

CA's Self-Assessment of CP/CPS documents to CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (BRs)

Introduction :

- 1) Network Solutions Certificate Authority
- 2) Audit will evaluate and cover the following root certificates, of which all passed the 2016-2017 audit.

(SHA-2)

Network Solutions Certificate Authority

(SHA-2) Network Solutions ECC Certificate Authority

(SHA-2) Network Solutions ECC EV Server CA

(SHA-2) Network Solutions RSA Certificate Authority

(SHA-2) Network Solutions RSA EV Server CA

Network Solutions Certificate Authority

Network Solutions DV Server CA 2

Network Solutions EV Server CA 2

Network Solutions OV Server CA 2
- 3) Used Baseline Requirements v. 1.5.6
- 4) CPS Statements were updated and evaluated by legal team at Network Solutions and Web.com.

Version 2.8

<https://legal.web.com/Document/Get/CertificationPracticeStatement?language=English>

<https://legal.web.com/Document/Get/CPSforEVCertification?language=English>

Version 1.6

5) Network Solutions will notate below anything that we are working to update this year.
- | BR Section Number | List the specific documents and section numbers of those documents which meet the requirements of each BR section | Explain how the CA's listed documents meet the requirements of each BR section. |
|--|---|--|
| 1.2.1. Revisions
Note the Effective Date for each item in the table. Certificates created after each Effective Date are expected to be in compliance with the item. Make sure your CA is in compliance with each of these items. After careful consideration, <i>indicate if your CA is fully compliant with all items in the table, or clearly indicate action that your CA is taking to improve compliance.</i> | Network Solutions Certification Practice Statement | Network Solutions has reviewed each item in section 1.2.1 and do acknowledge this CA is in compliance with all the forum ballot items. We completed 1.4.4 in February 2018. We have plans to integrate CNAME validation method in preparation for new root certs to be included in Q4 of 2018. We do not use the not permitted validation methods as stated in ballot 218. |
| 1.2.2. Relevant Dates
Note the Compliance date for each item in the table. Those are the dates by which your CP/CPS and practices are expected to be updated to comply with the item. Make sure your CA is in compliance with each of these items. After careful consideration, <i>indicate if your CA is fully compliant with all items in the table, or clearly indicate action that your CA is taking to improve compliance.</i> | Network Solutions Certification Practice Statement | Network Solutions intends to include the most current link to the official version 1.5.6 in the upcoming quarterly revision, on or before June 30, to the CPS statement, adding the suggested clause as mentioned in section 2.2 Publication of Information. |
| 1.3.2. Registration Authorities
Indicate whether your CA allows for Delegated Third Parties, or not. <i>Indicate which sections of your CP/CPS specify such requirements, and how the CP/CPS meets the BR requirements for RAs.</i> | Network Solutions does delegate tasks to third parties. CPS section 1.11 | We do allow for deligated third parties, specifically, Comodo, to represent and assist our CA to validate organizational subject details in OV and EV to maintain and fullfill best business practices and validation standards. |
| 2.1. Repositories
<i>Provide the direct URLs to the CA's repositories</i> | https://legal.web.com/TermsAndConditions/SslRepository | SSL Legal Repository is available from Network Solutions 'legal' link in website footer. |

