Bugzilla ID: 527056

Bugzilla Summary: Add Go Daddy CA Certs to root store

CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/) and must supply the information necessary to determine whether or not the policy's requirements have been satisfied, as per http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist. CA's are also encouraged to review the Recommended Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended_Practices.

General Information	Data
CA Name	Go Daddy Group, Inc.
Website URL	http://www.godaddy.com/
Organizational type	Commercial CA
Primary market /	The Go Daddy Group is an ICANN-accredited domain registrar. They also provide hosting solutions, Web site creation tools,
customer base	Secure SSL certificates, personalized email with spam and anti-phishing filtering, and e-commerce tools.
	The Go Daddy Group of companies also includes Wild West Domains, Inc., a reseller of domains and domain-related products and
	services; Domains By Proxy, a private registration service; Starfield Technologies, a research and development affiliate; and Blue
	Razor Domains, a membership-based discount registrar.
	Note: Starfield acquired the ValiCert Class 2 Policy Validation Authority from ValiCert, Inc. in June 2003.
CA Contact	CA Email Alias: <u>practices@starfieldtech.com</u>
Information	CA Phone Number: 480-505-8800
	Title / Department: PKI operations

For Each Root CA whose certificate is to be included in Mozilla (or whose metadata is to be modified)

Info Needed	Data	Data	Data
Certificate Name	Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority -	Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2	Starfield Services Root Certificate
	G2		Authority - G2
Cert summary /	This new root will eventually replace the	This new root will eventually replace the	CPS: Reserved for future use.
comments	"Go Daddy Class 2 CA" root cert that is	"Starfield Class 2 CA" root cert that is	
	currently included in NSS.	currently included in NSS.	Comment #17: Regarding the future use,
			we may use this root to anchor new
	CPS: Second Generation (G2) Go Daddy	CPS: Second Generation (G2) Starfield	services such as S/MIME certificates, or
	Root CA. Serves as the "trust anchor" for	Root CA. Serves as the "trust anchor" for	services that are required by laws or
	the future Starfield PKI hierarchy for any	the future Starfield PKI hierarchy for any	standards to run under a distinct trust
	certificates sold under the Go Daddy	certificates other than those sold under	anchor.
	brand. Issues any future CAs for different	the Go Daddy brand. Issues any future	
	types of PKI services sold under the Go	CAs for different types of PKI services	
	Daddy rand.	except those used with the Go Daddy	
		brand. Serves as a trusted root for time	
		stamping certificates.	

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Root Cert URL	https://certificates.godaddy.com/repositor	https://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repos	https://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repos
	y/gdroot-g2.crt	itory/sfroot-g2.crt	itory/sfsroot-g2.crt
SHA-1 fingerprint	47:BE:AB:C9:22:EA:E8:0E:78:78:34:62:	B5:1C:06:7C:EE:2B:0C:3D:F8:55:AB:2	92:5A:8F:8D:2C:6D:04:E0:66:5F:59:6A:
	A7:9F:45:C2:54:FD:E6:8B	D:92:F4:FE:39:D4:E7:0F:0E	FF:22:D8:63:E8:25:6F:3F
Valid from	2009-08-31	2009-08-31	2009-08-31
Valid to	2037-12-31	2037-12-31	2037-12-31
Cert Version	3	3	3
Modulus length	2048 (SHA-256)	2048 (SHA-256)	2048 (SHA-256)
Test Website	https://gdg2roottest.godaddy.com/	https://sfg2roottest.starfieldtech.com/	https://sfsg2roottest.starfieldtech.com/
	Note: No sub-CAs have yet been created fo	r these roots, so the test certs are signed direc	etly by the roots.
CRL URL	http://crl.godaddy.com/gdroot-g2.crl	http://crl.starfieldtech.com/sfroot-g2.crl	http://crl.starfieldtech.com/sfsroot-g2.crl
CRL Issuance		ted yet because no sub-CA has been created.	
Frequency	CPS section 4.4.9 CRL Issuance Frequency		
	Comment #14: CRLs issued by subCAs that will generally contain entries for end-entity certificates are typically issued every 24		
		ntly operating subCAs. However we reserve	
		be required or desired in specific circumstance	
OCSP Responder	http://ocsp.godaddy.com	http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com	http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com
OCSP Max Time	CPS section 4.4.11 Online Revocation/Statu	us Checking Availability: Issuing CAs Eve	ry 4 days or less
CA Hierarchy	Hierarchy Each root will sign at least one subordinate CA for issuing end-entity certificates.		
	Comment #14: at this time we expect <the hierarchy="" new="" roots="" the="" under=""> will be very similar to the hierarchy of the current roots.</the>		
	At present, we do not expect to have any cross-certificates for the new roots. However, if we need or want to start making use of		
	the newer root certificates before they have achieved a sufficient level of distribution amongst the installed base of various software		
	products, we may elect to issue cross-certificates to the new roots from the existing Go Daddy and Starfield root CAs (but not the		
	from the Valicert root).		
	CA Hierarchy diagram of the roots currently included in NSS: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=417535		
	·	it shows the current CA hierarchy in operati	on today)
3 rd –Party Sub-CAs	None, and none planned.		
Cross-Signing	None, and none planned, unless needed for		
Requested Trust Bits	Websites (SSL/TLS)	Websites (SSL/TLS)	Websites (SSL/TLS)
	Code Signing	Code Signing	Code Signing
	Ideally we would request all trust bits. However, they make the point in the Email Address Ownership/Control section that we need		
	to show documentation about our verification practices for email addresses. We do not currently have any such thing, as we have		
	not been in the personal identity cert business(yet).		
SSL Validation Type	Medium assurance certs: DV	Medium assurance certs: DV	Medium assurance certs: DV
DV, OV, and/or EV	High assurance certs: OV	High assurance certs: OV	High assurance certs: OV
	Extended Validation certs: EV	Extended Validation certs: EV	

