Bugzilla ID: 545614

Bugzilla Summary: Add Certinomis root CA cert

CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/) and must supply the information necessary to determine whether or not the policy's requirements have been satisfied, as per http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist.

CA's are also encouraged to review the Recommended Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended Practices.

| General Information | Data |
|--------------------------------|--|
| CA Name | Certinomis |
| Website URL | http://www.certinomis.com |
| Organizational type | Commercial CA |
| Primary market / customer base | Certinomis is a commercial CA that delivers certificates to the general public in France, and is the Certificate Service |
| | Provider of "La Poste" the French Postal Service. |
| CA Contact Information | CA Email Alias: Please provide an email alias that includes the people in your company who should receive |
| | correspondence from Mozilla in regards to root certificates. An email alias is being requested so that more than one |
| | person in your organization will receive notifications in case the primary contact is out of the office or leaves the |
| | organization. |
| | |
| | CA Phone Number: A main phone number from which Mozilla can reach the organization responsible for root |
| | certificates for the CA. |
| | |
| | Title / Department: If Mozilla needed to call your main phone number, what Title/Department should the Mozilla |
| | representative ask for? |

For Each Root CA whose certificate is to be included in Mozilla (or whose metadata is to be modified)

| Info Needed | Data |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Certificate Name | Certinomis - Autorité Racine |
| Cert summary / comments | |
| Root certificate URL | http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/ac-racine-g2.cer |
| SHA-1 fingerprint | 2e:14:da:ec:28:f0:fa:1e:8e:38:9a:4e:ab:eb:26:c0:0a:d3:83:c3 |
| Valid from | 2008-09-17 |
| Valid to | 2028-09-17 |
| Cert Version | 3 |
| Modulus length / key length | 4096 |

| Test Website | For testing purposes, please provide a URL to a website whose SSL cert chains up to this root. Note that this can be a test site. |
|--|---|
| CRL URL | ARL: http://crl.certinomis.com/AC_Racine/crl/crl-1.crl CRL for end-entity certs: NextUpdate: |
| OCSP Responder URL | Not provided |
| CA Hierarchy | This root has 3 sub-CAs. Are these all internally operated? "1 étoile" software or token, no face-to-face. (Class 1: Certificate issued upon verification of the e-mail) "2 étoiles" only crypto token with face-to-face (Class 2: Certificate issued upon verification of documents) "Corporate" for BtoB purpose. (Class 3: Certificate issued on vouchers, with identity checks face to face) |
| Externally Operated sub-CAs | Does this root have any subordinate CAs that are operated by external third parties? For the subordinate CAs that are operated by third parties, please provide a general description and explain how the CP/CPS and audits ensure the third parties are in compliance. Also, see https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:SubordinateCA checklist |
| Cross-Signing | List any other root CAs that have issued cross-signing certificates for this root CA |
| Requested Trust Bits | Please indicate which trust bits you would like to enable for this root. One or more of: Websites (SSL/TLS) Email (S/MIME) Code Signing |
| SSL Validation Type DV, OV, and/or EV | Do you perform identity/organization verification for all SSL certificates? Is it ever the case for SSL certs that the ownership of the domain name is verified, but the identity/organization of the subscriber is not verified? |
| EV policy OID(s) | Not EV |
| CP/CPS | All documents are in French. from bug Certificate Policy: http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/DT-FL-0905-001-PC-RACINE-1.2.pdf http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/DT-FL-0808-006-PC-SERV-1E-SSL-1.2.pdf CPS: http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/PR_AE_OpC_100125.pdf Additional CP document: http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/DT-FL-1001-001-PC-PROFILS-1.0.pdf from website Certinomis Certificate Policies: http://www.certinomis.com/qui_politiques_certification.php |