<p>2.2. Publication of information</p> <p>"The CA SHALL publicly give effect to these Requirements and represent that it will adhere to the latest published version."</p> <p>--> <i>Copy the specific text that is used into the explanation in this row. (in English)</i></p>	<p>Network Solutions Certification Practice Statement section 3.12</p>	<p>Network Solutions conforms to the current version of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates published by the Certificate Authority/Browser Forum at http://www.cabforum.org. In the event of any inconsistency between this CPS and the Baseline Requirements, the Baseline Requirements take precedence over this document. CPS Statements were updated and evaluated by legal team at Network Solutions and Web.com on March 31, 2018. As stated in section 1.2.2, Network Solutions intends to include the most current link to the official BR version 1.5.6 in the upcoming quarterly revision, on or before June 30, to the CPS statement, adding the suggested clause as mentioned in section 2.2 Publication of Information.</p>
<p>2.2. Publication of information</p> <p>"The CA SHALL host test Web pages that allow Application Software Suppliers to test their software with Subscriber Certificates that chain up to each publicly trusted Root Certificate. At a minimum, the CA SHALL host separate Web pages using Subscriber Certificates that are (i) valid, (ii) revoked, and (iii) expired."</p> <p>--> <i>List the URLs to the three test websites (valid, revoked, expired) for each root certificate under consideration. If you are requesting EV treatment, then the TLS cert for each test website must be EV.</i></p>		<p>CN=Network Solutions https://www.networksolutions.com/ https://www.current-expired-ns-cert.com/ https://www.current-revoked-ns-cert.com/</p> <p>CN= Network Solutions Certificate Authority https://www.networksolutions.com/ https://www.current-expired-ns-cert.com https://www.current-revoked-ns-cert.com</p> <p>CN= Network Solutions ECC Certificate Authority https://netsolencryption.com https://ecc-expired-ns-cert.com/ https://ecc-revoked-ns-cert.com/</p> <p>CN= Network Solutions RSA Certificate Authority https://www.rsa-valid-ns-cert.com/ https://www.rsa-expired-ns-cert.com/ https://www.rsa-revoked-ns-cert.com/</p>
<p>2.3. Time or frequency of publication</p> <p><i>Indicate your CA's policies/practices to ensure that the BRs are reviewed regularly, and that the CA's CP/CPS is updated annually.</i></p>		<p>We review the CPS statements on a quarterly basis and update the document as necessary and required based on CAB guidelines and ballot issues. The latest update was completed on March 31, 2018.</p>
<p>2.4. Access controls on repositories</p> <p><i>Acknowledge that all Audit, CP, CPS documents required by Mozilla's CA Certificate Policy and the BRs will continue to be made publicly available.</i></p>	<p>SSL Repository contains: Certification Practice Statement CPSforEVCertification Extended Validation (EV) Certificate Subscriber Agreement Relying Party Agreement Party Agreement Relying Party Guarantee SSL Certificate and Assured Site Seal Subscriber Agreement</p>	<p>All CPS and SSL Repositories will continue to remain publicly available at this location: https://legal.web.com/</p>

3.2.2.1 Identity If the Subject Identity Information in certificates is to include the name or address of an organization, <i>indicate how your CP/CPS meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>	We disclose this information on CPS section 2.12.4. Also, subject identification is listed in cooresponding tab attached to this file.	Yes, we are in compliance and make the Subject Identity information publically available in both CPS statements.
3.2.2.2 DBA/Tradename If the Subject Identity Information in certificates is to include a DBA or tradename, <i>indicate how your CP/CPS meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>	We disclose this information on CPS section 2.12.4. Also, subject identification is listed in cooresponding tab attached to this file.	
3.2.2.3 Verification of Country If the subject:countryName field is present in certificates, <i>indicate how your CP/CPS meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>	We disclose this information on CPS section 2.12.4. Also, subject identification is listed in cooresponding tab attached to this file.	We only insert the subject:countryName field for OV and EV SSL certificates, and do not insert it for DV certificates, so the countryName always relates to the subject identity as verified in our CPS section 2.12.4
3.2.2.4 Validation of Domain Authorization or Control <i>Indicate which of the methods of domain validation your CA uses, and where this is described in your CP/CPS. The CA's CP/CPS must clearly describe the acceptable methods of domain validation. It is *not* sufficient for the CP/CPS to merely reference the BRs. Enough information must be directly provided in the CP/CPS for the reader to be able to understand how the CA performs domain validation.</i>	CPS Section 4.2.1 Secure Server Certificate Application Validation Process	
3.2.2.4.1 Validating the Applicant as a Domain Contact If your CA uses this method of domain validation, <i>indicate where in the CP/CPS it is described, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>		We do not use this validating method.
3.2.2.4.2 Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain Contact If your CA uses this method of domain validation, <i>indicate where in the CP/CPS it is described, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>	CPS Section 4.2.1 Secure Server Certificate Application Validation Process	
3.2.2.4.3 Phone Contact with Domain Contact If your CA uses this method of domain validation, <i>indicate where in the CP/CPS it is described, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>		We do not use this validating method.
3.2.2.4.4 Constructed Email to Domain Contact If your CA uses this method of domain validation, <i>indicate where in the CP/CPS it is described, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>	CPS Section 4.2.1 Secure Server Certificate Application Validation Process	
3.2.2.4.5 Domain Authorization Document If your CA uses this method of domain validation, <i>indicate where in the CP/CPS it is described, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>	CPS Section 4.2.1 Secure Server Certificate Application Validation Process	This method is rarely utilized and is under consideration for removal on our upcoming CPS revision at the end of Q2.
3.2.2.4.6 Agreed-Upon Change to Website If your CA uses this method of domain validation, <i>indicate where in the CP/CPS it is described, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>	CPS Section 4.2.1 Secure Server Certificate Application Validation Process	
3.2.2.4.7 DNS Change If your CA uses this method of domain validation, <i>indicate where in the CP/CPS it is described, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>	CPS Section 4.2.1 Secure Server Certificate Application Validation Process	

