

Bugzilla ID: 511380

Bugzilla Summary: Add NIC Certifying Authority Root Certificate

CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (<http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/>) and must supply the information necessary to determine whether or not the policy's requirements have been satisfied, as per http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist.

CA's are also encouraged to review the Recommended Practices at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended_Practices.

General Information	Data
CA Name	National Informatics Centre (NIC)
Website URL (English version)	http://nicca.nic.in
Organizational type	National Government CA
Primary market / customer base	National Informatics Centre (NIC), a premier IT Organisation of the Department of Information Technology, Govt. of India, has been instrumental in steering Information and Technology applications in various Government Departments at Central, State and District levels, facilitating improvement in Government services for the Public, wider transparency in Government functions, and improvement in decentralized planning and management. As the nodal IT organization in the country, NIC has established the Certifying Authority (NICCA) in May, 2003, under license from the CCA for issuance of Digital Signature Certificates. Since its inception, NICCA has played a major role to promote, develop and incorporate e-governance in the country.
CA Contact Information	CA Email Alias: support@camail.nic.in CA Phone Number: 91-011-24361133 Title / Department: Technical Director & Chief Operations Manager

For Each Root CA whose certificate is to be included in Mozilla (or whose metadata is to be modified)

Info Needed	Data
Certificate Name	NIC Certifying Authority
Cert summary / comments	NIC CA issues three classes of Digital Signatures to subscribers, based on the level of verification that is performed in regards to the identity of the certificate subscriber. The NIC CA directly signs Class 1, Class 2 and Class3 end-entity certificates which can be used for SSL, email, and document signing. The NIC CA also signs the E-passport Sub-CA which signs Class 1, Class 2 and Class3 end-entity certificates which can be used for SSL, email, and document signing. These Digital Signatures are issued based on verification procedures as stated in the Information Technology (IT) Act 2000, an Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament in June 2000. NIC CA is signed by India's CCA root. CCA submitted a request for inclusion of the root certificate in bug #557167. Upon reviewing the request I found that the hierarchy is very large: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=557167#c15

	<p>The approach that we are going to take with this CA hierarchy is as follows.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) There will be a separate bug for each of CCA's 7 intermediate CAs to be separately evaluated for inclusion as a trust anchor in NSS. 2) After all 7 of the intermediate CAs have been approved/included, then I will proceed with the process of evaluating the CCA root certificate for inclusion in NSS. 3) If the CCA root certificate is approved for inclusion in NSS, then the 7 intermediate CAs will be removed from NSS at the same time that the CCA root is included.
The root CA certificate URL	NICCA Root Certificate: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=397595
SHA-1 fingerprint.	48:22:82:4e:ce:7e:d1:45:0c:03:9a:a0:77:dc:1f:8a:e3:48:9b:bf
Valid from	2007-07-01
Valid to	2015-07-03
Cert Version	3
Modulus length / key length	2048
Test Website	https://nicca.nic.in
CRL URL	https://nicca.nic.in/crl_2783.crl (NextUpdate: 7 days) CPS section 2.1.5: The publication of the CRL is scheduled, at least once in every week. The NICCA will immediately update and publish CRL after Suspension/Revocation of DSCs
OCSP Responder URL	None – OCSP is currently not provided
CA Hierarchy	<p>Diagram: https://bug511380.bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=398631</p> <p>The NIC CA directly signs Class 1, Class 2 and Class3 end-entity certificates which can be used for SSL, email, and document signing. The NIC CA also signs the E-passport Sub-CA which signs Class 1, Class 2 and Class3 end-entity certificates which can be used for SSL, email, and document signing.</p> <p>Sub-CAs may be created for different organizations and agencies, for ease of operations and management. The sub-CAs would be created purely in a technical context, to be part of the NICCA's technical infrastructure. The keys created for the sub-CAs will be located only on NICCA's technical infrastructure.</p> <p>Sub-CAs can issue Certificates only in the specified domain for which the sub-CA has been created. Agencies for whom the Sub-CAs are created have to be reflected in the corresponding certificate as 'NICCA – Sub-CA for <name of agency for whom Sub-CA has been set up>'.</p> <p>Sub-CAs cannot create their own subordinates. The certificate issuing authority for the Sub-CA always remains only with NICCA.</p>
SubCAs operated by 3rd parties	The keys created for Sub-CAs are located only on NICCA's technical infrastructure.

