Bugzilla ID: 438825

Bugzilla Summary: Add CA Root certificate (Brazil's National PKI)

CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/) and must supply the information necessary to determine whether or not the policy's requirements have been satisfied, as per http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist.

General Information	Data	
CA Name	Infra-Estrutura de Chaves Públicas Brasileira (ICP-Brasil)	
	Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia da Informação (ITI)	
Website URL	https://www.icpbrasil.gov.br/	
	http://www.iti.gov.br/	
Organizational type	National Government CA	
	The ITI (Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia da Informação), a Federal organization linked to the Presidency of the Republic of Brazil	
	with the principal attribution of being the Root Certification Authority (CA-Root) and supervising to many Certification Authority	
	(CA). The ITI, between other attributions, is the Root Certification Authority (CA Root) of ICP Brasil (Infra-Estrutura de Chaves	
	Públicas Brasileira) or Brazil's National PKI created by the law (Medida Provisória nº 2.200-2 / 2001). As such is the first authority	
	of the chain of certification, executioner of the Politics of Certificates and technical and operational standards approved by the	
	Committee of ICP-Brasil.	
	Hierarchical structure of ICP-Brasil: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=333737	
Primary market /	ICP Certificates are used in all secure Brazilian government sites (and several financial too). ICP-Brazil is not exclusively used by	
customer base	the government but the entire Brazilian society. The ICP-Brazil has the only (V0 and V1) chain operated by the ITI.	

For Each Root CA whose certificate is to be included in Mozilla (or whose metadata is to be modified)

Info Needed	Data - Old Root	Data - New Root
Certificate Name	Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira	Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira v1
Cert summary /	Root cert used to secure Brazilian government and financial	The next version of the root.
comments	sites.	
Root CA certificate URL	http://acraiz.icpbrasil.gov.br/CertificadoACRaiz.crt	http://acraiz.icpbrasil.gov.br/ICP-Brasil.crt
SHA-1 fingerprint.	8E:FD:CA:BC:93:E6:1E:92:5D:4D:1D:ED:18:1A:43:20:A4:6	70:5D:2B:45:65:C7:04:7A:54:06:94:A7:9A:F7:AB:B8:42:BD:C
	7:A1:39	1:61
Valid from	11/30/2001	7/29/2008
Valid to	11/30/2011	7/29/2021
Cert Version	3	3
Modulus length	2048	2048
Test Websites	https://internetbanking.caixa.gov.br/SIIBC/index.processa	https://ccd.serpro.gov.br/certificados/index.htm
	(server auto-loads sub-CAs)	https://servicos.dpf.gov.br/sinic-certidao/

		For these websites the SSL cert uses the AIA extension to	
		specify the CA Issuers URI, so the webserver doesn't auto-load	
		the sub-CAs. However, Firefox does not currently support this	
		use of AIA, as per bugzilla #399324.	
		In order to see the full chain, I also had to install these subCAs:	
		https://ccd.serpro.gov.br/acserpro/docs/serprov2.crt	
		https://ccd.serpro.gov.br/acserpro/docs/serprofinalv2.crt	
CRL	http://acraiz.icpbrasil.gov.br/LCRacraiz.crl	http://acraiz.icpbrasil.gov.br/LCRacraizv1.crl	
CILL	In page 27 of CP from 2006: Frequency of update for CRL 6 ho		
OCSP Responder URL	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	
CA Hierarchy	The ITI operates only the CA root (V0 and V1 chains)	Tot rippireuse	
Crimerareny	The 111 operates only the entroot (vo and vi enams)		
	Complete CA Hierarchy: http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/pub/Certification	ficacao/EstruturaIcn/Estrutura_completa_pdf	
	Comment #67: The blue boxes indicates the RA (registry autho		
	High-level CA Hierarchy: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachme	ent.cgi?id=342297	
	http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/pub/Certificacao/EstruturaIcp/Estru		
Sub-CAs operated by 3 rd	See 438825-subCA-review.pdf		
parties	List of all of the Subordinate CA's operated by third parties: http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/bin/view/Certificacao/E		
	Cert Hierarchy: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=		
	The 8 CAs (1° level) are externally operated by other organization	ions: CAIXA (www.caixa.gov.br), SERPRO (www.serpro.gov.br),	
	SERASA (http://www.serasa.com.br/), Certisign – a affiliate V	Verisign (http://www.certisign.com.br/), Secretaria da Receita	
	Federal (http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/), Presidência da Re	epública (http://www.presidencia.gov.br/ingles/), Imprensa Oficial	
	do Estado de São Paulo (http://www.imprensaoficial.com.br/Po	ortalIO/Certificacao/Sobre/Apresentacao_7_0.aspx), Poder	
	Judiciário Brasileiro (http://www.acjus.gov.br/) .		
	The ITI authorizes, supervises and audits the operations of CAs	s (1° level) like table	
	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=342298		
Cross-signing	none	none	
Requested Trust Bits	Websites		
CP/CPS	CP (Portuguese): http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/pub/Certificacao/lucation.		
	CPS of CA-root (Portuguese): http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/pub/6	Certificacao/DocIcp/DOC-ICP-01	
	_versao_4.0_retificada_em_15-01-09.pdf		
	CPS Requirements for sub-CA (Portuguese): http://www.iti.gov		
	versao_3.1_(REQUISITOS_MINPARA_AS_DPCs_DAS_A		
	ICP-Brasil Documents: http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/bin/view/Ce	ertificacao/DocIcp	

