## Mozilla - CA Program

Case Information			
Case Number	00000076	Case Record Type	CA Owner/Root Inclusion Request
CA Owner/Certificate Name	Government of Tunisia, Agence National de Certification Electronique / National Digital Certification Agency (ANCE/NDCA)	Request Status	Ready for Public Discussion

### **Additional Case Information**

Subject Include Government of Tunisia Root Case Reason

## **Bugzilla Information**

Link to Bugzilla Bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\_bug.cgi?

id=1233645

#### General information about CA's associated organization **CA Email Alias 1** ndca.pki@certification.tn **CA Email Alias 2 Company Website** http://www.certification.tn/ Verified? Verified **Organizational** Government Agency Verified? Verified Type Organizational Verified? Not Applicable Type (Others) Geographic Tunisia Verified? Verified Focus Verified **Primary Market** / This is the Tunisian national certification authority. Verified? **Customer Base** Impact to Mozilla National Digital Certification Agency (NDCA) operates under Verified? Verified Tunisia's Electronic Signature Law 83-2000 (http://www.certification.tn/sites/default/files/documents/loi\_2000-83 fr.pdf). All Mozilla users that would like to access Tunisian websites are likely to encounter the root certificate of the NDCA while web browsing, sending/receiving email to their own MTA, sending/receiving S/MIME email, etc.

#### **Required and Recommended Practices** Recommended https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended\_Practices#CA\_Recommended\_Practices Recommended I have **Practices Practices** reviewed Statement Mozilla's list of Recommended Practices, and confirm that we follow those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below. Verified? CA's 1) Publicly Available CP and CPS: Yes Verified 2) CA Hierarchy: Yes Response to

#### Recommended Practices

- 3) Audit Criteria: Yes
- 4) Document Handling of IDNs in CP/CPS: Use of IDNs isn't allowed. The CA does not allow the use of a domain name containing non-ASCII characters in certificates.
- 5) Revocation of Compromised Certificates: Server CP section 4.9
- 6) Verifying Domain Name Ownership: Yes
- 7) Verifying Email Address Control: Not applicable, Email trust bit not requested.
- 8) Verifying Identity of Code Signing Certificate Subscriber: Not applicable.
- 9) DNS names go in SAN: Yes. This extension contains at least one entry. Each entry is either a DNS Name containing the FQDN or the IP address of a server.
- 10) Domain owned by a Natural Person: Not applicable. The CA does not issue certificates for Natural Person. See http://www.certification.tn/rpa
- 11) OCSP: Yes
- 12) Network Security Controls: Yes

## **Forbidden and Potentially Problematic Practices**

### Potentially Problematic Practices

https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic\_Practices#Potentially\_problematic\_CA\_practices Problematic

Practices Statement

Verified?

I have reviewed Mozilla's list of Potentially Problematic Practices, and confirm that we do not do those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below.

Verified

Response to Problematic Practices

CA's

1) Long-lived DV certificates: No. The CA does not issue long-lived SSL certs.

2) Wildcard DV SSL certificates: OV certificates may include a wildcard asterisk character. Before issuing a Wildcard cert the RA verifies that the applicant has either the right to use or control the FQDN listed in the certificate, or is authorized by a person having such rights in order to obtain a certificate containing the FQDN (see section 4.2.1 of the CP)

3) Email Address Prefixes for DV Certs: For each FQDN to be included in a certificate, the Server CA confirms that the applicant is either the Domain Name Registrant or has control over the FQDN using the information listed in the "registrant", "technical", or "administrative" WHOIS records

- "administrative" WHOIS records.
  4) Delegation of Domain / Email validation to third parties: Not Applicable (No Delegation of domain/email validation to third parties.
- 5) Issuing end entity certificates directly from roots: No
- 6) Allowing external entities to operate subordinate CAs: No
- 7) Distributing generated private keys in PKCS#12 files: No. Subscribers generate their own key pairs. The CA does not issue the private key for the end-user (sections 6.1.2.2 and 6.1.3).
- 8) Certificates referencing hostnames or private IP addresses: No, the Server CA issues only SSL certificates which refer to domain names that are resolvable using the public DNS infrastructure.
- 9) Issuing SSL Certificates for Internal Domains: No, the Server CA issues only certificates to domain names recognized in the official database AFRINIC or INTERNIC (see section 4.2.1 of Server CP).
- 10) OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root: No
- 11) SHA-1 Certificates: The CA issue only sha256 certificates (see sections 7.1.1 for AC certificate profile and section 7.1.2 for end-user Certificate Profile).
- 12) Generic names for CAs: No
- 13) Lack of Communication With End Users:

http://www.certification.tn/en/content/technical-support

14) Backdating the notBefore date: The notBefore date is the date of issuing the certificate by the Server CA. The timestamp is always set to 00:00:00 GMT.