3.2.2.4.8 IP Address If your CA uses this method of domain validation, <i>indicate where in the CP/CPS it is described, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>		We do not use this validating method.
3.2.2.4.9 Test Certificate If your CA uses this method of domain validation, <i>indicate where in the CP/CPS it is described, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>		We do not use this validating method.
3.2.2.4.10. TLS Using a Random Number If your CA uses this method of domain validation, <i>indicate where in the CP/CPS it is described, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>		We do not use this validating method.
3.2.2.5 Authentication for an IP Address If your CA allows IP Addressss to be listed in certificates, <i>indicate how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>	CPS Section 4.2.1 Secure Server Certificate Application Validation Process	This method is rarely utilized and is under consideration for removal on our upcoming CPS revision at the end of Q2.
3.2.2.6 Wildcard Domain Validation If your CA allows certificates with a wildcard character (*) in a CN or subjectAltName of type DNS-ID, then <i>indicate how your CA meets the requirements in this seciton of the BRs.</i>		We coordinate with Comodo when necessary to use an automated process to fetch the Public Suffix List. We use the data in the PSL to determine if a domain to which a wildcard is to be prepended is a public suffix.
3.2.2.7 Data Source Accuracy <i>Indicate how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>		We securely collect data from customers when they request certs to be issued. The list of Reliable Data Sources that we use verify Subject Identity information is a fixed list from which our validators (and systems) may not vary. When
3.2.2.8 CAs MUST check and process CAA records <i>Indicate your CA's understanding that this section is a requirement as of September 8, 2017, and how your CA meets the requirements in this section of the BRs.</i>	CPS Section 4.2.4 Certificate Authority Authorization	We understand and comply with the requirements of 3.2.2.8, using the method stated in our CPS.
3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity	CPS 4.2.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal Name of the Individual (PUBLIC) • Organizational unit (PUBLIC) • Street, city, postal/zip code, country (PUBLIC) • Server Software Identification • Payment Information • Administrator contact full name, email address and telephone • Billing contact persons and organizational representative • Fully Qualified Domain Name / Network Server Name / Public or Private IP (PUBLIC) • Public Key (PUBLIC) • Proof of registration of domain name • Proof of existence and organizational status of the Organization • Subscriber agreement, signed or agreed to online
3.2.5. Validation of Authority	CPS Sections 1.2.1 and 4.3.3	
3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation or Certification Disclose all cross-certificates in the CA hierarchies under evaluation.	CPS Section 2.1.1 and lifecycle management 3.5.1	Disclosed in the CCADB

