Bugzilla ID: 511380 **Bugzilla Summary:** Add NIC Certifying Authority Root Certificate

CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/) and must supply the information necessary to determine whether or not the policy's requirements have been satisfied, as per http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist.

CA's are also encouraged to review the Recommended Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended_Practices.

General Information	Data
CA Name	National Informatics Centre (NIC)
Website URL (English version)	http://nicca.nic.in
Organizational type	National Government CA
Primary market / customer base	National Informatics Centre (NIC), a premier IT Organisation of the Department of Information Technology, Govt. of
	India, has been instrumental in steering Information and Technology applications in various Government Departments at
	Central, State and District levels, facilitating improvement in Government services for the Public, wider transparency in
	Government functions, and improvement in decentralized planning and management.
	As the nodal IT organization in the country, NIC has established the Certifying Authority (NICCA) in May, 2003,
	under license from the CCA for issuance of Digital Signature Certificates. Since its inception, NICCA has played a
	major role to promote, develop and incorporate e-governance in the country.
CA Contact Information	CA Email Alias: support@camail.nic.in
	CA Phone Number: 91-011-24361133
	Title / Department: Technical Director & Chief Operations Manager

For Each Root CA whose certificate is to be included in Mozilla (or whose metadata is to be modified)

Info Needed	Data	Data
Certificate Name	NIC Certifying Authority	NIC CA 2011
Issuer Field	CN = CCA India 2007	CN = CCA India 2011
	O = India PKI	O = India PKI
	C = IN	C = IN
Cert summary /	NIC CA issues three classes of Digital Signatures to subscribers,	Does the same description apply to the new root?
comments	based on the level of verification that is performed in regards to	
	the identity of the certificate subscriber. The NIC CA directly	
	signs Class 1, Class 2 and Class3 end-entity certificates which can	
	be used for SSL, email, and document signing. The NIC CA also	
	signs the E-passport Sub-CA which signs Class 1, Class 2 and	
	Class3 end-entity certificates which can be used for SSL, email,	

	and document signing. These Digital Signatures are issued based on verification procedures as stated in the Information Technology	
	(IT) Act 2000, an Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament	
	in June 2000.	
	NIC CA is signed by India's CCA root. CCA submitted a request	
	for inclusion of the root certificate in bug #557167. Upon	
	reviewing the request I found that the hierarchy is very large:	
	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=557167#c15	
	The approach that we are going to take with this CA hierarchy is	
	as follows.	
	1) There will be a separate bug for each of CCA's 7 intermediate	
	CAs to be separately evaluated for inclusion as a trust anchor in	
	NSS.	
	2) After all 7 of the intermediate CAs have been	
	approved/included, then I will proceed with the process of	
	evaluating the CCA root certificate for inclusion in NSS.	
	3) If the CCA root certificate is approved for inclusion in NSS,	
	then the / intermediate CAS will be removed from NSS at the	
The reat CA	Same time that the CCA foot is included.	Deat cart download UDI
a ne root CA	https://buggilla.mogilla.org/ettachmont.org/9id=207505	Root cert download UKL
SUA 1 fingerprint	$\frac{111105.7701022111a.1102111a.0127attachinefit.cgi?10-377393}{49:22:49:40:42:42:42:42:42:42:42:42:42:42:42:42:42:$	
Valid from	40.22.02.46.00.76.01.45.00.05.9a.a0.77.00.11.8a.05.48.90.01	2011 02 11
Valid to	2007-07-01	2011-03-11 2016 02 11 Are CCA subCA corts only valid for 5 years new?
Cart Varsion	2013-07-03	2010-05-11 - Ale CCA subCA cells only valuator 5 years now?
Modulus length /	2048	5 SHA 256 2048
key length	2040	511A-250, 2048
Test Website	Please provide url to test website that has an SSL cert chaining up	https://nicca.nic.in
	to this subCA.	<u>mups.//meea.me.m</u>
CRL URL	https://nicca.nic.in/crl_2783.crl (NextUpdate: 7 days)	http://cca.gov.in/rw/resources/CCAIndia2011Latest.crl
	CPS section 2.1.5: The publication of the CRL is scheduled, at	http://nicca.nic.in/crl_2792.crl (NextUpdate: 6 days)
	least once in every week. The NICCA will immediately update	http://nicca.nic.in/crl_142926D2FF14439B38F9.crl (NextUpdate:
	and publish CRL after Suspension/Revocation of DSCs	7 days)
OCSP Responder	None – OCSP is currently not provided	None – OCSP is currently not provided
URL		

