

# Browser vulnerability to Superfish

*A fact-finding trip to Best Buy*


Summary:

- Superfish performs HTTP MitM for IE, Chrome, and Firefox
- Superfish performs HTTPS MitM for IE and Chrome
- Superfish appears to **not** perform MitM on HTTPS connections from Firefox
- The Superfish proxy accepts its own certificate, so now that the private key has been leaked, an **attacker can mimic an arbitrary site in Chrome and IE**

I wanted to see how Superfish affects Firefox and other browsers, but needed an affected device. So I headed down to Best Buy and tested things out on their display unit, a Lenovo Yoga 2 11 Touch (YOGA2 11-59401972, Best Buy SKU 3297045).





When I started, the unit appeared to be cleanly initialized demo machine state. The only browser installed was Internet Explorer. So the first test I did was to verify that the Superfish certificate was present in the certificate manager and showed up when loading "<https://www.google.com/>". Check, and check.




(But hey, on the plus side, they're only using a 3-month cert!)

I then used IE to download Firefox, and installed it. (Note that this means that Superfish had access to Firefox as it was downloaded.) On loading "<https://www.google.com/>" with Firefox, the certificate UI showed the normal chain for Google -- no Superfish. Likewise, looking at the list of trusted in roots showed no Superfish cert, and the add-ons screen showed no addons.


(Of course, depending on how conspiracy theory / inception you want to get here, it's possible that Superfish rewrote the Firefox UI to hide their tracks. But given that they didn't with Chrome or IE, this seems improbable.)








When I then went to download Chrome, I accidentally entered “<http://google.com/chrome>”, not “https”. Due to the slow network at Best Buy, I was able to see status bar message “Connection to best-deals-products.com” -- a domain used by Superfish. So Superfish is injecting into HTTP. (I did not check the proxy settings to see if this was being done via configuration or intercept, but given the HTTPS exception, I suspect intercept.)



Going back to the HTTPS version of the Chrome site, I downloaded Chrome; however, since Chrome uses a custom downloader, it was probably available to Superfish as well. I performed

the same test with Chrome as with IE, and got the same results. So Chrome is affected over HTTPS.



I did not directly verify HTTP interference in IE and Chrome, but I assume if they're doing to Firefox, they're also doing it to IE and Chrome.

One critical question is whether an attacker can exploit the presence of the Superfish root to masquerade as an arbitrary website, now that the private key has been extracted and published. After all, given that Superfish software is a MitM in HTTPS transactions, they could be good citizens and not accept their root for the WAN-side transaction. Unfortunately, Superfish do not appear to be good citizens. The IE on a Superfish platform happily loads "<https://canibesuperphished.com/>", which uses a cert under the Superfish root. Firefox chokes (sec\_error\_unknown\_issuer).