4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application Indicate how your CA identifies suspicious certificate requests.	CPS Sections 5.29 and 5.30	Following best practices of CCADB, Network Solutions checks credentials against accounts. When previous attempts have been made to obtain a certificate and either issuance was blocked or a certificate revoked because of suspected fraud or other violation of terms of the subscriber agreement, we can suspend and blacklist IP addresses from which such applications have been made. We also have the ability to blacklist domain names where we become aware that the domain has been used for fraudulent use or otherwise has been the subject of activity counter to the terms of the subscriber agreement.
4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities	CPS Section 4.1	
4.2. Certificate application processing	CPS Section 4.1	
4.2.1 Re-use of validation information is limited to 825 days <i>Indicate your CA's understanding that this is a requirement as of March 1, 2018, and indicate how your CA meets the requirements of this section.</i>		Network Solutions has implemented this requirement to limit the re-use of validation information to 825 days.
4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions <i>Indicate how your CA identifies high risk certificate requests.</i>	CPS Section 1.6	We have a process which examines subject details and domain names, for matches or near matches to some known high profile or pre-notified names that may indicate that a certificate is at a higher than normal risk of fraudulent applications being made and in those cases we flag a certificate application for a manual review.
4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications	Not applicable to Network Solutions	There is an automated feed of new gTLDs from ICANN and our system incorporates checks on the validity of the domain name taking the list of gTLDs into account. This section actually has very little effect as we have not been able to issue trusted certificates for Internal Names for some time.
4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance	Not applicable to Network Solutions	The only certificates we issue from our root CAs are intermediate CA certificates. Our CA has no facility for the automated signature of such certificates, so this activity necessarily involves manual intervention by privileged users to sign such certificates.
4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate <i>Indicate which section in your CA's CP/CPS contains the list of reasons for revoking certificates.</i>	CPS 4.13, 4.13.1 and 4.13.2	The reasons for revoking certs: 1) Requests from customers 2) Insufficient payment or fraud detected 3) AUP suspension occurs to customer. 4) Revoke based on abuse report. While we comply in fact with the requirements of BR 4.9.1.1, our CPS does not delineate all of the options offered by BR 4.9.1.1. We will add to the CPS the delta needed to make explicit all of the options available under BR 4.9.1.1 in the next CPS revision, scheduled for end of June.

4.9.1.2 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate <i>Indicate which section in your CA's CP/CPS contains the list of reasons for revoking subordinate CA certificates.</i>	CPS 4.13, 4.13.1 and 4.13.2	We have a contractual relationship with Comodo that would explain the nature of a revocation incident.
4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation	CPS section 4.13 of Network Solutions Certification Practice Statement	Customers, Web.com, Comodo
4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request	CPS section 4.13 of Network Solutions Certification Practice Statement	Outlined in the CPS and CPS for EV. Authorized agent level employees, with the permission of the customer, may request to revoke their certificate. This is done through the Network Solutions Secure SSL Control Panel within the Account Manager.
4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request	CPS section 4.13 of Network Solutions Certification Practice Statement	We will abide by the requirements that mandate review within 24 hours.
4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency <i>Indicate if your CA publishes CRLs. If yes, then please test your CA's CRLs.</i>	CPS 4.13.2	An updated CRL is published on the Network Solutions website every 24 hours, however under special circumstances the CRL may be published more frequently. Example of a revoked certificate : https://www.current-revoked-ns-cert.com/
4.9.9. On-line Revocation/Status Checking Availability	CPS section 4.13 of Network Solutions Certification Practice Statement	The SSL Control Panel available to customers in the Account Manager will confirm the status.
4.9.10. On-line Revocation Checking Requirements <i>Indicate how your CA meets all of the requirements listed in this section, including support of GET, update frequency, preventing erroneous return of "good" status.</i>	Not listed in CPS, as handled by Comodo per contractual agreement.	We rely on the contractual agreement with Comodo that has OCSP responders which support both GET and POST requests. Their OCSP responses are valid for 96 hours (4 days). As stated in 7.3, our OCSP responders are capable of providing a 'good' or 'revoked' status for all certificates issued under the terms of this CPS.
4.9.11. Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available <i>Indicate if your CA supports OCSP stapling.</i>	Not applicable to Network Solutions	We support stapling but do not enforce its use and do not amend our CPS where stapling is to be used.
4.10.1. Operational Characteristics	CPS 1.5	
4.10.2. Service Availability	CPS 1.5	
5. MANAGEMENT, OPERATIONAL, AND PHYSICAL CONTROLS	CPS 2.1.6 and 2.2	Network Solutions CA operates an ISO27001 compliant ISMS which, as well as the WebTrust audits, is subject to SOC2 and SOC3 audits.
5.2.2. Number of Individuals Required per Task	CPS 1.2	Over 45 in various capacities: Technical, Organizational, Practices and Legal.
5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements	Not listed in CPS	We do not to list this information publically.
5.3.3. Training Requirements and Procedures	CPS 5.17	
5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements	CPS 5.17	
5.3.7. Independent Contractor Controls	CPS 5.17	
5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded <i>Indicate how your CA meets the requirements of this section.</i>	CPS 6.4	From time to time, events outside of the control of Network Solutions may delay the issuance process however Network Solutions will make every reasonable effort to meet issuance times and to make applicants aware of any factors that may affect issuance times in a timely manner.

