## Bugzilla ID: 527419 Bugzilla Summary: Add Secom Trust SHA256 root certificate

CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/) and must supply the information necessary to determine whether or not the policy's requirements have been satisfied, as per <a href="http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information\_checklist">http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information\_checklist</a>.

CA's are also encouraged to review the Recommended Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended\_Practices.

General Information	Data
CA Name	SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.
Website URL	http://www.secomtrust.net/
Organizational type	Commercial
Primary market / customer base	Japan
CA Contact Information	CA Email Alias: h-kamo@secom.co.jp, koi-takahashi@secom.co.jp
	CA Phone Number: 81-3-5775-8674
	Title / Department: Secure Service Department

For Each Root CA whose certificate is to be included in Mozilla (or whose metadata is to be modified)

Info Needed	Data
Certificate Name	Security Communication RootCA2
Cert summary / comments	This is the SHA256 version of the "Security Communication RootCA1" (SHA1) root certificate that is currently in NSS. It
	will have separate intermediate CAs for signing certificates for SSL, email, and code signing.
The root CA certificate URL	https://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root2/SCRoot2ca.cer
SHA-1 fingerprint	5F:3B:8C:F2:F8:10:B3:7D:78:B4:CE:EC:19:19:C3:73:34:B9:C7:74
Valid from	2009-05-28
Valid to	2029-05-28
Cert Version	3
Modulus length / key length	2048
Test Website	https://fmctest.secomtrust.net/ (Not an EV SSL cert.)
	To enable EV, we will need to be able to access a website whose EV SSL cert chains up to this root.)
CRL URL	https://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root2/SCRoot2CRL.crl
	http://testrepository.secomtrust.net/subca6/fullcrl.crl
	CRL issuing frequency for subordinate end-entity certificates: 24 hours
	From SECOM CA Service Passport for Web SR 2.0 Certificate Policy (PfWSR2CA-CP.pdf), Section4.9.7: CRL is
	expired regardless of treatment, every 24 hours

OCSP Responder URL	None
CA Hierarchy	CA Hierarchy Diagram for EV: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=446676
	This root certificate will sign the "Security Communication EV RootCA2" intermediate CA, which will sign the "SECOM
	Passport for Web EV CA2" intermediate CA, which will sign end-entity EV SSL certificates.
	This root will also have separate intermediate CAs for signing end-entity certificates for email (S/MIME) and code
	signing.
Sub-CAs operated by 3 <sup>rd</sup> parties	None
Cross-Signing	None
Requested Trust Bits	Websites (SSL/TLS)
	Email (S/MIME)
	Code Signing
SSL Validation Type	OV, EV
DV, OV, and/or EV	
EV policy OID(s)	1.2.392.200091.100.721.1
CP/CPS	Diagram showing relation of documents: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=447053
	Documents relating to this root: https://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root2/index.html
	Security Communication RootCA Certification Procedures for Operation (Japanese):
	https://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root/SCRootCPS.pdf
	Security Communication RootCA Subordinate CA Certificate Policy (Japanese):
	https://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root/SCRootCP1.pdf
	SECOM CA Service Passport for Web SR 2.0 Certificate Policy (Japanese):
	https://repo1.secomtrust.net/spcpp/pfw/pfwsr2ca/PfWSR2CA-CP.pdf
	SECOM Passport for Web EV Certificate Policy (Japanese):
	https://repo1.secomtrust.net/spcpp/pfw/pfwevca/PfWEVCA-CP.pdf
	SECOM Passport for Web EV Certificate Policy (copy-and-paste enabled):
	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=449589
	EV Verification Document: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=451885
	Comment #16: Please understand that the only sections for the verification of the organization and the domain owner are
	attached.
AUDIT	Audit Type: WebTrust CA Readiness Audit
	Auditor: KPMG
	Auditor Website: <u>http://www.kpmg.com</u>
	Audit Document URL(s): <u>https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=975&amp;file=pdf</u> (2009.06.08 – includes RootCA1)
	Readiness Audit: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=447054 (2009.06.08 - RootCA2 Readiness)
	No WebTrust EV Audit yet. When will this be available?

