wosign.com/ca1-server-4.crl	http://crls2.wosign.com/ca2-server-4.crl
	http://crls.wosign.com/server-3.crl	
	http://crls.wosign.com/server-1.crl	CPS section 2.3: WoSign updates and publishes a new CRL every
	http://crls.wosign.com/client-1.crl	24 hours or whenever a CA Certificate is revoked.
	http://crls.wosign.com/client-2.crl	
	http://crls.wosign.com/client-3.crl	CPS section 7.8: CRL Next Update: 48 hours
	http://crls.wosign.com/code-3.crl	
OCSP URL	http://ocsp1.wosign.com/ca1	http://ocsp2.wosign.com/ca2
(Required	http://ocsp1.wosign.com/class4/server/ca1	http://ocsp2.wosign.com/class4/server/ca2
now)	http://ocsp.wosign.com/class3/server/ca	
	http://ocsp.wosign.com/class1/server/ca	CPS section 4.9.9, OCSP: The current CRLs are reloaded at least
	http://ocsp.wosign.com/class1/client/ca	every 60 minutes.
	http://ocsp.wosign.com/class2/client/ca	
	http://ocsp.wosign.com/class3/client/ca	
	http://ocsp.wosign.com/class3/code/ca	
Requested	Websites (SSL/TLS)	Websites (SSL/TLS)
Trust Bits	Email (S/MIME)	Email (S/MIME)
	Code Signing	Code Signing
SSL Validation	DV, OV, and EV	DV, OV, and EV
Type		
EV Policy	1.3.6.1.4.1.36305.2	1.3.6.1.4.1.36305.6
OID(s)	EV tested:	EV tested:
	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=806644	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=806645
Non-	End-entity certificates serial number is random data with 7 bytes, and the issue time is random time, not the exact time.	
sequential		
serial		
numbers and		
entropy in		
cert		

CA Hierarchy information for each root certificate

Car incrarcing information for each root certificate		
CA Hierarchy	There are 7 internally-operated subordinate CAs	<mark>???</mark>
	for the "Certification Authority of WoSign" root:	Please provide CA Hierarchy information for "CA WoSign" root.
	(1) WoSign Class 4 EV Server CA	
	(2) WoSign Class 3 OV Server CA	
	(3) WoSign Class 1 DV Server CA	
	(4) WoSign Class 3 Code Signing CA	
	(5) WoSign Class 1 Client CA	
	(6) WoSign Class 2 Client CA	
	(7) WoSign Class 3 Client CA	
Externally Operated SubCAs	None, and none planned.	<mark>???</mark>
Cross-Signing	Startcom CA (CN = StartCom Certification	<mark>???</mark>
	Authority) issued cross-signing certificate for this	
	root CA.	
Technical Constraints on	External third parties may not cause the issuance	<mark>???</mark>
Third-party Issuers	of certificates in this CA hierarchy.	

Verification Policies and Practices

Policy Documentation	Document Repository: http://www.wosign.com/policy/cps_e.htm
	CPS (English): http://www.wosign.com/policy/WoSign-Policy-1_2_2.pdf
Audits	Audit Type: WebTrust for CA and WebTrust for EV
	Auditor: Ernst & Young
	Audit Report: https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=1443&file=pdf (2013.01.15)
	EV Readiness Audit Report: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=725294 (2013.01.15)
	Will need audit that includes both root certs before actual inclusion. Can move forward with approval process, but
	will need to hold on actual inclusion until audits of both roots is confirmed.
Baseline Requirements (SSL)	CPS section 1.2.
Organization Verification	CPS section 1.6.2:
Procedures	Class 1:Email address or domain name ownership/control verified. No identity checking.
	Class 2: Some identity checking.
	Class 3: Organization verified, phone call, trusted database checked.
	Class 4: EV
	CPS section 3.2.2.3.1 (Class 3): Organization verification
	CPS section 3.2.4: Validation of authority: WoSign confirms and verifies that the subscriber is duly authorized to
	represent the organization and obtain the certificate on their behalf by obtaining an authorization statement and by
	contacting the authorizer.