5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Logs	See section 3.5.4 Log Retention Period in Certification Practice Statement	Network Solutions follows a protocol to retain the audit logs for a period of seven years.
5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments <i>Indicate how your CA meets the requirements of this section.</i>	Provided to EY during audit assessment period. Not publically displayed.	We conduct an annual risk assessment on our certificate authority as part of our ISMS operation. This is subject to audit under WebTrust.
5.5.2. Retention Period for Archive	See sections 2.13 and 3.5.4 Log Retention Period in Certification Practice Statement	Network Solutions maintains logs for a period of seven years to comply with applicable laws.
5.7.1. Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures <i>Indicate how your CA meets the requirements of this section.</i>	CPS 2.1.6 and 2.2	We have a business continuity plan. We have multiple locations from which our CA could operate.
6.1.1. Key Pair Generation	CPS 2.1.1	The UTN and AddTrust CA Root key pairs are protected in accordance with an AICPA/CICA WebTrust program compliant infrastructure and CPS. Network Solutions ensures the protection of its CA Root signing key pairs with the use of Hardware Signing Module (HSM) devices, which are certified to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or higher, for key generation, storage and use.
6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber	CPS 2.1.1	We don't openly provide a private key to users as we install the certs for them on our hosting platform. However, If we have a request from customer to attain their private key we provide an encrypted file, which the end user must be able to decrypt.
6.1.5. Key Sizes	CPS 2.1.1	2048
6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking	CPS 2.1.2	We verify RSA and ECDSA keys, including subscriber keys per BR 6.1.6.
6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes	CPS 2.1.2	Installation
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls	CPS 2.8	Network Solutions strongly urges Subscribers to use a password or equivalent authentication method to prevent unauthorized access and usage of the Subscriber private key. The Subscriber is solely responsible for protection of the Subscriber's private keys. Network Solutions maintains no involvement in the generation, protection or distribution of such keys as part of the Certificate services.
6.2.5. Private Key Archival	CPS 2.1.3	When the Network Solutions CA Root Signing Key pair expire they will be archived for at least 7 years. The keys will be archived in a secure cryptographic hardware module as per their secure storage prior to expiration, as detailed in section 2.1.1 of this CPS.
6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module	Not applicable to Network Solutions, as reflected in CPS 2.7	We do not provide this to users.
6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module	CPS 2.8	We do not provide storage on this platform.