EV policy OID(s)	2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.3	2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.3	Not EV		
CP/CPS	Repository of root and intermediate certs and policies: https://certificates.godaddy.com/repository				
	CP and CPS: https://certs.starfieldtech.com				
	Relying Party Agreement: https://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/StarfieldRelyingPartyAgreement.pdf				
	Subscriber Agreement: https://certs.starfielegenent				
	Premium EV Subscriber Agreement: https://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/StarfieldEVSubscriberAgreement.pdf Code Signing Subscriber Agreement:				
	https://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/St	arfieldCodeSigningCertificateSubscriberA	greement_1.0.pdf		
	Extended Validation (EV) Certificate Docu	ments			
	Certified Public Account Letter: https://cert		LetterTemplate.pdf		
	Verified Legal Opinion: https://certs.starfie				
	Business Entity Attestation: https://certs.sta	arfieldtech.com/repository/EV Principal A	Attestation Starfield.pdf		
AUDIT					
	Auditor: KPMG				
	Auditor Website: www.kpmg.com				
	Audit Report and Management's Assertion				
	Both of these audit reports cover: Go Dadd		tarfield Services Root CA.		
	The new, G2, version of these roots are not				
			created in September. They have not been		
	covered under an official audit period. How				
	creation ceremony. We should be able to obtain some kind of letter/statement from KPMG attesting to the soundness of that				
	procedure (if Mozilla requires such a thing)				
Organization Identity	Comment #14: Medium (DV), High (OV) a	and EV assurance levels are all applicable			
Verification	CP/CPS section 3.1.8 Authentication of Or	conization Identity			
	For High Assurance organizational Subscri				
	• the organization name represents an organ		ment authority		
	• the individual requesting the certificate ha				
	• the individual requesting the certificate is				
	the marvidual requesting the certificate is	authorized to do so by the organization ha	and in the certificate		
	3.1.9 Authentication of Individual Identity				
	For High Assurance individual Subscribers				
	• the identity of the individual named in the				
	• the individual requesting the certificate ha				
	In the case of a small business/sole propriet				
	include the entity's "doing business as" (Dl	BA) name in an informational, unauthentic	cated "organizational unit" (OU) field.		

	3.1.10 Unified Communications Certificate Authentication The individual requesting the certificate is confirmed to have access to every fully qualified domain name included in the Subject Common Name or Subject Alternative Name fields of a UCC certificate. Only one Organization (as described in §3.1.8) or Individual (as described in §3.1.9) is authenticated for each High Assurance UCC certificate.
	3.1.11 Medium Assurance Authentication For Medium Assurance Subscribers, Starfield verifies the following: • the individual requesting the certificate has access to the domain name(s) that are specified in the certificate application
	3.1.12 Authentication of Organization Identity for Extended Validation Certificates For Extended Validation Subscribers, Starfield verifies the following in accordance with the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates: • Legal Existence and Identity
	 Assumed Name (optional) Physical Existence Operational Existence (if records indicate that the organization is less than three years old)
	Domain ownership or exclusive right to use Name, title, and authority of contract signer, and certificate approver
	3.1.14 Custom Certificate Authentication Starfield may issue certificates designed for use in a specific peer-to-peer application. These certificates are designed for use only in that application and steps are taken to ensure that they will not function for standard uses such as SSL or code signing.
Domain Name Ownership / Control	According to CPS sections 3.1.8, 3.1.9, and 3.1.11, for both Medium and High Assurance SSL certificates, Starfield verifies that the subscriber requesting the certificate has access to the domain name(s) that are specified in the certificate application.
	According to CPS section 3.1.12, for Extended Validation certificates, Starfield verifies "Domain ownership or exclusive right to use" in accordance with the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates.
Email Address Ownership / Control	Not requesting the email trust bit at this time.
Identity of Code Signing Subscriber	CPS Section 9: Code Signing Certificate – a certificate issued to an organization for the purpose of digitally signing software
	CPS Section 3.1.13 Code Signing Certificate Authentication: For High Assurance Code Signing Subscribers, Starfield verifies the following:
	 the organization name represents an organization currently registered with a government Authority the individual requesting the certificate is authorized to do so by the organization named in the certificate