CA Hierarchy	Diagram:	Same hierarchy?
CAmerateny	https://bug511380.bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=398631	Same merateny:
	The NIC CA directly signs Class 1 Class 2 and Class3 end-entity	
	certificates which can be used for SSL email and document	
	signing The NIC CA also signs the E-passport Sub-CA which	
	signs Class 1 Class 2 and Class 3 end-entity certificates which can	
	be used for SSL email and document signing	
	be used for 55E, email, and document signing.	
	Sub-CAs may be created for different organizations and agencies.	
	for ease of operations and management. The sub-CAs would be	
	created purely in a technical context, to be part of the NICCA's	
	technical infrastructure. The keys created for the sub-CAs will be	
	located only on NICCA's technical infrastructure.	
	Sub-CAs can issue Certificates only in the specified domain for	
	which the sub-CA has been created. Agencies for whom the Sub-	
	CAs are created have to be reflected in the corresponding	
	certificate as NICCA – Sub-CA for <name agency="" for="" of="" td="" whom<=""><td></td></name>	
	Sub-CA has been set up>'.	
	Sub-CAs cannot create their own subordinates. The certificate	
	issuing authority for the Sub-CA always remains only with	
	NICCA	
SubCAs operated	The keys created for Sub-CAs are located only on NICCA's	The keys created for Sub-CAs are located only on NICCA's
by 3rd parties	technical infrastructure.	technical infrastructure.
Cross-signing	None	None?
About the CCA	When the NICCA root certificate alone is imported, it acts as the roo	t. When the CCA root certificate is also imported, the NICCA
Root	certificate chains up to it.	• · ·
	Comment #9: in the Indian PKI regime, NICCA is not an intermedia	te CA or Sub-CA, in the real sense. This is further explained in the
	following lines wherein I have tried to present the Indian PKI model.	
	The Government of India established the Controller of Certifying A	Authorities (CCA), under section 17 of the Information Technology
	(IT) Act 2000, an Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament in	June 2000. The IT Act promotes the use of Digital Signatures for e-
	governance and e-Commerce through legal recognition to electro	nic records, and treats digital signatures at par with handwritten
	signatures. The Act defines the legal and administrative framework f	for establishment of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in the country

	for creating trust in the electronic environment. The CCA (url :	http://cca.gov.in) is the apex body to issue license and regulate the
	working of Certifying Authorities, in accordance with the provision	s of the IT Act 2000.
	CCA has set up the The Root Certifying Authority of India (RCAI), country. The Certifying Authorities, which meet the requisite criteri CCA and come under the RCAI. The Certifying Authorities (CAs) accordance with the CA's CPS. As on date, there are eight CAs that	which is at the root of trust in the hierarchical PKI established in the a specified in the IT Act 2000, are issued licenses to operate by in turn issue certificates to the general public and others in are operating under RCAI in India and NICCA is one of them.
	CCA, which is the apex regulatory body under the well established CA under its domain only after overseeing and ensuring the comp under the IT Act 2000, by the participating CA. These standards a between the audit program requirements of CCA and WebTrust sho	hierarchical PKI regime in the country, issues license to operate as a bliance of the "Technical Requirements" and "Operating Standards" are at par with the existing international practices and a comparison ws a clear equivalence.
	Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA) is the government Licen Information Technology (IT) Act 2000. The IT Act was passed by the administrative framework for establishment of a PKI in the country. in an Indian court of law, it has to be issued by a Certifying Authori	sing and Regulatory Authority, which has been set up under the he Indian Parliament in June 2000 and defines the legal and . The Act requires that for a Digital Signature Certificate to be valid ty which has been licensed to operate by the CCA.
	CCA has set up the The Root Certifying Authority of India (RCAI), system in the country. The CCA issues license to a Certifying Author "Technical Requirements" and "Operating Standards" under the IT the existing international practices and a comparison between the au equivalence. As on date, there are eight CAs that are operating under	which is at the root of trust in the well established hierarchical PKI brity only after overseeing and ensuring the compliance of the Act 2000, by the participating CA. These standards are at par with adit program requirements of CCA and WebTrust shows a clear or RCAI in India and NICCA is one of them.
	So in the Indian PKI hierarchy, CCA operates a root CA, but technic please be noted that CCA does not issue certificates to individuals. O and others, in accordance with the respective CA's CPS.	cally it is a licensing body whose end entity is a CA only. It may Only the licensed CAs in India issue certificates to the general public
	The point in <u>Comment #7</u> for inclusion of CCA's Certificate is well proliferation of PKI technology in India and NICCA would approac Certificate in the firefox browser.	taken. It may be reiterated here that CCA is a facilitator for the h CCA in due course with a request for enrolment of CCA's
Requested Trust	Websites (SSL/TLS)	Websites (SSL/TLS)
Bits	Email (S/MIME)	Email (S/MIME)
	Code Signing	Code Signing
SSL Validation	DV (Class 1), OV (Class 2 and 3)	DV (Class 1), OV (Class 2 and 3)
Туре		
EV policy OID(s)	Not requesting EV treatment	Not requesting EV treatment

