# Mozilla - CA Program

Case Information				
Cas	se Number	00000039	Case Record Type	CA Owner/Root Inclusion Request
CA Owner/	Certificate Name	SSC, Skaitmeninio Sertifkavimo Centras	Request Status	Ready for Public Discussion

# Additional Case Information Subject SSC Root inclusion requested Case Reason New Owner/Root inclusion requested

# Bugzilla Information Link to Bugzilla Bug http://bugzilla.mozilla.org /show\_bug.cgi?id=379152

General information about CA's associated organization				
CA Email Alias 1	itpro@ssc.lt			
CA Email Alias 2				
Company Website	http://www.ssc.lt/	Verified?	Verified	
Organizational Type	Private Corporation	Verified?	Verified	
Organizational Type (Others)		Verified?	Not Applicable	
Geographic Focus	Lithuania and the EU market	Verified?	Verified	
Primary Market / Customer Base	SSC is a Qualified CA (QCA) and a Trusted Service Provider (TSP) that issues certificates to public institutions, private organizations and natural persons.	Verified?	Verified	
Impact to Mozilla Users	Since 2005 SSC CA operates the first QCA in Lithuania and serves all major public sector institutions, International and local businesses, citizens.  Mozilla users: TLS based mail server/client authentication, email signing and encryption; Public sector websites (client and server) and e-services; FireFox based business applications; FireFox based e-service consumers, citizens.	Verified?	Verified	

esponse to Mozilla's list of Recommended Practices			
Recommended Practices	https://wiki.mozilla.org /CA:Recommended_Practices#CA_Recommended_Practices F	Recommended Practices Statement	I have reviewed Mozilla's list of Recommended Practices, and confirm that we follow those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below.

CA's Response to Recommended Practices \* Revocation of Compromised Certificates -- CPS section 4 9 1

\* Domain Owned by Natural Person -- according to ETSI QC profile

\* OCSP -- All issued EE certs provide OCSP access info.

Verified? Verified

Potentially Problematic Practices https://wiki.mozilla.org /CA:Problematic\_Practices#Potentially\_problematic\_CA\_practices Problematic Practices Statement I have reviewed Mozilla's list of Potentially Problematic Practices, and confirm that we do not do those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below.

CA's Response to Problematic Practices \* Email Address Prefixes for DV Certs -- admin@, administrator@, webmaster@, hostmaster@, postmaster@

\* Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files -- Where applicable, private keys are generated by the CA only on SSCD. \* SSC operates its services with exclusively owned/managed

Verified? Verified

Root Case Record # 1

resources only.

#### **Root Case Information**

Root Certificate Name	SSC GDL CA Root A	Root Case No	R00000048
Request Status	Ready for Public Discussion	Case Number	00000039

#### **Additional Root Case Information**

Subject Include SSC GDL CA Root A root

# Technical Information about Root Certificate O From Issuer Field Skaitmeninio sertifikavimo centras

OU From Issuer Field	CA ROOT Services	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Summary	This root has two internally-operated subordinate CAs that issue client (authentication, signing, and encryption) certificates.	Verified?	Verified
Root Certificate Download URL	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/certs/roota.crt	Verified?	Verified
Valid From	2013 Jun 04	Verified?	Verified
Valid To	2033 Jun 04	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Version	3	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Signature Algorithm	SHA-256	Verified?	Verified
Signing Key Parameters	4096	Verified?	Verified
Test Website URL (SSL) or Example Cert	Example Cert: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt /certs/test-v-class2-4qca.cer	Verified?	Verified

Verified?

