Mozilla - CA Program

Case Information			
Case Number	00000310	Case Record Type	CA Owner/Root Inclusion Request
CA Owner/Certificate Name	Financijska agencija (Fina)	Request Status	Information Verification In Process

Additional Case Information

Subject Include Financijska agencija (Fina) root

Case Reason

certs

Bugzilla Information

Link to Bugzilla Bug

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org /show_bug.cgi?id=1449941

General information about CA's associated organization			
CA Email Alias 1	pma@fina.hr		
CA Email Alias 2			
Company Website	http://www.fina.hr/finadigicert	Verified?	Verified
Organizational Type	Government Agency	Verified?	Verified
Organizational Type (Others)		Verified?	Not Applicable
Geographic Focus	Croatia	Verified?	Verified
Primary Market / Customer Base	Fina CAs are intended for use in electronic business inside and outside the Republic of Croatia. Fina is Qualified Trust Service Provider and operates in accordance eIDAS Regulation (Regulation (EU) 910/2014).	Verified?	Verified
Impact to Mozilla Users	Croatia user base.	Verified?	Verified

Required and	Required and Recommended Practices			
Recommended Practices	https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Required_or_Recommended_Practices	Recommended Practices Statement	I have reviewed Mozilla's lists of Required and Recommended Practices, and	

confirm that we follow those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below.

CA's Response to Recommended Practices

- 1. Publicly Available CP and CPS: CP/CPS section 2.2
- 1.1 Revision Table, updated annually: CP/CPS page 2
- 1.2 CAA Domains listed in CP/CPS: SSL CP/CPS section 4.2.2
- 1.3 BR Commitment to Comply statement: SSL CPS section 1.1.2
- 2. Audit Criteria: CP/CPS section 8
- 3. Revocation of Compromised Certificates: CP/CPS section 4.9
- 4. Verifying Domain Name Ownership: SSL CP section 3.2.2.3
- 5. Verifying Email Address Control:

NEED: If requesting the Email (S/MIME) trust bit, the CP/CPS must explain how the CA confirms that the certificate subscriber owns/controls the email address to be included in the certificate.

Which of the CP/CPS documents apply to S/MIME cert issuance?

In the Qualified and Non-Qualified CP/CPS documents, section 3.2.4 says that e-mail address is not verified.

Reference:

https://wiki.mozilla.org

/CA/Required_or_Recommended_Practices#Verifying_Email_Address_Control

- 6. DNS names go in SAN: SSL CP/CPS section 3.1
- 7. OCSP: CP/CPS section 4.9.9, 4.10
- OCSP SHALL NOT respond "Good" for unissued certs:
- 8. Network Security Controls: CP/CPS section 6.7

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Verified?

Need Response From CA

Potentially Problematic Practices	https://wiki.mozilla.org /CA/Forbidden_or_Problematic_Practices	Problematic Practices Statement	I have reviewed Mozilla's lists of Forbidden and Potentially Problematic Practices, and confirm that we do not do those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below.
CA's Response to Problematic Practices	1. Long-lived Certificates: SSL CP/CPS section 6.3.2 2. Non-Standard Email Address Prefixes for Domain Ownership Validation: SSL CP section 3.2.2.3 3. Issuing End Entity Certificates Directly From Roots: CP/CPS section 1.1, 1.3.1 4. Distributing Generated Private Keys in PKCS#12 Files: SSL CP section 3.2.1 5. Certificates Referencing Local Names or Private IP Addresses: SSL CP section 3.2.2.4 6. Issuing SSL Certificates for .int Domains: SSL CP section 3.2.2.3 7. OCSP Responses Signed by a Certificate Under a Different Root: 8. Issuance of SHA-1 Certificates: CP/CPS section 6.1.5 9. Delegation of Domain / Email Validation to Third Parties: CP/CPS section 1.3.2	Verified?	Verified

Root Case Record #1

Root Ca	se Info	rmation
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Root Certificate Name	Fina Root CA	Root Case No	R00000614
Request Status	Information Verification In Process	Case Number	00000310

Certificate Data	
Certificate Issuer Common Name	Fina Root CA
O From Issuer Field	Financijska agencija
OU From Issuer Field	
Valid From	2015 Nov 24
Valid To	2035 Nov 24
Certificate Serial Number	009833C9A800000005654BC6E
Subject	CN=Fina Root CA; OU=; O=Financijska agencija; C=HR
Signature Hash Algorithm	SHA256WithRSA
Public Key Algorithm	RSA 4096 bits
SHA-1 Fingerprint	6202BF169AF27FA67ED0CEC66B782B83226126E9
SHA-256 Fingerprint	5AB4FCDB180B5B6AF0D262A2375A2C77D25602015D96648756611E2E78C53AD3
Subject + SPKI SHA256	0414F71EAA8C54FE14D9123181A3E56981A24C55FE04B4A81E0956C8443F3D7F
Certificate Version	3

Technical Informa	tion about Root Certificate			
Certificate Summary	Fina Root CA has two internally- operated intermediate certificates, one for state administration bodies, and the other for business entities and citizens.	Verified?	Verified	
Root Certificate Download URL	http://rdc.fina.hr /Root/FinaRootCA.pem	Verified?	Verified	
CRL URL(s)	http://rdc.fina.hr/Root/FinaRootCA.crl http://rdc.fina.hr/RDC2015 /FinaRDCCA2015.crl http://rdc.fina.hr/RDC-TDU2015 /FinaRDC-TDUCA2015.crl SSL CP section 4.9.7: nextUpdate is 24 hours	Verified?	Verified	
OCSP URL(s)	http://ocsp.fina.hr	Verified?	Verified	

