## **Bugzilla ID:** 497917 **Bugzilla Summary:** Enable Keynectis root CA cert for EV SSL

CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/) and must supply the information necessary to determine whether or not the policy's requirements have been satisfied, as per <a href="http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information\_checklist">http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information\_checklist</a>.

General Information	Data
CA Name	Keynectis/Certplus
Website URL	http://www.keynectis.com/
Organizational type	Public corporation
Primary market / customer base	Keynectis is a French commercial CA that issues certificates to the general public. Keynectis was created by
	merging two previous French certification operators, Certplus and PK7.

Info Needed	Data
Certificate Name	Class 2 Primary CA
Cert summary / comments	This root is already included in NSS. The current request is to EV-enable the root. A new, internally-operated subordinate
	CA has been created for issuing EV SSL certificates.
The root CA certificate URL	Already included in NSS. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=263027
SHA-1 fingerprint	74:20:74:41:72:9C:DD:92:EC:79:31:D8:23:10:8D:C2:81:92:E2:BB
Valid from	1999-07-07
Valid to	2019-07-06
Cert Version	3
Modulus length	2048
Test Website	https://www.keynectis.com
CRL URL	KEYNECTIS Root CA CRL: http://www.certplus.com/CRL/class2.crl
	EV certificates CRL: http://trustcenter-crl.certificat2.com/keynectis/class2keynectisevca.crl
	NextUpdate: 7 days
	EV SSL CPS section 2.3: CRLs are published at least every 24 (twenty four) hours.
	Comment #6: CRL of our "Keynectis EV CA" is generated every 24 hours, and made valid for 7 days.
OCSP Responder URL	Authority Information Access: OCSP: URI: http://kvalid.keynectis.com/evssl-ocsp/
	Comment #6: The OCSP service is updated every hour, and OCSP responses have an expiration date/time equal to that of the
	CRL (thus, max 7 days for the "Keynectis EV CA")
subordinate CAs operated by	This root has two internally-operated subordinate CAs:
the CA organization	1) Class 2 KEYNECTIS CA, issues SSL certificates
associated with the root CA.	2) KEYNECTIS Extended Validation CA, issues EV SSL certificates

For Each Root CA whose certificate is to be included in Mozilla (or whose metadata is to be modified)

Requested Trust Bits W E	This root has not been involved in cross-signing with any other root CAs. Websites (SSL/TLS)
E If SSL certificates are issued O	
If SSL certificates are issued O	
	Email (S/MIME)
	DV, EV
	SSL CPS section 3.2.2 Authentication of an organization identity
DV, OV, and/or EV	Authentication of an organization identity is based on the verification of information provided by the organization. This information includes the organization name, the address of the organization and documentation or references of the existence of the organization, the domain name it owns. The entity that proceeded to the verification checks that the organization is legally entitled to the exclusive use of ts name, by mapping the information provided in the SSL certificate application, Club SSL or ISP SSL contract with nformation retrieved from official database documentation (database issued from government agencies or competent authorities), that confirms the existence of the organization. That database documentation contains rusted information that is filled by the trusted source that registers the legal company. nformation that is subject to verification during the authentication of the organization identity includes the SIREN number, VAT declaration number, DUNS For the purpose of SSL certificate delivery, the verification also requires to check that the domain name featured in
ag E A T na im G th	<ul> <li>he request belongs to that organization, which is therefore entitled to use it. In this way, verifications are made against domain name database.</li> <li>EV SSL CPS section 3.2:</li> <li>Applicant's existence and identity are verified, including; <ul> <li>Applicant's legal existence and identity, and</li> <li>Applicant's operational existence (business presence at a physical address), and</li> <li>Applicant's operational existence (business activity), and</li> <li>Verification of Applicant's Domain Name.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Che entity that proceeded to the verification checks that the organization is legally entitled to the exclusive use of its name, by mapping the information provided in the EV certificate application, Club EV or ISP EV contract with nformation retrieved from official database documentation (Qualified Independent Information Source, Qualified Government Tax Information Sources), that confirms the existence of he organization. That database documentation contains trusted information that is filled by the trusted source that egisters the legal company.</li> </ul>
EV policy OID(s) 1.	.3.6.1.4.1.22234.2.5.2.3.1
	All of the documents listed below are in English, unless otherwise noted.