SSL Verification Procedures	CPS section 3.2.2.1.2 (Class 1, DV): Fully qualified domain names, typically www.domain.com or "domain.com" are validated by sending an electronic mail message with a verification code to one of the following administrative electronic mail accounts: www.domain.com or "domain.com" are validated by sending administrative electronic mail accounts: www.domain.com or "domain.com" are validated by sending administrative electronic mail accounts and submit the verification code as prove of ownership of the domain name within a limited period sufficient enough to receive an electronic mail message. Additionally the existence of the domain name is verified by checking the WHOIS records provided by the domain name registrar. If the WHOIS data contain additional email addresses, they may be offered as additional choices to the above mentioned electronic mail accounts. CPS section 3.2.2.3.1 (Class 3, OV): Domain and email control validation is performed as in Class 1. Domain control
	may be also established through verification of the WHOIS records and matching subscriber information. CPS section 3.2.2.4 (Class 4, EV): Extended Validation for organizations are preformed according to the validation procedures and requirements of the Extended Validation Guidelines as published by the CA/Browser Forum. Applicants for EV must be at least Class 2 Identity validated prior to engagement for Extended validation.
Email Address Verification Procedures	CPS section 3.2.2.1.1 (Class 1): Email accounts are validated by sending an electronic mail message with a verification code to the requested email account. The subscriber has to return and submit the verification code as prove of ownership of the email account within a limited period sufficient enough to receive an electronic mail message. CPS section 3.2.2.2.1 (Class 2): Email control validation is performed as in Class 1.
Code Signing Subscriber Verification Procedures	Code Signing Certificates may be Class 2, Class 3, or EV. CPS sections 1.6.1.3, 3.1.1.2.3 (Class 2), 3.1.1.3.3 (Class 3), 3.1.1.4.2 (EV) CPS section 3.2.2.2.1 (Class 2): Personal Identity Validation CPS section 3.2.2.3.1 (Class 3): Organization verification
Multi-factor Authentication	CPS section 5.3. Client Certificate in USB Key.
Network Security	CPS sections 5 and 6.

Response to Mozilla's CA Recommended Practices (https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended_Practices)

Publicly Available CP and CPS	Yes. See above.
<u>CA Hierarchy</u>	Yes. See above.
<u>Audit Criteria</u>	Yes. See above.
Document Handling of IDNs in CP/CPS	CPS section 3.2.2.1.2
Revocation of Compromised Certificates	CPS section 4.9
Verifying Domain Name Ownership	See above.
Verifying Email Address Control	See above.
Verifying Identity of Code Signing Certificate	See above.
Subscriber	
DNS names go in SAN	Yes
Domain owned by a Natural Person	DV certs are issued without identity/organization checking.
<u>OCSP</u>	Yes

Response to Mozilla's list of Potentially Problematic Practices (https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices)

· ·	blematic Fractices (https://wiki.mozma.org/Graffoblematic_Fractices)
<u>Long-lived DV certificates</u>	DV SSL certs are valid up to 2 years.
Wildcard DV SSL certificates	CPS section 3.2.2.1.2: Wildcard domain names like "*.domain.com" are not issued in the Class 1 level.
Email Address Prefixes for DV Certs	If DV SSL certs, then list the acceptable email addresses that are used for verification:
	4 Emails: webmaster@, hostmaster@, postmaster@ and Whois Admin email.
Delegation of Domain / Email validation to	No
third parties	
Issuing end entity certificates directly from	No
<u>roots</u>	
Allowing external entities to operate	No
subordinate CAs	
Distributing generated private keys in	No
PKCS#12 files	
Certificates referencing hostnames or	No
<u>private IP addresses</u>	CPS section 3.2.2.1.3: Ipv4 addresses must bind to a FQDN and must not be reserved by IANA The
	subscriber must provide attestation about the right to use the relevant IP addresses.
<u>Issuing SSL Certificates for Internal Domains</u>	No
OCSP Responses signed by a certificate	No
<u>under a different root</u>	
CRL with critical CIDP Extension	No
Generic names for CAs	No
<u>Lack of Communication With End Users</u>	No