Verified

CRL URL(s)	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt /crls/class2-4qca.crl NextUpdate for CRLs of end-entity certs: 7 days CRL updates: please see section 4.9.7 of CPS	Verified?	Verified
OCSP URL(s)	http://class2-4qca.ocsp.gdl.ssc.lt/ Maximum expiration time of OCSP responses: 5 min.	Verified?	Verified
Revocation Tested	Not requesting Websites trust bit for this root.	Verified?	Not Applicable
Trust Bits	Code; Email	Verified?	Verified
SSL Validation Type		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Policy OID(s)	Not EV	Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Tested	Not applicable.	Verified?	Not Applicable
Root Stores Included In	Microsoft	Verified?	Verified
Mozilla Applied Constraints	None	Verified?	Verified

Digital Fin	gerprint Information		
SHA-1 Fingerprint	0C:20:09:A4:A8:8D:8B:42:02:18:52:50:54:0C:C4:2B:DF:B5:B0:89	Verified	
SHA-256 Fingerprint	B0:42:8B:08:C2:28:C4:3F:6F:9A:A0:FC:29:E9:D6:02:ED:10:98:FF:6F:15:3C:67:33:38:3F:EA:17:21:65:28 Verified?	Verified	

CA Hierarchy	This root has two internally-operated	Verified?	Verified
	Intermediate/Issuing CAs:  1. SSC GDL Class 1 CA Issues technically functional certificates with no identity assurances.  2. SSC GDL Class 2-4 QCA Issues QCs, SSL/TLS client (authentication/signing/encryption) and CS certificates only to Public.		
Externally Operated SubCAs	None, and none planned. The CPS does appear to allow for externally-operated subCAs in the future. CPS section 1.3.1: In the event when any of the CAs listed above in the table become a Subject of a third party issued certificate, the CA shall disclose all cross signing certificates.	Verified?	Verified
Cross Signing	None, and none planned.	Verified?	Verified
Fechnical Constraint on 3rd party Issuer	CPS section 1.3.2: SSC PKI currently operates a RA which is a wholly owned division of SSC. Besides establishing enrollment procedures, identity verification, identification and authentication of applicants the RA also conveys the Root and CA public key certificates and performs other functions detailed in this CPS.  * Currently SSC doesn't have third-party RAs, however may have registration	Verified?	Verified

olicy Documentation	Documents are provided in Lithuanian and English. Lithuanian: CP: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/lt/talpykla/dokumentai/sertifikato-taisykles-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.4.pdf CPS: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/lt/talpykla/dokumentai/sertifikavimo-yeiklos-nuostatai-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf	Verified?	Verified
	Documents SSC intends to change in the near feature.  https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /working-documents/		
	Draft CPS v4.10: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /working-documents/certificate-practice- statement-v4.10.pdf		
CA Document Repository	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /documents/	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	English		
СР	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /documents/certificate-policy-ssc-gdl- ca-v4.4.pdf	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	English		
CPS	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /documents/certificate-practice- statement-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf	Verified?	Verified
Other Relevant Documents	RPA: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt /en/repository/documents/ssc-gdl-ca-rpa- v2.pdf	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Name	TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Website	https://www.tuvit.de	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Qualifications	http://www.dakks.de/en/content /accredited-bodies-dakks	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit	https://www.tuvit.de/data/content_data /tuevit_en/6730UE_s.pdf	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Type	ETSI TS 101 456	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Statement Date	7/4/2014	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit		Verified?	Not Applicable
BR Audit Type		Verified?	Not Applicable
BR Audit Statement Date		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Audit		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Audit Type		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Audit Statement Date		Verified?	Not Applicable
BR Commitment to Comply		Verified?	Not Applicable