6.3.2 Certificates issued after March 1, 2018, MUST have a Validity Period no greater than 825 days <i>Indicate how your CA meets the requirements of this section.</i>	CPS 4.8	Network Solutions has removed the ability on storefront and in all backend billing and processing systems to sell or renew any 3 year term certificates as of March 1, 2018.
6.5.1. Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements The CA SHALL enforce multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of directly causing certificate issuance. <i>Indicate how your CA meets the requirements of this section.</i>	CPS 1.7	Network Solutions relies on UTN-USERFIRST-Hardware, AddTrust External CA Root for its Root CA Certificates for Digital Certificates issued after July 20, 2006. These relationships allow Network Solutions to issue highly trusted Digital Certificates by inheriting the trust level associated with the UTN root certificate named UTN-USERFIRST-Hardware and the AddTrust root certificate named AddTrust External CA Root.
7.1. Certificate profile CAs SHALL generate non-sequential Certificate serial numbers greater than 0 containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG. <i>Indicate how your CA meets the requirements of this section.</i>	CPS 4.42	Network Solutions CA generates 128 bit serial numbers as provided from a secure API call to Comodo. The numbers are the output of a CSPRNG. We have a separate uniqueness check that verifies that serial numbers are never re-used.
7.1.1. Version Number(s)	CPS 1.2.1	All Network Solutions certificate are x.509 v3
7.1.2. Certificate Content and Extensions; Application of RFC 5280	CPS 4.2.4	Network Solutions complies with all of the requirements of BR 7.1.2 and its sub-sections. We will consider the need to add this to the upcoming CPS statement update within the audit period.
7.1.2.1 Root CA Certificate	2.12.1	In compliance and in progress with audit of all certificates from June 30, 2017 to March 31, 2018
7.1.2.2 Subordinate CA Certificate	CPS 5.15	Network Solutions refrains from using the subscriber's private key corresponding to the public key in a Network Solutions issued certificate to issue end-entity SSL Certificate or subordinate CAs
7.1.2.3 Subscriber Certificate	CPS 2.10	Network solutions follows recommended extensions id-qt 1 (RFC 5280]
7.1.2.4 All Certificates	CPS 2.12.1 also, roots are exact as listed on cooresponding tab and on WebTrust audit reports	In compliance and in progress with audit of all certificates from June 30, 2017 to March 31, 2018
7.1.2.5 Application of RFC 5280	CPS 2.6.1	Network Solutions does not consider a precertificate to qualify or be considered a certificate.
7.1.3. Algorithm Object Identifiers	CPS 4.1.1	Network Solutions does not issue SHA-1 certificates under these guidelines. Additionally, we do not issue SHA-2 end entity certificates from SHA-1 subordinate CAs.
7.1.4. Name Forms	CPS 4.3.1	Acceptable names are listed in the CPS section 4.3.1.
7.1.4.1 Issuer Information		Network Solutions CA certificates, the content of the Certificate Issuer Distinguished Name field matches the Subject DN of the Issuing CA to support Name chaining.
7.1.4.2 Subject Information - Subscriber Certificates	CPS 2.10.1	In compliance