CP/CPS	The following documents are all in English.
	Certificate Practice Statement of NIC CA: http://nicca.nic.in/ndf/niccaens.ndf
	CPS Addendum for enrolling Root Certificate under Mozilla: https://nicca.nic.in/pdf/CPSAddendumForMozilla2.doc
	Overview of Information Technology Act 2000: http://nicca.nic.in/index.isp
	Details of Information Technology Act 2000: http://nicca.nic.in/pdf/itact2000.pdf
	Digital Signature Certificate Request Form: http://nicca.nic.in/pdf/DSC-Request-Form.pdf
	The NICCA authenticates entities requesting a Certificate, with the help of the RA setup at the concerned Government organization and
	with the help of the NIC Coordinator of that organization. (Detailed procedure given in the Digital Signature Certificate Request Form)
Baseline	According to Mozilla's CA Certificate Policy version 2.1, CAs are expected to comply with the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline
Requirements	Requirements (https://www.cabforum.org/documents.html) Please indicate the Baseline Requirements that you are not yet in
(SSL)	compliance with, and when you expect to achieve compliance.
AUDIT	
	Need current audit statement.
	Audit Type: WebTrust CA Equivalent
	Auditor: CyberQ Consulting Pvt. Ltd.
	Auditor Website: <u>http://www.cyberqindia.com</u>
	Audit Statement: <u>https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=499264</u> (2010.02.22)
	CyberQ is an accredited auditor as per the India Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA), <u>http://cca.gov.in/rw/pages/auditors.en.do</u>
	NIC CA is a licensed CA as per the CCA: <u>http://cca.gov.in/rw/pages/licensed_ca_nic.en.do</u>
	Subject: BE: Confirming Authenticity of Audit Statement provided by NIC CA
	Date: Thu 13 Jan 2011 10:43:50 +0530
	From: Debonrivo Kar <debonrivo com="" kar@cybergindia=""></debonrivo>
	To' 'Kathleen Wilson' <kwilson@mozilla.com></kwilson@mozilla.com>
	Dear Kathleen.
	I have examined the certificate which is available at
	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=499264
	and found it to be an authentic copy of the certificate provided by CyberQ to NICCA.
	Should you require any other clarification about the same, please feel free to contact the undersigned.
	Regards,
	Debopriyo Kar
	Director & Chief Technology Officer CyberQ Consulting Pvt. Ltd.
	Phone : +91-11-41603597 26225512 40550734- 35 Tele Fax:
	+91-11-41601915

