**Bugzilla ID:** 393166

Bugzilla Summary: Add Certigna certificates to NSS root store

CAs wishing to have their certificates included in Mozilla products must comply with the requirements of the Mozilla CA certificate policy (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/) and must supply the information necessary to determine whether or not the policy's requirements have been satisfied, as per <a href="http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information\_checklist">http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information\_checklist</a>.

| <b>General Information</b>                               | Data   |
|--|--|
| CA Name  | Certigna of Dhimyotis  |
| Website URL (English version)                            | http://www.certigna.fr   |
| Organizational type. (E.g., whether the CA is            | Dhimyotis public corporation   |
| operated by a private or public corporation,             |  |
| government agency, academic institution or               | Dhimyotis is the name of the company and Certigna is the brand for their     |
| consortium, NGO, etc.)                                   | certificates.  |
| Primary market / customer base. (Which types of          | Dhimyotis products and services include Certigna ID and Certigna SSL.        |
| customers does the CA serve? Are there particular        |  |
| vertical market segments in which it operates? Does      | Certigna is a French CA for European market at the beginning, and expects to |
| it focus its activities on a particular country or other | server other countries (India, USA, South America) soon.                     |
| geographic region?)                                      |  |

For Each Root CA whose certificate is to be included in Mozilla (or whose metadata is to be modified)

| Info Needed                      | Data   | Status / Notes |
|----------------------------------|--|----------------|
|                                  |  |                |
| Certificate Name                 | Certigna   | COMPLETE       |
| Cert summary / comments          | The Certigna root has three internally operated subordinated CA's:     | COMPLETE       |
| -                                | Certigna SSL is for SSL-enabled servers, Certigna ID is for            |                |
|                                  | authentication and digitally-signed email, and Certigna Chiffrement is |                |
|                                  | for encrypting email.  |                |
| The root CA certificate URL      | http://www.certigna.fr/ca/ACcertigna.crt                               | COMPLETE       |
|                                  |  |                |
| Download into FireFox and verify |  |                |
| SHA-1 fingerprint.               | B1:2E:13:63:45:86:A4:6F:1A:B2:60:68:37:58:2D:C4:AC:FD:94:97            | COMPLETE       |
| Valid from                       | 2007-06-29   | COMPLETE       |
| Valid to                         | 2027-06-29   | COMPLETE       |
| Cert Version                     | 3  | COMPLETE       |

| Modulus length /   | 2048   | COMPLETE |
|--|--|----------|
| key length CRL   | SSL Subordinate CA: http://www.certigna.fr/crl/certignassl.crl             | COMPLETE |
| • URL  |  |          |
| • update frequency for end-entity certificates   | ID Subordinate CA: http://www.certigna.fr/crl/certignaid.crl               |          |
|  | CRL issuing frequency for end-entity certificates: after a certificate's   |          |
|  | revocation, or every 72 hours.   |          |
| OCSP (if applicable)   | SSL Subordinate CA: http://ocsp.certigna.fr/certignassl                    | COMPLETE |
| OCSP Responder URL   | ID Subordinate CA: http://ocsp.certigna.fr/certignaid                      |          |
| List or description of subordinate CAs operated by   | Three subordinates CAs, internally operated:                               | COMPLETE |
| the CA organization associated with the root CA.   | 1) Certigna SSL (SSL CA is TS-102042 compliant)                            |          |
| (For example, this might include subordinate CAs created to issue different classes or types of end  | 2) Certigna ID (Authentication and Signing CA is TS-102042 compliant)      |          |
| entity certificates: Class 1 vs. class 2 certificates,   | 3) Certigna Chiffrement (Encryption CA is the complement of                |          |
| qualified vs. non-qualified certificates, EV   | Certigna ID )  |          |
| certificates vs. non-EV certificates, SSL certificates vs. email certificates, and so on.)           | URL of certificate hierarchy diagram:                                      |          |
| vs. eman certificates, and so on.)   | http://www.certigna.fr/chaine_certification.php                            |          |
| For internally-operated subordinate CAs the key is   |  |          |
| to confirm that their operation is addressed by the  | Certigna SSL and Certigna ID each have their own Certificate Policy        |          |
| relevant CPS, and that any audit covers them as well as the root.                                    | document (see links below).  |          |
|  | The Audit covers both the SSL and ID subordinate CAs:                      |          |
|  | "Certifié conforme ETSI TS 102 042   |          |
|  | - Famille CERTIGNA ID (authentification-signature) - Famille CERTIGNA SSL" |          |
| For subordinate CAs operated by third parties, if  | No subordinate CAs are operated by third parties.                          | COMPLETE |
| any:   |  |          |
| General description of the types of  |  |          |
| third-party subordinates that exist, and what the  |  |          |
| general legal/technical arrangements are by which those subordinates are authorized, controlled, and |  |          |
| mose subordinates are aumorized, controlled, and   |  |          |

