

Independent Assurance Report

To the management of Verizon Terremark NV (“Verizon Terremark”)

Scope

We have been engaged, in a reasonable assurance engagement, to report on Verizon Terremark’s management assertion that in destroying the Subordinate CA MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA on 25th August 2020 at Diegem, Belgium with the identifying information in Appendix A.

Verizon Terremark has:

- ▶ followed the CA key destruction requirements in its:
 - ▶ [Certificate policy v2.13](#)
 - ▶ [Certification practice statement v5.15](#)
- ▶ included appropriate, detailed procedures and controls in its Key Destruction script(s):
 - ▶ VZ Cybertrust Client CA_Termination_Script_v1-2
- ▶ maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA was destroyed in conformity with the procedures described in its Certificate Policy (CP), Certification Practices Statement (CPS), and Key Destruction script
- ▶ performed, during key destruction process, all procedures required by the Key Destruction script
- ▶ destroyed the MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA in a physically secured environment as described in its CP/CPS
- ▶ destroyed the MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA using personnel in trusted roles under multiple person control and split knowledge

In accordance with CA Key Destruction Criterion 4.6 of the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities, Version 2.2 \(Criteria\)](#).

Certification Authority's responsibilities

Verizon Terremark's management is responsible for its assertion, including the fairness of its presentation, and for destroying its CA keys in accordance with the Criteria.

Our independence and quality control

We have complied with the independence and other ethical requirements of the *Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants* issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants, which is founded on fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behavior.

The firm applies International Standard on Quality Control 1, and accordingly maintains a comprehensive system of quality control including documented policies and procedures regarding compliance with ethical requirements, professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

Auditor's responsibilities

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion based on our procedures. We conducted our procedures in accordance with International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000, *Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information*, issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. This standard requires that we plan and perform our procedures to obtain reasonable assurance about whether, in all material respects, management's assertion is fairly stated, and, accordingly, included:

1. obtaining an understanding of Verizon Terremark 's documented plan of procedures to be performed for the destruction of the MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA;
2. reviewing the detailed CA key destruction script(s) for conformance with industry standard practices;
3. testing and evaluating, during the CA key destruction process, the effectiveness of the actions defined in the key destruction scripts and the actual destruction of the encrypted material blobs;
4. physical observation of all procedures performed during the CA security world destruction process to ensure that the procedures actually performed on 25th August 2020 were in accordance with the Key Destruction script(s) for the MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA and
5. performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

We believe that the evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion.

Opinion

In our opinion, on 25th August 2020 Verizon Terremark's management assertion, as referred to above, is fairly stated, in all material respects, in accordance with CA Key Destruction Criterion 4.6 of the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities, Version 2.2.](#)

This report does not include any representation as to the quality of Verizon Terremark's services beyond those covered by CA Key Destruction Criterion 4.6 of the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities, Version 2.2.](#), nor the suitability of any of Verizon Terremark's services for any customer's intended purpose.

This report is intended solely for the information and use of Verizon Terremark NV management, representatives of the browser vendors and other trust stores, and should not be used by anyone other than these specified parties.

EY Bedrijfsrevisoren BV
Diegem, Belgium

Christel Weymeersch, Partner
September 15, 2020



Assertion of Verizon Terremark NV

15 September 2020

Verizon Terremark NV (Verizon Terremark) Certification Authority has deployed a public key infrastructure where, as part of the key management lifecycle; a key destruction ceremony was conducted to destroy the key material associated with MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA. The key destruction ceremony was formally documented and witnessed by internal and external audit representatives.

Verizon Terremark's management has securely destroyed the private keys in support of its CA operations. The private keys were destroyed in accordance with procedures described in Verizon Terremark's Certificate Policy (CP) and Certification Practice Statement (CPS), and its CA Key Destruction script(s), which were in accordance with CA Key Destruction Criterion 4.6 of the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities, Version 2.2.](#)

Verizon Terremark's management established and maintained effective controls over the destruction of these keys. These controls were designed to provide reasonable assurance of adherence to the above-mentioned practices throughout the key destruction process.

Verizon Terremark's management is responsible for establishing and maintaining procedures over its CA key destructions, and over the integrity and confidentiality of all security world tokens and access keys (including physical keys, tokens, and passwords) used in the destruction of the MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA, and for the CA environment controls relevant to the destruction of its CA keys.

Verizon Terremark's management has assessed the procedures and controls for the destruction of the CA keys. Based on that assessment, in management's opinion, in destroying its CA keys for the MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA on 25th August 2020 at Diegem, Belgium with the identifying information in Appendix A:

Verizon Terremark has

- followed the CA key destruction requirements in its:
 - [Certificate policy v2.13](#)
 - [Certification practice statement v5.15](#)
- included appropriate, detailed procedures and controls in its Key Destruction script(s):
 - VZ Cybertrust Client CA_Termination_Script_v1-2
- maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA was destroyed in conformity with the procedures described in its Certificate Policy (CP), Certification Practices Statement (CPS), and Key Destruction script
- performed, during the key destruction process, all procedures required by the Key Destruction script(s)
- destroyed the MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA in a physically secured environment as described in its CP/CPS
- destroyed the MCS VZ Cybertrust Client CA using personnel in trusted roles under multiple person control and split knowledge



in accordance with CA Key Destruction Criterion 4.6 of the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities, Version 2.2.](#)

Verizon Terremark NV

Culliganlaan 2E, Diegem (Belgium)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "BRB" with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Signed by: Bruce R. Biesecker

Function: Director, Managed Security Services & Identity Management, Verizon Business Group

Date: September 15, 2020



Ernst & Young
Réviseurs d'Entreprises
Bedrijfsrevisoren
De Kleetlaan 2
B - 1831 Diegem

Tel: +32 (0)2 774 91 11
Fax: +32 (0)2 774 90 90
ey.com

Appendix A - identifying information

CA hierarchy

The following table provides an overview of the CAs:

Name	Serial number	Fingerprint	Subject Key Identifier
VZ Cybertrust Client CA	Off43eedd35e6476853069d26e60c8f6	a37f1c0a9dc72298b61f933cb54c65438637b26dbed bd1e6b808279f3dad30e5	47:B1:1D:68:5D:75:4B:08:24:17:64:38:84:39:90:3D:05:30:74:EE