SSL Verification Procedures	Not requesting Websites trust bit for this root.	Verified?	Not Applicable
EV SSL Verification Procedures		Verified?	Not Applicable
Organization Verification Procedures	CPS sections 3.2.2 through 3.2.5. CPS section 4.1  For each type of entities we verify physical, legal, operational existence and for legal entities we also verify the relationship (representation/authorization) between a physical entity and associated legal entity.  The verification procedures above are applicable to all types of certificates issued by the CA (to the level of assurance required by appropriate certificate policy).	Verified?	Verified
Email Address Verification Procedures	CPS section 3.2.6: Information about the Subject, including email address, is included in certificates only after it is reliably verified.  DRAFT CPS v4.10 section 4: For digital assets whose identifiers are maintained by third parties (e.g. email addresses, domain names etc.) the RA verifies operational existence by directly accessing/using the resource (e.g. a server) or communicating through the resource (e.g. email address) and legal existence - by obtaining independent ownership conformation from the associated registrar.	Verified?	Verified
Code Signing Subscriber Verification Pro	CPS sections 3.2.2 through 3.2.5, and 3.2.7	Verified?	Verified
Multi-Factor Authentication	CPS section 5.	Verified?	Verified
Network Security	The CA's Security management documentation incorporates provisions of CA/B Forum "Network and Certificate System Security Requirements". An automatic procedure is run regularly to detect any "suspicious mis-issued" certificates including for high-profile domains.  The certificate issuance system, that is not accessible from the public Internet, can be quickly shut down in case of any emergency alert.  CPS section 6.7	Verified?	Verified

# Link to Publicly Disclosed and Audited subordinate CA Certificates

Publicly Disclosed & Audited subCAs https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository/authority-certificates-and-crls/

Verified? Verified

# **Root Case Record #2**

#### **Root Case Information**

Root Certificate Name	SSC GDL CA Root B	Root Case No	R00000049
Request Status	Ready for Public Discussion	Case Number	00000039

## **Additional Root Case Information**

Subject Include SSC GDL CA Root B root

O From	Skaitmeninio sertifikavimo centras	Verified?	Verified
Issuer Field			
OU From Issuer Field	CA ROOT Services	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Summary	This root has two internally-operated intermediate/issuing CAs, which sign SSL/TLS and CS certificates.	Verified?	Verified
Root Certificate Download URL	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/certs/rootb.crt	Verified?	Verified
Valid From	2013 Jun 04	Verified?	Verified
Valid To	2033 Jun 04	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Version	3	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Signature Algorithm	SHA-256	Verified?	Verified
Signing Key Parameters	4096	Verified?	Verified
est Website IRL (SSL) or xample Cert	https://evssl.gdl.ssc.lt/	Verified?	Verified
CRL URL(s)	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/crls/nhca.crl https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/crls/evca.crl http://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/crls/rootb.crl NextUpdate for CRLs of end-entity certs: 7 days CRL updates: please see section 4.9.7 of CPS	Verified?	Verified
OCSP URL(s)	http://nhca.ocsp.gdl.ssc.lt/ http://evca.ocsp.gdl.ssc.lt/ http://rootb.ocsp.gdl.ssc.lt/ Maximum expiration time of OCSP responses: 5 min.	Verified?	Verified
Revocation Tested	http://certificate.revocationcheck.com/evssl.gdl.ssc.lt	Verified?	Verified
Trust Bits	Code; Email; Websites	Verified?	Verified
SSL Validation Type	OV; EV	Verified?	Verified
EV Policy OID(s)	2.23.140.1.1	Verified?	Verified
EV Tested	// CN=SSC GDL CA Root B,OU=CA ROOT Services,O=Skaitmeninio sertifikavimo centras,C=LT "2.23.140.1.1", "SSC EV OID", SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, {0xC3, 0x1E, 0xEF, 0x56, 0x82, 0xAB, 0xB5, 0x51, 0xEB, 0xC8, 0x28, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x40, 0x98, 0x51, 0x8A, 0x67, 0x68, 0x52, 0x6D, 0x15, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0x64, 0xCF, 0xB9, 0x72, 0xA1, 0x42, 0x5D, 0x53 },	Verified?	Verified

