Bugzilla ID: 669849

Bugzilla Summary: Add T-Systems Root CA Certificate and enable it for EV

CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must

- 1) Comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/)
- 2) Supply all of the information listed in http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information checklist.

 a. Review the Recommended Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended Practices

 - b. Review the Potentially Problematic Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices

General information about the CA's associated organization

CA Company Name	T-Systems International GmbH	
Website URL	http://www.telesec.de, http://www.t-systems.com	
Organizational type	Commercial Company: T-Systems International GmbH is a German limited liability company and a wholly-owned	
	subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG.	
Primark Market /	T-Systems is part of Deutsche Telekom Group, which is serving more than 50 million customers worldwide and about	
Customer Base	160,000 business customers.	
	T-Systems Trust Center is the organizational unit issuing certificates to our customers. Our focus is mainly Western	
	Europe, especially Germany, but there are some international customers as well. We are providing services both to our	
	business and consumer customers as well.	
Impact to Mozilla Users	T-Systems Trust Center is maintaining a couple of root certificates and appropriate SubCAs, issuing all of the following	
	types of EE certificates (but not all are provided by each of the SubCAs): SSL server certificates, Secure mail protocols	
	(SMTPS), S/MIME email certificates, Code signing certificates.	
	Among others we are issuing certificates to enterprises using S/MIME certificates for their employees, academic	
	institutes for internal and external web services as well as email certificates for employees and students, airlines using	
	SSL server certificates for their website and departments of Deutsche Telekom as internal customers.	
	Therefore relying parties can be the public consumer market as well as internal enterprise employees.	
CA Contact Information	CA Email Alias: telesec_support@t-systems.com	
	CA Phone Number: +49 1805 268 204	
	Title / Department: Trust Center Services	

Technical information about each root certificate

Certificate Name	T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3
Certificate Issuer Field	CN = T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3
	OU = T-Systems Trust Center
	0 = T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH
	C = DE
Certificate Summary	T-Systems plans to offer certificates with a high security level (e.g. EV) chaining up to this "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3" root. High security level services for email and code signing will also be created, and the corresponding Sub-CAs will be operated under this Class 3 root. This Class 3 root will only have internally-operated subordinate CAs. T-Systems currently offers certificates with a standard security level (e.g. OV) chaining up to the currently included "Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2" root. All of those standard security services will eventually chain up to a "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2" root. Inclusion of the "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2" root is not currently part of this request.

Root Cert URL	http://www.telesec.de/downloads/GlobalRoot Class 3.cer
SHA1 Fingerprint	55:A6:72:3E:CB:F2:EC:CD:C3:23:74:70:19:9D:2A:BE:11:E3:81:D1
Valid From	2008-10-01
Valid To	2033-10-01
Certificate Version	3
Certificate Signature	PKCS #1 SHA-256 With RSA Encryption
Algorithm	
Signing key parameters	2048
Test Website URL	https://root-class3.test.telesec.de
CRL URL	http://pki.telesec.de/rl/GlobalRoot Class 3.crl
	http://crl.serverpass.telesec.de/rl/EV_SSL_CA_Class_3.crl (NextUpdate: 24hours)
	ServerPass CP/CPS section 4.9.7: The certificate revocation list (CRL), which contains the revoked certificates of end
	entities, is updated twice a day and published by the repository.
OCSP URL	OCSP URI in EE Cert: http://ocsp.telesec.de/ocspr
	OCSP URI in EV Intermediate Cert: http://ocsp.serverpass.telesec.de/ocspr
	Please provide the sections of your CP/CPS specifying availability and update requirements for the OCSP service. CA/Browser Forum's EV Guidelines Section 26(b): "If the CA provides revocation information via an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) service, it MUST update that service at least every four days. OCSP responses from this service MUST have a maximum expiration time of ten days."
	>> We will draft a new CPS Version for EV Service "ServerPass EV" and include it within chapter 4.9.9 Online availability of revocation/status information
	Please also perform this EV Testing: https://wiki.mozilla.org/PSM:EV Testing Easy Version
	>> Test browser loaded & installed; Root cert included in local root store;
	We would like to ask for support as offered on Mozilla's web site to create an "ASCII-encoded representation of the DER
	encoding" of our root certificate. Whom may I contact regarding this task?
	>> See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=669849#c10
Requested Trust Bits	Websites (SSL/TLS)
SSL Validation Types	EV
EV Policy OID(s)	1.3.6.1.4.1.7879.13.24.1