Cross-signing	None
About the CCA Root	<p>When the NICCA root certificate alone is imported, it acts as the root. When the CCA root certificate is also imported, the NICCA certificate chains up to it.</p> <p>Comment #9: in the Indian PKI regime, NICCA is not an intermediate CA or Sub-CA, in the real sense. This is further explained in the following lines wherein I have tried to present the Indian PKI model.</p> <p>--</p> <p>The Government of India established the Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA), under section 17 of the Information Technology (IT) Act 2000, an Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament in June 2000. The IT Act promotes the use of Digital Signatures for e-governance and e-Commerce through legal recognition to electronic records, and treats digital signatures at par with handwritten signatures. The Act defines the legal and administrative framework for establishment of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in the country for creating trust in the electronic environment. The CCA (url : http://cca.gov.in) is the apex body to issue license and regulate the working of Certifying Authorities, in accordance with the provisions of the IT Act 2000.</p> <p>CCA has set up the The Root Certifying Authority of India (RCAI), which is at the root of trust in the hierarchical PKI established in the country. The Certifying Authorities, which meet the requisite criteria specified in the IT Act 2000, are issued licenses to operate by CCA and come under the RCAI. The Certifying Authorities (CAs) in turn issue certificates to the general public and others in accordance with the CA's CPS. As on date, there are eight CAs that are operating under RCAI in India and NICCA is one of them.</p> <p>CCA, which is the apex regulatory body under the well established hierarchical PKI regime in the country, issues license to operate as a CA under its domain only after overseeing and ensuring the compliance of the "Technical Requirements" and "Operating Standards" under the IT Act 2000, by the participating CA. These standards are at par with the existing international practices and a comparison between the audit program requirements of CCA and WebTrust shows a clear equivalence.</p> <p>--</p> <p>Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA) is the government Licensing and Regulatory Authority, which has been set up under the Information Technology (IT) Act 2000. The IT Act was passed by the Indian Parliament in June 2000 and defines the legal and administrative framework for establishment of a PKI in the country. The Act requires that for a Digital Signature Certificate to be valid in an Indian court of law, it has to be issued by a Certifying Authority which has been licensed to operate by the CCA.</p> <p>CCA has set up the The Root Certifying Authority of India (RCAI), which is at the root of trust in the well established hierarchical PKI system in the country. The CCA issues license to a Certifying Authority only after overseeing and ensuring the compliance of the "Technical Requirements" and "Operating Standards" under the IT Act 2000, by the participating CA. These standards are at par with the existing international practices and a comparison between the audit</p>

	<p>program requirements of CCA and WebTrust shows a clear equivalence. As on date, there are eight CAs that are operating under RCAI in India and NICCA is one of them.</p> <p>So in the Indian PKI hierarchy, CCA operates a root CA, but technically it is a licensing body whose end entity is a CA only. It may please be noted that CCA does not issue certificates to individuals. Only the licensed CAs in India issue certificates to the general public and others, in accordance with the respective CA's CPS.</p> <p>The point in Comment #7 for inclusion of CCA's Certificate is well taken. It may be reiterated here that CCA is a facilitator for the proliferation of PKI technology in India and NICCA would approach CCA in due course with a request for enrolment of CCA's Certificate in the firefox browser.</p>
Requested Trust Bits	<p>Websites (SSL/TLS) Email (S/MIME) Code Signing</p>
SSL Validation Type	DV (Class 1), OV (Class 2 and 3)
EV policy OID(s)	Not EV
CP/CPS	<p>The following documents are all in English.</p> <p>Certificate Practice Statement of NIC CA: http://nicca.nic.in/pdf/niccacps.pdf Overview of Information Technology Act 2000: http://nicca.nic.in/index.jsp Details of Information Technology Act 2000: http://nicca.nic.in/pdf/itact2000.pdf</p> <p>Digital Signature Certificate Request Form: http://nicca.nic.in/pdf/DSC-Request-Form.pdf The NICCA authenticates entities requesting a Certificate, with the help of the RA setup at the concerned Government organization and with the help of the NIC Coordinator of that organization. (Detailed procedure given in the Digital Signature Certificate Request Form)</p>
AUDIT	<p>Audit Type: WebTrust CA Equivalent Auditor: CyberQ Consulting Pvt. Ltd. Auditor Website: http://www.cyberqindia.com Audit Statement: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=499264 (2010.02.22) CyberQ is an accredited auditor as per the India Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA), http://cca.gov.in/rw/pages/auditors.en.do NIC CA is a licensed CA as per the CCA: http://cca.gov.in/rw/pages/licensed_ca_nic.en.do ----- Original Message ----- Subject: RE: Confirming Authenticity of Audit Statement provided by NIC CA Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 10:43:50 +0530 From: Debopriyo Kar <debopriyo.kar@cyberqindia.com> To: 'Kathleen Wilson' <kwilson@mozilla.com></p>