If SSL,	OV: For SSL certs issued under this root both the Organization and the ownership/control of the Domain Name are verified.
DV, OV, and/or EV	
EV policy OID(s)	Not EV
AUDIT	Audit Type: ETSI TS 101 456 and ETSI TS 102 042
	Auditor: ICP-Brasil Management Committee
	Auditor Website: http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/bin/view/Main/ComiteGestor
	Audit Report: confidential (Currently working on an independent audit, which will be funded and published in 2010. Request is to proceed with current info, and public audit report will be provided as soon as possible.)
	Comment #63: We have 2 documents about this:
	a) http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/pub/Certificacao/Resolucoes/Resolucao 05.pdf
	b) http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/pub/Certificacao/Resolucoes/RESOLU_O_29_DE_29_01_2004.PDF
	The references are for the CPS (CA-root), in none of these public documents you are going to find reference the quoted standards. In the auditing to happen in 2010 we will have information of equivalences to the quoted standards.
	We'll proceed as per the queue for public discussion
	https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Schedule#Queue_for_Public_Discussion
	This will allow us to proceed through the approval process. However, it is likely that the actual inclusion will be postponed until an audit that meets the requirements of the Mozilla CA Certificate Policy has been provided.
	The document ICP DOC-ICP-08 v.2.0 defines the practices of auditing adopted
	(http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/pub/Certificacao/DocIcp/DOC-ICP-08v_2.0.pdf)
	The ITI also is responsible for the process of inspection of the Authorities
	subordinated according to document:
	http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/pub/Certificacao/DocIcp/DOC-ICP-09 - v 2.0.pdf
	The CA subordinate of 1st level are audited by the ITI itself.
	The CA subordinate of 2nd level are audited by the ITI and independent auditing. The independent auditing accredited by the ITI.
	The RA also are audited by independent auditing accredited by the ITI.
	The independent accredited auditing is in http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/bin/view/Certificacao/AuditoriaIndependente
	The accredited independent auditor follow the requisites of auditing predicted in the Resolution 44 of ICP-Brasil available in
	http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/pub/Certificacao/AuditoriaIndependente/RESOLU_O_44_DE_18_04_2006II.pdf
	Statement about ICP-Brazil's auditing procedures:
	https://bug438825.bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=374501

	Meantime due to operational questions of budget and planning, this auditing will be contracted and executed only in 2010. So, we will be able to ask the emission of declaration of agreement with the Brazilian standards of digital certification (CPS, PC and PS) and the equivalences to international standards, especially ETSI TS 101 456 V1.4.3 (2007-05) and ETSI TS 102 042 V1.3.4 (2007-12) demanded by the Mozilla Foundation. We are planning to launch the chain V2 this year. It is to prevent ICP Brazil of an eventual crash of the SHA-1 algorithm, according directions of the NIST.
Organization Identity	CP Section 3 declares that the CPS for each sub-CA must include the following sections:
Verification	3.1.8. Method to prove possession of private key
	3.1.9. Authentication of the identity of an individual
	3.1.9.1. Documents for identification of an individual
	3.1.9.2. Information in the certificate issued to an individual
	3.1.10. Authentication of the identity of an organization
	3.1.10.1. General
	3.1.10.2. Documents for identification of an organization
	3.1.10.3. Information in the certificate issued to an organization
	3.1.11. Authentication of the identity of equipment or application
	3.1.11.1. General
	3.1.11.2. Procedures for identification of equipment or application
	3.1.11.3 - Information contained in the certificate issued to a device or application
	CPS of CA-root section 3.1.8: The identification of a CA by the CA Root is executed through the procedures described in the document CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR ACCREDITATION BODIES OF MEMBERS OF ICPBRASIL [6].
	CPS Requirements for sub-CA Section 3.1.9: To verify the identity of an individual, the CPS documents of the sub-CAs must include the following in section 3.1.9: This item should be defined the procedures employed by RA bound for the confirmation of identity of an individual. This confirmation should be performed by the physical presence of the person with based on the identification documents legally accepted.
	CPS Requirements for sub-CA Section 3.1.10: To verify Organization, the CPS documents of the sub-CAs must include the following in section 3.1.10: Confirmation of the identity of a legal person should be made by presentation of at least the following documents:
	a.i) "if legal person (company) established or authorized its creation by law, copy of act Establishing and CNPJ;" The CPS documents of the sub-CAs must also include the following in section 3.1.10.3: Should be made to confirm the identity of the organization and individuals in the following terms: a) submission of the list of documents listed in Section 3.1.10.2;
	b) submitting the list of documents listed in Section 3.1.9.1 (s) representative (s) legal (s) of the corporation and of the use of the certificate;