	"MHExCzAJBgNVBAYTAkxUMSswKQYDVQQKEyJTa2FpdG1lbmluaW8gc2VydGlmaWth" "dmltbyBjZW50cmFzMRkwFwYDVQQLExBDQSBST09UIFNlcnZpY2VzMRowGAYDVQQD" "ExFTU0MgR0RMIENBIFJvb3QgQg==", "PoxPvOQpg4JNhFWO1TWAzw==", Success!		
Root Stores Included In	Microsoft	Verified?	Verified
Mozilla Applied Constraints	None	Verified?	Verified

# **Digital Fingerprint Information**

SHA-1 Fingerprint	C8:60:A3:18:FC:F5:B7:13:0B:10:07:AD:7F:61:4A:40:FF:FF:18:5F	Verified
SHA-256 Fingerprint	C3:1E:EF:56:82:AB:B5:51:EB:C8:28:DE:D8:40:98:51:8A:67:68:52:6D:15:2E:E1:64:CF:B9:72:A1:42:5D:53 Verified?	Verified

CA Hierarchy Inform	nation			
CA Hierarchy	This CA has two internally-operated Intermediate/Issuing CAs:  1. SSC GDL NH CA Issues device/eservice certificates including SSL/TLS and CS certificates.  2. SSC GDL EV CA Issues exclusively EV SSL and Qualified web site certificates (see section 8 of REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014).	Verified?	Verified	
Externally Operated SubCAs	None, and none planned.	Verified?	Verified	
Cross Signing	None, and none planned.	Verified?	Verified	
Technical Constraint on 3rd party Issuer	CPS section 1.3.2: SSC PKI currently operates a RA which is a wholly owned division of SSC. Besides establishing enrollment procedures, identity verification, identification and authentication of applicants the RA also conveys the Root and CA public key certificates and performs other functions detailed in this CPS.  * Currently SSC doesn't have third-party RAs, however may have registration partners in the future.  * According to ETSI TS 102 042 Registration service only verifies identity and, if applicable, any specific attributes of a subject. The results of this service are passed to the certificate generation, RAs are not allowed to issue certificates. Activities of registration service personnel, including those employed by SSC, are constrained/controlled by SSC's RA management software which has no certificate generation/issuing capabilities.	Verified?	Verified	

### **Verification Policies and Practices**

Policy Documentation	Documents are provided in Lithuanian and English. Lithuanian: CP: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/lt/talpykla/dokumentai/sertifikato-taisykles-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.4.pdf CPS: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/lt/talpykla/dokumentai/sertifikavimo-veiklos-nuostatai-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf	Verified?	Verified
	Documents SSC intends to change in the near feature. https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository/working-documents/  Draft CPS v4.10: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository		
	/working-documents/certificate-practice- statement-v4.10.pdf		
CA Document Repository	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /documents/	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	English		
СР	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /documents/certificate-policy-ssc-gdl- ca-v4.4.pdf	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	English		
CPS	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /documents/certificate-practice- statement-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf	Verified?	Verified
Other Relevant Documents	RPA: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt /en/repository/documents/ssc-gdl-ca-rpa- v2.pdf	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Name	TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Website	https://www.tuvit.de/	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Qualifications	http://www.dakks.de/en/content /accredited-bodies-dakks	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/audit/2015/	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Type	ETSI TS 102 042	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Statement Date	7/4/2014	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit	https://www.tuvit.de/data/content_data/tuevit_en/6729UE_s.pdf	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit Type	ETSI TS 102 042	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit Statement Date	7/4/2014	Verified?	Verified
EV Audit	https://www.tuvit.de/data/content_data /tuevit_en/6729UE_s.pdf	Verified?	Verified
EV Audit Type	ETSI TS 102 042	Verified?	Verified
EV Audit Statement Date	7/4/2014	Verified?	Verified
BR Commitment to Comply	CPS section 1.4: SSC GDL CA conforms to the current versions of the [CABF-BR] and [CABF-EV]15. In the event of any inconsistency between this CPS and those Guidelines, the Guidelines take precedence over the CPS.	Verified?	Verified

#### SSL Verification Procedures

DRAFT CPS v4.10 section 3.2.5: If the Subject of certificate is a service offered via a network, the Applicant must provide identifying information and an acceptable proof of ownership which shall include unique software or service name (e.g. DNS name), service attributes to be included in the certificate, if any, and owner's contact information. The CA shall validate that the Applicant is:

- (a) authorized to request a certificate for the service:
- (b) the real owner owner of the service (through an appropriate reliable 3rd party database);
- (c) able to demonstrate control of the domain (by manipulating DNS records and server configuration).