CA Hierarchy information for each root certificate

CA Hierarchy	This "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3" root will have internally-operated subordinate CAs corresponding to the high security services that are offered.
Externally Operated SubCAs	None. There will not be externally operated subCAs under this root.
Cross-Signing	Root CA "Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2" root certificate which is currently included in NSS has cross-signed with this new "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3" root cert.

Verification Policies and Practices

	verification i offices and i ractices	
Policy Documentation	Repository: http://www.telesec.de/pki/roots.html	
	CP (English): http://www.telesec.de/pki/service/GlobalRoot_Class_3/cp_en.pdf	
	CP (German): http://www.telesec.de/pki/service/GlobalRoot Class 3/cp.pdf	
	CPS (English): http://www.telesec.de/pki/service/GlobalRoot_Class_3/cps_en.pdf	
	CPS (German): http://www.telesec.de/pki/service/GlobalRoot Class 3/cps.pdf	
	ServerPass CP/CPS (German): http://www.telesec.de/serverpass/cps.html	
	ServerPass CP/CPS v1.1 (English): https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=555341	
Audits	Audit Type: WebTrust for CA and EV	
	Auditor: Ernst & Young GmbH	
	Auditor Website: http://www.ev.com/DE/de/Home/Home	
	WebTrust for CA Audit Report: http://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=1148&file=pdf (2010.12.17)	
	WebTrust EV Audit Report: https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=1090&file=pdf (2010.06.20)	
Organization Verification	ServerPass CP/CPS section 3.2.2, Identity check on an organization	
Procedures	TeleSec ServerPass Standard: The initial request can only be placed after successful registration in the customer portal	
	<myserverpass>. In order to confirm the legal person named in the Subject Distinguished Name (subjectDN) of the</myserverpass>	
	certificate under Organization (0), the following document is required according to the business category:	
	Legal person: The request form signed by an authorized signatory.	
	Authority: The request form signed by an authorized representative of the authority and stamped with the official seal.	
	Association: The certified copy (no more than 30 days old) of the register of associations excerpt must be submitted	
	together with the signed request form.	
	Trader(s): The certified copy (no more than 30 days old) of a current trade license and the personal ID of the trader	
	must be submitted together with the signed request form.	
	must be submitted together with the signed request form.	
	The following is checked for all business categories:	
	• Is the information on the request form identical to the information in the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) of the online	
	request?	
	• Does the company name of the organization/company correspond to the entry in the electronic commercial register or	
	comparable directories? Do current organization documents (no more than 30 days old) issued by a competent authority	
	also confirm the organization's existence (e.g., register of associations or comparable document, official stamp)?	
	• The authorization of the responsible contact at the organization named in the request (legal person),	
	• Does the domain name correspond to the official directories? Does the customer own the domain; i.e., has he been	
	given the exclusive right of use by means of a corresponding authorization?	
	• If a third party carries out the certificate request/management on behalf of the organization, it must have a	
	corresponding written authorization concerning the transfer of rights	
	Are any necessary Whois entries available.	
	Additional checks are carried out as required.	
	TeleSec ServerPass EV: The initial request can only be placed after successful registration in the customer portal	
	<myserverpass>. The required checks are carried out in accordance with [WTEVGUIDE].</myserverpass>	
	[WTEVGUIDE] = Guidelines For The Issuance and Management Of Extended Validation Certificates, The CA / Browser	
	Forum Version 1.2, October 1, 2009	