	CPS for EV SSL CA: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=387860
	Also available here: <u>https://www.keynectis.com/static/content/common/pc-dpc/DSQ_NT_KEYNECTIS_EV_SSL_CA_CPS_20090504s.pdf</u>
	Root CA Certification Policy: https://www.keynectis.com/static/content/common/pc-dpc/DSQ_CP_RCA_0.6.pdf
	SSL CA Certificate Policy: <u>https://www.keynectis.com/static/content/common/pc-dpc/DSQ_CP_KEYNECTIS_SSL_CA_CP_1.1s.pdf</u>
	CPS for SSL CA: <u>https://www.keynectis.com/static/content/common/pc-dpc/DSQ_PC_PC_AC_KEYNECTIS_SSL_1.2s.pdf</u>
	Keynectis Information: <u>https://www.keynectis.com/en/support-information/pc.html</u> CPS in French: <u>http://www.keynectis.com/PC/CPS_KEYNECTIS_120407v1.1.pdf</u>
AUDIT	Audit Type: ETSI 101 456         Auditor: LSTI - La Sécurité des Technologies de l'Information         Auditor website: <a href="http://www.lsti.fr/">http://www.lsti.fr/</a> ETSI Certificate: <a href="http://www.lsti-certification.fr/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=58&amp;Itemid=53&amp;lang=fr">http://www.lsti-certification.fr/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=58&amp;Itemid=53⟨=fr</a> (2008.10.14)
	Audit Type: WebTrust EV Readiness         Auditor: KPMG         Auditor website: <a href="http://www.kpmg.fr/">http://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=382979</a> (2009.05.26)         > From: Paling, Patrick < <u>Paling.Patrick@kpmg.nl&gt;</u> > Subject: RE: Verifying Authenticity of Audit Report provided by Keynectis         > Date: Friday, July 31, 2009, 1:45 AM         > Kathleen,         > I hereby confirm that KPMG Advisory NV performed the EVpoint-in-time         > audit for Keynectis and issued the report referred to in the URL below.         > Please do not hesitate to contact me in case you have any further questions.         > Best regards,         > Patrick
	From Patrick (KPMG): The CAB Forum also allows ETSI TS 102042 and TS 101456 as a basis for WebTrust EV SSL.

## Review CPS sections dealing with subscriber verification (section 7 of http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/)

- Verify the domain referenced in an SSL cert is owned/controlled by the subscriber. In addition to verification of subscriber's legal identity.
  - SSL CPS section 1.3.4, Owner of Domain Name (ODN): The ODN is the legal entity that holds the domain name to include in an SSL certificate delivered by KEYNECTIS SSL CA. The domain name is managed by a domain name administrator. An "Authentication" step enables KEYNECTIS SSL CA to ascertain that:
    - The organization mentioned in the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) exists and is legally entitled to the exclusive use of its name;
    - The domain name featured in the request belongs to that organization, which is therefore entitled to use it;
    - There is either an SSL administrator (refer to § 1.3.6 below) acting as the SSL certificate Applicant or a technical contact (refer tp § 1.3.5 below), acting as the SSL certificate Applicant, who is entitled to submit the request since he belongs to the ODN organization, or a company appointed by the ODN organization, and which authorized him to send the request.
  - SSL CPS section 3.2.2, Authentication of an organization identity: For the purpose of SSL certificate delivery, the verification also requires to check that the domain name featured in the request belongs to that organization, which is therefore entitled to use it. In this way, verifications are made against domain name database.
  - SSL CPS section 3.2.5, Validation of Authority: An applicant authority is checked during the registration and validation process of SSL certificates requests he proceeds to. The authentication of an applicant is based on a request sent to the ODN, whether he or she authorize or not the applicant to act as an applicant for the domain name he or she made the SSL certificate request for.
    - A TC authorization is verified during the retrieval of the SSL certificate by presentation of a retrieval code that was transmitted to the RA during the registration process. The retrieval code is only known from the applicant who transmits it to the TC prior to the retrieval of the SSL certificate.
    - AN SSL administrator authorization is also based on a document provided by the organization that gives evidence that the SSL administrator is appointed by the organization to this position.
  - EV SSL CPS section 3.2.2.4, Verification of an Entity Domain Name: For the purpose of EV certificate delivery, the verification also requires to check that the domain name featured in the request belongs to the Applicant, which is therefore entitled to use it. In this way, verifications are made against domain name database in order to verify Applicant is a registered holder, or has exclusive control, of the domain name to be included in the EV Certificate. Checks on domain names are such that the KEYNECTIS EV CA confirms such domain name satisfies the following requirements:
    - The domain name is registered with an Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) approved registrar or a registry listed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA);
    - Domain registration information in the WHOIS is public and shows the name, physical address, and administrative contact information for the organization. For Government Entity Applicants, the CA relies on the domain name listed for that entity in the records of the QGIS in Applicant's Jurisdiction to verify Domain Name.
    - Applicant:
      - is the registered holder of the domain name; or
      - has been granted the exclusive right to use the domain name by the registered holder of the domain name;
    - Applicant is aware of its registration or exclusive control of the domain name.