Section 4: For digital assets whose identifiers are maintained by third parties (e.g. email addresses, domain names etc.) the RA verifies operational existence by directly accessing/using the resource (e.g. a server) or communicating through the resource (e.g. email address) and legal existence - by obtaining independent ownership conformation from the associated registrar.

#### Verified? Verified

#### EV SSL Verification Procedures

CPS section 4.1: For EVCP and EVCP+ certificates extra verification measures are taken as defined in [CABF-EV] to ensure the Subscriber's legal, physical and operational existence. Proof of representation and authority to act on behalf of the Applicant has to be demonstrated in order to authenticate the signatures on EVCP and EVCP+ certificate application forms.

The RA checks that the organization is the legal holder of its name by mapping the information provided in the Extended Validation certificate application with information of official Government Registers (Legal entity DB, TAX payers DB, Social Security DB) that confirms the existence of the organization.

The RA checks the official postal address of the applicant along with Applicant's main business phone number. In case a technical contact is also the certificate requester with no approval rights, the certificate application form has to be signed by an authorized certificate approver, whose signature has to be verified. The RA communicates with the Certificate signer by phone to ensure validity of authorization. The RA may also communicate with the Certificate signer by postal mail sent to the applicant's place of business.

Verified? Verified

#### Organization Verification Procedures

CPS sections 3.2.2 through 3.2.5. CPS section 4.1

For each type of entities we verify physical, legal, operational existence and

Verified? Verified

for legal entities we also verify the relationship (representation/authorization) between a physical entity and associated legal entity.

The verification procedures above are applicable to all types of certificates issued by the CA (to the level of assurance required by appropriate certificate policy).

Email Address Verification Procedures

CPS section 3.2.6: Information about the Subject, including email address, is included in certificates only after it is reliably verified.

DRAFT CPS v4.10 section 4: For digital assets whose identifiers are maintained by third parties (e.g. email addresses, domain names etc.) the RA verifies operational existence by directly accessing/using the resource (e.g. a server) or communicating through the resource (e.g. email address) and legal existence - by obtaining independent ownership conformation from the associated registrar.

Code Signing Subscriber Verification CPS sections 3.2.2 through 3.2.5, and

3.2.7

Multi-Factor Authentication CPS section 4.2: Application processing for EVCP and EVCP+ certificates is finished after a person other than the one who performed initial Application information verification conducts an extra cross correlation CPS section 5.

**Network Security** 

The CA's Security management documentation incorporates provisions of CA/B Forum "Network and Certificate System Security Requirements".

An automatic procedure is run regularly to detect any "suspicious mis-issued" certificates including for high-profile domains.

The certificate issuance system, that is not accessible from the public Internet, can be quickly shut down in case of any

Link to Publicly Disclosed and Audited subordinate CA Certificates

emergency alert. CPS section 6.7

Publicly Disclosed & Audited subCAs https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository/authority-certificates-and-crls/

Verified?

Verified?

Verified?

Verified?

Verified?