	Email: cto@cyberqindia.com Website: www.cyberqindia.com
	CPS (http://nicca.nic.in/pdf/niccacps.pdf): 2.7.1. Frequency of Entity Compliance Audit The NICCA shall get its operations audited as per Rule 31 of the Rules under the IT Act. 2.7.2. Identity/Qualifications of Auditor The compliance audits shall be carried out by one of the empanelled Auditors duly authorized by the CCA. 2.7.3. Topics covered by Audit The NICCA shall be audited on the following: Security policy and planning Physical security Technology evaluation NICCA CPS. Compliance to NICCA's CPS Compliance to NICCA's CPS Contracts/agreements Requirements under the IT Act, Rules, Regulations and Guidelines. 2.7.4. Auditors Relationship with NICCA The auditor shall be independent of NICCA and shall not be software or hardware vendor or any service provider of NICCA. They shall not have any current or planned financial, legal or any other relationship, other than that of an auditor and the audited party. The auditor should be one of the empanelled auditors duly authorized by the CCA. 2.7.5. Actions taken as a Result of Deficiency The NICCA shall take immediate and appropriate actions determined by the significant exceptions and deficiencies identified during the compliance audit, in order to rectify such deficiencies.
Identity Verification	Addendum section 3.1.6: "The procedure of authentication organisation is carried out by the Head of the Office (HO) as stated in DSC Form (https://nicca.nic.in) under heading "The Guidelines for verification by Head of Office (HO)" and accordingly the HO gives the declaration on DCS From that information given is correct.
	DSC Signature Certificate Request Form: <u>https://nicca.nic.in/pdf/DSC-Request-Form.pdf</u> Guidelines for verification by Head of Office. Class 1: HO has to ensure the validity of the details given in the DSC Request Form and verify the same. Class 2: HO has to ensure the validity of the details given in the DSC Request Form and authenticate the same. HO has to further send it to SIO/NIC-Coordinate for forwarding to NICCA. HO has to utilize various procedures to obtain probative evidence in respect of identity of the applicants by way of seeking photograph and documentary evidence of one of the items

under point no. 9 (Identification details) for individual certificate.

For SSL server certificate the HO has to ensure attestation of URL for Web Servers by Domain Name Registering Agency, location of web server.

Class 3: In addition to verification process required for the class II certificate, the applicant's of class III certificates are required to be personally present with proof of their identity to the NIC-CA for issuance of DSC.

The Policy Overview section in the CPS (<u>http://nicca.nic.in/pdf/niccacps.pdf</u>) describes how the identity of the certificate subscriber is verified depending on the class/assurance level.

Class-1 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.1

Category Issued to the Individual from Govt., PSU/Statutory Bodies, Government Registered Companies and Web Servers/Servers. *Suggested Usage* Signing certificate primarily be used for signing personal emails and encryption certificate is to be used for encrypting digital emails and SSL certificate is used to establish secure communications through the use of secure socket layer (SSL) Assurance Level Provides minimum level of assurance. Subscriber's identity is proved only with help of Distinguished Name - DN and hence provides limited assurance of the identity.

Verification Process Simply Checks for the certainty of the details given in the DSC Request Form as authenticated by Head of Office. For SSL Certificates, appropriate Domain Registry shall be queried for verification of details.

Class-2 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.2

Category Issued to the Individual from Govt., PSU/Statutory Bodies, Government Registered Companies and Web Servers/Servers. *Suggested Usage* In addition to the 'suggested usage' mentioned in class I, the class II Signing certificate may also be used for digital signing, code signing, authentication for VPN Client, web form signing, smart card logon, user authentication, single sign-on and signing involved in e-procurement/e-governance applications.

In addition to the 'suggested usage' mentioned in class I, the class II Encryption certificate may also be used for encryption involved in e-procurement/e-governance applications. SSL certificate is used to establish secure communications through the use of secure socket layer (SSL).

Assurance Level Provides higher level of assurance confirming the details submitted in the DSC Request Form, including photograph and documentary proof in respect of at least one of the identification details.

Verification Process Checks for the certainty of the details given in the DSC Request Form as authenticated by Head of Applicant's Organisation, which is further forwarded by State Informatics Officer (SIO)/NIC-Coordinator to NICCA. Applicant's Organisation utilizes various procedures to obtain evidence in respect of identity of the applicants by way of documentary evidence of one of the items under point no 9 (Identification details), resulting in stronger assurance level. For SSL Certificates, appropriate Domain Registry shall be queried for verification of details.