- In case an EV Certificate request is made for a domain name containing mixed character KEYNECTIS EV CA visually
  compares the domain name with mixed character sets with known high risk domains. If a similarity is found then the EV
  Certificate Request is flagged as High Risk. The CA performs appropriate additional authentication and verification to be
  certain that Applicant and the target in question are the same organization.
- SSL CP section 3.2: For the purpose of SSL certificate delivery, the verification also requires to check that the domain name featured in the request belongs to that organization, which is therefore entitled to use it. In this way, verifications are made against domain name database.
- Verify the email account associated with the email address in the cert is owned by the subscriber. In addition to verification of subscriber's legal identity.
  - CPS section 2.3.1: For certificates with the E-mail Protection EKU (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4), Keynectis verifies that the entity submitting the request controls the email account associated with the email address referenced in the certificate.
- Verify identity info in code signing certs is that of subscriber
  - Not applicable. Code signing trust bit isn't requested.

## Flag Problematic Practices (http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic Practices)

- <u>Long-lived DV certificates</u>
  - SSL CPS section 4.1.2: Duration of the SSL certificate (1 or 2 year(s))
  - o No. EV SSL CPS section 5.6: The validity period of an EV certificate is 1 or 2 year(s).
- Wildcard DV SSL certificates
  - Not found.
- Delegation of Domain / Email validation to third parties
  - o Yes, KEYNECTIS delegates domain validation to third parties.
  - EV SSL CPS:
    - KEYNECTIS EV customer service acts as an RA for EV certificates.
    - EV Administrators act as RA for the Club EV and the ISP EV offers, (refer to § 1.3.8 below).
  - EV SSL CPS section 1.3.8, EV administrator: An EV administrator is a person authorized by the EV customer to act as EV certificate approver or requester for Club EV and ISP EV offers. The EV administrator may also revoke certificates on behalf of the EV customer he or she is authorized to act for. The EV administrator act as an RA service. When a KEYNECTIS EV customer owns its RA services it has to first contract with the KEYNECTIS EV CA. The contract mentions that:
    - The organization is responsible for internal authentication and all checks necessary to validate EV certificates in accordance with the present CP;
    - The organization, acting as an RA, implements relevant parts of the present CPS;
    - The organization has to inform the KEYNECTIS EV CA, in a reasonable and safe delay, of any changes related to the identity and the position of its representatives toward KEYNECTIS EV CA;

- Its EV administrator uses electronic certificates on smartcards to authenticate with the KEYNECTIS EV CA website when proceeding to EV certificate application and validation;
- Its RA services are subject to KEYNECTIS EV CA audits.
- An organization that owns its RA service also relies on TC for technical aspects of the EV certificate lifecycle management.
- EV SSL CPS section 1.3.8.1, EV administrator for Club EV offer: In case of a Club EV offer, the EV administrator is acting as an applicant for the organization that owns the domain names. For the Club EV offer, the EV administrator acts as an RA and manages RA services for the KEYNECTIS EV CA. In this perspective, the EV administrator is in charge of:
  - Filling the EV certificate requests on behalf of the EV customer
  - Transmitting the EV certificate retrieval codes to the appropriate technical contact
  - Revoking the EV certificate
  - Authenticate to the KEYNECTIS EV CA as necessary.
- EV SSL CPS section 1.3.8.2, EV administrator for ISP EV offer: In case of the ISP EV offer, the EV administrator is acting as an applicant for the ISP which himself is acting on behalf of organizations owning the domain names. For the ISP EV offer, the EV administrator acts as an RA and manages RA services for the KEYNECTIS EV CA. In this perspective, the EV administrator is in charge of:
  - Filling the EV certificate requests on behalf of the (ODN) hosted entities
  - Transmitting the EV certificate retrieval codes to the appropriate technical contact
  - Revoking the EV certificate
  - Authenticate to the KEYNECTIS EV CA as necessary.
- Issuing end entity certificates directly from roots
  - o No, end-entity certificates are issued through subordinate CAs.
- Allowing external entities to operate unconstrained subordinate CAs
  - No, Subordinate CAs are internally-operated.
- Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files
  - No. EV SSL CPS section 3.2: KEYNECTIS EV CA ensures that the customer requesting an EV certificate owns the private key corresponding to the public key to be certified, using CSR on PKCSs#10 format.
- Certificates referencing hostnames or private IP addresses
  - No. EV SSL CPS section 3.1: The Common Name is the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). It is the name of the website to be secured. Therefore, the Common Name is all that follows http://, including the extension. The Common Name can never be an IP address.
- OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root

o No

- <u>CRL with critical CIDP Extension</u>
  - CRLs import into Firefox without error.

- <u>Generic names for CAs</u>
  - CA is already included in NSS.