# Mozilla - CA Program

Case Number	00000067	Case Record Type	CA Owne	er/Root Inclusion Request
CA Owner/Certificate Name		Request Status	Ready for	r Public Discussion
dditional Case Inf	ormation			
Subject	Enable Email Trust Bit for Actalis Authentication Root CA	Case Reason		
ugzilla Informatio	n			
Link to Bugzilla Bug	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org /show_bug.cgi?id=1176188			
eneral informatio	n about CA's associated organization			
CA Email Alias 1	cps-admin@actalis.it			
CA Email Alias 2				
Company Website	http://www.actalis.it/	Verified?	Verified	
Organizational Type	Public Corporation	Verified?	Verified	
Organizational Type (Others)		Verified?	Not Appli	cable
Geographic Focus	Italy	Verified?	Verified	
Primary Market / Customer Base		Verified?	Verified	
mpact to Mozilla Users	This root is already trusted for secure email on other platforms.	Verified?	Verified	
esponse to Mozill	a's list of Recommended Practices			
Recommended Practices	https://wiki.mozilla.org /CA:Recommended_Practices#CA_Recommended_		nmended Statement	I have reviewed Mozilla's list of Recommended Practices, and confirm that we follow those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below.
Practices	* Document Handling of IDNs in CP/CPS - CPS sect 3.3.1.1: As of the date of revision of this CPS, Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) are not allow FQDNs to be inserted in the certificate must therefor comprised of ASCII characters only. * Revocation of Compromised Certificates - CPS sec 4.9.4	ed: all e be	Verified?	Verified

made clear in §3.1.1 and in chapter 7 of our CPS \* Domain owned by a Natural Person - We do not issue certs to natural persons; this is documented in §1.3.3 of our CPS

#### **Response to Mozilla's list of Potentially Problematic Practices**

Potentially Problematic Practices

ially https://wiki.mozilla.org atic /CA:Problematic\_Practices#Potentially\_problematic\_CA\_practices ices

 
 CA's Response to Problematic Practices
 \* SSL certs are OV or EV \* CPS section 4.1: It is also possible to apply for a "wildcard" SSL Server certificate

# Root Case Record # 1

Root Case Information					
Root Certificate Name	Actalis Authentication Root CA	Root Case No	R0000091		
Request Status	Ready for Public Discussion	Case Number	0000067		

Problematic

Practices

Statement

Verified?

I have reviewed Mozilla's list of

Practices, and confirm that we do not do those practices, with exceptions and clarifications noted in the text box below.

Potentially Problematic

Verified

### **Additional Root Case Information**

Subject Turn on Email Trust Bit for Actalis Authentication Root CA root cert

#### **Technical Information about Root Certificate**

O From Issuer Field	Actalis S.p.A./03358520967	Verified?	Verified
OU From Issuer Field		Verified?	Verified
Certificate Summary	Requesting that the email trust bit be turned on for the "Actalis Authentication Root CA" root certificate that was included via Bugzilla Bug #520557, and enabled for EV via Bugzilla Bug #957548.	Verified?	Verified
Root Certificate Download URL	Already included	Verified?	Not Applicable
Valid From	2011 Sep 22	Verified?	Verified
Valid To	2030 Sep 22	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Version	3	Verified?	Verified
Certificate Signature Algorithm	SHA-256	Verified?	Verified
Signing Key Parameters	4096	Verified?	Verified
Test Website URL (SSL) or Example Cert	https://ssltest-a.actalis.it:8443	Verified?	Verified