Dear Kathleen,
I have examined the certificate which is available at <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=499264> and found it to be an authentic copy of the certificate provided by CyberQ to NICCA. Should you require any other clarification about the same, please feel free to contact the undersigned.
Regards,
Debopriyo Kar
Director & Chief Technology Officer | CyberQ Consulting Pvt. Ltd.
Phone : +91-11-41603597 | 26225512 | 40550734- 35 | Tele Fax: +91-11-41601915
Email: cto@cyberqindia.com Website: www.cyberqindia.com

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CPS (<http://nicca.nic.in/pdf/niccacps.pdf>):

2.7.1. Frequency of Entity Compliance Audit

The NICCA shall get its operations audited as per Rule 31 of the Rules under the IT Act.

2.7.2. Identity/Qualifications of Auditor

The compliance audits shall be carried out by one of the empanelled Auditors duly authorized by the CCA.

2.7.3. Topics covered by Audit

The NICCA shall be audited on the following:

- Security policy and planning
- Physical security
- Technology evaluation
- NICCA's services administration
- NICCA CPS.
- Compliance to NICCA's CPS
- Contracts/agreements
- Requirements under the IT Act, Rules, Regulations and Guidelines.

2.7.4. Auditors Relationship with NICCA

The auditor shall be independent of NICCA and shall not be software or hardware vendor or any service provider of NICCA. They shall not have any current or planned financial, legal or any other relationship, other than that of an auditor and the audited party. The auditor should be one of the empanelled auditors duly authorized by the CCA.

2.7.5. Actions taken as a Result of Deficiency

The NICCA shall take immediate and appropriate actions determined by the significant exceptions and deficiencies identified during the compliance audit, in order to rectify such deficiencies.