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Verified

Verified

Verified

Verified

Root Case Record #3

 Root Case Information

 Root Certificate Name
 SSC GDL CA VS Root
 Root Case No
 R00000050

 Request Status
 Ready for Public Discussion
 Case Number
 00000039

### **Additional Root Case Information**

Subject Include SSC GDL CA VS Root root

O From Issuer Field	Skaitmeninio sertifikavimo centras	Verified?	Verified
OU From Issuer Field	VS ROOT Services	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Summary	This root has one internally-operated Intermediate/Issuing CA: SSC GDL VS Class 2-4 QCA Issues QCs, SSL/TLS client (authentication/signing/encryption) certificates to Government and Public institutions only.	Verified?	Verified
Root Certificate Download URL	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/certs/rootvs.crt	Verified?	Verified
Valid From	2013 Jun 04	Verified?	Verified
Valid To	2033 Jun 04	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Version	3	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Signature Algorithm	SHA-256	Verified?	Verified
Signing Key Parameters	4096	Verified?	Verified
Test Website URL (SSL) or Example Cert	Example Cert: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt /certs/test-v-vsclass2-4qca.cer	Verified?	Verified
CRL URL(s)	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt /crls/vsclass2-4qca.crl NextUpdate for CRLs of end-entity certs: 7 days; CRL updates: please see section 4.9.7 of CPS	Verified?	Verified
OCSP URL(s)	http://vsclass2-4qca.ocsp.gdl.ssc.lt/ Maximum expiration time of OCSP responses: 5 min.	Verified?	Verified
Revocation Tested	Not requesting Websites trust bit for this root.	Verified?	Not Applicable
Trust Bits	Email	Verified?	Verified
SSL Validation Type		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Policy OID(s)	Not EV	Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Tested	Not applicable	Verified?	Not Applicable
Root Stores Included In	Microsoft	Verified?	Verified
Mozilla Applied Constraints	None	Verified?	Verified

Digital Fin	gerprint Information		
SHA-1 Fingerprint	D2:69:5E:12:F5:92:E9:C8:EE:2A:4C:B8:D5:5E:29:5F:EE:6B:2D:31	Verified	
SHA-256 Fingerprint	BC:2A:BB:C4:9A:68:14:37:0D:17:E4:71:14:1C:22:79:43:11:C4:DD:DF:25:67:BE:37:28:3A:89:43:92:E5:D3 Verified?	Verified	

CA Hierarchy	This root has one internally-operated	Verified?	Verified
	Intermediate/Issuing CA: SSC GDL VS Class 2-4 QCA Issues QCs, SSL/TLS client (authentication/signing/encryption) certificates to Government and Public institutions only.		
Externally Operated SubCAs	None, and none planned.	Verified?	Verified
Cross Signing	None, and none planned.	Verified?	Verified
Fechnical Constraint on 3rd party Issuer	CPS section 1.3.2: SSC PKI currently operates a RA which is a wholly owned division of SSC. Besides establishing enrollment procedures, identity verification, identification and authentication of applicants the RA also conveys the Root and CA public key certificates and performs other functions detailed in this CPS.  * Currently SSC doesn't have third-party RAs, however may have registration partners in the future.	Verified?	Verified