CRL URL(s)		tal.actalis.it/Repository/AUTH-ROOT/getLastCRI )3.actalis.it/Repository/AUTH-G3/getLastCRL	=		Verified?	Verified	
OCSP URL(s)	http://ocs	tal.actalis.it/VA/AUTH-ROOT sp03.actalis.it/VA/AUTH-G3 sponses have an expiration time of 1 day			Verified?	Verified	
Revocation Tested	<u>http://cer</u> No error	tificate.revocationcheck.com/ssltest-a.actalis.it			Verified?	Verified	
Trust Bits	Code; E	nail; Websites			Verified?	Verified	
SSL Validation Type	OV; EV				Verified?	Verified	
EV Policy OID(s)	1.3.159.	1.17.1			Verified?	Verified	
EV Tested	"1.3.159 "Actalis I SEC_OI { 0x55, 0 0xBE, 0 0xAA, 0 "MGsxC "cyBTLn "YXRpb2	EV OID", D_UNKNOWN, x92, 0x60, 0x84, 0xEC, 0x96, 0x3A, 0x64, 0xB9, x01, 0xCE, 0x0B, 0xA8, 0x6A, 0x64, 0xFB, 0xFE, x85, 0xAF, 0xC1, 0x55, 0xB3, 0x7F, 0xD7, 0x60, zAJBgNVBAYTAkIUMQ4wDAYDVQQHDAVNaW AuQS4vMDMzNTg1MjA5NjcxJzAlBgNVBAMMH 24gUm9vdCBDQQ==", LE48w=",	0x6E, 0x2A, 0xBC, 0xC7, 0x66 }, xhbjEjMCEGA1UECg	waQWN0YWxp"	Verified?	Verified	
Root Stores Included In	Apple; G	oogle; Microsoft; Mozilla			Verified?	Verified	
Mozilla Applied Constraints	None				Verified?	Verified	
SHA-1 Fingerprint		nformation 87:06:5A:28:84:8A:F2:F3:4A:CE:19:2B:DD:C7:8E	E:9C:AC		١	/erified?	Verifie
SHA-256 Fingerprint	55:92:60:8	84:EC:96:3A:64:B9:6E:2A:BE:01:CE:0B:A8:6A:64	I:FB:FE:BC:C7:AA:B	5:AF:C1:55:B3:7F	:D7:60:66 <b>\</b>	/erified?	Verifie
CA Hierarc	hy Inforn	nation					
CA	Hierarchy	The Actalis Authentication Root CA currently has one subordinate CA that is internally-operated. This root signs internally-operated intermediate certificates that sign end-entity certificates. CPS section 1.3.1: The Root CA is used for issuing Sub CA certificates and related CRLs only, and is kept off-line when not in use, whereas end-entity certificates are issued by Sub CAs.	Verified?	Verified			
Externally	Operated SubCAs	None. CPS section 1.3.1: Within the framework of the service described in this document, both CA roles (Root CA and Sub CA) are played by Actalis	Verified?	Verified			
		CPS section 1.3.1: Within the framework of the service described in this document, both CA roles (Root CA and Sub CA) are	Verified? Verified?	Verified			

The feasibility and opportunity of activating additional Sub CAs, run by other organizations, will be evaluated later on, taking into account the requirements and constraints imposed by the applicable laws, business practices, and security policies (including those enforced by browser vendors).

CPS Section 1.3.2: The Registration Authority (RA) is a person, structure or organization that is responsible for: ... For certificates of class EV (Extended Validation), the RA activities are performed by Actalis only. For certificates of class OV (Organization Validated), RA activities can be performed by the Customer as an "Enterprise RA", if the conditions are met, limited to Internet domains controlled by the Customer.

### **Verification Policies and Practices**

Policy Documentation	Documents are provided in Italian and English.	Verified?	Verified
CA Document Repository	http://www.actalis.it/area-download.aspx	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	Italian		
СР	https://www.actalis.it/documenti-it/caact-free-s-mime-certificates- policy.aspx	Verified?	Verified
CP Doc Language	Italian		
CPS	https://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/cps-for-ssl-server-and-code- signing.aspx	Verified?	Verified
Other Relevant Documents	CP/CPS for Email Certs: https://www.actalis.it/documenti-it/caact-free-s-mime-certificates- policy.aspx	Verified?	Verified
	CP/CPS for SSL and Code Signing Certs: https://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/cps-for-ssl-server-and-code- signing.pdf		
Auditor Name	IMQ	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Website	http://www.imq.it/	Verified?	Verified
Auditor Qualifications	http://www.accredia.it/ppsearch /accredia_orgmask.jsp?PPSEARCH_ORG_SEARCH_MASK_ORG=0040	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit	http://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/actalisca audit statement.pdf	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Type	ETSI TS 102 042	Verified?	Verified
Standard Audit Statement Date	9/23/2014	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit	http://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/actalisca_audit_statement.pdf	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit Type	ETSI TS 102 042	Verified?	Verified
BR Audit Statement Date	9/23/2014	Verified?	Verified
EV Audit	http://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/actalisca_audit_statement.pdf	Verified?	Verified
EV Audit Type	ETSI TS 102 042	Verified?	Verified
EV Audit Statement Date	9/23/2014	Verified?	Verified