Identity Verification	<p>The Policy Overview section in the CPS (http://nicca.nic.in/pdf/niccacps.pdf) describes how the identity of the certificate subscriber is verified depending on the class/assurance level.</p> <p>Class-1 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.1 Category Issued to the Individual from Govt., PSU/Statutory Bodies, Government Registered Companies and Web Servers/Servers. Suggested Usage Signing certificate primarily be used for signing personal emails and encryption certificate is to be used for encrypting digital emails and SSL certificate is used to establish secure communications through the use of secure socket layer (SSL) Assurance Level Provides minimum level of assurance. Subscriber’s identity is proved only with help of Distinguished Name - DN and hence provides limited assurance of the identity. Verification Process Simply Checks for the certainty of the details given in the DSC Request Form as authenticated by Head of Office. For SSL Certificates, appropriate Domain Registry shall be queried for verification of details.</p> <p>Class-2 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.2 Category Issued to the Individual from Govt., PSU/Statutory Bodies, Government Registered Companies and Web Servers/Servers. Suggested Usage In addition to the ‘suggested usage’ mentioned in class I, the class II Signing certificate may also be used for digital signing, code signing, authentication for VPN Client, web form signing, smart card logon, user authentication, single sign-on and signing involved in e-procurement/e-governance applications. In addition to the ‘suggested usage’ mentioned in class I, the class II Encryption certificate may also be used for encryption involved in e-procurement/e-governance applications. SSL certificate is used to establish secure communications through the use of secure socket layer (SSL). Assurance Level Provides higher level of assurance confirming the details submitted in the DSC Request Form, including photograph and documentary proof in respect of at least one of the identification details. Verification Process Checks for the certainty of the details given in the DSC Request Form as authenticated by Head of Applicant’s Organisation, which is further forwarded by State Informatics Officer (SIO)/NIC-Coordinator to NICCA. Applicant’s Organisation utilizes various procedures to obtain evidence in respect of identity of the applicants by way of documentary evidence of one of the items under point no 9 (Identification details), resulting in stronger assurance level. For SSL Certificates, appropriate Domain Registry shall be queried for verification of details.</p> <p>Class-3 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.3 Category Issued to individuals from Government entities/Head of the Institutions, Statutory/Autonomous bodies, Government registered Companies Suggested Usage In addition to the ‘suggested usage’ mentioned in class-1, class- 2 & class-3. Signing certificate may also be used for digital signing for discharging his/her duties as per official designation and also encryption certificate may also be used for encryption requirement as per his/her official capacity.</p>
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	<p>Assurance Level Provides highest level of assurances, as verification process is very stringent.</p> <p>Verification Process In addition to the verification process required for the class II certificates, the subscribers of Class III certificates are required to be personally present with some proof of identity at NICCA/RA, for issuance of DSC. For SSL Certificates, Domain Registration Certificate shall also be required.</p>
<p>Domain Name Ownership / Control</p>	<p>CPS section 1.1.1. Certificates Classes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Class-1 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.1 Verification Process: For SSL Certificates, appropriate Domain Registry shall be queried for verification of details. • Class-2 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.2 Verification Process: For SSL Certificates, appropriate Domain Registry shall be queried for verification of details. • Class-3 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.3 Verification Process: In addition to the verification process required for the class II certificates... For SSL Certificates, Domain Registration Certificate shall also be required. <p>Comment #31: The procedure for retrieval of information from Domain registry and its usage for verification of Domain name owned/controlled by the subscriber is contained in an Audited document under General Section category of NICCA Documentation. NICCA adheres to the same for confirmation of Domain names wherever applicable. The text of this document inter-alia includes the following :</p> <p>The SSL Certificate is issued after properly verifying the Domain Name. The applicant is required to send a physical copy of DSC Application form with full details of the Custodian of the Server, Department to which the server belongs, Ministry, Official address and Contact Number etc. In the Application form, the Server related details viz. IP Address, URL/Domain name and Physical Location of the Server etc. are also furnished. Before issuing SSL certificate, NICCA ensures the correctness of the furnished information by making NSLOOKUP query / WHOIS Lookup query as applicable, and in case of any doubt, communicating with the applicant and resolving the matter over phone, email or personal interaction.</p>
<p>Email Address Ownership / Control</p>	<p>Comment #11: E-mail verification is done by the way of sending the user-id/password to the end-user to enable the submission of the Certificate Signing Request to NICCA system. This ensures that the person who has requested for the certificate, also has the control over the e-mail mentioned in the request form.</p> <p>Comment #14: NICCA issues Certificates to the subscribers in the Government, PSUs, Statutory Bodies, and Govt. Registered Companies in India. All details filled by the applicant in the DSC Application form, inclusive of E-mail, are authenticated by the “Head of Office or JS (Admn.) for Government Sector/Superior Authority for Banking Sector of Applicant/ Company Secretary of Govt. Registered Companies,” before being formally submitted to NICCA for processing. This is given in the “Verification Process” in CPS. The procedure mentioned in Comment #11 for verification of Emails is documented and internal to NICCA and additionally ensures that the person who has requested for the certificate, also has the control over the e-mail mentioned in the request form.</p>