SSL Verification	ServerPass section 3.2.2: The following is checked for all business categories:
Procedures	• Does the domain name correspond to the official directories? Does the customer own the domain; i.e., has he been
	given the exclusive right of use by means of a corresponding authorization?
	• If a third party carries out the certificate request/management on behalf of the organization, it must have a
	corresponding written authorization concerning the transfer of rights
	Are any necessary Whois entries available.
	Additionally there is an "Operation Manual" for Trust Center staff including employees working on the registration and validation procedure. To summarize, www.denic.de is the first tool which is used to verify the ownership of a domain under TLD .de , which most of the issued certificates are. For international TLD WHOIS is used instead (www.whois.net). The domainholder must be the same organization stated within the O field of the certificate. If this is not the case, a letter of attorney is needed stating, that the one applying for the certificate is acting on behalf of the domain owner.
Email Address	N/A – Not requesting the email trust bit at this time.
Verification Procedures	
Code Signing Subscriber	N/A – Not requesting the code signing trust bit at this time.
Verification Procedures	

Response to Mozilla's CA Recommended Practices (https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended Practices)

Response to Flozina 5 di Recommendea i lactices (https://www.mozma.org/ork.recommendea/flactices)	
Publicly Available CP and CPS	Both, CP and CPS for all Root CAs maintained by T-Systems are available on the following website:
	http://www.telesec.de/pki/roots.html
<u>CA Hierarchy</u>	This Class 3 root will only have internally-operated subordinate CAs.
Audit Criteria	WebTrust CA and EV audits are performed annually.
Document Handling of IDNs in CP/CPS	N/A
Revocation of Compromised Certificates	Compromised certificates will be revoked by T-Systems Trust Center (see CPS chapter 4.9 "Certificate
	Revocation and Suspension".
<u>Verifying Domain Name Ownership</u>	See above.
<u>Verifying Email Address Control</u>	See above.
Verifying Identity of Code Signing Certificate	See above.
Subscriber	
DNS names go in SAN	N/A
<u>Domain owned by a Natural Person</u>	N/A, as there will be no SLL certificates issued for domains owned by natural persons.
<u>OCSP</u>	T-Systems Trust Center is providing OCSP service all owned CAs and EE certificates (see CPS).
	All certificates will have to include the URI for the OCSP responder:
	CA: http://ocsp.telesec.de/ocspr
	EE: http://ocsp.serverpass.telesec.de/ocspr

Response to Mozilla's list of Potentially Problematic Practices (https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic Practices)

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<u>Long-lived DV certificates</u>	N/A – SSL certs issued under his root are EV
Wildcard DV SSL certificates	N/A – SSL certs issued under his root are EV
Email Address Prefixes for DV Certs	N/A – SSL certs issued under his root are EV
Delegation of Domain / Email validation to	There will be no externally-operated Sub-CAs or RAs for the certificates in the hierarchy of this Class

third parties	3 root. Only internal RAs may verify certificates issued in the hierarchy of this Class 3 root.
Issuing end entity certificates directly from	N/A, root CA will NEVER issue EE certificates
roots	
Allowing external entities to operate	Externally-operated subCAs are not allowed under the Class 3 root.
<u>subordinate CAs</u>	
<u>Distributing generated private keys in</u>	N/A, as T-Systems Trust Center is NOT generating private keys for EE certificates
PKCS#12 files	
<u>Certificates referencing hostnames or</u>	N/A, as only FQDN or IP addresses, which can be resolved by DNS are used
<u>private IP addresses</u>	
<u>Issuing SSL Certificates for Internal Domains</u>	Validation procedures for .int domains are the same as for all other TLD.
	T-Systems Trust Center has followed the recommended "internal" audit and there were no issues
	found. RA employees are aware of the issues. The topic is discussed during the regular scheduled
	trainings.
	The Operation Manual describes the various types of TLD (generic, sponsored, unsponsored, country-
	code, infrastructure). It is stated, that .int is a sponsored (IANA) TLD for multi-national organizations,
	which has to be validated by the internal RA.
OCSP Responses signed by a certificate	N/A, OCSP responses are always signed by the CA which issued the revoked certificate
<u>under a different root</u>	
CRL with critical CIDP Extension	N/A, as no "partitioned" CRLs are used
Generic names for CAs	N/A - CN and O fields in issuer are clear.
Lack of Communication With End Users	CPS includes contact details for any question or comment. This is not limited to entities or people
	having any kind of contract with T-Systems.