SEL Verified       CPS section 3.3.1 For SSL Server certificates, the CA verifies that all FODEs and P defrees to be included in the certificate are under the certificate class:       Verified?       Verified?         - by means of WAICSI queries (if erverse DNS lookups for IP addresses) to reliable DNS information sources.       - by catery if the elevant DNS Registrar or governmental domain the certificate class:       - by catery if the elevant DNS Registrar or governmental domain end the certificate class:       - by catery if the elevant DNS Registrar or governmental domain end the certificate class:       - by catery if the elevant DNS Registrar or governmental domain end the certificate class:       - by catery if the elevant DNS Registrar or governmental domain end the certificate class:       - by catery if the elevant DNS Registrar or governmental domain end the certificate class:       - by catery if the elevant DNS Registrar or governmental domain end the certificate class:       - by catery if the domains doministrator via e-nail using an e-mail address operating a 'admin'; 'administrator' is e-mail end the sequestor bit the three them in the Applicant is troice to the chart them is the by them is the many of the catery is the catery is the requestor is many three domains admitter via them is the policient of the requestor is many three domains admitter via them is the catery is the catery is the requestor is admitter via them is the class and the requestor is admitter is the section 3.2.1 For Section 3.2.1 and SEC address were reliable to the elevant of the requestor is admitter via them is the class and the requestor is admitter is obtained by prevent admitter is the end the class admitter is the end the certificate requestor is admitter is the class by sending a random code to the elleveler is admitser equestor is admitter is the end the cert	BR Commitment to Comply	CPS section 1.1	Verified?	Verified
Verification Procedures       CPS section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 describe authentication of organization and Verified?       Verified?         Verified       CPS section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 describe authentication of organization and Verification Procedures       Verified?       Verified?         Email Address Verification Procedures       Free S/MIME Cert CP section 3.2.1: The only element of the requestor's elemity that is collected and verified by the CA is the requestor's address specified by the requestor in the on-line certificate request form, then asking the requestor to also enter such code before the certificate proves that the specified email address exists and the requestor has access to it.       Verified?       Verified?         Code Signing Subscriber       CPS section 1.3.3: Certificate Owners or Subscribers are organizations or agencies requesting an SL. Server certificates to Code Signing certificate and holding the corresponding private key. In particular, with reference to S7.2: of [EVCG], Actalis issues certificates to following types of organizations: - Private Organization - Government Entity In this CPS, the term 'Owner' refers to the entity named 'Subject' or 'Subscriber' in [BR] and [EVCG].       Verified?       Verified?         CPS section 1.4: Actalis issues EV and OV Code Signing certs.       Authentication or organization and individual identity is described in sections 3.2: 2 and 3.2.3 of the CPS.       Verified?       Verified?         CPS section 1.1: The commonName (OID 2.5.4.3) component of the Subject for identificate, may contain any string chosen by requestor, provided that it is not misleading about the certificate owner's identify or about the certificate purpose identify or about the certificate iss		<ul> <li>FQDNs and IP address to be included in the certificate are under the control of the Applicant organization, or his parent organization. These checks are carried out by dif-ferent methods, depending on the case and the certificate class:</li> <li>by means of WHOIS queries (+ reverse DNS lookups for IP addresses) to reliable DNS information sources.</li> <li>by querying the relevant DNS Registrars or governmental domain registration agencies, as appropriate;</li> <li>by communicating with the domain administrator via e-mail, using an e-mail address obtained by pre-pending a "admin", "administrator", "webmaster", "hostmaster", or "postmaster" to the domain name (this latter is obtained by pruning zero or more components from the requested FQDN).</li> <li>Should one or more of those FQDNs and/or IP addresses be managed by an entity other than the Applicant or their parent organization, the Applicant is required to provide evidence to the CA that they have been formally delegated by the domains' owner to manage those domains</li> </ul>	Verified?	Verified
Verification Procedures       Individual identity.       Verified         Email Address Verification Procedures       Free SMIME Cert CP section 3.2.1: The only element of the requestor's email address specified by the requestor in the on-line certificate request form, then asking the requestor to also enter such code before the certificate request is a coepted. The requestors ability to enter the correct code proves that the specified email address exists and the requestor has access to it.       Verified?       Verified         Subscriber Verification Pro- subscriber Verification Pro- subscriber Verification Pro- subscriber are oblicated by the CA, as they are not inserted into the certificate and holding the corresponding private key. In particular, with reference to g7.2 of [EVCG]. Atalia issues certificates to following types of organizations: - Private Organization - Government Entity In this CPS, the term "Owner' refers to the entity named "Subject" or "Subscriber' in [BR] and [EVCG]. In all cases the certificate Owner shall be an organization, not a natural person.       Verified?       Verified         CPS section 1.3.1: The commonName (OID 2.5.4.3) component of the Subject field".  - For a Code Signing certificate, may contain any string chosen by requestor, provided that it is not misleading about the certificate owner's identity about the certificate purpose       Verified?       Verified?         Multi-Factor       CPS section 1.1: The commonName (OID 2.5.4.3) component of the Subject field".  - For a Code Signing certificate, may contain any string chosen by requestor, provided that it is not misleading about the certificate owner's identity about the certificate purpose       Verified?       Verified?         Multi-Factor Auth	Verification	CPS section 3.3.2 For EV-class certificates	Verified?	Verified