| | Qualified Certificate RGS-A (PRIS V2) |
|-----------------------|--|
| | Certificates for Person (Authentication and Signature): |
| | |
| | http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/DT-FL-0808-004-PC-ORGA-1E-M-1.1.pdf |
| | http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/DT-FL-0808-014-PC-ORGA-2E-M-1.1.pdf |
| | Certificates for Server Authentication: |
| | http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/DT-FL-0808-006-PC-SERV-1E-SSL-1.1.pdf |
| | http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/DT-FL-0808-007-PC-SERV-2E-SSL-1.1.pdf |
| | Certificates of Server for Customer Authentication: |
| | http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/DT-FL-0808-008-PC-SERV-1E-CLT-1.1.pdf |
| | http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/DT-FL-0808-018-PC-SERV-2E-CLT-1.1.pdf |
| | Non-Qualified Certificates |
| | Certificates of Person or Servers (Corporate): |
| | http://www.certinomis.com/publi/pc/pol_corporate_1.pdf |
| | Certificates of Server (SSL): |
| | https://www.certinomis.com/publi/pc/pol_certinomisssl_1.pdf |
| | |
| | What is the relation between the CP/CPS documents listed in the bug versus the documents that are provided at |
| | http://www.certinomis.com/qui_politiques_certification.php? |
| AUDIT | Audit Type: ETSI 101 456 |
| | Auditor: LSTI http://www.lsti-certification.fr |
| | Audit Document: http://www.certinomis.com/publi/rgs/8035 OC TS 101 456 ex1F.pdf |
| | Listed on LSTI website: http://www.lsti- |
| | certification.fr/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=53⟨=en |
| | (2009.08.06) |
| Organization Identity | Please provide translations into English of the sections of the CP/CPS documents pertaining to Verification of Identity and |
| Verification | Organization. Please also list the documents and section or page numbers where the original text can be found. |
| Domain Name | section 7 of http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ : We consider verification of certificate signing |
| Ownership / Control | requests to be acceptable if it meets or exceeds the following requirements: |
| | • for a certificate to be used for SSL-enabled servers, the CA takes reasonable measures to verify that the |
| | entity submitting the certificate signing request has registered the domain(s) referenced in the certificate |
| | or has been authorized by the domain registrant to act on the registrant's behalf; |
| | Please provide translations into English of the sections of the CP/CPS documents that describe the procedures for |
| | verifying that the domain referenced in an SSL cert is owned/controlled by the subscriber. Please also list the |
| | corresponding document(s) and section or page numbers containing the original text. |
| Email Address | section 7 of http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ : We consider verification of certificate signing |
| Ownership / Control | requests to be acceptable if it meets or exceeds the following requirements: |
| 5 Control | requests to be acceptance if it moons of encounts and following requirements. |

| | for a certificate to be used for digitally signing and/or encrypting email messages, the CA takes reasonable measures to verify that the entity submitting the request controls the email account associated with the email address referenced in the certificate <i>or</i> has been authorized by the email account holder to act on the account holder's behalf; Please provide translations into English of the sections of the CP/CPS documents that describe the procedures for verifying that the email account associated with the email address in the cert is owned/controlled by the |
|--|--|
| | subscriber. Please also list the corresponding document(s) and section or page numbers containing the original text. |
| Identity of Code Signing Subscriber | section 7 of http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ : We consider verification of certificate signing requests to be acceptable if it meets or exceeds the following requirements: • for certificates to be used for digitally signing code objects, the CA takes reasonable measures to verify that the entity submitting the certificate signing request is the same entity referenced in the certificate or has been |
| | authorized by the entity referenced in the certificate to act on that entity's behalf; If you are also requesting that the Code Signing trust bit be enabled, please provide the specific document(s) and |
| | section or page numbers where the procedures for code signing certs are described. Please provide translations into English of the sections of the CP/CPS documents that describe the identity |
| | verification procedures for code signing certs. Please also list the corresponding document(s) and section or page numbers containing the original text. |
| Potentially Problematic Practices | Please review the list of Potentially Problematic Practices (http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic Practices). Identify the ones that are and are not applicable. For the ones that are applicable, please provide further information and translations into English of the CP/CPS where relevant. |
| | Long-lived DV certificates Wildcard DV SSL certificates |
| | Delegation of Domain / Email validation to third parties |
| | Issuing end entity certificates directly from roots |
| | Allowing external entities to operate unconstrained subordinate CAs O Distribution of the control of |
| | Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files O |

Certificates referencing hostnames or private IP addresses

 Issuing SSL Certificates for Internal Domains
 OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root
 CRL with critical CIDP Extension
 Generic names for CAs