### Mozilla - CA Program

Case Information			
Case Number	00000036	Case Record Type	CA Owner/Root Inclusion Request
CA Owner/Certificate Name	PSC-FII	Request Status	Need Information from CA

# Additional Case Information Subject New Owner/Root inclusion requested Case Reason New Owner/Root inclusion requested

# Link to Bugzilla Bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org /show\_bug.cgi?id=667466

#### General information about CA's associated organization CA Email Alias 1 dmin-pki@fii.gob.ve CA Email Alias 2 **Company Website** Verified? https://ar.fii.gob.ve/ Verified **Organizational Type** Verified? Government Agency Verified **Organizational Type** Verified? Verified The CA is operated by a government (Others) agency of Venezuela (Fundación Instituto de Ingeniería para Investigación y Desarrollo Tecnológico) and The type national. Verified? Geographic Focus Venezuela Verified Primary Market / Customers are the public and private sector Verified? Verified **Customer Base** of Venezuela. Market Segment: E-government secure. Impact to Mozilla Users Verified? PSC-FII is a public entity belonging to the Verified Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela accredited as a Provider of Electronic Certification Services (PSC) by the Superintendence of Electronic Certification Services (Spanish acronym, SUSCERTE) under the Law on Data Messages and Signatures Electronic. PSC-FII's primary market are public and private users in Venezuela.

esponse to Mozilla's list of Recommended Practices			
Recommended Practices	https://wiki.mozilla.org /CA:Recommended_Practices#CA_Recommended_Practices	Recommended Practices Statement	I have reviewed Mozilla's list of Recommended Practices, and confirm that we follow those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text bo below.

https://wiki.mozilla.org

/CA:Recommended\_Practices#CA\_Recommended\_Practices

Verified?

Need Response From CA

#### Response to Mozilla's list of Potentially Problematic Practices

Potentially **Problematic Practices**  https://wiki.mozilla.org

/CA:Problematic\_Practices#Potentially\_problematic\_CA\_practices

**Problematic Practices** Statement I have reviewed Mozilla's list of Potentially Problematic Practices, and confirm that we

do not do those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below.

CA's Response to Problematic **Practices** 

NEED CA's response to each of the items listed in

https://wiki.mozilla.org

/CA:Problematic Practices#Potentially problematic CA practices

Verified? Need Response From CA

### Root Case Record # 1

#### **Root Case Information**

**Root Certificate Name** PSC Publico del MppCTII para el Estado **Root Case No** R00000044

Venezolano

Request Status **Case Number** Need Information from CA 00000036

#### **Additional Root Case Information**

Subject

O From Issuer Field

Certificate Signature

(SSL) or Example Cert

Algorithm Signing Key

**Parameters** Test Website URL Include PSC Publico del MppCTII para el

Estado Venezolano root cert

Sistema Nacional de Certificacion

#### **Technical Information about Root Certificate**

Electronica

SHA-256

4096

OU From Issuer Field	Superintendencia de Servicios de Certificacion Electronica	Verified?
Certificate Summary	This is a sub-CA of the "Autoridad de Certificacion Raiz del Estado Venezolano" root certificate owned by SUSCERTE. In Bug #489240 it was determined that SUSCERTE's sub-CAs would apply for inclusion themselves as separate trust anchors.	Verified?
Root Certificate Download URL	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org /attachment.cgi?id=8670003	Verified?
Valid From	2011 Jan 25	Verified?
Valid To	2021 Jan 22	Verified?
Certificate Version	3	Verified?

https://publicador-psc.fii.gob.ve

/erified?

Verified?

Verified?

Verified?

Verified?

Verified

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CRL URL(s)	http://www.suscerte.gob.ve /lcr/CERTIFICADO- RAIZ-SHA384CRLDER.crl https://publicador-psc.fii.gob.ve/crlsha256 /cacrl.crl	Verified?	Verified
OCSP URL(s)	http://ocsp.acraiz.suscerte.gob.ve http://publicador-psc.fii.gob.ve:2560/ocsp	Verified?	Verified
Revocation Tested	NEED to resolve all errors returned by https://certificate.revocationcheck.com/publicador-psc.fii.gob.ve	Verified?	Need Response From CA
Trust Bits	Code; Email; Websites	Verified?	Verified
SSL Validation Type	DV	Verified?	Verified
EV Policy OID(s)	Not EV	Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Tested	Not requesting EV treatment.	Verified?	Not Applicable
Root Stores Included In	Microsoft	Verified?	Verified
Mozilla Applied Constraints	NEED: Mozilla has the ability to name constrain root certs; e.g. to *.gov or *.mil. CAs should consider if such constraints may be applied to their root certs.	Verified?	Need Response From CA

## Digital Fingerprint Information

3E:B1:8B:67:37:B3:30:2F:03:55:16:34:58:1C:FB:BF:38:EA:92:96

/policies/security-group/certs/policy/inclusion/

/CA:CertificatePolicyV2.1#Frequently Asked Questions

- https://wiki.mozilla.org

Verified? V

Verified

Verified

SHA-256

SHA-1

24:A9:C8:E1:15:0D:89:0D:42:D8:2B:1D:57:BF:3A:BB:F2:AD:AE:84:6B:3A:DD:EC:7A:79:28:5C:9D:4C:C7:7C Verified?