Verification Procedures       identity that is collected and verified by the CA is the requestor's email address. This is checked by sending a random code to the alleged email address. This is checked by sending a random code to the alleged email address specified by the requestor in the on-line certificate request form, then asking the requestor to also enter such code before the certificate request is accepted. The requestor's ability to enter the correct code proves that the specified email address exists and the requestor has access to it.       Verified?         Code Signing Subscriber Verification Pro       CPS section 1.3.3: Certificate Owners or Subscribers are organizations or agencies requesting an SSL. Server certificate or Code Signing certificate and holding the corresponding private key. In particular, with reference to §7.2 of [EVCG]. Actalis issues certificates to following types of organizations: - Private Organization - Government Entity In this CPS, the term "Owner' refers to the entity named "Subject" or "Subscriber" in [BR] and [EVCG]. In all cases the certificate Owner shall be an organization, not a natural person.       Verified?       Verified?         CPS section 1.4: Actalis issues EV and OV Code Signing certs.       Authentication of organization and individual identity is described in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 of the CPS.       CPS section 1.1: The commonName (OID 2.5.4.3) component of the Subject field: for a Code Signing certificate, may contain any string chosen by requestor, provided that it is not misleading about the certificate owner's identity or about the certificate propose       Verified?       Verified?         Multi-Factor Authentication - CPS Section 4.2: The procedure for certificate issuance enforces a "dual control" requirement, in that it always requires two different operat	Verification		Verified?	Verified
Subscriber Verification Pro       agencies requesting an SSL Server certificate or Code Signing certificate and holding the corresponding private key. In particular, with reference to \$7.2 of [EVCG]. Actalis issues certificates to following types of organizations: - Private Organization - Government Entity In this CPS, the term "Owner" refers to the entity named "Subject" or "Subscriber" in [BR] and [EVCG]. In all cases the certificate Owner shall be an organization, not a natural person.         CPS section 1.4: Actalis issues EV and OV Code Signing certs.         Authentication of organization and individual identity is described in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 of the CPS.         CPS section 3.1.1: The commonName (OID 2.5.4.3) component of the Subject field: - for a Code Signing certificate, may contain any string chosen by requestor, provided that it is not misleading about the certificate owner's identity or about the certificate purpose       Verified?       Verified?         Multi-Factor Authentication - RA operator (RAO) - CA operator (CAO) For performing the operations listed above, the RAO logs on to Actalis' CA system by means of a strong (i.e. two-factor) authentication.       Verified?       Verified?	Verification	identity that is collected and verified by the CA is the requestor's email address. This is checked by sending a random code to the alleged email address specified by the requestor in the on-line certificate request form, then asking the requestor to also enter such code before the certificate request is accepted. The requestor's ability to enter the correct code proves that the specified email address exists and the requestor has access to it. No other attributes (e.g. name, surname, affiliation, etc.) are collected or	Verified?	Verified
Authentication       control" requirement, in that it always requires two different operators to be completed:         - RA operator (RAO)       - CA operator (CAO)         For performing the operations listed above, the RAO logs on to Actalis'         CA system by means of a strong (i.e. two-factor) authentication.	Subscriber	<ul> <li>agencies requesting an SSL Server certificate or Code Signing certificate and holding the corresponding private key. In particular, with reference to §7.2 of [EVCG], Actalis issues certificates to following types of organizations:</li> <li>Private Organization</li> <li>Government Entity</li> <li>In this CPS, the term "Owner" refers to the entity named "Subject" or "Subscriber" in [BR] and [EVCG].</li> <li>In all cases the certificate Owner shall be an organization, not a natural person.</li> <li>CPS section 1.4: Actalis issues EV and OV Code Signing certs.</li> <li>Authentication of organization and individual identity is described in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 of the CPS.</li> <li>CPS section 3.1.1: The commonName (OID 2.5.4.3) component of the Subject field:</li> <li>for a Code Signing certificate, may contain any string chosen by requestor, provided that it is not misleading about the certificate owner's</li> </ul>	Verified?	Verified
Network Security CPS section 6 Verified? Verified		control" requirement, in that it always requires two different operators to be completed: - RA operator (RAO) - CA operator (CAO) For performing the operations listed above, the RAO logs on to Actalis'	Verified?	Verified
	Network Security	CPS section 6	Verified?	Verified

## Link to Publicly Disclosed and Audited subordinate CA Certificates

Publicly Disclosed & http://www.actalis.it/area-download.aspx Audited subCAs

vermed? Verme