	c) physical presence of the use of the certificate and signature of the guarantee in respect of which item 4.1.1 and d) the physical presence of the representative (s) (s) legal (s) of the person and the signature of the legal term for ownership of which item 4.1.1.
	CPS documents of the sub-CAs (see items 3.1.10 and 3.1.11 within each document): AC-Caixa: https://icp.caixa.gov.br/repositorio/DPCACCAIXAPF.pdf AC-Certisign:http://icp-brasil.certisign.com.br/repositorio/dpc/AC_Certisign_Multipla/DPC_AC_Certisign_Multipla_v3.0.pdf AC-Serpro:https://ccd.serpro.gov.br/serproacf/docs/dpcserproacf_v2.0.pdf AC-PR: https://ccd.serpro.gov.br/ACPR/docs/dpcacpr.pdf AC-SERASA: http://publicacao.certificadodigital.com.br/repositorio/dpc/declaracao-scd.pdf AC-Imprensa-Oficial-Estado-SãoPaulo: http://www.imprensaoficial.com.br/PortalIO/Certificacao/downloads/pdf/RFB/DPC_AC_IMESP_RFB_v3.0.pdf AC-Jus (AC-CAIXA-Jus):https://icp.caixa.gov.br/repositorio/DPCACCAIXAJUS.pdf AC-SRF: http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/acsrf/dpcacsrf.pdf
Domain Name Ownership / Control	CPS Requirements for sub-CA section 3.1.11: To verify Domain Ownership, the CPS documents of the sub-CAs need to include the following in sections 3.1.11 and 3.1.11.2: For certified equipment or application using the URL field Common Name must be verified if the applicant holds the certificate of registration of domain name with the competent body, or has permission from the owner field to use that name. In this case must be presented documentation (term of authorization for use of domain or similar) signed by the holder of the domain. For example: in Brazil we consult WHOIS service
Email Address Ownership / Control	Not applicable. Not requesting email trust bit at this time. E-mail is optional, except AC-SRF is mandatory. When mandatory or person asked for use e-mail address. It is also a part of the issuance of the certificate, the user to receive a PIN (PIN1) in RA and another PIN (PIN2) to be sent to e-mail.
Identity of Code Signing Subscriber	Not applicable. Not requesting code signing trust bit at this time
Potentially Problematic Practices	http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic Practices • Long-lived DV certificates • Not applicable within ICP-Brasil. For sub-CAs, see 438825-subCA-review.pdf. • Wildcard DV SSL certificates • Not applicable within ICP-Brasil. For sub-CAs, see 438825-subCA-review.pdf. • Delegation of Domain / Email validation to third parties • Issuing end entity certificates directly from roots
	 The CA root is off-line. All certificates are issuing through a subordinate CA (2° level). Allowing external entities to operate unconstrained subordinate CAs

- The ITI authorizes, supervises and audits the operations of CAs (1° level) like table https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=342298
- o The complete document is here http://www.iti.gov.br/twiki/pub/Certificacao/DocIcp/DOC-ICP-08 v 2.0.pdf
- o Each CA (1° and 2° level) has CP/CPS approved by the ITI.
- Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files
 - o Not applicable within ICP-Brasil. For sub-CAs, see 438825-subCA-review.pdf.
- Certificates referencing hostnames or private IP addresses
 - o Not applicable within ICP-Brasil. For sub-CAs, see 438825-subCA-review.pdf.
- OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root
 - o Not applicable within ICP-Brasil. For sub-CAs, see 438825-subCA-review.pdf.
- CRL with critical CIDP Extension
 - o CRLs import into Firefox without error.
- Generic names for CAs
 - o CA name is not generic.