Organization Identity	Translations from Security Communication RootCA Subordinate CA Certificate Policy (SCRootCP1)
Verification	3.2 Initial identification and authentication
vermeation	3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key
	Route CA operated by Secom verify the signature of the Certificate Signing Request: following, "CSR" submitted by the
	applicant and verify that the corresponding public key contained in it is signed with private key. In addition, check the
	fingerprint of the CSR to identify the owner of the public key.
	3.2.2 Authentication of organization
	Applicant must submit the following when apply the certificate.
	- Application for certificate issuance
	- Information that shows the existence of the organization
	- CSR
	- Any other documents if required by Secom
	Secon use the information above and make sure that there are no errors or missing information in the application.
	3.2.3 Authentication of individual
	Root CA operated by Secom does not issue certificates to individuals.
	3.2.4 Validation of authority
	Secon validate the representatives, employees or agents of organizations or groups who have the legal authority to apply
	certificates.
	4. Requirements for certificate life-cycle management
	4.1 Certificate Application
	4.1.1 The one who can apply certificate
	Application of issuance for certificates can be performed by representatives, employees or agents of organizations or
	groups.
	4.1.2 Registration procedures and responsibilities
	Applicant applies for the certificate in accordance with procedures notified by Secom in advance.
	Applicant who applies for the certificate accepts CP, CPS, and other contents of those documents disclosed by Secom.
	Applicant must ensure the accuracy of information on that application.
	4.2 Certificate Application Procedures
	4.2.1 Identification and authentication procedures
	Secom validates the application documents submit by the applicant and authenticity of CSR conformed with this CP "3.2
	initial identification and authentication".
	4.2.2 Acceptance or rejection of certificate applications
	Secom notifies the applicant for the results whether accept or reject for the application after the validation in accordance
	with predetermined procedures.
	4.2.3 Certificate Application Processing Time
	Secom issues the certificate immediately if the application is accepted.

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	4.3 Issuance of certificate	
	4.3.1 Procedures to issue certificate by CA	
	Secom issues the certificate by signing Secom root CA's private key to the applicant's public key certificate for CSR according to the content of CP "7.1 Certificate profile".	
	4.3.2 Notification of certificate issuance to subscriber	
	Secon sends the certificate issued that is sealed with a receipt and stored in the external storage media such as floppy disks	
	to the applicant by delivered personally or mail	
	4.4 Confirmation for receipt of the certificate	
	4.4.1 Confirmation procedure for receipt of the certificate	
	Applicant must send the receipt to Secom at the timing verified the contents of the certificate.	
	Secom realizes the completion of the procedure at the timing of get the receipt.	
	However, if there are errors in the contents of the certificate, the applicant must contact Secon without delay.	
	Complaints about the contents of the certificate must be made within 14days after the date the certificate was sent.	
	4.4.2 Publication of the certificate	
	Secom root CA is not in principle the public the subordinate CA certificates.	
	4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuing by CA to other entities	
	Secom root CA does not notify the issuance of certificates for other entities.	
	4.5 Usage of key pair and certificate	
	4.5.1 Usage of the subscriber's private key and certificate	
	The usage of the certificates issued by Secom root CA and private keys possessed by applicants are limited to services	
	provided by Secom or services provided by subscribers of Secom root CA that is contractual relationship with Secom.	
	The certificates issued by Secom root CA should not be used for any other purpose.	
	4.5.2 Usage of the user's public key and certificate	
	Users are familiar with CP and CPS and agree to use root CA and verify the authenticity of the certificate issued by Secom	
	root CA.	
Domain Name	Translations of sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of PfWEVCA-CP (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=449589)	
Ownership / Control	3.2 Initial identification and authentication	
EV	3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key	
	It is proved that the applicant has the private key as follows.	
	Certificate Signing Request, "CSR" submitted by the applicant and verify that the corresponding public key contained in it	
	is signed with private key.	
	In addition, check the fingerprint of the CSR to identify the owner of the public key.	
	3.2.2 Authentication of company	
	Secon authorize the authentication of the applicant company as follows.	
	By using the official documents from central or local government, database provided by QIIS or QGIS, and another ways	
	that the equal level of authorization possible.	
	3.2.3 Authentication of individual	
	5.2.5 Franciscon of Independent	