Policy Documentation Documents are provided in Lithuanian and English. Lithuanian: CP: https://gdl.repository.ssc.ll/tl/talpykla/dokumental/sertifikato-taisykles-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf CPS: https://gdl.repository.ssc.ll/ll/talpykla/dokumental/sertifikato-taisykles-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf CPS: https://gdl.repository.ssc.ll/en/repository.ssc.ll/ll/talpykla/dokumental/sertifikatymo-velklos-nuostatai-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf  Documents SSC intends to change in the near feature. https://gdl.repository.ssc.ll/en/repository /working-documents/ Draft CPS v4.10: https://gdl.repository.ssc.ll/en/repository /working-documents/estificate-practice-statement-v4.10.pdf  CA Document Repository //documents/entificate-practice-statement-v4.10.pdf  CP Doc Language English  CP https://gdl.repository.ssc.ll/en/repository //documents/certificate-policy-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.4.pdf  CPD Doc Language English  CPS https://gdl.repository.ssc.ll/en/repository //documents/certificate-practice-statement-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf  Other Relevant Documents  RPA: https://gdl.repository.ssc.ll/en/repository //pdd/ //pdf  CPS https://gdl.repository.ssc.ll/en/repository //documents/certificate-practice-statement-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf  Verified? Verified  Verified Verified  Verified Verified  Verified Verified	Verification Policies	and Practices		
Repository //documents/ CP Doc Language English  CP https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /documents/certificate-policy-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.4.pdf  CP Doc Language English  CPS https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /documents/certificate-practice-statement-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf  Other Relevant Documents  RPA: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt /en/repository.ssc.lt /en/repository.ssc.lt /en/repository.ssc.lt /en/repository.ssc.lt /en/repository/documents/ssc-gdl-ca-rpa-v2.pdf	Policy Documentation	and English. Lithuanian: CP: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/lt/talpykla /dokumentai/sertifikato-taisykles-ssc-gdl- ca-v4.4.pdf CPS: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt /lt/talpykla/dokumentai/sertifikavimo- veiklos-nuostatai-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf  Documents SSC intends to change in the near feature. https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /working-documents/  Draft CPS v4.10: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /working-documents/certificate-practice-	Verified?	Verified
CP https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /documents/certificate-policy-ssc-gdl- ca-v4.4.pdf  CP Doc Language English  CPS https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /documents/certificate-practice- statement-ssc-gdl-ca-v4.7.pdf  Other Relevant Documents  RPA: https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt /en/repository/documents/ssc-gdl-ca-rpa- v2.pdf  Verified? Verified  Verified? Verified			Verified?	Verified
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Auditor Website	https://www.tuvit.de/	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Qualifications	http://portal.etsi.org/TBSiteMap /ESI/TrustServiceProviders.aspx	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit	https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/audit/2015/	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Type	ETSI TS 101 456	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Statement Date	7/4/2014	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit		Verified?	Not Applicable
BR Audit Type		Verified?	Not Applicable
BR Audit Statement Date		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Audit		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Audit Type		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Audit Statement Date		Verified?	Not Applicable
BR Commitment to Comply		Verified?	Not Applicable
SSL Verification Procedures	Not requesting Websites trust bit for this root.	Verified?	Not Applicable
EV SSL Verification Procedures		Verified?	Not Applicable
Organization Verification Procedures	CPS sections 3.2.2 through 3.2.5. CPS section 4.1  For each type of entities we verify physical, legal, operational existence and for legal entities we also verify the relationship (representation/authorization) between a physical entity and associated legal entity.  The verification procedures above are applicable to all types of certificates issued by the CA (to the level of assurance required by appropriate certificate policy).	Verified?	Verified
Email Address Verification Procedures	CPS section 3.2.6: Information about the Subject, including email address, is included in certificates only after it is reliably verified.  DRAFT CPS v4.10 section 4: For digital assets whose identifiers are maintained by third parties (e.g. email addresses, domain names etc.) the RA verifies operational existence by directly accessing/using the resource (e.g. a server) or communicating through the resource (e.g. email address) and legal existence - by obtaining independent ownership conformation from the associated registrar.	Verified?	Verified
Code Signing Subscriber Verification Pro	Not requesting Code Signing trust bit for this root.	Verified?	Not Applicable
Multi-Factor Authentication	CPS section 5.	Verified?	Verified

**Network Security** 

The CA's Security management documentation incorporates provisions of CA/B Forum "Network and Certificate System Security Requirements".

An automatic procedure is run regularly to detect any "suspicious mis-issued" certificates including for high-profile

The certificate issuance system, that is not accessible from the public Internet, can be quickly shut down in case of any emergency alert.

CPS section 6.7

Verified? Verified

### Link to Publicly Disclosed and Audited subordinate CA Certificates

Publicly Disclosed & Audited subCAs https://gdl.repository.ssc.lt/en/repository /authority-certificates-and-crls/

Verified? Verified