Fingerprint

#### **CA Hierarchy Information CA Hierarchy** The PSC Publico del MppCTII para el Estado Verified? Verified Venezolano (PSC-FII) is the first public provider credited by the Venezuelan state to offer electronic signature certificates. Is a subCA under the venezuelan root of certification ("Sistema Nacional de Certificacion Electronica"). This root signs end-entity certificates directly. Externally Operated Verified? NEED: Can this certificate sign externally-operated Need Response From CA SubCAs subCA certificates? **Cross Signing** Verified? Need Response From CA - List all other root certificates for which this root certificate has issued cross-signing certificates. - List all other root certificates that have issued crosssigning certificates for this root certificate. - If any such cross-signing relationships exist, it is important to note whether the cross-signing CAs' certificates are already included in the Mozilla root store or not. **Technical Constraint** Verified? NEED: CP/CPS documentation describing the technical Need Response From CA on 3rd party Issuer and contractual controls over any 3rd party who may issue certs in this CA Hierarchy. This includes external RAs as well as External subCAs. - section 7.1.5 of version 1.3 of the CA/Browser Foruom's Baseline Requirements - https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance

Policy	Email CP: https://ar.fii.gob.ve/pub/docs/DPC_PC2015/PC/pc%20servidor/pc_serv_email-	Verified?	Verified
Documentation	F017/Aprobar_080-PCS-F017.pdf SSL CP: https://ar.fii.gob.ve/pub/docs/DPC_PC2015/PC/pc%20servidor/pc_serv_ssl-		
	F073/Aprobar 080-PCS-F073.pdf		
	Code Signing CP: https://ar.fii.gob.ve/pub/docs/DPC PC2015/PC/pc%20firma%20codigo		
	/Aprobar_080-PCS-F075.pdf		
	Operadores AR/AC CP: https://ar.fii.gob.ve/pub/docs/DPC_PC2015/PC/PC%20operador		
	/Aprobar_080-PCO-F018.pdf		
CA Document Repository	https://ar.fii.gob.ve/	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	Spanish		
СР	https://ar.fii.gob.ve/pub/docs/DPC_PC2015/PC/pc%20servidor/pc_serv_ssl-F073/Aprobar_080-PCS-F073.pdf	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	Spanish		
CPS	https://ar.fii.gob.ve/pub/docs/DPC_PC2015/DPC/080-DPC-F014.pdf	Verified?	Verified
Other Relevant Documents	Accredited provider: http://www.suscerte.gob.ve/acreditacion/	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Name	Milthon J. Chavez	Verified?	Verified
uditor Website		Verified?	Not Applicable
Auditor Qualifications	http://www.suscerte.gob.ve/registro/	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8665614	Verified?	Not Verified
Standard Audit Type	ETSI TS 102 042	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Statement Date	6/12/2015	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit	NEED: If requesting Websites trust bit, then also need a BR audit as described here: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:BaselineRequirements	Verified?	Need Response From CA
BR Audit Type		Verified?	Need Response From CA
BR Audit Statement Date		Verified?	Need Response From CA
EV Audit		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Audit Type		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Audit Statement Date		Verified?	Not Applicable
BR Commitment to Comply	NEED section in the CP/CPS that has the commitment to comply with the BRs as described in section 2.2 of version 1.3 of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements.	Verified?	Need Response From CA
SL Verification Procedures	NEED Sections of CP/CPS that sufficiently describe the verification steps that are taken to confirm the ownership/control of the domain name to be included in the SSL/TLS cert. As per section 3 of <a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org">https://wiki.mozilla.org</a> /CA:Information checklist#Verification Policies and Practices	Verified?	Need Response From CA
	https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:BaselineRequirements#CA_Conformance_to_the_BRs_ It is not sufficient to simply reference section 11 of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline		

certificate subscriber owns/controls the domain name to be included in the certificate. Simply referencing section 11 of the BRs does not specify which of those options the CA uses, and is insufficient for describing how the CA conforms to the BRs. The CA's CP/CPS must include a reasonable description of the ways the CA can verify that the certificate subscriber owns/controls the domain name(s) to be included in the certificate.

EV SSL Verification Procedures	Not requesting EV treatment	Verified?	Not Applicable
Organization Verification Procedures	NEED: CP/CPS sections that describe identity and organization verification procedures for cert issuance.	Verified?	Need Response From CA
Email Address Verification Procedures	NEED Sections of CP/CPS that sufficiently describe the verification steps that are taken to confirm the ownership/control of the email address to be included in the cert.  As per section 4 of <a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org">https://wiki.mozilla.org</a> /CA:Information checklist#Verification Policies and Practices <a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended">https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended</a> Practices#Verifying Email Address Control	Verified?	Need Response From CA
Code Signing Subscriber Verification Pro	NEED: - URLs and section/page number information pointing directly to the sections of the CP/CPS documents that describe the procedures for verifying the certificate subscriber's identity and authority, and the organization's identity and existence.  https://wiki.mozilla.org /CA:Recommended Practices#Verifying Identity of Code Signing Certificate Subscriber	Verified?	Need Response From CA
Multi-Factor Authentication	NEED CA response (and corresponding CP/CPS sections/text) to section 6 of <a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information">https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information</a> checklist#Verification Policies and Practices	Verified?	Need Response From CA
Network Security	NEED CA response (and corresponding CP/CPS sections/text) to section 7 of <a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist#Verification_Policies_and_Practices">https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist#Verification_Policies_and_Practices</a>	Verified?	Need Response From CA

Link to Dublish Disal	and and Auditor	l aubardinata CA	Contificator
Link to Publicly Discl	osea ana Auditea	i subordinate CA	Certificates

Publicly Disclosed & Audited subCAs

NEED URL to publicly disclosed subordinate CA certificates that chain up to certificates in Mozilla's CA program, as per Items #8, 9, and 10 of Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion Policy. Verified? Need Response From CA