7.1.4.3 Subject Information - Root Certificates and Subordinate CA Certificates	CPS 2.10.1	In compliance
7.1.5. Name Constraints <i>Indicate your CA's understanding of Mozilla's requirement to disclose in the CCADB all subordinate CA certificates that are not technically constrained as described in this section.</i>	CPS 2.6.2	Network Solutions understands the requirement to disclose all subordinate CA certificates that are not technically constrained by name.
7.1.6. Certificate Policy Object Identifier	CPS 4.1.1	Network Solutions understands and complies with the BRs 7.1.6 concerning the use of Policy Object Identifiers. We will clarify in CPS in the next revision within the upcoming audit period July 2018.
7.1.6.1 Reserved Certificate Policy Identifiers	CPS 4.1.1	
7.1.6.2 Root CA Certificates	https://cert.webtrust.org/ViewSeal?id=2290	
7.1.6.3 Subordinate CA Certificates	https://cert.webtrust.org/ViewSeal?id=2292	
7.1.6.4 Subscriber Certificates	CPS 2.10, 2.10.1	
8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS		
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment The period during which the CA issues Certificates SHALL be divided into an unbroken sequence of audit periods. An audit period MUST NOT exceed one year in duration. For new CA Certificates: The point-in-time readiness assessment SHALL be completed no earlier than twelve months prior to issuing Publicly-Trusted Certificates and SHALL be followed by a complete audit under such scheme within ninety (90) days of issuing the first Publicly-Trusted Certificate. <i>Indicate your CA's understanding of this requirement, and how your CA meets the requirements of this section.</i>	CPS 1.5 - Annual audits by Ernst & Young for SSL products	We understand and comply with annual audits that do not have any gaps or unbroken sequence of audits. The upcoming audit will cover July 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018.
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor <i>Indicate how your CA meets the requirements of this section.</i>	CPS 1.5 - Annual audits by Ernst & Young for SSL products	Network Solutions CA engages EY LLC to perform WebTrust audits. EY are independent from us, are skilled in performing WebTrust for CAs audits, employ properly trained and skilled individuals to perform the audits, are bound by a professional code of ethics, and maintains professional LE&O insurance of > \$1m.
8.4. Topics covered by assessment	CPS 1.5 - Annual audits by Ernst & Young for SSL products	Every year, Network Solutions provides EY with evidence that we maintain the integrity of keys and certificates, along with protection for the lifecycle of the SSLs. Information of the subscriber is properly collected and authenticated.
8.6. Communication of results	CPS 1.5 - Annual audits by Ernst & Young for SSL products	See audit WebTrust reports and management assertions.

<p>Also indicate your understanding and compliance with Mozilla’s Root Store Policy, which says:</p> <p>“Full-surveillance period-of-time audits MUST be conducted and updated audit information provided no less frequently than annually. Successive audits MUST be contiguous (no gaps).</p> <p>....</p> <p>The publicly-available documentation relating to each audit MUST contain at least the following clearly-labelled information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- name of the company being audited;- name and address of the organization performing the audit;- Distinguished Name and SHA256 fingerprint of each root and intermediate certificate that was in scope;- audit criteria (with version number) that were used to audit each of the certificates;- a list of the CA policy documents (with version numbers) referenced during the audit;- whether the audit is for a period of time or a point in time;- the start date and end date of the period, for those that cover a period of time;- the point-in-time date, for those that are for a point in time;- the date the report was issued (which will necessarily be after the end date or point-in-time date); and- For ETSI, a statement to indicate if the audit was a full audit, and which parts of the criteria were applied, e.g. DVCP, OVCP, NCP, NCP+, LCP, EVCP, EVCP+, QCP-w, Part1 (General Requirements), and/or Part 2 (Requirements for trust service providers). <p>“</p>		<p>We comply with Mozilla's root store policy to follow best practices related to audit compliance, in that we maintain a strict adherence to the annual schedule as set forth by the EY organization and CAB forum policy.</p>
8.7. Self-Audits	Self audit is provided to EY during audit assessment period. Not publically displayed.	The Legal department and Product Manager at Network Solutions complete regular self audits of all SSL products under management and provide necessary evidence every audit period.
9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties	CPS 5.27 and 5.28	Network Solutions certificates may include a brief statement describing limitations of liability, limitations in the value of transactions to be accomplished, validation period, intended purpose of the certificate and disclaimers of warranty that may apply. Subscribers must agree to Network Solutions Certificate and Site Seal Subscriber Agreement before signing-up for a certificate, as well as agreeing to bind their relying parties to the Network Solutions Relying Party Agreement.
9.6.3. Subscriber Representations and Warranties	CPS 5.16 and 5.17	In compliance
9.8. Limitations of liability	CPS 5.3	In compliance

9.9.1. Indemnification by CAs	CPS 5.3.6	In compliance
9.16.3. Severability	CPS 5.42	In compliance