Secom authorize the authentication of the applicant individual as follows.
By using the official documents from central or local government, database provided by QIIS or QGIS, and another ways
that the equal level of authorization possible.
3.2.4 Information of non verified certicate user
Not described.
3.2.5 Confirmation of the authority to apply
Secom confirm that the applicant has proper right to apply the certificate by the section 3.2 or 3.3 on this CP.
In the case if the application is made by third party, we request to give us the letter of attorney.
* The third party application means that other than the company using the host name described on common name of the
certificate that is described on the section 3.1.1.
3.2.6 This CA is issued one-way cross signing certificate from Security Communiation EV RootCA1.
3.3 Identification and authentication at renewal application
3.3.1 Identification and authentication at usual renewal application
It is same as 3.2.
3.3.2 Identification and authentication at renewal application after revocation
No renewal for revoked certificate.
The application is treated as new and it is same as 3.2.
Translations of Secom Passport for Web EV service verification procedures that were attached to the bug.
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=451885
2.3 procedure3. Physical existence of the applicant
The below is the procedures to verify the physical existence of the applicant.
(1) Current address is same with the QIIS/ QGIS and the one on the application.
QIIS/QGIS(EDINET(https://info.edinet.go.jp/EdiHtml/main.htm))
(2) If we cannot verify by (1), RA or operation manager visits the current address and verify the physical existence.
(3) If we cannot verify by (1) or (2), we verify by lawyer opinion letter. We verify: (a) The address for the current physical
existence on the letter. (b) The real existence of the lawyer who wrote the letter.
2.4 procedure 4. Domain/ CSR verification
4-1. The contents of (O) for CSR
4-1. The contents of (O) for CSK 4-1-1. Registered corporation
We verify the (O) is same as the financial statements publicly available on the Web site.
If the financial statements is not available, it is verified by QIIS or QGIS.
If it is not verified by the above, it is verified by certificate of incorporation or lawyer opinion letter.
And again, if it is not verified by the above, it should be roman alphabet of Hepburn system.
For example, Secom CO.,LTD. => sekomu kabushikigaisya
Wrong with the domain

The certificate was issued with the same DN before except the case of renewal or reissue.
For the above, we ask the applicant to remake the CSR and apply again.
* For more detail, please refer to "4. Check for the content of CSR for supplementation".
4-1-2. Government ministries and agencies and organization in country/local public entity
We verify the (O) is same as QIIS, QGIS and get the screen capture.
If it is not verified by QIIS, QGIS, it should be roman alphabet of Hepburn system.
For example, Yokohama city => Yokohamashi
Government and municipal offices => Kankocho
Wrong with the domain
The certificate was issued with the same DN before except the case of renewal or reissue.
For the above, we ask the applicant to remake the CSR and apply again.
* For more detail, please refer to "4. Check for the content of CSR for supplementation".
Tor more detail, prease refer to 4. Check for the content of Core for supprementation .
4-1-3. University/ National and public high school
We verify the (O) is same as QIIS, QGIS and get the screen capture.
If it is not verified by QIIS, QGIS, it should be roman alphabet of Hepburn system.
For example, Tokyo university => Tokyo daigaku
Wrong with the domain
The certificate was issued with the same DN before except the case of renewal or reissue.
For the above, we ask the applicant to remake the CSR and apply again.
* For more detail, please refer to "4. Check for the content of CSR for supplementation".
4-2 Verification of the domain owner
By using Whois gateway(NIC domain reference function), we verify the applied company name on domain information
(the contents included in CommonName) and the applicant (if the domain name use consent form is submitted, it is same as the domain owner).
The two points to check for exclusive right to use.
For example, the applied CN is "WWW.login.secom.co.jp"
(1) Applied company or company that exists in parents/child relation with the applied company owns "secom.co.jp".
(2) Applied company or company that exists in parents/child relation with the applied company owns "login.secom.co.jp".
In order to check for parents/child relation, we use QIIS or QGIS(EDINET).
If we cannot find it, we ask the applicant to change the owner as same as the applicant company name for WHOIS.
If we cannot refer the owner at Whois gateway, ask the applicant for registration.
JP domain: http://whois.jprs.jp/
COM, NET, ORG domain: http://www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois
Other than the above: http://www.uninett.no/navn/domreg.html

	4-2-1. For the domain owner is different from the applicant company
	In order to verify the exclusive ownership, we check either document below if the domain owner is third party.
	Domain name use consent form
	Lawyer opinion letter
	Points to be checked on the lawyer opinion letter is below.
	(1) It is described that the domain (secondary domain) is exclusively owned by the applicant company.
	The domain name is described at item #5 on the lawyer opinion letter.
	(2) The lawyer who wrote the lawyer opinion letter is really existing that is checked with 6. Check for the existence of the
	lawyer for supplementation.
Domain Name	From SECOM: The procedure we verify of domain owner is same for EV and Non-EV SSL.
Ownership / Control	The only difference is that no lawyer opinion letter is used for Non-EV SSL.
non-EV	See translation of section 4.2 of the verification procedures above.
Email Address	Translations of sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of CP at the URL below.
Ownership / Control	https://repo1.secomtrust.net/spcpp/pfm20pub/PfM20PUB-CP.pdf
Ownership / Control	3.2 Initial identification and authentication
	3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key
	Secom confirm that Certificate Signing Request submitted by the applicant and verify that the corresponding
	public key contained in it is signed with private key. In addition, check the fingerprint of the CSR to identify the
	owner of the public key.
	3.2.2 Authentication of company
	Secom authorize the authentication of LRA or company as follows.
	By using the official documents from central or local government, database provided by QIIS or QGIS, and
	another ways that the equal level of authorization possible.
	In the case the official documents provided by central or local government, we request to give us Certificate of
	seal impression (issued within 3months) or equivalent as this.
	3.2.3 Document to be submitted
	The documents provided to Secom is as follows.
	<ul> <li>The information described about the LRA or the company.</li> <li>Another documents for verification required by Secom.</li> </ul>
	If Secom judge the application is inappropriate after the verification, we return the all documents. We destroy the
	application form.
	3.2.4 Authentication of applicant and certificate user
	Verification for applicant and certificate user is conducted by the method decided by LRA based on the operation
	standard.

	Translations of Mail Authentication Service Verification Procedure provided by SECOM
	6. procedure4. Certificate information
	Verify for DN information
	Whether or not there is a mistake on DN information.
	- Not same for company name
	- Spelling mistake
	- Domain name mistake
	- The certificate was issued with the same DN before except the case of renewal or reissue.
	- Authentication by sending and receiving email.
	If it is not possible to send or receive the email, we verify the applied email address by making phone call or by
	another ways to the applicant company.
	7. procedure5. Verification of the domain owner
	By using Whois gateway(NIC domain reference function), we verify the applied company name on domain
	information (the contents included in CommonName) and the applicant (if the domain name use consent form is
	submitted, it is same as the domain owner).
	JP domain: http://whois.jprs.jp/
	COM, NET, ORG domain: http://www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois
	Other than the above: <u>http://www.uninett.no/navn/domreg.html</u>
	8. procedure6. Verification by phone call
	By making phone call to applicant company and make sure that the applicant belongs to the company and apply
	for the certificate.
Identity of Code	SECOM verifies the organization by QIIS or Certificate of the seal impression, and confirms the request of the
Signing Subscriber	certificate by making phone call to HRM of the organization. Possession of private key is confirmed as signing
	public key included in CSR by private key. It is described at section 3 "Identification and authentication" on CP.
Potentially	http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic Practices
Problematic Practices	Long-lived DV certificates
Trooreniune Tructices	• SSL certs are OV
	Wildcard DV SSL certificates
	• <u>Windcard DV SSE certificates</u> • SSL certs are OV
	<ul> <li><u>Delegation of Domain / Email validation to third parties</u> <ul> <li>Not applicable</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	Issuing end entity certificates directly from roots
	<ul> <li><u>Issuing end entry certificates directly from roots</u></li> <li>Not applicable.</li> </ul>
	<u>Allowing external entities to operate unconstrained subordinate CAs</u>
	• Not applicable.

•	Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files
	o No.
•	Certificates referencing hostnames or private IP addresses
	• None.
•	OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root
	o No.
•	CRL with critical CIDP Extension
	o No.
•	Generic names for CAs
	• Name is not generic