Mozilla Trust Bits	Email; Websites	Verified?	Verified
SSL Validation Type	ov	Verified?	Verified
Mozilla EV Policy OID(s)	Not EV	Verified?	Not Applicable
Root Stores Included In		Verified?	Verified
Mozilla Applied Constraints	None	Verified?	Verified

est Website - Valid		Verified?	Need Response From CA
Test Website - Expired			
Test Website - Revoked			
Example Cert			
Test Notes	NEED: 3 test websites as per section 2.2 of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements: At a minimum, the CA SHALL host separate Web pages using Subscriber Certificates that are (i) valid, (ii) revoked, and (iii) expired.		

st Results (Whe	en Requesting the SSL/TLS Trust Bit		
Revocation Tested	NEED: Test with http://certificate.revocationcheck.com/ make sure there aren't any errors.	Verified?	Need Response From CA
CA/Browser Forum Lint Test	NEED: The CA MUST check that they are not issuing certificates that violate any of the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (BRs). BR Lint Test: https://github.com/awslabs/certlint	Verified?	Need Response From CA
Test Website Lint Test	NEED: The CA MUST check that they are not issuing certificates that violate any of the X.509 rules. X.509 Lint Test: https://github.com/kroeckx/x509lint	Verified?	Need Response From CA
EV Tested	N/A	Verified?	Not Applicable

A Hierarchy Information			
CA Hierarchy	CP/CPS section 1.1 http://www.fina.hr /Default.aspx?sec=1866.	Verified?	Verified
	There are two subordinate CAs signed by "Fina Root CA": "Fina RDC		

2015" issues certificates for business
entities (authentication and signature
certificates, electronic seal
certificates, SSL certificates,
certificates for systems and devices)
and for citizens (authentication and
signature certificates) and "Fina RDC-
TDU 2015" issues certificates for
state administration bodies
(authentication and signature
certificates, electronic seal
certificates).

Externally Operated SubCAs	None	Verified?	Verified	
Cross Signing	Not Allowed	Verified?	Verified	
Technical Constraint on 3rd party Issuer	External Registration Authorities are allowed: SSL CPS sections 1.3.2 and 9.6.2 RA Network: The complete registration authority network consisting of the Fina RA Network and of external RAs with which Fina concluded an agreement on the registration services. Section 9.6.1: ensures that internal and external verification of compliance of Fina as the provider of trust services are conducted in accordance with Section 8.1 hereof.	Verified?	Verified	

erification Po	olicies and Practices		
Policy Documentation	Root http://rdc.fina.hr/Root/FinaRootCA-CPCPS2-2-en.pdf	Verified?	Verified
	SSL http://rdc.fina.hr/RDC2015/FinaRDC2015-CPWSA1-2-en.pdf http://rdc.fina.hr/RDC2015/FinaRDC2015-CPSWSA1-2-en.pdf		
	QC http://rdc.fina.hr/RDC2015/FinaRDC2015-CPQC1-2-en.pdf http://rdc.fina.hr/RDC2015/FinaRDC2015-CPSQC1-2-en.pdf		
	NQC http://rdc.fina.hr/RDC2015/FinaRDC2015-CPNQC1-1-en.pdf http://rdc.fina.hr/RDC2015/FinaRDC2015-CPSNQC1-1-en.pdf		
CA Document Repository	https://www.fina.hr/finadigicert	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	English		
СР	http://rdc.fina.hr/RDC2015/FinaRDC2015-CPWSA1-2-en.pdf	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	English		
CPS	http://rdc.fina.hr/Root/FinaRootCA-CPCPS2-2-en.pdf	Verified?	Verified

Other Relevant Documents	Audit Reports: http://rdc.fina.hr/CAR/67100UE_s.pdf http://rdc.fina.hr/CAR/9779UE_s.pdf http://rdc.fina.hr/CAR/9780UE_s.pdf http://rdc.fina.hr/CAR/67101UE_s.pdf http://rdc.fina.hr/CAR/6799UE_s.pdf http://rdc.fina.hr/CAR/6799UE_s.pdf	Verified?	Verified
Auditor	TÜVIT - TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Location	Germany	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit	http://rdc.fina.hr/CAR/67100UE_s.pdf	Verified?	Not Verified
Standard Audit Type	ETSI EN 319 411	Verified?	Not Verified
Standard Audit Statement Date	6/26/2018	Verified?	Not Verified
BR Audit	http://rdc.fina.hr/CAR/67100UE_s.pdf	Verified?	Not Verified
BR Audit Type	ETSI EN 319 411	Verified?	Not Verified
BR Audit Statement Date	6/26/2018	Verified?	Not Verified
EV SSL Audit		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV SSL Audit Type		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV SSL Audit Statement Date		Verified?	Not Applicable
BR Commitment to Comply	SSL CPS section 1.1.2	Verified?	Verified
BR Self Assessment	NEED: If requesting Websites trust bit, attach BR Self Assessment (https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/BR Self-Assessment) to the Bugzilla Bug.	Verified?	Need Response From CA
SSL Verification Procedures	SSL CP section 3.2.2.3	Verified?	Verified
EV SSL Verification Procedures	cation		Not Applicable
Organization Verification Procedures	CP/CPS sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.5	Verified?	Verified
Email Address Verification Procedures	Verification how the CA confirms that the certificate subscriber owns/controls the email		Need Response From CA
Code Signing Subscriber Verification Pro	Mozilla is no longer accepting requests to enable the Code Signing trust bit.	Verified?	Not Applicable

Multi-Factor Authentication	CP/CPS section 6.5.1	Verified?	Verified
Network Security	CP/CPS section 6.7	Verified?	Verified