	<p>CPS section 3.1: An applicant has to fill the ‘DSC Request Form’ (available on the NICCA web site https://nicca.nic.in) for issue of a Digital Signature Certificate from NICCA. The detail filled by the applicant has to be verified from the available records and authenticated by the Head of Office of the Organization/Department/Ministry.</p> <p>3.1.1.3. Organization Necessity: Mandatory. Comments: For certificates, this is the official name of the Institution employing the Subscriber. For Organisation Certificates, this is the name of the respective Organisation.</p> <p>3.1.1.4. Organizational Unit Necessity: Mandatory. Comments: For certificates, this is the official name of the organisational unit or department in which the Subscriber works. For Organisation Certificates, this is the name of the Organisation Unit.</p> <p>3.1.1.5. E-Mail Necessity: Mandatory. Comments: For certificates, this is the functional and valid official e-mail address of the subscriber.</p>
Code Signing Subscriber Verification	<p>Verify identity info in code signing certs is that of subscriber Code Signing certs are only Class 2 or Class 3.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Class-2 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.2 Verification Process: Checks for the certainty of the details given in the DSC Request Form as authenticated by Head of Applicant’s Organisation, which is further forwarded by State Informatics Officer (SIO)/NIC-Coordinator to NICCA. Applicant’s Organisation utilizes various procedures to obtain evidence in respect of identity of the applicants by way of documentary evidence of one of the items under point no 9 (Identification details), resulting in stronger assurance level. For SSL Certificates, appropriate Domain Registry shall be queried for verification of details. • Class-3 Certificate OID 2.16.356.100.1.4.3.3 Verification Process: In addition to the verification process required for the class II certificates, the subscribers of Class III certificates are required to be personally present with some proof of identity at NICCA/RA, for issuance of DSC.
Potentially Problematic Practices	<p>http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-lived DV certificates <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ CPS section 2.1.1.3: Certificates issued will normally be valid for a maximum period of two years from the date of issue, but may vary from case to case at the discretion of NICCA. • Wildcard DV SSL certificates <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NICCA is not issuing Wild Card DV SSL Certificates • Delegation of Domain / Email validation to third parties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ CPS section 1.4. Registration Authorities: At present NICCA functions through State/District office of NIC. Although verification of credentials of the applicants are carried out by the head of respective organizations/departments. The NICCA may also function through Registration Authorities (RAs) in each organization interested in having Digital Certificates issued to its

employees. The head of office of the organization or any person authorized by the organization may function as the RA. These RAs have complete charge of the authentication and validation of each Subscriber within the organization.

- Comment #28: Proper third party audits of RAs, by CCA accredited Auditors are conducted as per CCA guidelines.
- Comment #31: Included in the statement of the latest Audit Equivalency Certificate. As per CCA guidelines, RAs are audited along with the Annual CA audit on a sample basis with the stipulation that any new RA has to be compulsorily audited.
- CPS section 2.1.1.2: The NICCA authenticates entities requesting a Certificate, with the help of the RA setup at the concerned Government organization and with the help of the NIC Coordinator of that organization. (Detailed procedure given in the Digital Signature Certificate Request Form available at <https://nicca.nic.in/pdf/DSC-Request-Form.pdf>)
- [Issuing end entity certificates directly from roots](#)
 - NIC CA has been licensed by Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA) to issue end entity certificates directly from the root. CCA is the government Licensing and Regulatory Authority in India, which has been set up under the IT Act 2000. The CCA issues license to a Certifying Authority only after overseeing and ensuring the compliances as per the IT Act 2000, by the participating CA.
- [Allowing external entities to operate unconstrained subordinate CAs](#)
 - If sub-CAs are issued for third parties, those sub-CAs will still be operated by the NIC. Sub-CAs cannot create their own subordinates. The certificate issuing authority for the Sub-CA always remains only with NIC.
- [Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files](#)
 - CPS section 6.1:
 - The subscriber's key pair shall be generated by the subscriber or at RA office in the presence of the subscriber.
 - Normally a subscriber generates his own key pair as explained in section 2.1.3.10 and submits the public key in PKCS#10 format to NICCA. However, private keys of end users are delivered in person, if Digital Signature Certificate (DSC) is issued on Crypto device (PKCS#11).
 - The NICCA accepts Certificate requests in PKCS#10 request format.(See RFC 2314).
 - The preferred transport method for certification requests is SSL protected HTTP.
- [Certificates referencing hostnames or private IP addresses](#)
 - NICCA is not issuing certificates referencing hostnames or private ip address.
- [OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root](#)
 - Not applicable – OCSP not provide.
- [CRL with critical CIDP Extension](#)

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">○ CRL imported into Firefox without error.• Generic names for CAs<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ CA name doesn't seem to be too generic. |
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