| audited.  |   |             |
|---|---|-------------|
| audited.  |   |             |
| (For example, contractual arrangements should require third-party subordinates to operate in accordance with some CPS/CP. Technical arrangements might include name constraints, not allowing them to create their own subordinates, etc.)  |   |             |
| List any other root CAs that have issued cross-   | None  | COMPLETE    |
| signing certificates for this root CA   | Tyr 1 %   | COLUMN ETTE |
| Requested Trust Bits  | Websites  | COMPLETE    |
| One or more of:   | Email   |             |
| Websites (SSL/TLS)      The state of th | Code  |             |
| • Email (S/MIME)  |   |             |
| Code (Code Signing)   |   | G01 (D1 DDD |
| <ul> <li>If SSL certificates are issued within the hierarchy rooted at this root CA certificate:</li> <li>Whether or not the domain name referenced in the certificate is verified to be owned/controlled by the certificate subscriber. (This is commonly referred to as a DV certificate.)</li> <li>Whether or not the value of the Organization attribute is verified to be that associated with the certificate subscriber. (This is commonly referred to as an OV certificate.)</li> <li>Whether verification of the certificate subscriber conforms to the Extended Validation Certificate Guidelines issued by the CAB Forum. (This is commonly referred to as an EV certificate.)</li> </ul>  | IV/OV identity/organisationally-validated  b) CERTIGNA ID CP and CPS "Chapter 3.2.3. Identity validation  The certificate request file sent to the RA must include:  • The Certigna ID certificate request form, available on Certigna Web site, fully filled and signed by the subscriber. It includes:  • Acceptance of terms and conditions  • First and last name to be included in certificate  • Subscriber informations (name, address, e-mail)  • Copy of a valid identity document when recording the subscriber In some cases, the request file must include: If the subscriber belongs to an organization:  • Proof of attachment to this organization  • Authorized representative of the organization informations (name, organization, addresse, phone, e-mail), whose name is mentioned in the  certificate request form  • Copy of a valid official document when recording the request, including the SIREN number (DUNS equivalent for France), or by | COMPLETE    |

|   | organization."   |          |
|---|--|----------|
| <ul> <li>Example certificate(s) issued within the hierarchy rooted at this root, including the full certificate chain(s) where applicable.</li> <li>For SSL certificates this should also include URLs of one or more web servers using the certificate(s).</li> <li>There should be at least one example certificate for each of the major types of certificates issued, e.g., email vs. SSL vs. code signing, or EV vs. OS vs. DV.</li> <li>Note: mainly interested in SSL, so OK if no email example.</li> </ul> | https://www.certigna.fr  | COMPLETE |
| CP/CPS  | SSL Subordinate:   | COMPLETE |
| Certificate Policy URL  | http://www.certigna.fr/documents/pc_certigna_ssl.php   |          |
| Certificate Practice Statement(s) (CPS) URL   |  |          |
|   | ID Subordinate:  |          |
| (English or available in English translation)   | http://www.certigna.fr/documents/pc_certigna_id.php  |          |
| AUDIT: The published document(s) relating to independent audit(s) of the root CA and any CAs within the hierarchy rooted at the root. (For example, for WebTrust for CAs audits this would be the "audit report and management assertions" document available from the webtrust.org site or elsewhere.)   | A public statement of compliance with ETSI 102.042 has been provided by their 2008 auditor and posted on Certigna's website: http://www.certigna.fr/downloads/attestation_lsti.pdf  I have independently verified this information with the auditor, and have updated the pending list with the new audit info: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/pending/  Audit Type: ETSI TS-102042  Auditor: LSTI - La Sécurité des Technologies de l'Information Auditor Website: http://www.lsti.fr  Audit Document URL(s): http://www.lsti-certification.fr/images/stories/dhimyotis.pdf | COMPLETE |

## **Review CPS sections dealing with subscriber verification** (COMPLETE)

• Verify domain check for SSL

- Comment #15: Certigna SSL CP and CPS Chapter 3.2.3: "The certificate request file sent to the RA must include: ... Proof of possession by the organization of domain name corresponding to the FQDN"
- Comment #17: Yes, we verify the information in whois registries. This is documented in an internal document.
- Verify the email account associated with the email address in the cert is owned by the subscriber. In addition to verification of subscriber's legal identity.
  - Comment #15: Certigna ID CP and CPS Chapter 3.2.3: "The certificate request file sent to the RA must include: ... Subscriber informations (name, address, e-mail)"
  - Comment #17: There is a registration form with the email address signed and dispatched to us by the subscriber. We verify that the CSR contains the same address than the one in the form. We send the certificate to the subscriber by mail (to the e-mail address of the form). This is documented in an internal document.
- Verify identity info in code signing certs is that of subscriber
  - Comment #15: No code signing certificates.
  - Comment #17: we have planned to make code signing certificates in the near future. If the need arises our CP/ CPS will have text about: "Verify identity information in code signing certificates is that of subscriber"
- Make sure it's clear which checks are done for which context (cert usage)
  - Certigna SSL and Certigna ID each have their own Certificate Policy document

## Flag Problematic Practices (COMPLETE)

https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic\_Practices

- Long-lived DV certificates
  - Certs are IV/OV
- Wildcard DV SSL certificates
  - Certs are IV/OV
- Delegation of Domain / Email validation to third parties
  - Not found
- Issuing end entity certificates directly from roots
  - o End-entity certs are issued from intermediate CAs
- Allowing external entities to operate unconstrained subordinate CAs
  - o Intermediate CAs are internally operated
- <u>Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files</u>
  - Not found
- Certificates referencing hostnames or private IP addresses

- o Not found
- OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root
  - o OCSP successfully used in Firefox for the example website
- <u>CRL</u> with critical CIDP Extension
  - o CRLs successfully imported into Firefox

## Verify Audits (COMPLETE)

- Validate contact info in report, call to verify that they did indeed issue this report.
  - o COMPLETE
- For EV CA's, verify current WebTrust EV Audit done.
  - o N/A
- Review Audit to flag any issues noted in the report
  - o COMPLETE