Potentially
Problematic
Practices

http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic Practices

- Long-lived DV certificates
 - Yes. CPS section 7.1.4: One to ten years after Certificate issuance (depending on SSL certificate type).
 - Comment #12: Our CPS permits up to 10 years. Indeed, we did issue 10 year DV certificates in the past. The
 CPS remains that way in order to cover those still-valid certificates. We no longer issue 10-year
 certificates; the maximum lifetime we currently offer is 5 years.
- Wildcard DV SSL certificates
 - Yes for Medium assurance certs Medium assurance certs are DV.
 - o CPS section 7.1.4, medium assurance: CN = domain name of Subscriber's web site (may be fully qualified, wildcard, contain no periods, or IP address reserved for internal use)
 - o Comment #12: GoDaddy/Starfield do issue wildcard DV certificates.
 - O Comment #14: At present, there are no extra steps taken in the validation process of a wildcard DV certificate beyond that of a non-wildcard DV certificate. The debate over what level of risk actually exists from wildcard certificates is ongoing and certainly not decided. We believe that there are good measures that browsers can take, such as highlighting the actual domain portion in the address bar (highlighting "example.com" in the case of "paypal.example.com") that are very beneficial in helping end users determine which site they are actually visiting. We also do not believe that this is an issue unique to DV certificates.
- Delegation of Domain / Email validation to third parties
 - o GoDaddy/Starfield does not delegate any validation duties. All vetting/verification/validation is performed by GoDaddy/Starfield.
- Issuing end entity certificates directly from roots
 - O GoDaddy/Starfield does not issue subscriber certificates directly from root CAs. However, we do issue certificates directly from the roots for infrastructure purposes (OCSP responder certificates, timestamp authority certificates, and test certificates, such as the SSL test certificates used at the test URLs listed in this application).
- Allowing external entities to operate unconstrained subordinate CAs
 - o GoDaddy/Starfield have not, and have no plans to, issue subordinate CA certificates to third parties.
- Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files
 - o As a policy, GoDaddy/Starfield do not ever generate or come into contact with subscriber private keys.
- Certificates referencing hostnames or private IP addresses
 - Yes for Medium and High assurance certs
 - Comment #12: GoDaddy/Starfield currently do issue certificates to private IP addresses and non-fully-qualified hostnames if a subscriber so requests. All such requests are reviewed by a human RA prior to issuance.
 - o Comment #14: First, all requests (regardless of the name(s) being requested) are automatically screened through an extensive list of strings intended to flag any name that may be used in fraud, phishing, etc. In the case of non-TLD names, a human RA will further evaluate the name looking for any signs of homoglyph

- attacks or other visual issues with the name. For both non-TLD names and IP addresses, our process: 1) Verifies that the name or IP cannot be resolved/routed on the public Internet, and 2) Verifies that there are no signs of attempted fraud using both automated and manual methods.
- O CPS section 7.1.4, medium assurance: CN = domain name of Subscriber's web site (may be fully qualified, wildcard, contain no periods, or IP address reserved for internal use)
- o CPS section 7.1.4, high assurance: CN = domain name of Subscriber's web site (may be fully qualified, wildcard, contains no periods, or IP address reserved for internal use)
- o CPS section 7.1.4, EV: Certificates: CN = domain name of Subscriber's web site
- OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root
 - o Test websites loaded without error into Firefox browser when OCSP enforced. AIA extension has OCSP.
 - Comment #12: All GoDaddy/Starfield CAs generate OCSP responses using a certificate that is issued directly by the CA for which responses are being generated. In other words, the "Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority G2" directly issues an OCSP Response signing certificate, and that certificate is used in the OCSP responses for the "Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority G2" (and likewise for our other CAs).
- CRL with critical CIDP Extension
 - o CRLs import into Firefox browser without error.
- Generic names for CAs
 - o The root cert names are not generic.