Class-3 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.3

Category Issued to individuals from Government entities/Head of the Institutions, Statutory/Autonomous bodies, Government registered

	Companies
	Suggested Usage In addition to the 'suggested usage' mentioned in class-1, class-2 & class-3. Signing certificate may also be used for digital signing for discharging his/her duties as per official designation and also encryption certificate may also be used for encryption
	requirement as per his/her official capacity
	Assurance Level Provides highest level of assurances, as verification process is very stringent.
	Verification Process In addition to the verification process required for the class II certificates, the subscribers of Class III
	certificates are required to be personally present with some proof of identity at NICCA/RA, for issuance of DSC. For SSL Certificates, Domain Registration Certificate shall also be required.
Domain Name	Addendum section 3.1.8: The Head of the Office (HO) as stated in DSC Form (https://nicca.nic.in) ensures the existence of
Ownership /	URL/IP number and verifies that IP allocation organisation and physical location of web server.
Control	The RA checks for the existence of owner of domain name by using tools available on the Internet. The information received
	from tools gives the owner/registrant/registrar (organization, contact person) details which is verified against the information provided in DSC Form.
	The para 6.1.2 with heading "Private Key Delivery to Entity" has been substituted with following text
	In case the subscriber chooses to generate his/her key pair through web interface (https://nicca nic in) the private key is
	delivered to the entity at their place through web interface only after authentication based on user-id and password. In case the
	subscriber chooses to generate his/her key pair using his/her own method and submits public key in PKCS#10 format using
	web interface (https://nicca.nic.in) of NICCA after authentication based on user-id and password, he/she retains private key himself/herself.
	CPS section 1.1.1. Certificates Classes:
	 Class-1 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.1 Verification Process: For SSL Certificates, appropriate Domain Registry shall be queried for verification of details.
	 Class-2 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.2 Verification Process: For SSL Certificates, appropriate Domain Registry shall be queried for verification of details.
	Class-3 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.3 Verification Process: In addition to the verification process required for the class II certificates For SSL Certificates, Domain Registration Certificate shall also be required.
	Comment #31: The procedure for retrieval of information from Domain registry and its usage for verification of Domain name owned/controlled by the subscriber is contained in an Audited document under General Section category of NICCA Documentation. NICCA adheres to the same for confirmation of Domain names wherever applicable. The text of this document inter-alia includes the following:
	The SSL Certificate is issued after properly verifying the Domain Name. The applicant is required to send a physical copy of DSC Application form with full details of the Custodian of the Server, Department to which the server belongs, Ministry,

	Official address and Contact Number etc. In the Application form, the Server related details viz. IP Address, URL/Domain
	name and Physical Location of the Server etc. are also furnished. Before issuing SSL certificate, NICCA ensures the
	correctness of the furnished information by making NSLOOKUP query / WHOIS Lookup query as applicable, and in case of
	any doubt, communicating with the applicant and resolving the matter over phone, email or personal interaction.
Email Address	Comment #11: E-mail verification is done by the way of sending the user-id/password to the end-user to enable the submission
Ownership /	of the Certificate Signing Request to NICCA system. This ensures that the person who has requested for the certificate, also
Control	has the control over the e-mail mentioned in the request form.
	Comment #14: NICCA issues Certificates to the subscribers in the Government, PSUs, Statutory Bodies, and Govt. Registered Companies in India. All details filled by the applicant in the DSC Application form, inclusive of E-mail, are authenticated by the "Head of Office or JS (Admn.) for Government Sector/Superior Authority for Banking Sector of Applicant/ Company Secretary of Govt. Registered Companies, " before being formally submitted to NICCA for processing. This is given in the "Verification Process" in CPS. The procedure mentioned in <u>Comment #11</u> for verification of Emails is documented and internal to NICCA and additionally ensures that the person who has requested for the certificate, also has the control over the e-mail mentioned in the request form.
	CPS section 3.1: An applicant has to fill the 'DSC Request Form' (available on the NICCA web site
	https://nicca.nic.in) for issue of a Digital Signature Certificate from NICCA. The detail filled by the applicant has to be verified from the
	available records and authenticated by the Head of Office of the Organization/Department/Ministry.
	3.1.1.3. Organization
	Necessity: Mandatory.
	Comments: For certificates, this is the official name of the Institution employing the Subscriber. For Organisation Certificates, this is the
	name of the respective Organisation.
	3.1.1.4. Organizational Unit
	Necessity: Mandatory.
	Comments: For certificates, this is the official name of the organisational unit or department in which the Subscriber works. For
	Organisation Certificates, this is the name of the Organisation Unit.
	3.1.1.5. E-Mail
	Necessity: Mandatory.
a. 1. al. 1	Comments: For certificates, this is the functional and valid official e-mail address of the subscriber.
Code Signing	Verify identity info in code signing certs is that of subscriber
Subscriber	Code Signing certs are only Class 2 or Class 3.
Verification	• Class-2 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.2 Verification Process: Checks for the certainty of the details given in the DSC
	Request Form as authenticated by Head of Applicant's Organisation, which is further forwarded by State Informatics
	Officer (SIO)/NIC-Coordinator to NICCA. Applicant's Organisation utilizes various procedures to obtain evidence in
	respect of identity of the applicants by way of documentary evidence of one of the items under point no 9 (Identification
	details), resulting in stronger assurance level. For SSL Certificates, appropriate Domain Registry shall be queried for
	verification of details.