# Root Case Record # 1

## **Root Case Information**

Root Certificate Tunisian Root Certificate Authority - Root Case No R00000106

Name TunRootCA2

Request Status Ready for Public Discussion Case Number 00000076

Certificate Data	
Certificate Issuer Common Name	Tunisian Root Certificate Authority - TunRootCA2
O From Issuer Field	National Digital Certification Agency
OU From Issuer Field	
Valid From	2015 May 05
Valid To	2027 May 05
Certificate Serial Number	2166150505270505bc8ab01daf0abec4
Subject	CN=Tunisian Root Certificate Authority - TunRootCA2, OU=null, O=National Digital Certification Agency, C=TN
Signature Hash Algorithm	sha256WithRSAEncryption
Public Key Algorithm	RSA 4096 bits
SHA-1 Fingerprint	96:38:63:3C:90:56:AE:88:14:A0:65:D2:3B:DC:60:A0:EE:70:2F:A7
SHA-256 Fingerprint	C7:95:FF:8F:F2:0C:96:66:88:F0:64:A1:E0:91:42:1D:31:10:A3:45:6C:17:EC:24:04:B9:98:73:87:41:F6:22
Certificate Fingerprint	0F:31:0D:C7:29:9B:D0:C9:BB:62:F1:52:81:C3:BF:AB:10:AC:69:04:1D:C0:FE:49:4A:2F:83:D5:25:30:2A:FC
Certificate Version	3

Summary C. Root Certificate ht Download URL	his root has internally-operated subordinate As.  his root has internally-operated subordinate As.  his root has internally-operated subordinate As.	Verified?	Verified
Download URL	ttp://www.certification.tn/pub/TunRootCA2.crt	Verified?	
		30111041	Verified
Se	tp://crl.certification.tn/TunRootCA2.crl erver CP section 2.3: A new CRL is ublished every 24 hours	Verified?	Verified
Ō	tp://ocsp.certification.tn CSP responses have a maximum expiration ne of 10 days.	Verified?	Verified
Trust Bits W	/ebsites	Verified?	Verified
SSL Validation O	V	Verified?	Verified
EV Policy OID(s) No	ot EV	Verified?	Not Applicable
Root Stores M Included In	licrosoft	Verified?	Verified
Mozilla Applied No Constraints	one	Verified?	Verified

Test Websites or Ex	kample Cert		
Test Website - Valid	https://valid-ov.certification.tn	Verified?	Verified
Test Website - Expired	https://expired-ov.certification.tn		
Test Website - Revoked	https://revoked-ov.certification.tn		
Example Cert	https://webmail.ance.tn		
Test Notes			

Test Results (When Requesting the SSL/TLS Trust Bit)			
Revocation Tested	https://certificate.revocationcheck.com/webmail.ance.tn no errors.	Verified?	Verified
CA/Browser Forum Lint Test	Tested. No errors.	Verified?	Verified
Test Website Lint Test	Tested. No errors.	Verified?	Verified
EV Tested	Not requesting EV treatment	Verified?	Not Applicable

CA Hierarchy Infor	mation			
CA Hierarchy	This root will have internally-operated subordinate CAs. Currently it has one internally-operated subordinate CA: - Tunisian Server Certificate Authority - TunServerCA2	Verified?	Verified	
Externally Operated SubCAs	No Externally Operated SubCAs.	Verified?	Verified	
Cross Signing	No Cross-Signing.	Verified?	Verified	
Technical Constraint on 3rd party Issuer	No external Registration Authorities.	Verified?	Verified	

Policy Documentation	Root CP: http://www.certification.tn/sites/default/files/documents/politiqueRACINE-NG-01.pdf	Verified?	Verified
	Server (TLS/SSL) CP: http://www.certification.tn/sites/default/files/documents/politiqueSERVEURS-PTC-BR-02.pdf		
	CP/CPS in English : http://www.certification.tn/sites/default/files/documents/CPCPS-PTC-BR-EN-05.pdf		
CA Document Repository	http://www.certification.tn/en/content/downloads	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	French		
СР	http://www.certification.tn/sites/default/files/documents/PolitiqueSERVEURS-PTC-BR-05.pdf	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	French		
CPS	http://www.certification.tn/sites/default/files/documents/PolitiqueSERVEURS-PTC-BR-05.pdf	Verified?	Verified
Other Relevant Documents	Certificate Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use: http://www.certification.tn/sites/default/files/documents/CGUSSL.pdf	Verified?	Verified
	National Digital Certification Agency (NDCA) operates under Tunisia's Electronic Signature Law 83-2000: <a href="http://www.certification.tn/sites/default/files/documents/loi_2000-83_fr.pdf">http://www.certification.tn/sites/default/files/documents/loi_2000-83_fr.pdf</a>		
Auditor Name	LSTI	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Website	http://www.lsti-certification.fr/images/liste_entreprise/Liste%20PSCe.pdf	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Qualifications	https://portal.etsi.org/TBSiteMap/ESI/TrustServiceProviders.aspx	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8879910	Verified?	Verified

Confirmed. CP section 6.5-6.7

**Network** 

Security

Verified

Verified

Verified

Verified

Verified

Verified

Verified

Verified

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Verified

Verified

Verified?

Verified

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable