

# Mozilla - CA Program

Case Information			
Case Number	00000069	Case Record Type	CA Owner/Root Inclusion Request
CA Owner/Certificate Name	HARICA	Request Status	Ready for Public Discussion

Additional Case Information	
Subject	Add HARICA SHA256 Root CA Certificates
Case Reason	

Bugzilla Information	
Link to Bugzilla Bug	<a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1201423">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1201423</a>

General information about CA's associated organization			
CA Email Alias 1	ca-admin@harica.gr		
CA Email Alias 2			
Company Website	<a href="http://www.harica.gr/">http://www.harica.gr/</a>	Verified?	Verified
Organizational Type	Consortium	Verified?	Verified
Organizational Type (Others)	Non profit activity operated by the Greek Universities Network ( <a href="http://www.gunet.gr">www.gunet.gr</a> ).	Verified?	Verified
Geographic Focus	Greece Greek Academic and Research Institutions	Verified?	Verified
Primary Market / Customer Base	HARICA is a non-profit organization serving the Greek Academic and Research Community	Verified?	Verified
Impact to Mozilla Users	Root renewal	Verified?	Verified

Response to Mozilla's list of Recommended Practices			
Recommended Practices	<a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended_Practices#CA_Recommended_Practices">https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommended_Practices#CA_Recommended_Practices</a>	Recommended Practices Statement	I have reviewed Mozilla's list of Recommended Practices, and confirm that we follow those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below.
CA's Response to Recommended Practices	* Document Handling of IDNs in CP/CPS: HARICA does not use IDNs in certificates * Revocation of Compromised Certificates: CPS section 4.9 * DNS names go in SAN: HARICA follows the BR section 9.2.2 and includes DNS names in SAN.	Verified?	Verified

Response to Mozilla's list of Potentially Problematic Practices			
Potentially	<a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org">https://wiki.mozilla.org</a>	Problematic	I have reviewed Mozilla's list

**Problematic Practices**

/CA:Problematic\_Practices#Potentially\_problematic\_CA\_practices

**Practices Statement**

of Potentially Problematic Practices, and confirm that we do not do those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below.

**CA's Response to Problematic Practices**

- \* HARICA issues DV certificates valid for up to 36 months. CPS section 6.3.2
- \* HARICA does not currently issue Wildcard DV certificates and Wildcard OV certificates.
- \* Email Address Prefixes for DV Certs: CPS section 3.2.3.2
- \* The main RA and CA is run by the HARICA Administration Team. CPS section 9.16.3 requires that external RAs confirm the ownership of the email address and domain name to be included in the certificate, and that the RA be audited as per Mozilla's Inclusion Policy.
- \* HARICA does not issue end entity certificates directly from root CAs except for OCSP purposes (CPS section 1.3.1)
- \* When HARICA issues subordinate CA certificates to external entities they are either technically constrained or publicly disclosed and audited as per Mozilla's Inclusion Policy.
- \* The CP/CPS discourages key-pair generation on behalf of users and strongly advises only end user to be able to generate private keys. Section 6.1.2 of our CP/CPS mentions that there might be cases for batch key generation under a very strict procedure.
- \* CPS 3.1.1.2: "The certification of IP addresses or hostnames instead of the FQDNs is not allowed."
- \* HARICA does not issue certificates for internal domains. Only internet domains are allowed.
- \* HARICA does not sign OCSP Responses using a certificate under a different root.
- \* HARICA has clear names for CN and O fields in all subCAs, including the ROOTCA.
- \* Harica Administration uses e-mail and telephone support for end-users. Telephone support works 8 hours/day, working days. Furthermore, specific institutions, such as the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, provide helpdesk visiting facilities for end users and on-site support at faculty members offices/computers.
- \* We have issued 24 SHA1 SSL certificates that are valid beyond January 1, 2017. We have already contacted the owners to replace them with new SHA256 and plan to revoke them by 31/8/2016.

**Verified?**

Verified

## Root Case Record # 1

### Root Case Information

<b>Root Certificate Name</b>	Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2015	<b>Root Case No</b>	R00000096
<b>Request Status</b>	Ready for Public Discussion	<b>Case Number</b>	00000069

### Additional Root Case Information

**Subject** Include Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2015

### Technical Information about Root Certificate

<b>O From Issuer Field</b>	Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>OU From Issuer Field</b>		<b>Verified?</b>	Verified

<b>Certificate Summary</b>	This SHA256 "Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2015" root certificate will eventually replace the SHA--1 "Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011" root certificate that was included via Bugzilla Bug #581901.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Root Certificate Download URL</b>	<a href="http://www.harica.gr/certs/HaricaRootCA2015.der">http://www.harica.gr/certs/HaricaRootCA2015.der</a>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Valid From</b>	2015 Jul 07	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Valid To</b>	2040 Jun 30	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Certificate Version</b>	3	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Certificate Signature Algorithm</b>	SHA-256	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Signing Key Parameters</b>	4096	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Test Website URL (SSL) or Example Cert</b>	<a href="https://www2.harica.gr">https://www2.harica.gr</a>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>CRL URL(s)</b>	<a href="http://crlv1.harica.gr/HaricaRootCA2015/crlv1.der.crl">http://crlv1.harica.gr/HaricaRootCA2015/crlv1.der.crl</a> <a href="http://crlv1.harica.gr/HaricaAdministrationCAR5/crlv1.der.crl">http://crlv1.harica.gr/HaricaAdministrationCAR5/crlv1.der.crl</a> CPS section 4.9.7: For end-user/device certificates ... the CRL will be in effect for a maximum time of ten (10) days.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>OCSP URL(s)</b>	<a href="http://ocsp.harica.gr">http://ocsp.harica.gr</a> For Subscriber Certificates: OCSP responses have a maximum expiration time of two (2) days.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Revocation Tested</b>	<a href="https://certificate.revocationcheck.com/www2.harica.gr">https://certificate.revocationcheck.com/www2.harica.gr</a> no errors	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Trust Bits</b>	Code; Email; Websites	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>SSL Validation Type</b>	DV; OV	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>EV Policy OID(s)</b>	Not EV	<b>Verified?</b>	Not Applicable
<b>EV Tested</b>	Not Requesting EV Treatment	<b>Verified?</b>	Not Applicable
<b>Root Stores Included In</b>	Apple; Microsoft	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Mozilla Applied Constraints</b>	None	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified

### Digital Fingerprint Information

<b>SHA-1 Fingerprint</b>	01:0C:06:95:A6:98:19:14:FF:BF:5F:C6:B0:B6:95:EA:29:E9:12:A6	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>SHA-256 Fingerprint</b>	A0:40:92:9A:02:CE:53:B4:AC:F4:F2:FF:C6:98:1C:E4:49:6F:75:5E:6D:45:FE:0B:2A:69:2B:CD:52:52:3F:36	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified

### CA Hierarchy Information

<b>CA Hierarchy</b>	"Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011" currently has 20 internally operated and technically-constrained subCAs.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
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<b>Externally Operated SubCAs</b>	<p>There is currently one externally-operated subordinate CA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aristotle University of Thessaloniki</li> <li>- <a href="http://www.auth.gr">http://www.auth.gr</a>, <a href="http://it.auth.gr">http://it.auth.gr</a></li> <li>- <a href="http://www.pki.auth.gr/certs/AuthCentralCAR3.pem">http://www.pki.auth.gr/certs/AuthCentralCAR3.pem</a>, (to be decommissioned by Sep 2015)</li> <li>- <a href="http://www.pki.auth.gr/certs/AuthCentralCAR4.pem">http://www.pki.auth.gr/certs/AuthCentralCAR4.pem</a></li> <li>- <a href="http://www.pki.auth.gr/certs/AuthCentralCAR5.pem">http://www.pki.auth.gr/certs/AuthCentralCAR5.pem</a></li> <li>- AuthCentralCAR4 and AuthCentralCAR5 issue sub-CAs and end user/server certificates</li> <li>- <a href="http://www.pki.auth.gr/documents/CPS-EN.pdf">http://www.pki.auth.gr/documents/CPS-EN.pdf</a></li> <li>- Sections in CP/CPS demonstrating the measures to verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- Ownership of domain name: 3.2.2, 3.2.3.2 and 3.2.5</li> <li>-- Ownership of e-mail: 3.2.2, 3.2.3.1 and 3.2.5</li> </ul> </li> <li>- For all certificates chaining up to these Sub-CA, both the organization and the ownership/control of the domain are verified.</li> <li>- This CA is currently operated by the same administration team as the HARICA Root CA.</li> <li>- OSCP: <a href="http://ocsp.pki.auth.gr">http://ocsp.pki.auth.gr</a></li> <li>- Audit: <a href="http://pki.auth.gr/documents/AUTH-ETSI_CERTIFICATE_AUTH_W_ANNEX">http://pki.auth.gr/documents/AUTH-ETSI_CERTIFICATE_AUTH_W_ANNEX</a></li> </ul>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Cross Signing</b>	<p>This Root will be cross-signed by "Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011" to assist the rollover.</p>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Technical Constraint on 3rd party Issuer</b>	<p>HARICA has implemented technical restrictions (at the RA and CA level) allowing only specific domains affiliated with their constituency to be included in certificates. HARICA has implemented technical controls to restrict issuance to a specific set of domain names which have been confirmed. These controls check the dNSName, E-mail and the CN of the certificate requests</p> <p>CPS section 7.1.5: Each subCA MUST be constrained to the Institution's domain name that the subCA signs for. For example, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki subCA will be limited to the "<a href="http://www.auth.gr">auth.gr</a>" domain, using the name constraints extension</p>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified

### Verification Policies and Practices

<b>Policy Documentation</b>	All documents are in Greek and English.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>CA Document Repository</b>	<a href="http://www.harica.gr/procedures">http://www.harica.gr/procedures</a>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>CP Doc Language</b>			
<b>CP</b>		<b>Verified?</b>	Not Applicable
<b>CP Doc Language</b>			

CPS	<a href="http://www.harica.gr/documents/CPS-EN.pdf">http://www.harica.gr/documents/CPS-EN.pdf</a>	Verified?	Verified
Other Relevant Documents	Qualified Certificates (under GUnet): <a href="http://www.eett.gr/opencms/opencms/EETT_EN/Electronic_Communications/DigitalSignatures/EsignProviders.html">http://www.eett.gr/opencms/opencms/EETT_EN/Electronic_Communications/DigitalSignatures/EsignProviders.html</a>	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Name	QMSCERT	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Website	<a href="http://www.qmcert.com">http://www.qmcert.com</a>	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Qualifications	<a href="http://www.esyd.gr/eped/1.179906_en.doc">http://www.esyd.gr/eped/1.179906_en.doc</a>	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit	<a href="https://www.harica.gr/documents/HARICA-ETSI_CERTIFICATE_AUTH_W_ANNEX.pdf">https://www.harica.gr/documents/HARICA-ETSI_CERTIFICATE_AUTH_W_ANNEX.pdf</a>	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Type	ETSI TS 102 042	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Statement Date	6/5/2015	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit	<a href="http://pki.auth.gr/documents/AUTH-ETSI_CERTIFICATE_AUTH_W_ANNEX.pdf">http://pki.auth.gr/documents/AUTH-ETSI_CERTIFICATE_AUTH_W_ANNEX.pdf</a>	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit Type	ETSI TS 102 042	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit Statement Date	6/5/2015	Verified?	Verified
EV Audit		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Audit Type		Verified?	Not Applicable
EV Audit Statement Date		Verified?	Not Applicable
BR Commitment to Comply	CPS section 1.5.4	Verified?	Verified
SSL Verification Procedures	<p>CPS section 3.2.3.2: For each Fully-Qualified Domain Name listed in a Certificate, the CA SHALL confirm that, as of the date the Certificate was issued, the Applicant either is the Domain Name Registrant or has control over the FQDN by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Confirming the Applicant as the Domain Name Registrant directly with the Domain Name Registrar,</li> <li>- Communicating directly with the Domain Name Registrant using an address, email, or telephone number provided by the Domain Name Registrar;</li> <li>- Communicating directly with the Domain Name Registrant using the contact information listed in the WHOIS record's "registrant", "technical", or "administrative" field;</li> <li>- Communicating with the Domain's administrator using an email address created by pre-pending 'admin', 'administrator', 'webmaster', 'hostmaster', or 'postmaster' in the local part, followed by the at-sign ("@"), followed by the Domain Name....</li> </ul> <p>CPS section 3.2.4: The certificates that are issued do not include non-verified subscriber information. Each server certificate is manually verified.</p>	Verified?	Verified
EV SSL Verification Procedures	Not requesting EV treatment	Verified?	Not Applicable
Organization Verification Procedures	<p>HARICA MoU <a href="http://www.harica.gr/documents/MoU-EN.pdf">http://www.harica.gr/documents/MoU-EN.pdf</a>. Only Institutions currently registered as Academic or Research Institutions and their affiliates in Greece are allowed to join HARICA</p> <p>CPS sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3</p>	Verified?	Verified
Email Address Verification Procedures	<p>CPS section 3.2.3.1: HARICA central RA uses three methods for e-mail ownership and control verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The first method uses simple e-mail verification. The user enters the e-mail address at the initial certificate request form and a verification e-mail is sent to the user with a link to a</li> </ul>	Verified?	Verified

unique web page. After following this link, an e-mail is sent to the institution's network operation center mail administrator that requires an approval based on the full name entered by the user and the user's email. This approval requires the identification of the user with his/her physical presence and an acceptable official document.

- The second method uses an LDAP server. The user enters the personal e-mail address at the initial certificate request form and the corresponding password. This information is verified against the institution's LDAP server. If the verification is successful, the RA queries the real name of the user and creates the certificate request. In order for a user to be listed in the Institutional Directory server, the institution must have verified the user with his/her physical presence and an acceptable official photo-id document.

- The third method uses a Single Sign On (SSO) architecture based on the SAML specification. The user enters the personal e-mail address at the initial request form and is then redirected to the appropriate web page of the Identity Provider. The Identity Provider verifies the user and returns the real name and the email address..

<b>Code Signing Subscriber Verification Pro</b>	CPS sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Multi-Factor Authentication</b>	HARICA uses multi-factor authentication for the issuance of server certificates, and to access the RA and CA engines. CPS section 6.5.1.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Network Security</b>	HARICA has performed the actions listed in #7 of <a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist#Verification_Policies_and_Practices">https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist#Verification Policies and Practices</a> CPS section 6.7.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified

#### Link to Publicly Disclosed and Audited subordinate CA Certificates

<b>Publicly Disclosed &amp; Audited subCAs</b>	<a href="https://www.harica.gr/rep_dyn.php">https://www.harica.gr/rep_dyn.php</a>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
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## Root Case Record # 2

### Root Case Information

<b>Root Certificate Name</b>	Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC RootCA 2015	<b>Root Case No</b>	R00000097
<b>Request Status</b>	Ready for Public Discussion	<b>Case Number</b>	00000069

### Additional Root Case Information

<b>Subject</b>	Include Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC RootCA 2015
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### Technical Information about Root Certificate

<b>O From Issuer Field</b>	Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>OU From Issuer Field</b>		<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Certificate Summary</b>	This "Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC RootCA 2015" root	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified

certificate is the ECC version of the  
 "Hellenic Academic and Research  
 Institutions RootCA 2015"

<b>Root Certificate Download URL</b>	<a href="http://www.harica.gr/certs/HaricaECCRootCA2015.der">http://www.harica.gr/certs/HaricaECCRootCA2015.der</a>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Valid From</b>	2015 Jul 07	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Valid To</b>	2040 Jun 30	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Certificate Version</b>	3	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Certificate Signature Algorithm</b>	ECC	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Signing Key Parameters</b>	ECC P-384	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Test Website URL (SSL) or Example Cert</b>	<a href="https://www3.harica.gr">https://www3.harica.gr</a>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>CRL URL(s)</b>	<a href="http://crlv1.harica.gr/HaricaECCRootCA2015/crlv1.der.crl">http://crlv1.harica.gr/HaricaECCRootCA2015/crlv1.der.crl</a> <a href="http://crlv1.harica.gr/HaricaECCAdministrationCAR1/crlv1.der.crl">http://crlv1.harica.gr/HaricaECCAdministrationCAR1/crlv1.der.crl</a>  CPS section 4.9.7: For end-user/device certificates ... the CRL will be in effect for a maximum time of ten (10) days.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>OCSP URL(s)</b>	<a href="http://ocsp.harica.gr">http://ocsp.harica.gr</a> For Subscriber Certificates: OCSP responses have a maximum expiration time of two (2) days.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Revocation Tested</b>	<a href="https://certificate.revocationcheck.com/www3.harica.gr">https://certificate.revocationcheck.com/www3.harica.gr</a>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Trust Bits</b>	Code; Email; Websites	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>SSL Validation Type</b>	DV; OV	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>EV Policy OID(s)</b>	Not EV	<b>Verified?</b>	Not Applicable
<b>EV Tested</b>	Not Requesting EV Treatment	<b>Verified?</b>	Not Applicable
<b>Root Stores Included In</b>	Apple; Microsoft	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Mozilla Applied Constraints</b>	None	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified

### Digital Fingerprint Information

<b>SHA-1 Fingerprint</b>	9F:F1:71:8D:92:D5:9A:F3:7D:74:97:B4:BC:6F:84:68:0B:BA:B6:66	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>SHA-256 Fingerprint</b>	44:B5:45:AA:8A:25:E6:5A:73:CA:15:DC:27:FC:36:D2:4C:1C:B9:95:3A:06:65:39:B1:15:82:DC:48:7B:48:33	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified

### CA Hierarchy Information

<b>CA Hierarchy</b>	"Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC RootCA 2015" currently has the following internally operated subCAs: - Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC AdminCA R1 We plan to issue the following internally operated subCAs for specific usages:	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
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- ECC Client Authentication and SecureEmail
- ECC Code Signing
- ECC SSL (DV/OV) Server Certificates

<b>Externally Operated SubCAs</b>	There are currently no externally operated subCAs issued from this root. According to our CP/CPS and the Mozilla RootCA program, in case of externally operated CAs, they will either be technically constrained or publicly disclosed and audited.	Verified?	Verified
<b>Cross Signing</b>	This Root will be cross-signed by "Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011" to assist the rollover.	Verified?	Verified
<b>Technical Constraint on 3rd party Issuer</b>	HARICA has implemented technical restrictions (at the RA and CA level) allowing only specific domains affiliated with their constituency to be included in certificates. HARICA has implemented technical controls to restrict issuance to a specific set of domain names which have been confirmed. These controls check the dNSName, E-mail and the CN of the certificate requests CPS section 7.1.5: Each subCA MUST be constrained to the Institution's domain name that the subCA signs for. For example, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki subCA will be limited to the "auth.gr" domain, using the name constraints extension	Verified?	Verified

## Verification Policies and Practices

<b>Policy Documentation</b>	All documents are in Greek and English.	Verified?	Verified
<b>CA Document Repository</b>	<a href="http://www.harica.gr/procedures">http://www.harica.gr/procedures</a>	Verified?	Verified
<b>CP Doc Language</b>			
<b>CP</b>		Verified?	Not Applicable
<b>CP Doc Language</b>			
<b>CPS</b>	<a href="http://www.harica.gr/documents/CPS-EN.pdf">http://www.harica.gr/documents/CPS-EN.pdf</a>	Verified?	Verified
<b>Other Relevant Documents</b>	Qualified Certificates (under GUnet): <a href="http://www.eett.gr/opencms/opencms/EETT_EN/Electronic_Communications/DigitalSignatures/ESignProviders.html">http://www.eett.gr/opencms/opencms/EETT_EN/Electronic_Communications/DigitalSignatures/ESignProviders.html</a>	Verified?	Verified
<b>Auditor Name</b>	QMSCERT	Verified?	Verified
<b>Auditor Website</b>	<a href="http://www.qmscert.com">http://www.qmscert.com</a>	Verified?	Verified
<b>Auditor Qualifications</b>	<a href="http://www.esyd.gr/eped/1.179906_en.doc">http://www.esyd.gr/eped/1.179906_en.doc</a>	Verified?	Verified
<b>Standard Audit</b>	<a href="https://www.harica.gr/documents/HARICA-ETSI_CERTIFICATE_AUTH_W_ANNEX.pdf">https://www.harica.gr/documents/HARICA-ETSI_CERTIFICATE_AUTH_W_ANNEX.pdf</a>	Verified?	Verified
<b>Standard Audit Type</b>	ETSI TS 102 042	Verified?	Verified
<b>Standard Audit Statement Date</b>	6/5/2015	Verified?	Verified
<b>BR Audit</b>	<a href="http://pki.auth.gr/documents/AUTH-ETSI_CERTIFICATE_AUTH_W_ANNEX.pdf">http://pki.auth.gr/documents/AUTH-ETSI_CERTIFICATE_AUTH_W_ANNEX.pdf</a>	Verified?	Verified



<b>BR Audit Type</b>	ETSI TS 102 042	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>BR Audit Statement Date</b>	6/5/2015	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>EV Audit</b>		<b>Verified?</b>	Not Applicable
<b>EV Audit Type</b>		<b>Verified?</b>	Not Applicable
<b>EV Audit Statement Date</b>		<b>Verified?</b>	Not Applicable
<b>BR Commitment to Comply</b>	CPS section 1.5.4	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>SSL Verification Procedures</b>	<p>CPS section 3.2.3.2: For each Fully-Qualified Domain Name listed in a Certificate, the CA SHALL confirm that, as of the date the Certificate was issued, the Applicant either is the Domain Name Registrant or has control over the FQDN by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Confirming the Applicant as the Domain Name Registrant directly with the Domain Name Registrar,</li> <li>- Communicating directly with the Domain Name Registrant using an address, email, or telephone number provided by the Domain Name Registrar;</li> <li>- Communicating directly with the Domain Name Registrant using the contact information listed in the WHOIS record's "registrant", "technical", or "administrative" field;</li> <li>- Communicating with the Domain's administrator using an email address created by pre-pending 'admin', 'administrator', 'webmaster', 'hostmaster', or 'postmaster' in the local part, followed by the at-sign ("@"), followed by the Domain Name....</li> </ul> <p>CPS section 3.2.4: The certificates that are issued do not include non-verified subscriber information. Each server certificate is manually verified.</p>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>EV SSL Verification Procedures</b>	Not requesting EV treatment	<b>Verified?</b>	Not Applicable
<b>Organization Verification Procedures</b>	<p>HARICA MoU <a href="http://www.harica.gr/documents/MoU-EN.pdf">http://www.harica.gr/documents/MoU-EN.pdf</a>. Only Institutions currently registered as Academic or Research Institutions and their affiliates in Greece are allowed to join HARICA</p> <p>CPS sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3</p>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Email Address Verification Procedures</b>	<p>CPS section 3.2.3.1: HARICA central RA uses three methods for e-mail ownership and control verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The first method uses simple e-mail verification. The user enters the e-mail address at the initial certificate request form and a verification e-mail is sent to the user with a link to a unique web page. After following this link, an e-mail is sent to the institution's network operation center mail administrator that requires an approval based on the full name entered by the user and the user's email. This approval requires the identification of the user with his/her physical presence and an acceptable official document.</li> <li>- The second method uses an LDAP server. The user enters the personal e-mail address at the initial certificate request form and the corresponding password. This information is verified against the institution's LDAP server. If the verification is successful, the RA queries the real name of the user and creates the certificate request. In order for a user to be listed in the Institutional Directory server, the institution must have verified the user with his/her physical presence and an acceptable official photo-id document.</li> <li>- The third method uses a Single Sign On (SSO) architecture based on the SAML specification. The user enters the personal e-mail address at the initial request form and is then redirected to the appropriate web page of the Identity Provider. The Identity Provider verifies the user and returns the real name and the email address..</li> </ul>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified

<b>Code Signing Subscriber Verification Pro</b>	CPS sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Multi-Factor Authentication</b>	HARICA uses multi-factor authentication for the issuance of server certificates, and to access the RA and CA engines. CPS section 6.5.1.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
<b>Network Security</b>	HARICA has performed the actions listed in #7 of <a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist#Verification_Policies_and_Practices">https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist#Verification Policies and Practices</a> CPS section 6.7.	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified

### Link to Publicly Disclosed and Audited subordinate CA Certificates

<b>Publicly Disclosed &amp; Audited subCAs</b>	<a href="https://www.harica.gr/rep_dyn.php">https://www.harica.gr/rep_dyn.php</a>	<b>Verified?</b>	Verified
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