	Class-3 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.3 Verification Process: In addition to the verification process required for the class
	II certificates, the subscribers of Class III certificates are required to be personally present with some proof of identity at
	NICCA/RA, for issuance of DSC.
Potentially	http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices
Problematic	• Long-lived DV certificates
Practices	• CPS section 2.1.1.3: Certificates issued will normally be valid for a maximum period of two years from the date
	of issue, but may vary from case to case at the discretion of NICCA.
	Wildcard DV SSL certificates
	 NICCA is not issuing Wild Card DV SSL Certificates
	Delegation of Domain / Email validation to third parties
	 CPS section 1.4. Registration Authorities: At present NICCA functions through State/District office of NIC.
	Although verification of credentials of the applicants are carried out by the head of respective
	organizations/departments. The NICCA may also function through Registration Authorities (RAs) in each
	organization interested in having Digital Certificates issued to its employees. The head of office of the
	organization or any person authorized by the organization may function as the RA. These RAs have complete
	charge of the authentication and validation of each Subscriber within the organization.
	 Comment #28: Proper third party audits of RAs, by CCA accredited Auditors are conducted as per CCA
	guidelines.
	• Comment #31: Included in the statement of the latest Audit Equivalency Certificate. As per CCA guidelines, RAs are audited along with the Annual CA audit on a sample basis with the stipulation that any new RA has to be
	compulsorily audited
	• CPS section 2.1.1.2: The NICCA authenticates entities requesting a Certificate, with the help of the RA setup at
	the concerned Government organization and with the help of the NIC Coordinator of that organization. (Detailed
	procedure given in the Digital Signature Certificate Request Form available at https://nicca.nic.in/pdf/DSC-
	Request-Form.pdf)
	• Issuing end entity certificates directly from roots
	• NIC CA has been licensed by Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA) to issue end entity certificates directly
	from the root. CCA is the government Licensing and Regulatory Authority in India, which has been set up under
	the IT Act 2000. The CCA issues license to a Certifying Authority only after overseeing and ensuring the
	compliances as per the IT Act 2000, by the participating CA.
	• Allowing external entities to operate unconstrained subordinate CAs
	• If sub-CAs are issued for third parties, those sub-CAs will still be operated by the NIC. Sub-CAs cannot create
	their own subordinates. The certificate issuing authority for the Sub-CA always remains only with NIC.
	• Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files
	• CPS section 6.1:
	• The subscriber's key pair shall be generated by the subscriber or at RA office in the presence of the
	subscriber

Normally a subscriber generates his own key pair as explained in section 2.1.3.10 and submits the public
- Normany a subscriber generates ins own key pair as explained in section 2.1.5.10 and sublinks the public
key in PKCS#10 format to NICCA. However, private keys of end users are delivered in person, if
Digital Signature Certificate (DSC) is issued on Crypto device (PKCS#11).
 The NICCA accepts Certificate requests in PKCS#10 request format. (See RFC 2314).
 The preferred transport method for certification requests is SSL protected HTTP.
<u>Certificates referencing hostnames or private IP addresses</u>
 NICCA is not issuing certificates referencing hostnames or private ip address.
OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root
• Not applicable – OCSP not provide.
<u>CRL with critical CIDP Extension</u>
• CRL imported into Firefox without error.
<u>Generic names for CAs</u>
CN is not generic